SATBIR SINGH AND ORS.versusSTATE OF HARYANA

A                           SATBIR SINGH AND ORS.
                                         V.

                              STATE OF HARYANA

                              SEPTEMBER 14, 2005

B                     [H.K. SEMA AND G.P. MATHUR, JJ.]


          Penal Code, 1860-Sections 304-B, 498-A and 201-Dowry death-
    Harassment for dowry by in-laws of the deceased on various occasions-
C   Deceased sent to her father's home to arrange dowry about JO days before
    the occurrence-Deceased returned to her matrimonial home on request of
    the accused persons-Deceased found dead under suspicious circumstances
    and cremated hurriedly-High Court upheld conviction by trial court-On
    appeal Held, death undisputedly occurred during 7 years of marriage and
    prosecution established ingredients of the offences-Once the prosecution
D   has established ingredients of Section 304-B IPC, the onus lies on the accused
    to rebut the presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act-Evidence
    of defence witness did not inspire confidence-Acts of harassment were never
    condoned when the deceased returned to her matrimonial home-Evidence
    Act, 1872-Section 113-B.

E         Juvenile Justice Act, 1986-Section 2(h)-Juvenile Justice (Care and
    Protection) Act, 2000-Section 20-Held, provisions are applicable even to
    cases initiated and pending provided the offender has not completed ; 8 years
    of age as on 1.4.2001.

          The appellants, the in-laws of the deceased, were convicted under
F   Sections 304-B, 498-A and 201 of the Indian Penal Code. The deceased
    was being harassed for dowry, before her death. A-1 and A-4 were her
    father-in-law and mother in law. A-2 was her brother-in-law and A-3, her
    husband. As per the prosecution, the accused persons sent the deceased
    to her father's home about IO days before the occurrence to arrange dowry
G   of Rs. 7000 for the purchase of a buffalo. Later, on 11.6.1989 A-3 came
    to the house of PW-4, her father, and requested him to send the deceased
    to her matrimonial home for attending the engagement ceremony of A-2,
    for which he agreed. On the intervening right of 13.4.1989 and 14.6.1989,
    A-2 and four others informed PW-4 that the deceased was seriously ill.

H                                        182
                   SATBIRSINGHv. STATEOFHARYANA                          183
When he reached there he found her dead with blood in her mouth. The            A
accused persons refused to hand over the dead body to PW-4 and hurriedly
cremated her body, the next morning. The High Court affirmed the order
of conviction passed by the trial court. Hence this appeal.

      Aj1pellants contended that the evidence of DW-1, the compounder
of the village doctor, was material for rebuttal of the presumption under       B
Section 113-8 of the Indian Evidence Act; that the deceased condoned all
acts of harassment, when she returned to her matrimonial home on
11.6.1989; and that A-2 was entitled to the benefit of the Juvenile Justice
Act, 1986 and Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection) Act, 2000.

      Dismissing the appeal, the Court                                          c
       HELD: 1. Undisputedly the death of the deceased occurred during
seven years of her marriage. At the time of marriage the dowry was paid
according to the capacity of the complainant. However, subsequent to the
 marriage, the deceased was harassed for not bringing more dowry. Ten           D
days prior to the incident, the deceased had come to the complainant's
place and stated that her in-laws were demanding Rs. 7,000 as they wanted
to purchase a buffalo. She had further stated that till she brought the same,
she would not be allowed to return. She died in intervening period of 13/
14.6.1989 with bodily injury occurring otherwise than under normal
circumstances. The prosecution was able to establish the ingredients as         E
enjoined under Section 304-8 of Indian Penal Code. Once the same was
established the presumption against the accused began as enjoined under
Section 113-8 of the Indian Evidence Act. Though a rebuttable
presumption, the onus lies on the accused against whom the presumption
lies to discharge it. Once the prosecution has established ingredients of       F
Section 304-8 IPC, the onus lies on the accused to rebut the presumption
under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act. [187-8-C-D-E-F]

      State of Karnataka v. M V. Manjunathegowda and Anr., (2003] 2 SCC
188, relied on

      2.1. The evidence of DW-1 was considered by the trial court as well       G
as by the High Court and rejected, as it did not inspire confidence. The
case of the appellant was that the deceased died of heart attack and in his
defence he examined DW-1. Prima facie, the evidence did not inspire
confidence. DW-1 in his own statement stated that he was a matriculate
and working as a compounder with the village Doctor, who did not possess        H
    184                       SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2005] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A MBBS degree. DW-1 referred to a Certificate stated to have been granted
    by a village Doctor to the effect that he had worked as Compounder, but
    he had no knowledge about the symptoms of heart attack. The deposition
    of DW-1 was that the deceased was suffering from heart ailment, was only
    a figment of his imagination. With his educational background no
B   credibility could be given to such a statement. The accused had not brought
    out any evidence that the deceased was suffering from heart ailment. The
    plea that the deceased died of heart attack was merely a ruse to escape
    punishment. PW-4 categorically stated, in his cross examination that the
    deceased did not die of heart attack but she was killed because he saw
    bluish signs on her neck. [188-B-C-D-E-Fl
c         2.2. It came in evidence that the deceased was taken back by A-3 on
    11.6.1989 stating that the engagement ceremony of his younger brother
    was to be performed on 12.6.1989 and in which the presence of deceased
    was required. There was no evidence whatsoever to show that the
    engagement of A.2 was performed on 12.6.1989. Taking the deceased back
D   on 11.6.1989 under the pretext of impending engagement ceremony on
    12.6.1989 is merely a ruse. 1188-F-G-HI

         State of Orissa v. Niranjan Mahapatra and Ors., JT (2005) 2 SC 599
    and Kans Raj v. State of Punjab and Ors., JT (2000) 5 SC 223, distinguished

          3. Juvenile means a boy who has not attained the age of 16 years or
E   a girl who has not attained the age of 18 years. As per the statement A-2
    he was 17 years of age, as on 13.6.1989, therefore, not entitled to the benefit
    of Juvenile Justice Act, 1986. The provisions of the Juvenile Justice (Care
    & Protection) Act, 2000 are applicable even to those cases initiated and
    pending for offences committed under the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986,
F   provided the offender has not completed 18 years of age as on l.4.2001.
                                                                   (189-C-D-E-Fl

            CRIMINAL AP PELLA TE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 7 of
    2005.

G        From the Judgment and Order dated 8.8.2003 of the Punjab and Haryana
    High Court in Crl. A. No. 151 SB of 1990.
         R.N. Kush, Jetender Singh, Ms. Deep Shikha and S.K. Sabharwal for
    the Appellants.
            Manjit Singh, Harikishan Kataria and T.V. George for the Respondent.
H           The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
              SATBIR SINGHv. STATEOFHARYANA [SEMA, J.)                     185
      SEMA, J. Heard parties.                                                      A
      This appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 8.8.03
passed by the High Court affirming the conviction recorded by the Trial
Court.

      Accused No. I Satbir Singh, father-in-law of the deceased, Accused
No.2, Pritam Singh, younger brother of the deceased, Accused No.3, Dilbag          B
Singh, husband of the deceased and Accused No. 4, Smt. Bohti, mother-in-
law of the deceased were put to trial under Sections 304-B, 498-A and 201
IPC. The Trial Court, after considering the evidence and the documents on
record, convicted all of them and sentenced them to undergo rigorous
imprisonment for 7 years under Section 304-B IPC. They were also sentenced         C
to 3 years RI and fine of Rs. !000, in default to undergo I year RI under
Section 498-A IPC. Accused Nos. 2 and 3 were also sentenced to undergo
3 years RI and fine of Rs. I 000, in default to undergo RI for one year under
Section 20 I !PC. The sentence were, however, ordered to run concurrently.

      Briefly stated the prosecution case is that the FIR was lodged by            D
complainant, PW-4, father of the deceased on I4.6. I 989 to the effect that he
had five daughters and two sons. Smt. Shanti Devi was married to Accused
No.3, Dilbag Singh, and at the time of marriage he had given dowry as per
his capacity. Subsequently when the deceased used to come from her maternal
house, she was asked to make some demand of dowry on the instructions of
the family members of her in-laws. It is also stated that after the marriage       E
also, the complainant had given a radio and wrist watch, but not satisfied,
accused No.3 and his family members used to demand more dowry. It is also
stated that about I 0 days back from the date of occurrence that is, intervening
night of 13/14the June, 1989, the deceased Smt. Shanti had come to the
house of the complainant and stated that Accused No.3 Dilbag Singh, Accused        F
No.2, Pritam Singh, Accused No. I, Satbir Singh and Accused No.4 Smt.
Bohti, the mother-in-law of the deceased, asked her to go to the complainant's
house and bring a sum of Rs. 7000, because they wanted to purchase a
buffalo. It is also stated that the deceased would not be allowed to reside in
in-laws house till she brought Rs. 7000 with her. It is stated that the
complainant, being a poor man, could not meet the said demand. On I 1.6.1989,      G
A.3, Dilbag Singh came to the house of the complainant and requested him
to send the deceased Smt. Shanti with him stating that there was an engagement
ceremony of his younger brother, Pritam Singh on 12.6. I 989 and the presence
of the deceased will be required. Considering the request, the deceased was
sent along with A.3 on 12.6.1989. It is further stated that in the intervening     H
    186                       SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2005) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A night .of 13/14.6.1989 at about 1.30 a.m. A.2 and four others came to the
    village·of the complainant and told him that his daughter was seriously ill.
    On arrival the complainant noticed that Shanti was already dead and there
    was blood in her mouth. He requested the accused that he will take the body
    of his daughter to his village and perform last rites. However, the request was
B   declined and the accused hurriedly called about 15120 persons from the village
    and against his wishes the body of the deceased was cremated at about 8.00
    a.m.

          Section 304-B reads as under:-

           I.   Where the death of a woman is caused by any bums or bodily
c               injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within
                seven years of here marriage and it is shown that soon before her
                death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband
                or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any
                demand for dowry, such death shall be called "dowry death",
D               and such husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her
                death."
               Section 304-B as quoted above, clearly shows that in order to
           bring the offence within the purview of Section 304-8, the following
           ingredients are to be fulfilled:-
E              (a) that the death of woman is caused by any bums or bodily
           injury occurs other than in normal circumstances,

               (b) that such death must have occurred during the seven years of
           her marriage,

F              (c) Soon before her death, she must be subjected to cruelty or
           harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband,

              (d) Such harassment by the husband or relative must be in
           connection with any demand for dowry.

G              (e) Once the ingredients are fulfilled the death shall be presumed
           as dowry death. The husband and such other relatives shall be deemed
           to have caused her death.

        Section 304-B was inserted in the Indian Penal Code by Act 43 of 1986
  with effect from 19.11.1986. In consequence thereof, another Section 113-B
H was inserted in the Evidence Act by Act 43 of 1986 with effect from 1.5.1986.
              SATBIR SINGH v. STATE OF HARYANA [SEMA, J.]                   187

Section 113-B of the Evidence Act deals with the presumption of the dowry           A
death which reads as· under:-

        "113-B. Presumption as to dowry death - When the question is
        whether a person has committed the dowry death of a woman and it
        is shown that soon before her death such woman had been subjected
        by such person to cruelty or harassment, or in connection with, any         B
        demand for dowry, the Court 'shall presume that such person had
        caused the dowry death.''

        Undisputedly in this case the death of a woman has occurred during
 seven years of her marriage. It is also stated that, at the time of marriage the
 dowry has been paid according to the capacity of the complainant. However,         C
 subsequent to the marriage, the deceased Shanti was harassed for not bringing
'more dowry. Ten days prior to the incident, the deceased had come to the
 complainant's place and stated that her in-laws were demanding Rs. 7000 as
 they wanted to .purchase a buffalo. She had further stated that till she brings
 the desired money, she would not be allowed to reside in her in-laws place.        D
 She died in intervening period of 13/14/6/1989 with bodily injury occurs
 otherwise than under normal circumstances. In our view, the prosecution has
 been able to establish the ingredients as enjoined under Section 304-B of
 Indian Penal Code. Once the prosecution is able to establish the aforesaid
 ingredients, the presumption against the accused starts as enjoined under
 Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act. Of course, it is a rebuttable            E
 presumption and the onus lies, on the accused against whom the presumption
 lies to discharge it. On this aspect the laws are no more res integra. In catena
 of decisions, this Court has repeatedly held that once that ingredients of
 Section 304-B IPC have been able to established by the prosecution, the onus
 lies on the accused to rebut the presumption under Section 113-B of the            F
 Evidence Act. Avoiding multiplicity, we may refer to the decision rendered
 by this Court in the case of State of Karnataka v. M. V. Manjunathegowda
 and Anr., [2003] 2 SCC 188 at page 189 this Court said that

            "In order to establish the offence under Section 304-B IPC the
        prosecution is obliged to prove that the death of a woman is caused         G
        by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal
        circumstances and such death occurs within 7 years of her marriage
        and if it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to
        cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband.
        Such harassment and cruelty must be. in connection with any demand
        for dowry. If the prosecution is able to prove these circumstances          H
    188                       SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2005] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A           then the presumption under Section I 13-B of the Evidence Act will
            operate. It is a rebuttable presumption and the onus to rebut shifts on
            the accused. The defence of the accused was a total denial. Therefore,
            the presumption as to dowry death envisaged under Section I 13-B of
            the Evidence Act remains unrebutted."

B         Learned counsel for the appellant, in order to rebut the presumption,
    has taken us through the evidence of DW-1. His evidence was considered by
    the Trial Court as well as by the High Court, and rejected as it does not
    inspire confidence. The case of the appellant was that the deceased died of
    heart attack and in his defence he examined DW-1. We have also been taken
C   through the entire evidence of DW-1. Prima facie, the evidence does not
    inspire confidence. DW-1 in his own statement, said that he was a matriculate.
    He was stated to be working as a Compounder with the village Doctor. The
    village Doctor does not possess MBBS degree. DW-1 referred to a Certificate
    stated to have been granted by a village Doctor to the effect that he had
    worked as Compounder, but he has no knowledge about the symptoms of
D   heart attack. The deposition of DW-1 is the deceased Shanti was suffering
    from heart ailment, is only a figment of his imagination. With his educational
    background, as aforestated, no court shall give credence to such statement, as
    has been rightly done by the Trial Court and the High Court in the instant
    case. This apart, the accused has not brought out any evidence that the deceased
E   was suffering from heart ailment. Therefore, the plea that the deceased died
    of heart attack was merely a ruse to escape punishment. PW-4 categorically
    stated, in his cross examination, that the deceased, Smt. Shanti, did not die
    of heart attack but she was killed because he saw bluish signs on her neck.
    Learned counsel for the appellant also streneously urged that the harassment,
    if any, meted out to the deceased was subsequently condoned by the act of
F   the accused by taking the deceased back to his house on I 1.6.1989. It has
    come in evidence that the deceased was taken back by A.3 on I 1.6. I 989
    stating that the engagement ceremony of his younger brother who has been
    arraigned as A.2 in this appeal was to be performed on 12.6.1989 and on
    which the presence of deceased was required. There is no evidence whatsoever
G   to show that the engagement of A.2 was performed on 12.6. I 989 as stated.
    Therefore, taking the deceased back on 11.6 .1989 under the pretext of
    impending engagement ceremony on 12.6.1989 is merely a ruse. Learned
    counsel has referred to the decision of this Court rendered in the case of State
    of Orissa v. Niranjan Mahapatra and Ors.. reported in JT (2005) 2 SC 599
    wherein this Court has held, that there was no evidence to suggest that soon
H   before the occurrence, the deceased was subjected to torture and harassment




                                                                                       ,kl
                  SA TBIR SINGH v. STATE OF HARYANA [SEMA, J.]               189

"   and therefore the ingredients under Section 304-B was not established. Apart A
'   from, no law has been laid down in the said decision which can be followed
    as a precedent, the facts of that case are distinguishable with the facts of the
    present case. In the present case, we have already noted that the ingredients
    of Section 304-B have been well established by the prosecution.

          Learned counsel also has referred to another decision of this Court B
    rendered in Kans Raj v. State of Punjab and Ors., reported in JT (2000) 5
    SC 223 wherein this Court held that subsequent allegation must be levelled
    against all the accused which may be mentioned in the complaint PW-4 has
    mentioned all the names of the accused in the F.l.R. This ruling is of no help
    to the appellant.                                                              C
          Lastly, it is contended that the A.2, Pritam Singh was 17 years of age
    as on 13 .6.1989 and therefore he should be entitled to the benefit of the
    Juvenile Justice Act, 1986. Section 2(h) defines "Juvenile" means a boy
    who has not attained the age of 16 years or a girl who has not attained the
    age of 18 years. As per his own statement A.2 was 17 years of age as on D
    13.6.1989, therefore, he is not entitled to the benefit of Juvenile Justice Act,
    1986.

          Counsel also made an attempt to press the services of Section 20 of the
    Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection) Act, 2000 (56 of 2000). The Act was
    enforced with effect from 1.4.200 I. Jn the case of Pratap Singh v. State of    E
    Jharkhand and Anr., reported in JT (2005) 2 SC 271, the Constitution Bench
    of this Court considered the question and held, that the provisions of the
    2000 Act would be applicable even to those cases initiated and pending for
    offences committed under the Act of 1986, provided the offender has not
    completed 18 years of age as on 1.4.200 I.
                                                                                    F
         For the reasons aforesaid, the appeal is devoid of any merit and it is,
    accordingly, dismissed.

          Accused Nos. I, 2 and 4 are on bail. Their bail bonds stands cancelled.
    They are directed to be taken in custody forthwith to serve out the remaining   G
    part of the sentences. Compliance report be sent to this Court within one
    month.

    A.Q.                                                      Appeal dismissed.

                                                                                    H