Supreme Court of India
SASIKUMARversusTHE STATE OF TAMIL NADU
- Citation
- 2009 INSC 773
- Decided
- 8 May 2009
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Bench
- ARIJIT PASAYAT
Holding
A dying declaration, when made by a person in a fit state of mind and satisfying the required safeguards, can be the sole basis of conviction without corroboration.
Summary
The appellant, Sasikumar, was convicted of murder under Section 302 IPC for allegedly setting fire to his wife Menaka, who later died. The conviction was based primarily on Menaka's dying declaration recorded by Judicial Magistrate PW5 in the presence of a duty doctor, who affirmed that she was in a fit and conscious state of mind. The appellant challenged the reliance on the dying declaration, arguing it should be excluded due to lack of corroboration and the mother of the deceased not supporting the prosecution version. The Supreme Court examined the principles governing dying declarations, emphasizing that such statements can form the sole basis of conviction if made voluntarily by a person of sound mind, without tutoring or prompting. Satisfied that the procedural safeguards were met, the Court held that the trial and High Courts were correct in relying on the dying declaration and dismissed the appeal.
Issues considered
- Whether a dying declaration can be the sole basis for conviction without corroborative evidence.
- Whether the dying declaration in this case was made by a fit, conscious person and was free from tutoring or prompting.
- Whether the appellate court should interfere with the conviction based on the dying declaration.
Legislation cited
- Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 302, s. 307, s. 498A
Subjects
dying declarationevidencemurderIndian Penal CodeSection 302corroborationappellate reviewcriminal law
Judgment
[2009] 8 S.C.R. 541
SAS IKUMAR A
v.
THE STATE OF TAMIL NADU
(Criminal Appeal No. 966 of 2009)
MAY 08, 2009
B
[0~. ARIJIT PASAYAT AND ASOK KUMAR
GANGULY, JJ.)
Evidence: Dying declaration -~Governing principles -
Discussed - On facts, conviction based on dying declaration, C
by courts below - Interference with - Held: Not called for -
Juditial magistrate who recorded the dying declaration was
fully satisfied that deceased was in fit and conscious state of
mind to give statement which was endorsed by the duty
doctor. D
In appeal to this Court, appellant challenged his
conviction order passed by courts below by placing
reliance on the dying declaration of victim-wife.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court E
HELD: 1. PW5 was the Judicial Magistrate who
recorded the dying declaration in the presence of the duty
doctor PWG. From the evidence of PW5, it is clear that he
received the requisition from the hospital Ex.PS at 12.30 F
p.m. to record dying declaration of the deceased in the
hospital and proceeded to record statement by putting
question to her. PW5 was fully satisfied that the deceased
was in a fit and conscious state of mind to give the
statement which was also endorsed by PWG. (Para 8) G
[545-C-D]
2.1. This is a case where the basis of conviction of
the accused by the trial Court was the dying declarations.
541 H
542 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 8 S.C.R.
I
A The situation in which a person is on his deathbed, being
exceedingly solemn, serene and grave, is the reason in
law to accept the veracity of his statement. It is for this
reason that the requirements of oath and cross-
examination are dispensed with. Besides, should the
B dying declaration be excluded, it will result in miscarriage
of justice because the victim being generally the only eye-
witness in a serious crime, the exclusion of the statement
would leave the Court without a scrap of evidence. [Para
9) [545-E-G]
c 2.2. Though a dying declaration is entitled to great
weight, it is worthwhile to note that the accused has no
power of cross-examination. Such a power is essential
for eliciting the truth as an obligation of oath could be.
This is the reason the Court also insists that the dying
D declaration should be of such nature as to inspire full
confidence of the Court in its correctness. The Court has
to be on guard that the statement of the deceased was
not as a result of either tutoring or prompting or a product
of imagination. The Court must be further satisfied that
E the deceased was in a fit state of mind after a clear
opportunity to observe and identify the assailant. Once
the Court is satisfied that the declaration was true and
voluntary, undoubtedly, it can base its conviction without
any further corroboration. It cannot be laid down as an
F absolute rule of law that the dying declaration cannot
form the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated.
The rule requiring corroboration is merely a rule of
prudence. Thus the conclusions of the Trial Court and the
/-
High Court placing reliance on the dying declaration
G cannot be faulted. [Paras 10 and 11) [545-G-H; 546-A-C;
548-8)
Smt. Paniben v. State of Gujarat AIR 1992 SC 1817;
Munnu Raja & Anr. V. The State of Madhya Pradesh 1976
(2) SCR 764; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Ram Sagar Yadav
H and Ors. AIR 1985 SC 416; Ramavati Devi v. State of Bihar
SASIKUMAR v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU 543
-----
..
AIR 1983 SC 164; K. Ramachandra Reddy and Anr. v. The A
Public Prosecutor AIR 1976 SC 1994; Rasheed Beg v. State
of Madhya Pradesh 1974 (4) SCC 264; Kaka Singh v. State
of M.P. AIR 1982 SC 1021; State of Maharashtra v.
Krishnamurthi Laxmipati Naidu AIR 1981 SC 617; Surajdeo
Oza and Ors. v. State of Bihar AIR 1979 SC 1505; Nanahau B
Ram and Anr. State of Madhya Pradesh AIR 1988 SC 912;
State of UP. v. Madan Mohan and Ors. AIR 1989 SC 1519;
Mohan/a/ Gangaram Gehani v. State of Maharashtra AIR
1982 SC 839; Mohan Lal and Ors. v. State of Haryana 2007
(9) sec 151 - relied on. c
Case Law Reference :
AIR 1992, SC 1817 relied on Para 9
1976 (2) SCR 764 relied on Para 9
D
AIR 1985 SC 416 relied on Para 9
AIR 1983 SC 164 relied on Para 9
AIR 1976 SC 1994 relied on Para 9
E
1974 (4) sec 264 relied on Para 9
AIR 1982 SC 1021 relied on Para 9
•
AIR 1981 SC 617 relied on Para 9
AIR 1979 SC 1505 relied on Para 9 F
AIR 1988 SC 912 relied on Para 9
AIR 1989 SC 1519 relied on Para 9
AIR 1982 SC 839 relied on Para 9 G
"" 2001 (9) sec 151 relied on Para 9
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
No. 966 of 2009.
H
..
544 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 8 S.C.R.
A From the Judgment & Order dated 13.04.2007 of the High
Court of Judicature at Madras in Criminal Appeal No. 214 of
2006.
M. Qamaruddin for the Appellant.
8 S. Thananjayan for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. 1. Leave granted.
c 2. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of a Division
Bench of the Madras High Court upholding the conviction of the
appellant for offences punishable under Section 302 of the
Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short 'IPC') while setting aside the
conviction in terms of Section 307 IPC. Appellant faced trial in
D the Court of Sessions, Vellore and was convicted in terms of
Sections 302 and 307 IPC. He was acquitted of the charges
relating to Section 498A IPC.
3. Prosecution version in a nutshell is as follows :
E On 10.11.2003, the accused poured kerosene on his wife
Menaka; set fire to her as a result of which she died on
30.11.2003 and in the course of the same transaction he •
attempted to murder his child aged about 9 months by pouring
kerosene on her and setting fire to her also. But luckily she
F survived. Therefore, the trial went on against the accused not
only under Section 302 and 307 IPC but also under Section
498-A IPC. The prosecution examined PWs 1 to 8 besides
marking Exs. P1 to P15 and MOs. 1 and 2.
G 4. On completion of investigation charge sheet was filed
and since accused pleaded innocence, trial was held.
5. The trial court placed reliance on the evidence of PWs
5, 6 and 7 and on the dying declaration recorded to hold the
H
SASIKUMAR v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU 545
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
appellant guilty. In appeal, the High Court upheld the conviction A
under Section 302 IPC while upsetting the conviction in terms
of Section 307 IPC.
6. In support of the appeal, learned counsel for the
appellant submitted that since the mother of the deceased PW1
B
did not support the prosecution version, the trial Court and the
. High Court should not have placed reliance on the so called
dying declaration .
7. Learned counsel for the State supported the judgment.
c
8. It is to be noted that PW5 was the Judicial Magistrate
who recorded the dying declaration in the presence of the duty
doctor PW6. From the evidence of PW5 it is clear that he
received the requisition from the hospital Ex.PS at 12.30 p.m.
• to record dying declaration of the deceased in the hospital from D
Menaka and proceeded to record statement by putting question
to her. PW5 was fully satisfied that the deceased was in a fit
and conscious state of mind to give the statement which was
also endorsed by PW6.
9. This is a case where the basis of conviction of the E
accused by the trial Court was the dying declarations. The
situation in which a person is on his deathbed, being
• exceedingly solemn, serene and grave, is the reason in law to
accept the veracity of his statement. It is for this reason that the
requirements of oath and cross-examination are dispensed F
with. Besides, should the dying declaration be excluded, it will
result in miscarriage of justice because the victim being
generally the only eye-witness in a serious crime, the exclusion
of the statement would leave the Court without a scrap of
evidence. G
j.
10. Though a dying declaration is entitled to great weight,
it is worthwhile to note that the accused has no power of cross-
examination. Such a power is essential for eliciting the truth as
an obligation of oath could be. This is the reason the Court also
H'
546 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 8 S.C.R.
A insists that the dying declaration should be of such nature as
to inspire full confidence of the Court in its correctness. The
Court has to be on guard that the statement of the deceased
was not as a result of either tutoring or prompting or a product
of imagination. The Court must be further satisfied that the
B deceased was in a fit state of mind after a clear opportunity to
observe and identify the assailant. Once the Court is satisfied
that the declaration was true and voluntary, undoubtedly, it can
base its conviction without any further corroboration. It cannot
be laid down as an absolute rule of law that the dying
c declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it
is corroborated. The rule requiring corroboration is merely a
rule of prudence. This Court has laid down in several judgments
the principles governing dying declaration, which could be
summed up as under as indicated in Smt. Paniben v. State of
D Gujarat (AIR 1992 SC 1817): •
(i) There is neither rule of law nor of prudence that dying
declaration cannot be acted upon without corroboration.
[See Munnu Raja & Anr. v. The State of Madhya Pradesh
(1976) 2 SCR 764)]
E
(ii) If the Court is satisfied that the dying declaration is true
and voluntary it can base conviction on it, without
corroboration. [See State of Uttar Pradesh v. Ram Sagar •
Yadav and Ors. (AIR 1985 SC 416) and Ramavati Devi
F v. State of Bihar (AIR 1983 SC 164)]
(iii) The Court has to scrutinize the dying declaration
carefully and must ensure that the declaration is not the
result of tutoring, prompting or imagination. The deceased
had an opportunity to observe and identify the assailants
G and was in a fit state to make the declaration. [See K.
Ramachandra Reddy and Anr. v. The Public Prosecutor
(AIR 1976 SC 1994)]
(iv) Where the dying declaration is suspicious, it should not
H be acted upon without corroborative evidence. [See
SASIKUMAR v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU 547
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
"
- Rasheed Beg v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1974 (4) SCC
264)]
(v) Where the deceased was unconscious and could never
make any dying declaration, the evidence with regard to
A
it is to be rejected. [See Kaka Singh v State of M.P. (AIR
B
1982 SC 1021)]
4
(vi) A dying declaration which suffers from infirmity cannot
form the basis of conviction. [See Ram Manorath and Ors.
v. State of U.P. (1981 (2) SCC 654)
c
(vii) Merely because a dying declaration does contain the
details as to the occurrence, it is not to be rejected. [See
/
State of Maharashtra v. Krishnamurthi Laxmipati Naidu
(AIR 1981 SC 617)]
D
(viii) Equally, merely because it is a brief statement, it is
not to be discarded. On the contrary, the shortness of the
statement itself guarantees truth. [See Surajdeo Oza and
Ors. v. State of Bihar (AIR 1979 SC 1505).
(ix) Normally the Court in order to satisfy whether the E
deceased was in a fit mental condition to make the dying
declaration looks up to the medical opinion. But where the
~
eye-witness said that the deceased was in a fit and
' conscious state to make the dying declaration, the medical
opinion cannot prevail. [See Nanahau Ram and Anr v. F
State of Madhya Pradesh (AIR 1988 SC 912)]. '-
(x) Where the prosecution version differs from the version
as given in the dying declaration, the said declaration
cannot be acted upon. [See State of U.P. v. Madan
G
j, Mohan and Ors. (AIR 1989 SC 1519)].
(xi) Where there is more than one statement in the nature
of dying declaration, one first in point of time must be
preferred. Of course, if the plurality of dying declarations
H
548 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 8 S.C.R.
-
A could be held to be trustworthy and reliable, it has to be
accepted. [See Mohan/al Gangaram Gehani v.State of
Maharashtra (AIR 1982 SC 839) and Mohan Lal and Ors.
v. State of Haryana (2007 (9) SCC 151).
11. Above being the position, the conclusions of the Trial
8
Court and the High Court placing reliance on the dying
declaration cannot be faulted. We find no merit in this appeal
which is accordingly dismissed. •
D.G. Appeal dismissed.
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