Holding

A statement recorded during a Section 202 inquiry is inadmissible under Sections 33 and 157 of the Evidence Act and cannot form the basis of conviction.

Summary

The father of the deceased filed a complaint alleging that the appellants demanded additional dowry, tortured the victim and caused her death. A magistrate conducted an inquiry under Section 202 CrPC, during which an eye‑witness (PW 1) gave a statement that was later recorded. At trial PW 1 was declared hostile and the other witnesses (PW 2‑5) testified, leading to conviction of the appellants for murder under Sections 302 and 34 IPC and a life sentence, which the High Court upheld. The appellants appealed, contending that PW 1's statement recorded in the Section 202 inquiry was inadmissible under Section 33 of the Evidence Act because they had no right to cross‑examine, and that it could not be used to corroborate other witnesses under Section 157. The Supreme Court held that statements made in a Section 202 inquiry are not admissible under Sections 33 or 157, and that the prosecution failed to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt on circumstantial evidence, leading to the appellants' acquittal.

Issues considered

The admissibility of a witness statement recorded during a Section 202 CrPC inquiry under Section 33 of the Evidence Act.
Whether such a statement can be used to corroborate other witnesses under Section 157 of the Evidence Act.
Whether the prosecution established the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt on the basis of circumstantial evidence.

Legislation cited

Subjects

EvidenceSection 33Section 157Section 202 CrPCDowry deathCircumstantial evidenceHomicide vs suicideAcquittal

Judgment

-)-

A SASHI JENA AND ORS.
v.
-
KHADAL SWAIN AND ANR.

FEBRUARY 10, 2004

B [Y.K. SABHARWAL AND B.N. AGRAWAL, JJ.]

Evidence Act, 1872-Sections 33 and 157-Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973-Section 202-Complaint made to Magistrate against appellants for
C murder of deceased for not bringing sufficient dow1y-lnquiry ordered by
Magistrate-Case committed to trial court on completion of inquiry-Appellants
convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment-Confirmed by High Court-
Statement of witness supporting prosecution during the inquiry but turning
hostile during trial-Admissibility of the statement made during the course of
inquiry-Held, not admissible since the accused has no right or opportunity
D to cross-examine the witness during the inquiry-Statement cannot be used to
corroborate evidence of other witnesses-On facts and evidence. there is no
circumstantial evidence-Hence appellants-accused are acquitted-JPC-
Section 302 and 34.

Police received a report that the deceased, wife of appellant no. 2,
E committed suicide by hanging herself in her house. On the basis of the
report, an unnatural death case was registered. On receipt of the pos.t-
mortem report of the deceased, a case under Section 302, JPC was
registered against unknown person. The police, after investigation, found
the case to be one of suicide and not homicide and submitted a final report
F accordingly.

The father of the deceased, PW2, filed a complaint petition to
Magistrate for prosecution of the appellants for murdering the deceased
for not bringing sufficient dowry. According to the complaint, the deceased
was given in marriage to appellant no. 2 with a dowry of Rs. 20,000. The
G family of appellant no. 2 demanded dowry even after marriage and on its
non-fulfilment, the deceased was ill-treated and tortured by the appellants.
On the date of the incident, the deceased asked PW.I, her neighbour, to
immediately inform her parents about a further demand of Rs. 5000 by
her in-laws and told him that if the amount was not paid, she would be
done to death. Before PW 1 could convey the news to the parents of the
H 260
SASH! JENA v. KHADAL SWAIN 261

deceased, he heard the cries coming from the house of the appellants. PW A
1 found the d_eceased IyingJ on the floor and appellants 1 and 2 were
pressing a crowbar on her neck till her death while appellants 3 and 4
were holding her legs. PW.1 thereafter immediately rushed to the village
of PW.2 and narrated him the entire incident. PW 2 along with his wife
PW. 4, PW. 1 and PW. 5 went to the house of the appellants. The appellant B
no. 1 stopped them from entering the house by holding out a Kati (Sword).

Magistrate directed an inquiry under section 202 CrPC. After
inquiry, the Magistrate issued processes against the appellants and they
were committed to the Court of Sessions to face trial.

During the trial, PW 1 was declared hostile. Relying upon the reports
c
of PWs. 2 to 5, the appellants were convicted by trial court under Section
302 read with Section 34 IPC and sentenced them to undergo life
imprisonment. In appeal, High Court confirmed the conviction and
sentence of the appellants awarded by the trial court.
D
In appeal to this Court, appellants contended that the statement of
PW 1, made before the Magistrate during the course of inquiry under
Section 202 CrPC against the appellants is not admissible in evidence
under section 33 of the Evidence Act, 1872 since the appellants had neither
any right nor opportunity to cross-examine PW 1 during the course of
the inquiry. E
Allowing the appeal, the Court

HELD: 1. It is well settled that the scope of inquiry under Section
202 CrPC is very limited one and that is to find out whether there are
sufficient grounds for proceeding against the accused who has no right to F
participate therein much less a right to cross-examine any witness
examined by the prosecution, but he may remain present only with a view
to be informed of what is going on. As during the course of inquiry under
Section 202 CrPC an accused has no right much less opportunity to cross-
examine a prosecution witness, statement of such a witness recorded G
during the course of the inquiry is not admissible in evidence under Section
33 of the Act and, consequently, the sam~ cannot form the basis of
conviction of an accused. (267-C-D; 268-A-BI

V.M. Mathew v. V.S. Sharma and Ors., AIR (1996) SC 109, Chandra
Deo Singh v. Prakash Chandra Bose@ Chabi Bose and Anr., AIR (1963) H
-.
262 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004) 2 S.C.R.

A SC 1403, relied on.

2. A plain reading of the Section would show that previous statement
of a -particular witness can be used to corroborate only his own evidence
during trial and not evidence of other witnesses. The statement of PW.I
recorded during the course of enquiry under Section 202 CrPC cannot
B be used against the accused for any purpose as the same is not admissible
either under Section 33 or Section 157 of the Evidence Act.
1268-D; 268-H; 269-A)

Moti Singh and Anr. v. The State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR (1964) SC 900
relied on.
c
3.1. PWs 2 and 4 did not disclose in their statements made before
the Police about the demand of dowry at any point of time and torture of
the victim for non-fulfilment of such a demand by the accused persons.
For the first time, such a case was made out by the prosecution in the
D Complaint petition which was filed after 11 months of the alleged
occurrence. In view of these facts, it is not possible to place reliance upon
the evidence of PWs. 2 and 4 to prove this circumstance. 1269-E-FJ

. 3.2. PWs. 2, 3, 4 and 5 stated in their evidence that when they arrived
at the place of occurrence PW 1 narrated the incident to them. PW 1 did
E not at all support the prosecution case during trial and his statement
before the committing court having been already held to the inadmissible,
it cannot be used for corroborating the evidence of PWs. 2, 3, 4 and 5
made during trial. That apart, so far as PWs. 2 and 4 are concerned, from
the evidence of PW. 7, it would appear that these witnesses had, in their
statements made before the police, nowhere stated that PW. 1 narrated
F the incident to them showing complicity of the accused persons with the
crime and for the first time such a case was made out in the complaint
petition after 11 months of the alleged occurrence. So far as PWs. 3 and
5 are concerned, they were examined for the first time during the course
of inquiry under Section 202 CrPC after several months of the alleged
G occurrence. This being the position, it is not safe to rely upon the evidence
of these witnesses to prove this circumstance. [269-G-H; 270-A-BI

3.3. PW.3 stated during the course of cross examinatfon that he had
neither seen any Kati in the hands of accused nor seen ht.r obstructing
the witnesses from entering the house. In view of this statement of PW. 3,
H the veracity of the prosecution case that the appellant obstructed PWs. 2,
- SASH! JENA v. KHADAL SWAIN [AGRAWAL, J.]

3, 4 and 5 from entering the house by holding out a Kati becomes highly
doubtful and, accordingly the prosecution has failed to prove this
263

A

circumstance. 1270-DI

3.4. Exhibit 16 which was based on the post-mortem report, to the
effect that, in the absence of any mention in the postmortem report as to
whether the fracture was antemortem or not and what was the type of B
the fracture, it could not be said with reasonable amount of certainty that
it was a case of homicide. Hence, it would not be safe to place reliance
upon the report (Ext. 16). Thus, in view of the opinion of the doctor, PW
6, there is no option but to hold that it was a case of homicide and the
prosecution has succeeded in proving this circumstance against the accused C
persons which, being the solitary circumstance against them, cannot form
the basis of their conviction as it is well settled that in a case of
circumstantial evidence, there should be chain of circumstances showing
complicity of the accused persons with the crime and the chain should be
complete. The prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reason~ble
doubt and the High Court was not justified in upholding the conviction D
of the appellants. 1270-G-H; 271-A-BI

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No.
697 of 2003.

From the Judgment and Order dated I 7 .5.2002 of the Orissa High E
Court in Crl. A. No. 38 I of 1992.

P.N. Misra, Shibashish Misra and R.M. Patnaik for the Appellants.

Janaranjan Das, Swetaketu Mishra and Ms. Moushumi Gahlot for the
Respondents. F
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

B.N. AGRA WAL, J. The appellants were convicted by trial court under
Section 302 read with Section 34.ofthe Penal Code and sentenced to undergo
imprisonment for life. On appeal being preferred, their conviction and sentence G
have been upheld by the High Court.

The short facts are that on 4.5. I 986 at 5.30 p.m. one Trinath Behera,

- who was Gramrakhi of Village Golabandha, submitted a report at Buguda
Police Station disclosing therein that on the same day at 12.30 p.m. one
Sarasu Jena@ Salu, wife of appellant no. 2 - Prasana Kumar Jena, committed H
264 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004) 2 S.C.R.

A suicide by hanging herself in her house.·· On the basis of this written report,
Unnatural Death Case No. 3 dated 4.5.1986 was instituted, but subsequently,
-
after a few days, on receipt of postmortem report of the dead body of Salu,
a case under Section 302 of the Penal Code was registered against unknown
persons. The police, after registration of the case, took up investigation,
B examined witnesses and upon completion thereof, having found the instant
case to be one of suicide and not homicide, submitted final repo11 in favour
of the accused persons on 27.10.1986 whereafter on 29.4.1987 Khadal Swain
[PW:2], father of deceased Salu, filed a complaint in the Cou11 of learned
Sub-Divisional Magistrate for prosecution of the appellants.

C Case of the prosecution, as unfolded in the complaint petition, in short,
is that appellant no. 1 Sashi Jena, is the mother-in-law of Salu, appellant no.
2 - Prasana Kumar Jena, her husband and other two appellants, namely, Sarat
Kumar Jena and Rabindranath Jena, are full brothers of appellant no. 2. Salu
was given in marriage by PW.2 to appellant no. 2 in the .month of Baisakh
in the year 1985 and at the time of marriage PW.2 gave dowry worth Rs.
D 20,000/-, but in spite of that the accused persons were not satisfied and
demanded a further sum of Rs. 5000 and on its non-fulfillment, Salu was ill-
treated by her husband and also subjected to torture by all the accused persons.
On 4.5.1986 in the morning Salu met Madan Swain (PW.I) and requested
him to inform her parents about demand of further amount of Rs. 5000/- by
E her in-laws and she had expressed before him that in case the said amount
was not paid, she would be done to death. PW. I assured Salu that he would
convey the news to her parents, but before he could do so, the same day in
the afternoon at 12.30 p.m., when PW. I was in the house of his in-laws, who
were next door neighbour of the appellants, on hearing cries coming from the
house of the appellants, he went there and found that Salu was lying on the
F floor and appellant nos. I and 2 were pressing a crowbar on her neck till her
death while appellant nos. 3 and 4 were holding her legs. PW.1 thereafter
immediately rushed to the village of PW.2 and narrated him the entire incident
whereupon PW.2 along with his wife-Rohini Swain (PW.4), PW.1 and Narayan
Swain [PW.5], co-villager of PWs 2 and 4, went to the house of the appellants,
G but appellant no. I stopped them from entering the house by holding out a
Kati (Sword). PW. I was said to have also narrated the incident to PW.4,
Kirtan Nayak (PW.3), a co-villager of the accused persons, and PW.5.

Upon filing of the complaint, learned Magistrate examined the
coinplainant on solemn affinnation and postponed issuance of processes against
H the accused persons by deciding to hold inquiry under Section 202 of the
SASH! JENA v. KHADAL SWAIN [AGRAWAL • .I.] 265

Criminal Procedure Code ('the Code' for short), during the course of which, A
apart from other witnesses, the prosecution examined PW. I, who supported
the prosecution case, as disclosed in the complaint petition. Upon conclusion
of inquiry, the Magistrate issued processes against the appellants and they
were committed to the Court of Sessions to face trial.

Defence of the accused persons was that they were innocent and had B
no complicity with the crime as it was not a case of homicide because Salu
had committed suicide by hanging herself, she being unhappy with her husband
as one of his legs was swollen, which was incurable.

During trial, the prosecution examined 7 witnesses out of whom PW. I, C
who, according to the prosecution case was an eye-witness to the alleged
occurrence, did not at all support the prosecution case, as such declared
hostile. PWs. 2 and 4 are father and mother respectively of deceased Salu.
PW.3 was a resident of the village of occurrence and PW.5 co-villager of the
complainant. PW.6 was the Doctor who held post-mortem examination on
the dead body of Salu and PW.7 was the Investigating Officer. Upon D
conclusion of the trial, the learned Additonal Sessions Judge convicted and
sentenced the appellants, as stated above, and their appeal to the High Court
. having been di~missed, the present appeal by special leave.

According to the prosecution case, PW. I was the solitary eyewitness
to the alleged occurrence, but, in his evidence before the trial court, he did E
not at all support the prosecution case though he supported the same in all
material pa11icu lars in his statement made before the learned Magistrate during
the course of inquiry under Section 202 of the Code. The crucial question
to be examined in this case is as to whether the statement of PW. I recorded
during the course of inquiry under Section 202 of the Code is relevant and
admissible in the case on hand so as to form basis of conviction of the
F
accused persons. It has been submitted on behalf of the appellants that such
a statement is not admissible under Section 33 of the Evidence Act, 1872
('the Act' for short) as the accused had neither any right nor opportunity to
cross-examine PW. I during the course of inquiry. It may be useful to
refer to Section 33 of the Act which runs thus:- G
"S.33.- Relevancy of certain evidence for proving, in subsequent
proceeding, the truth of facts therein stated.- Evidence given by a
witness in a judicial proceeding or before any person authorized by
law to take it, is relevant for the purpose of proving, in a subsequent
judicial proceeding, or in a later stage of the same judicial proceeding, H
266 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2004] 2 S.C.R.

A the truth of the facts which it states, when the witness is dead or
cannot be found, or is incapable of giving evidence, or is kept out of
the way by the adverse party, or if his presence cannot be obtained
without an amount of delay or expense which, under the circumstances
of the case, the Court considers t1nreasonable :

B Provided -

that the proceeding was between the same parties or their
representatives in interest;

that the adverse party in the first proceeding had the right and
C opportunity to cross-examine;

that the questions in issue were substantially the same in the first as
in the second proceeding.

Explanation.- A criminal trial or inquiry shall be deemed to be a
proceeding between the prosecutor and the accused within the meaning
D of this section."

[Emphasis Added]

From a bare perusal of the aforesaid provision, it would appear that
evidence given by a witness in a judicial proceeding or before any person
E authorized to take it is admissible for the purpose of proving in a subsequent
judicial proceeding or in a later stage of the same judicial proceeding, the
truth of the facts which it states in its evidence given in earlier judicial
proceeding or earlier stage of the same judicial proceeding, but under proviso
there are three pre-requisites for making the said evidence admissible in
p subsequent proceeding or later stage of the same proceeding and they are (i)
that the earlier proceeding was between the same parties; (ii) that the
adverse party in the first proceeding had the right and opportunity to cross
examine; and (iii) that the questions in issue in both the proceedings were
substantially the same, and in the absence of any of the three pre-requisites
afore-stated, Section 33 of the Act would not be attracted. This Court had
G occasion to consider this question in the case of VM. Mathew v. V.S. Sharma
and 01:s., AIR ( 1996) Supreme Court I 09, in which it was laid down that in
view of the second proviso, evidence of a witness in a previous proceeding
would be admissible under Section 33 of the Act only if the adverse party in
the first proceeding had the right and opportunity to cross examine the
H witness. The Court observed thus at pages 110 and 111 :-
SASHI JENA v. K.HADAL SWAIN (AGRAWAL. J.] 267

"The adverse party referred in the proviso is the party in the previous A
proceeding against whom the evidence adduced therein was given
against his interest. He had the right and opportunity to cross-examine
the witness in the previous proceeding .... the proviso lays down the
acid test that statement of a particular witness should have been
tested by both parties by examination and cross-examination in order B
to make it admissible in the later proceeding."

[Emphasis added]

Thus, the question to be considered is as to whether accused has any
-
'•
right to cross examine a prosecution witness examined during the course of
inquiry under Section 202 of the Code. It is well settled that the scope of C
inquiry under Section 202 of the Code is very limited one and that is to

-
find out whether there are sufficient grounds for proceeding against the
accused who has no right to participate therein much less a right to cross
examine any witness examined by the prosecution, but he may remain present
only with a view to be informed of what is going on. This question is no D
longer res integra having been specifically answered by a 4-Judge bench
decision of this Court in the case of Chandra Deo Singh v. Prakash Chandra
Bose @ Chabi Bose and Anr., AIR (1963) SC 1430, wherein this Court
categorically laid down that an accused during the course of inquiry under
Section 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, has no right at all to
cross examine any witness examined on behalf of the prosecution. It was E

--
observed thus at page 1432:

"Taking the first ground, it seems to us clear from the entire scheme
of Ch. XVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure that an accused person

- does not come into the picture at all till process is issued. This does
not mean that he is precluded from being present when an enquiry is F
held by a Magistrate. He may remain present either in person or
through a counsel or agent with a view to be informed of what is
going on. But since the very question for consideration being whether·
he should be called upon to face an accusation, he has no right to
take part in the. proceedings nor has the Magistrate any jurisdiction G
to permit him to do .so. It would follow from this, therefore, that it

- would not be open to the Magistrate to put any question to witnesses
at the instance of the person named as accused but against whom
process has not been issued; nor can he examine any witnesses at the
instance of such a person ........."
[Emphasis Added ] H
268 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2004] 2 S.C.R.

A Thus, we have no difficulty in holding that as during the course· of
inquiry under Section 202 of the Code an accused has no right much less
opportunity to cross examine a prosecution witness, statement of such a
witness recorded during the course of the inquiry is not admissible in evidence
under Section 33 of the Act and, consequently, the same cannot form the
basis of conviction of an accused.
B
Next question that arises in the case on hand is as to whether the
statement of PW. I recorded during the course of inquiry under Section 202
of the Code can be proved under Section 157 of the Act to corroborate
evidence of other witnesses viz. PWs 2, 3, 4 and 5 examined during trial.
C Language of Section 157 of the Act is very clear and the same lays down that
"in order to corroborate the testimony of a witness, any former statement
made by such witness relating to the same fact at or about the time when the
fact took place, or before any authority legally competent to investigate the
·fact may be proved". A plain reading of the Section would show that
previous statement ofa particular witness can be used to corroborate only
0 his own evidence during trial and not evidence of other witnesses. In the
case of Moti Singh and Anr. v. The State of Vilar Pradesh, AIR (1964) SC
900, similar question had arisen before a 4-Judge bench of this Cou11
wherein though the evidence in court of two witnesses, naniely, Ram Shankar
and Jageshwar, during trial was disbelieved in relation to the manner of
E occurrence by t'ie trial court as well as the High Court, their statements made
before a Magistrate under Section 164 of the Code were relied upon to
corroborate the other evidence adduced by the prosecution during trial. The
aforesaid procedure was deprecated by this Court and it was laid down that
such previous statement could be used to corroborate the evidence of that
very witness examined during the course of trial and not evidence of other
F witnesses examined before the trial court. In that case, this Court set aside
the conviction of the accused persons observing thus at page 90 I :-

" ..... Those statements could have been used only in either corroborating
or contradicting the statements of these witnesses in Cou11. If those
witnesses were not to be believed, their previous statements could not
G be used as independent evidence in support of the other prosecution
evidence."
In view of the foregoing discussion, we are of the opinion that the
statement of PW. I recorded during the course of enquiry under Section 202
of the Code cannot be used against the accused for any purpose as the same
H is not admissible either under Section 33 or Section 157 of the Act. This
SASHI JENA v. KHADAL SWAIN (AGRAWAL, J.] 269

being the position, in the absence of any direct evidence, it has to be considered A
as to whether conviction of the appellants can be upheld on the basis of
circumstantial evidence enumerated hereunder and the prosecution has
succeeded in proving the same :

I. The deceased was ill-treated by her husband and subjected to
torture by other accused persons for non-fulfillment of demand B
of dowry of Rs. 5,000 in spite of the fact that at the time of
marriage articles worth Rs. 20,000 were given by way of dowry,
which led to her death.
2. PWs. 2, 3, 4 and 5 made statements in court that PW. 1 narrated
the incident to them showing complicity of the accused with the C
crime.
3. Prosecution witnesses were prevented by appellant no. I - Sashi
Jena from entering her house when they arrived there by holding
out a Kati.
4. Medical evidence showing that it was a case of homicide and not D
suicide.
So far as the first circumstance is concerned, the prosecution has adduced
evidence of PWs. 2 and 4, who are father and mother respectively of Salu.
These two witnesses, as it would appear from the evidence of PW.7, the E
Inyestigating Officer, were examined before the police but they did not
disclose, in their statements made before the police, demand of dowry at any
point of time and torture of the victim for non-fulfillment of such a demand
by the accused persons. For the first time, such a case was made out by the
prosecution in the Petition of Complaint which was filed after l I months of
the alleged occurrence. In view of these facts, it is not possible to place F
reliance upon the evidence of PWs. 2 and 4 to prove this circumstance.

This brings us to the second circumstance that PW.I disclosed about
the incident showing complicity of the accused persons with the crime before
the prosecution witnesses. PWs. 2, 3, 4 and 5 stated in their evidence that
when they arrived at the place of o~currence PW. I narrated the incident to G
them. As stated above, PW. I did not at all support the prosecution case
during trial and his statement before the committing court having been already
held by us to be inadmissible, it cannot be used for corroborating the evidence
of PWs.2, 3, 4 and 5 made during trial. That apart, so far as PWs.2 and 4
are concerned, from the evidence of PW. 7, it would appear that these witnesses H
270 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] 2 S.C.R.

A had, in their statements made before the police, no where stated that PW-I
narrated the incident to them showing complicity of the accused persons with
the crime and for the first time such a case was made out in the complaint
petition after I I months of the alleged occurrence. So far as PWs. 3 and 5
are concerned, they were not examined before the police, but were examined, J
B for the first time, during the course of inquiry under Section 202 of the Code
after several months of the alleged occurrence, viz., PW.3 after 22 months in -~
March I 988 and PW. 4 after I2 months in May, I 987 of the incident. This
being the position, it is not safe to rely upon the evidence of these witnesses I
to prove this circumstance.

c by appellant
The third circumstance that the prosecution witnesses were prevented
no. I - Sashi Jena from entering her house by holding out a Kati
has been proved by PWs. 2, 3, 4 and 5 as all of them so stated in their
examination-in-chief. PW.3 stated during the course of cross examination
that he had neither seen any Kati in the hands of accused Sashi Jena nor seen
her obstructing the witnesses from entering the house. In view of this statement
D of PW.3, the veracity of the prosecution case that accused Sashi Jena obstructed
the members of the prosecution party from entering the house by holding out
a Kati becomes highly doubtful and, accordingly, we have no option but to
hold that the prosecution has failed to prove this circumstance.

We now come to the fourth and the last circumstance that according to
E the medical evidence it was a case of homicidal death and not suicide. From
the evidence of PW.6 - the Doctor who held postmortem examination, it would
appear that it was a case of homicidal death. It appears that during the course
of investigation, PW.7 - the Investigating Officer - sent the postmortem report
..
>

to Professor, FMT Department, MKCG Medical College, Berhampur, for his
p opinion, who requested PW.7 to send hyoid bone, as according to him, it was
essential for formation of opinion as to whether it was a case of suicide or
homicide, but PW.7 reported vide his letter dated 15.I0.1986 (Ext. 16/I) that
the said bone was not available in the Sub-Divisional Hospital where
postmortem examination was conducted. Upon receipt of the said letter, the said
Professor submitted his report under letter dated 15. IO. I 986 (Ext. I 6), which
G was based on the post-mortem report, to the effect that, in the absence of any
mention in the postmortem report as to whether the fracture was antemortem
or not and what was the type of the fracture, it could not be said with
reasonable amount of certainty that it was a case of homicide. In this view of
the matter, it would not be safe to place reliance upon the report (Ext. I6).
H Thus, in view of opinion of the doctor, PW.6, we have no option but to hold
'1
SASH! JENA v. KHADAL SWAIN [AGRAWAL, J.] 271
that it was a case of homicide and the prosecution has succeeded in proving A
this circumstance against the accused persons which, being the solitary
circumstance against them, cannot form basis of their conviction as it is
well settled that in a case of circumstantial evidence, there should be chain
., of circumstances showing complicity of the accused persons with the crime
and the chain should be complete. In view of the foregoing discussion, we are B
of the view that prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable
doubt and the High Court was not justified in upholding conviction of the
appellants.

In the result, the appeal is allowed, the conviction and sentence of the
appellants are set aside and they are acquitted of the charge. The appellants, C
who are in custody, are directed to be released forthwith if not required in
connection with any other case.

B.S. Appeal allowed .

...