Holding

Section 319 CrPC is an extraordinary power that may be exercised only when the court is satisfied of strong suspicion based on convincing evidence, not merely on the informant’s statement; therefore the order summoning the appellants was invalid.

Summary

The appellants were summoned as additional accused in a murder trial under Section 319 of the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC) solely on the basis of the first informant’s statement. The trial court allowed the application, and the High Court dismissed the appellants’ revision, prompting a criminal appeal before the Supreme Court. The Court examined whether Section 319, an extraordinary power, can be exercised on mere ipse‑dixit or prima‑facie material and what evidentiary standard must be satisfied. It held that the power must be exercised sparingly, requiring strong suspicion and convincing evidence that would likely lead to conviction, not merely the informant’s allegation. Consequently, the order summoning the appellants was set aside and the matter remitted to the Sessions Judge for fresh consideration. The appeal was allowed.

Issues considered

Whether an order under Section 319 CrPC can be passed solely on the basis of a first informant’s statement without further corroboration.
What standard of evidence and test must be applied when exercising the extraordinary power under Section 319 CrPC.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 190, s. 193, s. 209, s. 227, s. 319
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 148, s. 149, s. 302

Subjects

Section 319 CrPCextraordinary jurisdictionsummoning additional accusedevidentiary standardcriminal proceduremurder trialappellate review

Judgment

[2009] 8 $.C.R. 762

A SARBJIT SINGH & ANR.
V.
STATE OF PUNJAB & ANR.
(Criminal Appeal No. 998 of 2009 etc.)
MAY 12, 2009
B
[S.B. SINHA AND P. SATHASIVAM, JJ.]

C.Jde of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - s. 319 -
Applicability - Scope of - Held: the provision provides.
C extraordinary power to court - Such power should be exercised
sparingly only in extraordinary cases - While exercising it, .
court to apply stringent test.

During trial of a murder case, on the basis of th~
0 statement of first informant, an application u/s. 319 CrPQ
was filed for summoning the appellants, and the same
was allowed by trial court. Revision before High Court
was dismissed. Hence the present appeal.

Allowing the appeal, the Court
E
HELD: 1. The provision of Section 319 CrPC, on a
plain reading, provides that such an extraordinary case
has been made out, must appear to the court. Before an
additional accused can be summoned for standing trial,
F the nature of the evidence should be such which would
make out grounds for exercise of extraordinary power.
The materials brought before the court must also be such
which would satisfy the court that it is one of those cases
where its jurisdiction should be exercised sparingly.
G [Para 17] [744-E-G]

2. An order u/s. 319 CrPC, should not be passed only
because the first informant or one of the witnesses seeks
to implicate other person(s). Sufficient and cogent

H 762
SARBJIT SINGH & ANR. v. STATE OF PUNJAB & 763
ANR.
-.
reasons are required to be assigned by the court so as A
to satisfy the ingredients of the provisions. Mere ipse dixit
would not serve the purpose. Such an evidence must be
convincing one, at least for the purpose of exercise of the
extraQrdinary jurisdiction. [Para 17] [775-8-C]
B
3. The courts are required to apply stringent tests;
.., • one of the tests being whether evidence on record is
such which would reasonably lead to conviction of the
person sought to be summoned. Mere existence of a
prima facie case may not serve the purpose. Different
standards are required to be applied at different stages.
c
Whereas the test of prima facie case may be sufficient for
taking cognizance of an offence at the stage of framing
of charge, the court must be satisfied that there exists a
~~f0!19 suspicion. While framing charge in terms of
Section 227 CrPC, the court must consider the entire D
materials on record to form an opinion that the evidence
if unrebutted would lead to a judgment of conviction. A
higher standard should be set up for the purpose of
invoking the jurisdiction u/s. 319 CrPC. Unless a higher
standard for the purpose of forming an opinion to E
summon a person as an additional accused is laid down,
:,; the ingredients thereof, viz., (i) an extraordinary case and
... (ii) a case for SPi.lringly exercise of jurisdiction, would not
be satisfied. [Paras 17 and 18] [775-D-H; 776-A]
F
Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Ram Kishan Rastogi
(1983) 1 SCC 1; Shashikant Singh v. Tarkeshwar Singh
(2002) 5 SCC 738; Mohd. Shafi v. Mohd. Rafiq and Anr. 2007
(5) SCALE 611; Lal Suraj @ Suraj Singh and Anr. v. State
of Jharkhand 2008 (16) SCALE 276 and Y. Saraba Reddy
G
_;ii· .; v. Puthur Rami Reddy and Anr. JT 2007 (6) SC 460, relied
on

Rakesh v. State of Haryana (2001) 6 SCC 248; Ranjit
Singh v. State of Punjab (1998) 7 SCC 149; Lok Pal v. Nihal
H
764 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 8 S.C.R.

·-
A Singh (2006) 10 SCC 192; Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab
and Ors. JT 2008 (12) SC 7 and Bholu Ram v. State of Punjab
and Anr. JT 2008 (9) SC 504, referred to

Case Law Reference:
B (1983) 1 sec 1 Relied on Para 12
(2002) 5 sec 738 Relied on Para 13 • ...
(2001) 6 sec 248 Referred to Para 13
(1998) 1 sec 149 Referred to Para 13
c
(2oos) 1o sec 192 Referred to Para 13
;:
2007 (5) SCALE 611 Relied on Para 13
2008 (16) SCALE 276 Relied on Para 13 •
D
JT 2008 (12) SC 7 Referred to Para 14
JT 2008 (9) SC 504 Referred to Para 14
JT 2007 (6) SC 460 Relied on Para 17
E CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION; Criminal Appeal
No. 998 of 2009.
..:_

From the Judgment & Order dated 12.10.2006 of the High •
Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in Criminal Rev. No.
F 2073 of 2006
WITH

Crl. A. No. 999 of 2009.

G Jasbir Singh Malik, S.C. Verma (for S.K. Sabharwal), S.C.
Verma (for Kamakshi S. Mehhwal) A.K. Mehta (for Kuldip ) ·-
Singh) Sudhir Walia (for Mahinder Singh Dahiya) for the
appearing parties.

H
SARBJIT SINGH & ANR. v. STATE OF PUNJAB & 765
ANR.
~
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by A

S.B. SINHA, J. 1. Leave granted.

2. Interpretation and/ or application of the provisions of
Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short
"the Code") is in question in these appeals. They arise out of B
a judgment and order dated 12.10.2006 passed by a learned
Single Judge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Crt. Rev.
No. 2073 of 2006 dismissing the revision petition filed by the
appellants herein from an order dated 28.09.2006 passed by
the Additional Sessions Judge, Gurdaspur whereby application c
of prosecution under Section 319 of the Code was allowed and
the appellants were summoned to face trial for offences under
r:(
• Section 148/302 read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal
Code.
• D
3. A First Information Report was lodged by Balwant Singh
(PW-1) alleging that while working on the fields at about 11.30
a.m. on 02.05.2005, he found Rajwinder Singh alias Raju being
surrounded by the accused. He was attacked by them by their
respective weapons in their hands, till they became sure of his E
death. After the accused left the place of occurrence, PW-1
went.near Raju and made him drink water. Sarabjit Singh and
'~
· Saroop Singh, appellants herein, while standing near the
... village, shouted that Raju had not died whereupon Gurdip Singh,
appellant in Criminal Appeal arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.19 of
F
2007, Hira Singh and Bhagwant Masih again came near him
and caused further physical inju~ies to him. They thereafter fled
away.

4. Contention of the accused, however, in that case is that
the deceased Raju was a vagabond having numerous criminal G
~-~ . cases registered against him and a large number of
proceedings were initiated. He was catched by a mob of
villagers being fed up with his activities. Allegations against the
appellants have been levelled because of political rivalry.
H
766 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2009] 8 S.C.R.

•,
A 5. The investigating officer upon completion of the
investigation filed a chargesheet against ten persons and filed
a final report against the appellants herein. The accused
persons were standing their trial.

6. Before the learned Sessions Judge, Balwant Singh
B
(PW-1) was examined. He repeated the allegations contained
in the First Information Report.

7. Relying only on or on the basis of the said statements
made by PW-1, an application for summoning the appellants
c in terms of Section 319 of the Code was filed.

8. On the basis of the said statements alone, the
application filed by the first informant under Section 319 of the
Code was allowed, stating:
D "7. In view of the specific attribution to Gurdip Singh,
Sarabjit Singh and Sarup Singh, it is prima facie
established that they were members of an unlawful
assembly having the common object to kill Rajwinder Singh
and they are liable to face the trial u/s 148, 302 read with
E Section 149 l.P.C. Hence, accused Gurdip Singh son of
Sohan Singh, Sarabjit Singh son of Nazir Singh and Sarup
Singh son of Mohan Singh, residents of village Kaile Kalan
be summoned through non-bailable warrant, of arrest for ....
17.10.06 to face trial u/s 148, 302 read with Section 149
F l.P.C. alongwith the other accused. Singh accused
Gurpreet Singh alias Gopi is already facing the trial,
therefore, there is no need to issue process against him.
With this, the application u/s 319 Cr. P.C. is disposed of
accordingly. Papers be attached with the trial file."
G
As indicated hereinbefore, appellants' revision application
t • ,
thereagainst before the High Court was dismissed.

9. Mr. Jasbir Singh Malik, learned counsel appearing on
behalf of the appellants, would contend that the power of a court
H under Section 319 of the Code being exceptional in nature, the
SARBJIT SINGH & ANR. v. STATE OF PUNJAB & 767
ANR. [S.B. SINHA, J.]
.. courts below must be held to have committed a manifest error A
in summoning the appellants for standing trial as additional
accused although they were found to be innocent during
~ investigation.

10. Mr. AK. Mehta, learned counsel appearing on behalf
B
of respondents, on the other hand, supported the impugned
judgment.

11. Section 319 of the Code reads as under:

"319. Power to proceed against other persons appearing c
to be guilty of offence.-(1) Where, in the course of any
inquiry into, or trial of, an offence, it appears from the
evidence that any person not being the accused has
committed any offence for which such person could be tried
together with the accused, the Court may proceed against D
i • such person for the offence which he appears to have
committed.

(2) Where such person is not attending the Court he may
~
be arrested or summoned, as the circumstances of the
,. case may require, for the purpose aforesaid. E

(3) Any person attending the Court although not under
"' arrest or upon a summons, may be detained by such court
for the purpose of the inquiry into, or trial of, the offence
" which he appears to have committed. F
(4) Where the Court proceeds against any person under
Sub-section (1) then-

(a) the proceedings in respect of such person shall be
commenced afresh, and witnesses re-heard; G

... .+ (b) subject to the provisions of Clause (a), the case may
proceed as if such person had been an accused person
when the Court took cognizance of the offence upon which
the inquiry or trial was commenced." H
768 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009) 8 S.C.R.

A 12. The extent of the power of a Sessions Judge to
summon persons other than the accused to stand trial in a
pending case came up for consideration before this Court in
Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Ram Kishan Rastogi
[(1983) 1 SCC 1]. Therein, this Court while holding that the
B provision confers a discretionary jurl:.;diction on the court added
"this is really an extraordinary power which is conferred on the
Court and should be used very sparingly and only if compelling
reasons exist for taking cognizance against the other person
against whom action has not been taken".
c 13. Interpretation of the aforementioned provision, in the
light of the said decision, came up for consideration before
various courts from time to time. We may take note of some of
them.

D In Shashikant Singh v. Tarkeshwar Singh [(2002) 5 SCC
738], this Court held:

"9. The intention of the provision here is that where in the
course of any enquiry into, or trial of, an offence, it appears
to the court from the evidence that any person not being
E the accused has committed any offence, the court may .
proceed against him for the offence which he appears to
have committed. At that stage, the court would consider
that such a person could be tried together with the accused
who is already before the court facing the trial. The
•
-
F safeguard provided in respect of such person is that, the
proceedings right from the beginning have mandatorily to
be commenced afresh and the witnesses reheard. In short,
there has to be a de novo trial against him. The provision
of de novo trial is mandatory. It vitally affects the rights of
G a person so brought before the court. It would not be
sufficient to only tender the witnesses for the cross- ' ..
examination of such a person. They have to be examined
afresh. Fresh examination-in-chief and not only their
presentation for the purpose of the cross-examination of
H the newly added accused is the mandate of Section
SARBJIT SINGH & ANR. v. STATE OF PUNJAB & 769
ANR. [S.8. SINHA, J.]

319(4). The words "could be tried together with the A
accused" in Section 319(1), appear to be only directory.
"Could be" cannot under these circumstances be held to
be "must be". The provision cannot be interpreted to mean
that since the trial in respect of a person who was before
the court has concluded with the result that the newly added B
person cannot be tried together with the accused who was
• before the court when order under Section 319(1) was
passed, the order would become ineffective and
inoperative, nullifying the opinion earlier formed by the court
on the basis of the evidence before it that the newly added c
person appears to have committed the offence resulting
in an order for his being brought before the court."

It was furthermore held:

"14. A Magistrate is empowered to take cognizance of an D
offence in the manner provided under Section 190 of the
Code. Section 209 enjoins upon a Magistrate to commit
the case to the Court of Session when it appears to the
Magistrate that the offence is triable exclusively by the
Court of Session. Section 193 provides for the power of E
the Court of Session to take cognizance of any offence. It
uses the expression "cognizance of any offence" and not
that of "offender". These three provisions read with Section
319 make it clear that the words "could be tried together
with the accused" in Section 319 are only for the purpose F
of finding out whether such a person could be 'put on trial
for the offence ... "

In Rakesh v. State of Haryana [(2001) 6 SCC 248], this
Court held:
G
"13. Hence, it is difficult to accept the contention ofthe
learned counsel for the appellants that the term "evidence"
as used in Section 319 of the Criminal Procedure Code
would mean evidence which is tested by cross-
examination. The question of testing the evidence by H
770 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 8 S.C.R.

A cross-examination would arise only after addition of the
accused. There is no question of cross-examining the
witness prior to adding such person as accused. The
section does not contemplate an additional stage of first
summoning the person and giving him an opportunity of
B cross-examining the witness who has deposed against
him and thereafter deciding whether such person is to be
added as accused or not. The word "evidence" occurring
in sub-section (1) is used in a comprehensive and broad
sense which would also include the material collected by
c the investigating officer and the material or evidence which
comes before the court and from which the court can
prima facie conclude that the person not arraigned before
it is involved in the commission of the crime."

In Ranjit Singh v. State of Punjab [(1998) 7 SCC 149],
D this Court opined:

"20. Thus, once the Sessions Court takes cognizance of
the offence pursuant to the committal order, the only other
stage when the court is empowered to add any other
E person to the array of the accused is after reaching
evidence collection when powers under Section 319 of the
Code can be il')voked. We are unable to find any other
power for the Sessions Court to permit addition of new
person or persons to the array of the accused. Of course
F it is not necessary for the court to wait until the entire
evidence is collected for exercising the said powers.
21. But then one more question may survive. In a situation
where the Sessions Judge notices from the materials
produced but before any evidence is taken, that any other
G person should also have necessarily been made an
accused (without which the framing of the charge would be
defective or that it might lead to a miscarriage of justice),
is the Sessions Court completely powerless to deal with
such a contingency? One such situation is cited by the
H learned Judges through an illustration narrated in Kishun
SARBJIT SINGH & ANR. v. STATE OF PUNJAB & 771
ANR. [S.B. SINHA, J.]

Singh case1 as follows: (SCC pp. 29-30, para 15) A

"[W]here two persons A and B attack and kill X and it is
found from the material placed before the Judge that the
fatal blow was given by A whereas the blow inflicted by B
had fallen on a non-vital part of the body of X. If A is not B
challaned by the police, the Judge may find it difficult to
• charge B for the murder of X with the aid of Section 34
IPC. If he cannot summon A, how does. he frame the
charge against B?"

22. Another instance can be this. All the materials c
produced by the investigating agency would clearly show
the positive involvement of a person who was not shown
in the array of the accused due to some inadvertence or
omission. Should the court wait until evidence is collected
to get that person arraigned in the case? D
23. Though such situations may arise only in extremely rare
cases, the Sessions Court is not altogether powerless to
deal with such situations to prevent a miscarriage of justice.
It is then open to the Sessions Court to send a report to E
the High Court detailing the situation so that the High Court
... can in its inherent powers or revisional powers direct the
committing Magistrate to rectify the committal order by
•
issuing process to such left-out accused. But we hasten
to add that the said procedure need be resorted to only
F
for rectifying or correcting such grave mistakes.
This Court in Lok Pal v. Nihal Singh ((2006) 10 SCC 192]
observed:

"... The court, while examining an application under Section G
J, " 319 of the Code, has also to bearin mind that there is no
compelling duty on the court to proceed against other
persons. In a nutshell, for exercise of discretion under
Section 319 of the Code all relevant factors, including
those noticed above, have to be kept in view and an order H
772 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 8 S.C.R.

A is not required to be made mechanically merely on the
ground that some evidence had come on record
implicating the person sought to be added as an accused.

It was furthermore observed:
B "19. In these circumstances, therefore, if the prosecution
can at any stage produce evidence which satisfies the court
that the other accused or those who have not been arrayed
as accused against whom proceedings have been
• -
quashed have also committed the offence the court can
c take cognizance against them and try them along with the
other accused. But, we would hasten to add that this is
really an extraordinary power which is conferred on the
court and should be used very sparingly and only if
compelling reasons exist for taking cognizance against the
D other person against whom action has not been taken ... •

In Mohd. Shafi v. Mohd. Rafiq & Anr. [2007 (5) SCALE
611], this Court held:

"7. Before, thus, a trial court seeks to take recourse to the
E said provision, the requisite ingredients therefore must be
fulfilled. Commission of an offence by a person not facing ...:
trial, must, therefore, appears to the court concerned. It
cannot be ipse dixit on the part of the court. Discretion in
this behalf must be judicially exercised. It is incumbent that
F the court must arrive at its satisfaction in this behalf.
*** *** ***

12. The Trial Judge, as noticed by us, in terms of Section
319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was required to
G arrive at his satisfaction. If he thought that the matter should
receive his due consideration only after the cross-
examination of the witnesses is over, no exception thereto
could be taken far less at the instance of a witness and
when the State was not aggrieved by the same."
H
SARBJIT SINGH & ANR. v. STATE OF PUNJAB & 773
ANR. [S.B. SINHA, J.]

The decision of this Court in Mohd. Shafi (supra), however, A
has been explained in Lal Suraj @ Suraj Singh and Anr. v.
State of Jharkhand [2008 (16) SCALE 276], stating:

"... The principle of strong suspicion may be a criterion at
the stage of framing of charge as all the materials brought B
during investigation were required to be taken into
consideration, but, for the purpose of summoning a person,
who did not figure as accused, a different legal principle
J
is required to be applied. A court framing a charge would
have before it all the materials on record which were
required to be proved by the prosecution. In a case where,
c
however, the court exercises its jurisdiction under Section
319 of the Code, the power has to be exercised on the
basis of the fresh evidence brought before the court. There
lies a fine but clear distinction."
D
• 14. Our attention, however, has been drawn to a Two-
Judge Bench decision of this Court in Hardeep Singh v. State
of Punjab & Ors. [JT 2008 (12) SC 7] wherein doubting the
correctness of Mohd. Shafi (supra), two questions have been
referred to a larger Bench, which are as under: E
"(1) When the power under Sub-section (1) of Section 319
of the Code of addition of accused can be exercised by a
,., Court? Whether application under Section 319 is not
, maintainable unless the cross-examination of the witness
F
is complete?

(2) What is the test and what are the guidelines of
exercising power under Sub-section (1) of Section 319 of
the Code? Whether such power can be exercised only if
the Court is satisfied that the accused summoned in all G
likelihood would be convicted?"
,. .. Mr. Mehta would also draw our attention to Bholu Ram v.
State of Punjab & Anr. [JT 2008 (9) SC 504].
Whereas Hardeep Singh (supra) is not a judgment in that H
774 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 8 S.C.R.

A sense of the term; in Bholu Ram (supra) the principal question
which arose for consideration of this Court was as to whether
an order passed under Section 319 of the Code can be
recalled which was answered in the negative.

15. For the purpose of this case, it is not necessary to
8
proceed on the basis that the decision in Mohd. Shafi (supra)
should be applied in all fours.

16. We have noticed hereinbefore that Mohd. Shafi
(supra) has been explained in Lal Suraj (supra) holding that a
C power under Section 319 of the Code can be exercised only
on the basis of fresh evidence brought before it and not on the
basis of the materials which had been collected during
investigation particularly when a final form was submitted and
the same had been accepted by the Magistrate concerned.
D There is no gainsaying that the power under Section 319 of the
Code is an extraordina(y power which in terms of the decision
of this Court in Municipal Corporation of Delhi (supra) is
required to be exercised sparingly and if compelling reasons
exist for taking cognizance against whom action has not been
E taken.
17. The provision of Section 319 of the Code, on a plain
reading, provides that such an extraordinary case has been
made out must appear to the court. Has the criterion laid down ..
by this Court in Municipal Corporation of Delhi (supra) been
F satisfied is the question? Indisputably, before an additional
accused can be summoned for standing trial, the nature of the
evidence should be such which would make out grounds for
exercise of extraordinary power. The materials brought before
the court must also be such which would satisfy the court that it
G is one of those cases where its jurisdiction should be exercised
sparingly.

We may notice that in Y. Saraba Reddy v. Puthur Rami
Reddy and Anr. [JT 2007 (6) SC 460], this Court opined:
H
SARBJIT SINGH & ANR. v. STATE OF PUNJAB & 775
ANR. [S.B. SINHA, J.]

"... Undisputedly, it is an extraordinary power which is A
conferred on the Court and should be used very sparingly
and only if compelling reasons exist for taking action
against a person against whom action had not been taken
earlier. The word "evidence" in Section 319 contemplates
that evidence of witnesses given in Court .. " B
An order under Section 319 of the Code, therefore, should
not be passed only because the first informant or one of the
" witnesses seeks to implicate other person(s). Sufficient and
cogent reasons are required to be assigned by the court so
as to satisfy the ingredients of the provisi9ns. Mere ipse dixit
c
would not serve the purpose. Such an evidence must be
convincing one at least for the purpose of exercise of the
extraordinary jurisdiction.

For the aforementioned purpose, the courts are required D
.. to apply stringent tests; one of the tests being whether evidence
on record is such which would reasonably lead to conviction of
the person sought to be summoned.

18. The observation of this Court in Municipal Corporation
E
of Delhi (supra) and other decisions following the same is that
mere existence of a prima facie case may not serve the
purpose. Different standards are required to be applied at
different stages. Whereas the test of prima facie case may be
sufficient for taking cognizance of an offence at the stage of
framing of charge, the court must be satisfied that there exists F
a strong suspicion. While framing charge in terms of Section
227 of the Code, the court must consider the entire materials
on record to form an opinion that the evidence if unrebutted
would lead to a judgment of conviction. Whether a higher
standard be set up for the purpose of invoking the jurisdiction G
under Section 319 of the Code is the question. The answer to
;. . these questions should be rendered in the affirmative. Unless
. a higher standard for the purpose of forming an opinion to
summon a person as an additional accused is laid down, the
ingredients thereof, viz., (i) an extraordinary case and (ii) a case H
776 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 8 S.C.R.

A for sparingly exercise of jurisdiction, would not be satisfied.

19. We, therefore, are of the opinion that the impugned
judgment cannot be sustained which is set aside accordingly
and the matter is remitted to the learned Sessions Judge for
consideration of the matter afresh.
8
20. The appeals are allowed with the aforementioned
directions.

K~K.T. Appeals allowed.

•

. ,,