SARJEET SINGH (D) TH. LRS.versusHARI SINGH & ORS.
- Citation
- 2014 INSC 729
- Decided
- 15 October 2014
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Bench
- DIPAK MISRA
Holding
A civil suit for possession of Shami/at deh is not maintainable; such disputes fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Collector under Sections 7, 11 and 13 of the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulations) Act, 1961.
Summary
The appellants, co‑sharers of a Shami/at Patti Sayar (common village land) in village Dahina, filed a civil suit seeking declaration and possession of the land against the respondents. The trial court and the first appellate court decreed in favour of the appellants, granting them possession. The High Court set aside those decrees, holding that the suit was not maintainable under the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulations) Act, 1961 and directing the appellants to seek partition of the joint land. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined whether a civil court can adjudicate disputes concerning Shami/at deh and interpreted Sections 7, 11 and 13 of the Act, concluding that such matters must be ventilated before the Collector and that civil courts lack jurisdiction. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, affirming the High Court’s order and leaving the parties to bear their own costs.
Issues considered
- The suit for declaration and possession of Shami/at deh is maintainable in a civil court under the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulations) Act, 1961.
- Whether Sections 7, 11 and 13 of the Act bar civil courts from entertaining disputes concerning common village lands.
- The appropriate forum for redressal of grievances relating to Shami/at deh – civil court or the Collector.
Legislation cited
Subjects
Judgment
• [2014] 11 S.C.R. 65
SARJEET SINGH (D) TH. LRS.
v.
A
HARi SINGH & ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 9722 of 2014)
OCTOBER 15, 2014
B
[DIPAK MISRA AND VIKRAMAJIT SEN, JJ.]
Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulations) Act, 1961
- Suit for declaration and possession of suit land - Decreed
by trial court as well as first appellate court - High Court in C
second appeal set aside the decree and granted liberty to
plaintiff to seek partition of the land - On appeal, held : The
suit land was 'Shami/at Patti Sayar' i.e. common village land,
Jicenced to the co-sharers - Hence no one including plaintiffs
could have laid claims to separate or individual possession D
thereof.
ss. 7, 11 and 13 - Suit for possession of Shami/at deh
land - Maintainability - Held: Civil court has no jurisdiction
to adjudicate upon the question pertaining to Shami/at deh - E
Appropriate forum for redressal of such grievances, was
Collector - The suit was not maintainable.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
HELD:1. The land in question is admittedly Shami/at F
. Patti Sayar, i.e. common village lands, the user of which
is not confined strictly to cultivation and hence no
person, including the Plaintiffs, could have laid claims to
separate or individual possession thereof. The land in
question was, in fact, licenced to the co-sharers and was G
not their privately owned properties, individually or
severally or collectively. Shami/at deh require to be
carefully and assiduously protected, and this is the
65 H
66 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 11 S.C.R.
A avowed purpose of the Punjab Village Common Lands
•
(Regulation) Act, 1961. [Paras 7, 8 and 9] [74-A-D; 75-B]
2. The suit as framed and filed was not maintainable
in view of the Act. The provisions of Sections 7 and 11
of the Act hav.e been blatantly violated by the Plaintiffs
8
and ignored by the Courts below. It is evident from the
reading of the provisions u/s. 7 and 11 of the Act that
instead of approaching the Civil Court, if the Plaintiffs
had any grievance against the defendants as regards the
C possession of the suit land, they ought to have ventilated
their grievances before the Collector and not before the
Civil Court. Section 13 of the Act makes it clear that the
Civil Courts have no jurisdiction to entertain or adjudicate
upon any question pertaining to shamilat deh. [Paras 9
and 10] [74-F-H; 75-C]
D
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
9722 of 2014.
From the Judgment & Order dated 7.09.2012 of the High
E Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in R.S.A. No. 1346
of 2009.
Shish P., N.P. Midha, S.K. Gupta, Balbir Singh Gupta for
the Appellant.
F Raja! Sharma, Dinesh Verma, Shbhasish Bhowmick for
the Respondent.
The Judgment of the ,Court was delivered by
VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J. Leave granted.
G
1. The Appellants essay to restore the concurrent views
of the Additional Civil Judge (Senior Division) Rewari, in Civil
Suit No.308 of 1997 in terms of the Judgment and Decree
d'3ted 27.8.2002, as also the Judgment and Decree dated
H 11.12.2008 passed by the Additional District Judge, Rewari,
• SARJEET SINGH (D} TH. LRS. v. HARi SINGH 67
[VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J.]
in Civil Appeal No.50 of 2002. Their views, however, did not A
find favour with the High Court in the impugned Judgment dated
7.9.2012 passed in Regular Second Appeal No.1346 of 2009.
2. The parties are shareholders of Shami/at Patti Sayar
of land comprised in Khewat No.300 Khatoni No.551, Khasra
B
No.622(0-10), Gair Mumkin Gatwar, situated in village Dahina,
as per the jamabandi of the year 1970-71. The Plaintiffs/
Appellants filed a suit for declaration, and possession of the
suit land against the Defendants/Respondents. The Plaint does
not contain a categorical stand as to whether the Defendants/
Respondents are co-sharers along with the Plaintiffs/Appellants C
in respect of the suit land. It has been pleaded that the
Defendants have no concern whatsoever with the suit land
which has not been validly partitioned among the co-sharers.
The Written Statement is also devoid of clarity inasmuch as it
is pleaded that the Plaintiffs are not in possession of the suit D
land and have no right to file the suit; but that constructions have
been carried out by the Defendants in the presence of the
Plaintiffs, as well as other persons mentioned in Schedule A
of the Plaint, which contains the names of the co-sharers of the
suit land. It is then pleaded in the Written Statement that the E
suit land was allotted to Hardwari and Mangal and that their
legal heirs had executed an oral transfer of the land in favour
of the Defendants, who became co-sharers to the extent of 31
192 in the Shami/at Patti Sayar, (obviously along with other co-
sharers, including the Plaintiffs). The Defendants have also F
pleaded that the oral transfer took place in 1992 by exchanging
the Defendants' land with that of the legal heirs of Hardwari and
Mangal.
3. Eight Issues were framed of which only the first two, the
onus of which was on the Plaintiffs, were addressed in the G
evidence led by the parties. Issue Nos.3 to 7 were to be proved
by the Defendants which they abandoned altogether. Both
Issues 1 & 2 were decided in favour of the Plaintiffs, i.e. the
Appellants before us. Keeping in perspective the evidence to
H
A
68 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 11 S.C.R.
the effect that the Plaintiffs were co-sharers in the Shami/at Patti
•
Sayar in regard to which the said Hardwari and Mangal had
directly no right, nor were in possession thereof, it was
concluded that the legal heirs of Hardwari and Mangal had no
legal capacity to exchange the suit land. Even in the evidence
B led on behalf of the Defendants, it was the admitted case that
the suit land was in the ownership of Sayar Patti, which are akin
to village or gram sabha lands used for purposes allied to
cultivation, on which land revenue is not imposable, but other
levies are. It has also been conceded in the evidence led on
c behalf of the Defendants that the permission of co-sharers had
not been obtained prior to the alleged exchange of land. After
reviewing the entire evidence, the Trial Court as well as the First
Appellate Court rightly concluded on facts that the possession
of the Defendants was not lawful. However, their direction that
D the Plaintiffs were entitled to take back the possession, it
seems to us, is legally untenable and unsustainable.
4. In the impugned Judgment the High Court has duly
noted the fact that the Defendants' stand that they were co-
sharers ought to have been established by them consequent
E upon an Issue being struck in that regard. Significantly, it was
emphasised that the list of co-sharers attached to the Plaint
included the Plaintiffs as well as the Defendants and that,
therefore, a suit for partition ought to have been filed by the
Plaintiffs even in the face of the averments in the Written
F Statement that the Defendants had a 3/192 share. Confronted
with the concurrent findings of the Trial Court as well as the First
Appellate Court and keeping in perspective the evidence that
was recorded, the High Court framed a substantial question of
law to the effect that since the Defendants were co-sharers,
G could possession of the land be ordered to be delivered to the
Plaintiffs without the Plaintiffs seeking partition of the entire joint
land, including the suit land. Regrettably, while setting aside the
judgment and decree of the Courts below, the High Court has
failed to substantiate it with reasons for doing so. The High
H Court has, however, granted liberty to the Plaintiffs to seek
• SARJEET SINGH (D) TH. LRS. v. HARi SINGH 69
[VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J.]
partition of the suit land and other joint land in accordance with A
law.
5. Abadi deh refers to cultivable lands which are inhabited
by the villagers. These areas, also called phirni, are usually
demarcated on the revenue maps/sharja in red .ink or /a/ dora, B
within which a departure from the prescription of strictly
agricultural user is permitted. As it has been traditionally
conceived of, it is only the cultivators of the adjoining agricultural
lands, along with their family members, who are expected to
reside therein. Lands within /a/ dora or phirni can be used for C
purposes related to agriculture, such as cattle-sheds and
storage halls for straw, manure and waste generated in the
village. Other user is legally impermissible. In some instances,
/al dora lands are more or less converted into an 'urbanised
village' where cultivation of the contiguous land has ceased so
as to enable wider user. As the resident population of the D
village increases, the demand or need for conversion of
agricultural land for residential purposes is achieved by
extendinglincreasing the /a/ dora, hence the term 'extended la/
dora'. In no event can land in the /a/ dora be converted to
commercial user or, arguably, even for residential complexes E
housing persons totally unconnected with the cultivation of the
contiguous lands. This is essential for preserving cultivable rural
lands for agricultural purposes. It is a legal misnomer that
merely because municipal law and building restrictions and
regulations contained therein are not applicable to /a/ dora, any F
and every kind of user or development is permissible. It is this
fallacious understanding of the law that has led to the
mushrooming of illegal land development within the /al dora.
'Shami/at' connotes commonality of possession, in
contradistinction to ownership individually or severally. Shami/at G
deh are common or village lands. Banjar in common parlance
means fallow or barren or unproductive hence shamilat banjar
- common uncultivable lands and banjar qadim - common/
village lands left fallow for a long period. Patti/Pati has various
contextual connotations including a strip of land detached from H
A
70 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 11 S.C.R.
•
the original village though dependent on it; it ·is a subdivision
of land. For facility of reference Section 2(g) of the Punjab
Village Common Lands (Regulations) Act, 1961 as applicable
to Haryana is extracted below:-
2(g) "Shami/at deh" includes -
B
(1) Land described in the revenue records
as Shami/at deh or Charand excluding abadi deh;
(2) shamilat tikkas;
c (3) lands described in the revenue records
as shami/at, tarafs, pattis, pannas and tho/as and
used according to revenue record~. for the benefit
or the village community or a part thereof or for
common purposes of the village;
D
(4) lands used or reserved for the benefit of the village
community including streets, lanes, playgrounds,
schools, drinking wells, or ponds within the sabha
area as defined in clause (mmm) of Section 3 of
E the Punjab Gram Panchayat Act, 1952, excluding
lands reserved for the common purposes of a
village under Section 18 of the East Punjab
Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of
Fragmentation) Act, 1948 (East Punjab Act 50 of
F 1948), the management and control whereof vests
in the State Government under Section 23-A of the
aforesaid Act; and
(4a) vacant land situate in abadi deh or gorah deh not
owned by any person;
G
(5) lands in any village described as banjar qadim and
used for common purposes of the village according
to revenue records;
H Provided that shamilat deh at least to the extent of twenty-
• SARJEET SINGH (D) TH. LRS. v. HARi SINGH
[VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J.]
71
five per centum of the total area of the village does not exist A
in the village;
but does not include land which -
(i) becomes or has become shamilat deh due to river
action or has been reserved as shamilat in villages B
subject to river action except shami/at deh entered
as pasture, pond or playground in the revenue
records;
(ii) has been allotted on quasi- permanent basis to c
displaced person;
(iia) was shamilat deh, but has been allotted to any
person by the Rehabilitation Department of the
State Government, after the commencement of this
Act, but on or before the 9th day of July, 1985; D
(iii) has been partitioned and brought under cultivation
by individual land-holders before the
26th January, 1950;
E
(iv) having been acquired before the 26th January, 1950,
by a person by purchase or in exchange for
proprietary land from a co-sharer in the shamilat
deh and is so recorded in the jamabandi or is
supported by a valid deed;
F
(v) is described in the revenue records as shamilat,
taraf, pattis, pannas and tho/a and not used
according to revenue records for the benefit to the
village community or a part thereof or for common
purposes of the village; G
(vi) lies outside the abadi deh and was being used as
gitwar, bara, manure pit, house or for cottage
industry immediately before the commencement of
this Act; H
A
72
(vii)
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
Omitted by Act No. 18 of 1995;
[2014] 11 S.C.R.
•
(viii) was shamilat deh, was assessed to land revenue
and has been in the individual cultivating
possession of co-sharers not being in excess of
their respective shares in s.uch shamilat deh on or
B
before the 26th January, 1950; or
(ix) is used as a place of worship or for purposes
subservient thereto;
c (6) lands reserved for the common purposes of a
village under Section 18 of the East Punjab
Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of
Fragmentation) Act, 1948 (East Punjab Act 50 of
1948), the management and control whereof vests
0 in the Gram Panchayat under Section 23-A of the
aforesaid Act.
Explanation.- Lands entered in the column of ownership
of record of rights as 'Jumla Ma/kan Wa Digar Haqdaran
Arazi Hassab Rasad', 'Jumla Malkan' or 'Mushtarka
E Malkan' shall be sham/at deh within the meaning·of this
section.
6. We shall now return to the facts of the case in hand. The
jamabandi relating to the subject land recites that the owner
F of the subject land is Shami/at Patti. Hardwari and Mangal were
holding the land as Gair Marusi having half share each in Gair
Mumkin Gitwar Bila Lagan Bawajay Sayak Keti, which the Trial
Court has rightly explained as land of which possession has
been given by the proprietor, in the present case the Shami/at
G Patti, to the two named persons for the specific purpose of
repairing agricultural implements. Since the allotment is
intrinsically in the nature of a licence of common village land
for a particular user, it is legally inconceivable that these two
persons could have effected an oral exchange with the
H Defendants. The ownership collectively vested at all times with
• SARJEET SINGH (D) TH. LRS. v. HARi SINGH.
[VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J.]
the Gaon or Shami/at patti. Ergo, none of the litigating parties
could assume ownership or exclusive and proprietary
73
A
possession thereto. Gair Mumkin literally means that which is
not possible; and in the present context indicates waste or
uncultivable land. Bila Lagan connotes either rent-free grant or
one where the rent has not been· fixed. Sayar!Sayer literally B
refers to moveables; it also concerns miscellaneous levies apart
from land revenue. As defined in Ganga Devi vs. State of U.P.,
AIR 1972 SC 931, it "includes whatever has to be paid or
delivered by a licencee on account of right of gathering
produce, forest rights, fisheries and the use of water for irrigation c
from artificial sources". Sayar or Sayer are variable imposts
on movable property and are thus distinct from land revenue.
Khasra refers to the 'field book' or village register recording
the possession or tenure of agricultural land and the cognate
term khasra girdawari is the crop or harvest inspection record D
pertaining to the land. Khewat lists the co-sharers and
proprietors of village/agricultural land.s along with their
respective liabilities to pay the land re~enue. Khud-kasht
denotes a proprietor of land who is cultivating it himself.
7. The Trial Court had decreed the suit, holding that the E
Plaintiffs were entitled to the possession of the disputed land.
It, therefore, directed the Defendants to handover the land in
its original shape, to the Plaintiffs and other Co-owners within
two months from the date of the decision. This finding has not
been disturbed by the First Appellate Court. These two Courts F
failed to keep in mind that the land was Shami/at deh and
hence no person, including the Plaintiffs, could have laid claims
to separate or individual possession thereof. In second Appeal,
however, in terms of the impugned Judgment, the High Court
has correctly dismissed the Plaintiffs' suit holding that the G
Plaintiffs shall be at liberty to seek partition of the suit land and
other joint land in accordance with law.
8. Having considered the matter in all its complexities, we
are persuaded to uphold the directions of the High Court.
H
A
74 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 11 S.C.R.
However, this is primarily and principally for reasons different
•
to those that have prevailed upon the learned Single Judge. The
land in question is admittedly Shami/at Patti Sayar, i.e.
common village lands the user of which is not confined strictly
to cultivation. The holding of Hardwari and Mangal is thus in
B contradistinction to that of khewat i.e. proprietorship of the land.
This is amply evident from the fact that so far as the grant of
Hardwari and Mangal is concerned, it specifically envisages the
repairing of agricultural implements of the villagers by them.
Hardwari and Mangal were legally incompetent to transfer the
c possession by mutual compact with any third person, including
co-sharers. Shami/at deh require to be carefully and
assiduously protected, and this is the avowed purpose of the
Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961 as
applicable to both the States of Punjab and Haryana. The three
Courts below have failed altogether in giving effect to Section
0
7 of the said Act which provides, inter a/ia, that the Assistant
Collector of First Grade alone can eject any person who is in
wrongful and unauthorized possession of the shamilat deh of
any village and instead put the Panchayat in possession
thereof. The Proviso to sub-section 7(1) empowers the
E Assistant Collector (who is a Revenue Official and not a Civil
Court) to even decide a question' of title to the land if it happens
to be raised. Section 11 of the Act thereafter enables any
person, or even a Panchayat, to approach the Collector to
decide any claim in respect of the land. It is evident from the
F reading of these provisions that instead of approaching the
Civil Court, if the Plaintiffs had any grievance against the
Defendants as regards the possession of the sL1it land, they
ought to have ventilated their grievances before the Collector
and not before the Civil Court. The provisions of Sections 7 and
G 11 thereof have been blatantly violated by the Plaintiffs and
ignored by the Courts below. If any doybt remains as to the
correct forum for the resolution of the dispute pleaded in the
Plaint, Section 13 of the Act makes it clear that the Civil Courts
have no jurisdiction to entertain or adjudicate upon any question
H pertaining to shamitat deh.
• SARJEET SINGH (D) TH. LRS. v. HARi SINGH
[VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J.]
75
9. It is always a brooding possibility that collusive suits are A
filed by co-sharers or other persons in the endeavour that
shamilat deh may be metamorphosed or transformed into
privately owned lands, always to the detriment of the gram
sabha and of the villagers collectively. The three Courts below
have not been adequately alive to this very important aspect. B
The land in question was, in fact, licenced to the co-sharers and
was not their privately owned properties, individually or severally
or collectively.
10. In the impugned judgment the High Court has
· dismissed the suit. It is manifestly evident that the suit as framed C
and filed was not maintainable in view of the Punjab Village
Common Lands (Regulations) Act, 1961 and, therefore,
deserved to be dismissed. We hold, accordingly, and,
therefore, dismiss this Appeal, leaving the parties to bear their
respective costs. D
Kalpana K. Tripathy Appeal dismissed.
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