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Supreme Court of India

SARGUJA TRANSPORT SERVICEversusSTATE TRANSPORT APPELLATE TRIBUNAL, M.P., GWALIOR AND OTHERS

Citation
1986 INSC 233
Decided
12 November 1986
Disposal
Dismissed

Holding

A petitioner who withdraws a writ petition under Articles 226/227 without permission to file a fresh petition is deemed to have abandoned the remedy and is precluded from filing another writ petition on the same cause of action.

Summary

The petitioners, Sarguja Transport Service, obtained a transport permit which was later set aside by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal. They filed a writ petition (M.P. No. 2945/85) under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution, which the High Court allowed them to withdraw and dismissed as withdrawn. Subsequently they filed a second writ petition (M.P. No. 188/86) challenging the same order. The High Court dismissed the second petition, holding that because the first petition was withdrawn without permission to file a fresh petition, a fresh writ could not be entertained. The petitioners appealed to the Supreme Court, contending that the earlier withdrawal was not a bar since the petition had not been decided on merits. The Supreme Court held that withdrawal of a writ petition without the Court’s permission amounts to abandonment of the remedy and, by extending the principle of Rule I, Order XXIII of the CPC, bars the filing of another writ on the same subject matter. The Court dismissed the Special Leave Petition, affirming the High Court’s decision.

Issues considered

  • Whether a writ petition withdrawn without the High Court’s permission to file a fresh petition bars the filing of a subsequent writ petition on the same subject matter.
  • Whether the principle underlying Rule I, Order XXIII of the CPC, which precludes a fresh suit after an unpermitted withdrawal, should be extended to writ petitions under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution.

Legislation cited

Subjects

writ petitionwithdrawalArt.226Art.227CPC Order XXIII Rule Ipublic policyres judicataspecial leave petitiontransport permitabandonment

Judgment

                     SARGUJA TRANSPORT SERVICE
A                                         V.
         STATE TRANSPORT APPELLATE TRIBUNAL, M.P.,
                   GWALIOR AND OTHERS

                             NOVEMBER 12. 1986
B
            [E.S. VENKATARAMIAH AND M.M. DUTT, JJ.]

          Constitution of India, 1950: Articles 21, 32, 226 & 227-Writ                  1--
    Petition withdrawn without permission to file a fresh petition-Effect
    of-Petitioner whether precluded from filing any fresh petition/suit in
    respect of the same subject matter.
c                                                                                   1
           Civil Procedure Code, 1908: Order XXlll, Rule I-Applicability'
    of to cases of withdrawal of writ petitions.

        Sub-rule (I) of rule I, Order XXIII of the Code of Civil Procedure
D permits a plaintiff to abandon his suit against .all or any of the de-
  fendants at any time after the institution of the suit; sub-rule (3) lays
  down that where the court is satisfied (a) that a suit must fail by reason
  of some formal defect, or (b) that there are sufficient grounds for allow-
  ing the plaintiff to institute a fresh suit for the subject matter of the suit,
  it may grant permission to him to withdraw from such suit with liberty
E to institute a fresh suit, while sub-rule (4) provides that where the
  plaintiff abandons any suit under sub-rule ( 1) or withdraws from it
  without the permission referred to in sub-rule (3), he shall be precluded
  from instituting any fresh suit in respect of such subject matter.

        The provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 are not in
F terms applicable to the writ proceedings. However, the procedure pre-




                                                                                    1
  scribed, therein, as far as it can be made applicable, is followed by the
  High Court in disposing of the writ petitions.                            ,

        The petitioner withdrew its earlier writ petition filed under Art.
  226/227 of the Constitution without permission of the Court to file a
G fresh petition. Later on it filed another writ petition against the order
  assailed in the first petition. The High Court summarily dismissed it
  laking the view that no second writ petition lies against the same order
  where the earlier petition was not withdrawn with permission to file a
  fresh petition.

H         In this petition· for special leave it was contended that since the

                                        200
                                         SARGUJA T.S. v. S.T.A.T.                        20 l

;..      .       High Court had not decided the earlier petition on merits but had only         A
      ""-.       permitted the petitioner to withdraw it the withdrawal could not be
                 treated as a bar to the subsequent writ petition.

                        On the question: Whether a petitioner after withdrawing a writ
                 petition filed by him in the High Court under Art. 226/227 of the Con-
                 stitution without permission to institute a fresh petition can file a fresh    B
                 writ petition in the High Court under these Articles, and whether it
                 would advance the ca'!5e of justice if the principle underlying rule I,
                 Order XXIII of the Code of Civil Procedure is adopted in respect of the
                 writ petitions under these Articles.
~·
                       Dismissing the special leave petition, the Court,                        c
                         HELD: l. The High Court was right in holding that a fresh peti-
                 tion was not maintainable before it in respect of the same subject matter
                 since the earlier writ petition had been withdrawn without permiS.ion
                 lo file a fresh petition. [108D]
                                                                                                D
                       2.1 The principle underlying rule I, Order XXIII of the Code of
                 Civil Procedure that when a plaintiff once institutes a suit in a Court
                 a'1d thereby avails of a remedy given to him under law, he cannot be
                 permitted lo institute a fresh suit in respect of the same subject matter
                 again after abandoning the earlier suit or by withdrawing ii without the
                 permission of the Court to file fresh suit. should be extended in the          E
                 interest of justice on the ground of public policy to cases of withdrawal
                 of writ petition also. [206D, 208A]

-                      2.2 ln\'ito he.nefi.ciunz nbn datur. The law confers upon a man no
                 rights or benefits which he does not desire. Whoever waives, abandons

         !
             ~   or disclaims a right )Vould loose it. [206E]                                   F

                        2.3 Where a petitioner withdraws a writ petition filed by him in
                 the High Court under Art. 226/217 without permission to institute a
                 fresh petition he should be deemed lo ha.e abandoned the remedy
                 under these Articles in respect of the cause of action relied on in the writ
                 petition and barred from filing a fresh petition. [207H, 208C]                 G

                       3. I The principle embodied in rule I, Order XXllI of the Code is
 ·)-             founded on public policy. It is not the same as the rule of res judicata
     '           contained in s. I ! of the Code, which applies to a case where the suit or
                 an issue has already been heard and finally decided hy a Court.· In the
                 case of abandonment or withdrawal of a suit, there is no prior adjudica-       H
    202                     SUl'RJ;ME COURT Rel'ORTS           [ 1987] l S.C.R.

                                                                        '
A tion of a suit nor an issue is involved. The plaintiff is precluded from
  instituting any fresh suit in respect of the same subject matter to pre-
  vent the abuse of the proc-ess of the Court. [206G, H, D, 2078)

        3.2 Such.withdrawal would not bar other remedies like a suit or a
  petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution before the Supreme Court in
B a case involving the question of enforcement of fundamental rights since
  such withdrawal does not amount to res j11dirnt11 and there hns been no
  decision on the merits by the High Court. [208C, 207EI

          Daryao and Ors. v. The State of U.I'. and Ors .. [1962) l SCR
    575. referred to.                                                   ·          1'
c
            [A petition involving the personal liberty of an individual in which
    the petitioner prays for the issue of a writ in the nature of hahcas corpus
    or seeks to enforce the fundamental right guaranteed under Art. 2 I of
    the Constitution stands on a different footing altogether. This question
    is left open.] [208E]
D
           CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Special Leave Petition
     (Civil) No. 5665 of 1986

          From the Judgment and Order dated 17. I. 1986 of the Madhya
     Pradesh High Court in Misc. Petition No. !88 of 198fl.
E
           B.P. Singh and Ranjit Kumar for the Petitioner.

           The Order of the Court was delivered by

          VENKATARAMIAH, J. On the expiry of the period of a permit
F   to run a stage carriage on the route Jashpumagar-Ambikapur issued               r",
    under the Motor Vehicles Act. 19.19 (hereinafler referred to as 'the                \
    Act") in favour of the Jan ta Transport Co-operative Society, the                   ·~·
    petitioner and some others filed applications for the grant of the said
    permit before the Regional Transport Authority. Bilaspur. The Janta
    Transport Co-operative Society also made ·an application for the IC·
G   newal of the permit in its favour. The application for renewal filed by
    the Jan ta Transport Co-operative Society was rejected by the Regional
    Transport Authority on the ground that it was barred by time. On a
    consideration of the relative merits of the other applicants. namely.
    the petitioner and others, the Regional Transport Authority granted
    the permit in favour of the petitioner. The said order was challenged in
H   appeal by M/s. Ali Ahmed & Sons-respondent No . .1, which was also
                  SARGUJA T.S. v. S.T.A.T. [VENKATARAMIAH, J.I                 203

          an applicant for the said permit before the State Transport Appellate A
          Tribunal. The other unsuccessful applicants also filed separate appeals
          questioning the grant in favour of the petitioner. The State Transport
          Appellate Tribunal heard all the appeals together. The Tribunal by its
          order dated 19.9.1985 set aside the order granting the permit in favour
          of the petitioner on two grounds, namely, that Mohd. Jhahid Khan,
          the proprietor of the petitioner concern was a practising advocate and B
          that he had ceased to carry on the transport business in his .individual
          capacity and granted the permit in favour of M/s. Ali Ahmyd & Sons.
    ·     Aggrieved by the order of the Tribunal the petitioner filed a writ
    ·(petition in M.P. No. 2945 of 1985 on the file of the High Court of
      · Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur under Articles 226/227 of the Constitu-
        . lion of India. That petition was taken up for hearing on 4. IO. 1985 by
          the High Court. On that day the High Court passed the following
                                                                                   c
          order:-

                   "Shri Y.S. Dharmadhikari, learned counsel for the peti- ·
                   tinner seeks permission to withdraw the petition. He is
                   permitted to do so. The petition is dismissed as withdrawn." D

              Later on the petitioner again filed another writ petition before
        the High Court in M.P. No. 188 of 1986. That petition came up for
        hearing on 17. I. 1986. At the conclusion of the hearing the High Court
        passed the following order:-
                                                                                     E
                   "Shri P.R. Bhave for the petitioner heard orr admi.ssion.

-                  This writ petition is directed against the order of the State
                   Transport Appellate Tribunal setting aside the grant in
                   favour of the petitioner, and instead giving the permit to
                   the respondent No. 3. The petitioner earlier filed writ peti-     F
                   lion No. M.P. No. 2945/85 against the impugned order
                   which was withdrawn on 4. I0.'!985. No second writ petition
                   lies against the same order. The earlier petition was not
                   withdrawn with permission to file a fresh petition. Besides,
                   we do not find any° merit in this petition. The Appellate
                   Tribunal has granted the permit to the respondent No. 3 as        G
                   he has been found superior to the petitioner. Besides, he
                   being a practising lawyer could not be doing the transport
                   business. Similar petition of other operators has already
                   been dismissed by this Court.

                   Accordingly, the petition is dismissed summarily."                H
     204                    SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [ 1987] 1 S.C.R.

A          Aggrieved by the above order rejecting the writ petition at the         v•
                                                                                   .,
     stage of admission. the petitioner has filed the above special leave
     petition requesting the Court to grant the special leave to prefer an
     appeal against the order of the High Court.

           The main contention urged before this Court by the learned
 B   counsel for the petitioner is that the !figh Court was in error in reject-
     ing the writ petition out of which this case arises, on the ground that
     the petitioner had withdrawn the earlier writ petition in which he had
     questioned the order passed by the Tribunal on .J. lO. 1985 without the
     permission of the High Court to file a fresh petition. It is urged by the
     learned counsel that since the High Court had not decided the earlier
C    petition on merits but only had permitted the petitioner to withdraw
     the petition, the withdrawal of the said earlier petition could not have
     been treated as a bar to the subsequent writ petition.

           In this case we are called upon to consider the effect of .the
    withdrawal of the writ petition filed under Articles 226i227 of the
 D Constitution of India without the permission of the High Court to file a
    fresh petition. The provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. 1908
    (hereinaf\er referred to as 'the Code') are not in terms applicable to
    the writ proceedings although the procedure prescribed therein as far
    as it can be made applicable is followed by the High Court in disposing
    of the writ petitions. Rule l of Order XXIII of the Code provides for
E the withdrawal of a suit and the consequences of such withdrawal.
    Prior to its amendment by Act 104 of 1976, rule 1 of Order XXIII of
    the Code providej for two kinds of withdrawal of a suit. namely, (i)
    absolute withdrawal, and (ii) withdrawal with the permission of the
    Court to institute a fresh suit on the same cause of action. The first
                                                                                        -
    category of withdrawal was governed by sub-rule ( 1) thereof. as it
F stood theri, which provided that at any time after the institution of a
   suit the plaintiff might, as against all or any of ihe defendants 'with-
   draw' his suit or abandon a part of his claim. The second category was
   governed by sub-rule (2) thereof which provided that where the Court
   was satisfied (a) that a suit must fail by reason of some formal defect.
   or (b) that there were sufficient grounds for allowing the plaintiff to
G institute a fresh suit for the subject-matter of a suit or part of a claim, it
   might, on such terms as it thought fit. grant the plaintiff permission to
   withdraw from such suit or abandon a part of a claim with liberty to
   institute a fresh suit in respect of the subject-matter of such suit or such
   part of the claim. Sub-rule (3) of the former rule 1 of Order XXIII of
   the Code provided that where the plaintiff withdrew from a suit or
H abandoned a part of a claim without the permission referred to in
                     SARGUJA T.S. v. S.T.A.T (VENKATARAMIAH, J.]                205

          sub-rule (2) he would be liable tq such costs as the Court might award       A
          and would be preclu~ed from instituting any fresh suit in respect of
          such subject-matter or such part of the claim. Since it was considered
          that the use of the word 'withdrawal' in relation to both the categories
          of withdrawals led to confusion, the rule was amended to avoid such
          confusion. The relevant part of rule l of Order XXIII of the Code now
          reads thus:-                                                                 B

                     "Rule L Withdrawal of suit or abandonment of part of
                     claim-(!) At any time after the institution of a suit, the
                     plaintiff may as against all or any of the defendants
-                    abandon his suit or abandon a part of his claim:

                                        ****              . ****              ****
                                                                                       c
                      (3) Where the Court is satisfied-

                          (a) that a suit must fail by reason of some formal de-
                          fect, or                                              ·
                                                                                       D
                          (b) that there are sufficient grounds for allowing the
                          plaintiff to institute a fresh suit for the subject-matter
                          of a suit or part of a claim,

                      it may, on such terms as it thinks fit, grant the plaintiff
                      permission to withdraw from such suit or such part of the E
                      claim with liberty to institute a fresh suit in respect of the
                      subject-matter of such suit or such part of the claim.

-                     ( 4) Where the plaintiff-


    ""·
     .\                   (a) abandons any suit or part of claim under sub-rule F
                          ( l), or
                          (b) withdraws from a suit or part of a claim without the
                          permission referred to in sub-rule (3),

                     he shall be liable for such costs as the Court may award and
                     shall be precluded from instituting any fresh suit in respect G
                     of such subject-matter or such part of the claim."

                It may be noted that while in sub-rule (I) of the former rule l of
          Order XXIII of the Code the words 'withdraw his suit' had been used,
          in sub-rule (I) of the new rule I of Order XXIII of the Code, the words H
          'abandon his suit' are used, The new sub-rule (I) is applicable to a case
    206                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS             (1987] 1 S.C.R.


A   where the Court does not accord pennission to withdraw from a suit or
    such part of the claim with liberty to institute a fresh suit in respect of
    the subject-matter of such suit or such part of the claim. In the new
    sub-rule (3) which corresponds to the fonner sub-rule (2) practically
    f.10 change is made and under that sub-rule the Court is empowered to
    grant subject to the conditions mentioned therein pennission to with-
B   draw from a suit with liberty to institute a fresh suit in respect of the
    subject-matter of such suit. Sub-rule (4) of the new rule l of Order
    XXIII of the Code provides that where the plaintiff abandons any suit
    or part of claim under sub-rule ( l) or withdraws from a suit or part of a
    claim without the pennission referred to in sub-rule (3), he would be
    liable for such costs as the Court might award and would also be
    precluded from instituting any fresh suit in respect of such subject-
c   matter or such part of the claim.

         The Code as it now stands thus makes a distinction between
  'abandonment' of a suit and 'withdrawal' from a suit with pennission
  to file a fresh suit. It provides that where the plaintiff abandons a suit
D or withdraws from a suit without the pennission, referred to in sub-
  rule (3) of rule l of Order XXIII of the Code, he shall be precluded
  from instituting any fresh suit in respect of such subject-matter or such
  part of the claim. The principle underlying rule l of Order XXIII of
  the Code is that. when a plaintiff once institutes a suit in a Court and
  thereby avails of a remedy given to him under law, he cannot be
E permitted to institute a fresh suit in respect of the same subject-matter
  again after abandoning the earlier suit or by withdrawing it without the
  permission of the Court to file fresh suit. lnvito benificium non datur.
  The law confers upon a man no rights or benefits which he does not
  desire. Whoever waives, abandons or disclaims a right will loose it. In
  order to prevent a litigant from abusing the pro"cess of the Court by
F instituting suits again and again on the same cause of action without
  any good "reason the Code insists that he should obtain the pennission
  of the Court to file a fresh suit after establishing either of the two
  grounds mentioned in sub-rule (3) of rule l of Order XXIII. The
  principle underlying the above rule is founded on public policy, but it
  is not the same as the rule of res judicota contained in section l l of the
G Code which provides that no court shall try any suit or issue in which
  the matter directly or su,bstantially in issue has been directly or sub-
  stantially in issue in a fo~er suit between the same parties, or bet-
  ween parties under whom they or any of them claim, litigating under
  the same title, in a Court competent to try such subsequent suit or the
  suit in which such issue has been subsequently raised, and has been
H heard and finally· decided by such Court. The rule of res j11dicata
                          SARGUJA T.S. v. S.T.A.T. IVENKATARAMIAH, J.]                 207

               applies to a case where the suit or an issue has already been heard and        A
               finally decided by a Court. In the case of abandonment or withdrawal
               of a suit without the permission of the Court to file a fresh suit, there is
               no prior adjudication of a suit or an issue is involved, yet the Code
               provides, as stated earlier, that a second suit will not lie in sub-rule (4)
               of rule l of Order XXIIJ of the Code when the first suit is withdrawn
                                                                                              B
     ....      without the permission referred to in sub-rule (3) in order to prevent
               the abuse of the process of the Court.

                    The question for our consideration is whether it would or would
            'f~.not advance the cause of justice if the principle underlying rule     l of
          ( Order XXIII of the Code is adopted in respect of writ petitions filed
               under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India also. It is common         c
              knowledge that very often after a writ petition is heard for some time
              when the petitioner or his counsel finds that the Court is not likely to
              pass an order admitting the petition, request is made by the petitioner
              or by his counsel, to permit the petitioner to withdraw from the writ
              petition without seeking permission to institute .a fresh writ petition. A
              Court which is unwilling to admit the petition would not ordinarily             D
              grant liberty to file a fresh petition while it may just agree to permit the
              withdrawal of the petition. It is plain that when once a writ petition
              filed in a High Court is withdrawn by the petitioner himself -he is
              precluded from filing an appeal against the order passed in the writ
              petition because he cannot be considered as a party aggrieved by the
              order passed by the High" Court. He may as"stated in Daryao and Ors.            E
              v. The State of U. P. and Ors., [ 1962] 2 S.C.R. 575 in a case involving
              the question of enforcement of fundamental rights file a petition be-
-·            fore the Supreme Court under Article 32 ·of the Constitution of India
              because in such a case there has been no decision on the merits by the
       ;..., High Court. The relevant observation of this Court in Daryao 's case
            \(supra) ts to be found at page 593 and it is as follows:                         F

                          "If the petition is dismissed as withdrawn it cannot be a bar
                          to a subsequent petition under Art. 32, because in such a
                          case there has been no decision on the merits by the Court.
                          We wish to make it clear that the conclusions thus reached
                          by us are confined only to the point of res judicata which          G
                          has been argued as a preliminary issue in these writ peti-
                          tions and no other.··

                   The point for consideration is whether a petitioner after with-
              drawing a writ petition filed by him in the High Court under Article
                                                                                              H
              226 of the Constitution of India without the permission to institute a
    208                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS           [1987] 1 S.C.R.

A   fresh petition can file a fresh writ petition in the High Court under that     y-
    Article. On this point the decision in Daryao's case (supra) is of no
    assistance. But we are of the view that the principle underlying rule l
    of Order XXIII of the Code should be extended in the interests of
    administration of justice to cases of withdrawal of writ petition also,
    not on the ground of res judicata but on the ground of public policy as
B   explained above. It would also discourage the litigant from indulging
    in bench-hunting tactics. In any event there is no justifiable reason in     '->•.
    such a case to permit a petitioner to invoke the extraordinary jurisdic-
    tion of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution once
    again. While the withdrawal of a writ petition filed in a High Court _     .
    without permission to file a fresh writ petition may not bar other        1          ~
C   remedies like a suit or a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution
    of India since such withdrawal does not amount to res judicata, the
    remedy under Article 226 of the Con_stitution of India should be             .:.,..
    deemed to have been abandoned by the petitioner in respect of the
    cause of action relied on in the writ petition when he withdraws it
    without such permission. In the instant case the High Court was right
D   in holding that a fresh writ petition was not maintainable before it in
    respect of the same subject-matter since the earlier writ petition had
    been withdrawn without permission to file a fresh petition. We, how-
    ever. make it clear that whatever we have stated in this order may not
    be considered as being applicable to a writ petition involving the
     personal liberty of an individual in which the petitioner prays for the       '-,r--
E   issue of a writ in the nature of habeas corpus or seeks to enforce the
    fundamental right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution
    since such a case stands on a different footing altogether. We. however
    leave this question open.

          Even on merits we do not find any ground to reverse the decision
F   of the High Court. In the result we dismiss the special leave petition.

    P.S.S.
                                                        Petition dismissed.




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