Supreme Court of India
SATBIR SINGH & ANOTHERversusSTATE OF HARYANA
- Citation
- 2021 INSC 301
- Decided
- 28 May 2021
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- N V RAMANA
Holding
The Court upheld the conviction under Sec. 304B IPC while setting aside the conviction under Sec. 306 IPC because suicide was not proved.
Summary
The appellants were convicted for dowry death (Sec. 304B IPC) and abetment of suicide (Sec. 306 IPC) after the victim died from severe burns within a year of marriage, allegedly following dowry harassment. The Supreme Court examined whether the prosecution had proved the essential ingredients of Sec. 304B, including the "soon before" requirement and the statutory presumption under Sec. 113B, Evidence Act. It held that the prosecution had established a proximate link between dowry harassment and the death, satisfying Sec. 304B and invoking the presumption, which the accused failed to rebut. Conversely, the Court found no competent evidence that the death was a suicide, a prerequisite for Sec. 306, and therefore the presumption under Sec. 113A could not apply. Consequently, the Court upheld the conviction under Sec. 304B but set aside the conviction and sentence under Sec. 306. The appeals were allowed in part, confirming the dowry‑death conviction and overturning the abetment‑of‑suicide conviction.
Issues considered
- Whether the conviction under Section 304B of the Indian Penal Code is sustainable on the facts and the statutory presumption under Section 113B of the Evidence Act.
- Whether the conviction under Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code can be sustained in the absence of proof that the death was a suicide.
Legislation cited
- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 232, s. 233
- Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961
- Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 113A, s. 113B
- Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 304B, s. 306
Subjects
dowry deathSection 304B IPCSection 306 IPCpresumption under Section 113Bsoon beforerebuttable presumptionevidence lawcriminal procedure
Judgment
[2021] 7 S.C.R. 269 269
SATBIR SINGH & ANOTHER A
v.
STATE OF HARYANA
(Criminal Appeal Nos. 1735-1736 of 2010)
MAY 28, 2021 B
[N. V. RAMANA, CJI, AND ANIRUDDHA BOSE, JJ.]
Penal Code, 1860: s. 304B – Dowry death – Conviction under
– Prosecution case that the victim committed suicide by setting herself
ablaze just after one year of her marriage and that soon before
C
her death, she was subjected to cruelty and harassment for bringing
less dowry by the accused – Conviction of the accused for the
offences u/s. 304B and 306 with 7 years and 5 years rigorous
imprisonment respectively – High Court upheld the order of the
trial court – On appeal, held: Prosecution was able to successfully
prove that the death of the victim due to burn injuries took place D
within one year of her marriage – It has been proved that soon
before her death she was subjected to harassment and cruelty
pursuant to demands of dowry – Chain of circumstances proves
that there existed a live and proximate link between the instances of
demand of dowry and the death of the victim – Statements of the
E
witnesses were corroborative, consistent and reliable – However,
presumption in s. 113B not rebutted by the accused – Thus, the
High Court and trial court rightly convicted the accused u/s. 304-B
– As regards offence u/s. 306, the prosecution failed to establish
that the death occurred due to suicide, thus, the conviction and
sentence u/s. 306 is set aside – Evidence Act, 1872 – s. 113B, 113A. F
s. 304B – Phrase ‘soon before’ – Interpretation of – Held:
Phrase ‘soon before’ in s. 304B cannot be construed to mean
immediately before – Strict interpretation would defeat the very
object of enactment – No straitjacket formulae can be laid down by
this Court to define what eXacts the phrase soon before entails – G
Thus, the Courts should use their discretion to determine if the period
between the cruelty or harassment and the death of the victim would
come within the term soon before – Establishment of a proximate
and live link between the cruelty and the consequential death of
the victim, is pivotal to the said determination.
H
269
270 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 7 S.C.R.
A s. 304B – Dowry death – Categorization death, as homicidal
or suicidal or accidental – Pigeonhole approach – Held: s.304 B
does not take a pigeonhole approach in categorizing death as
homicidal or suicidal or accidental – Reason for such non-
categorization is due to the fact that death occurring otherwise
than under normal circumstances can, in cases, be homicidal or
B
suicidal or accidental.
s. 304B – Inclusion of, in the Code – Legislative history –
Explained.
Evidence Act, 1872: s. 113-B – Presumption as to dowry death
C – Rebuttal of – Held: When the prosecution shows that soon before
her death such woman has been subjected by such person to cruelty
or harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, a
presumption of causation arises against the accused u/s. 113B –
Thereafter, the accused has to rebut this statutory presumption –
Usage of rebuttable presumption of causality, u/s. 113B creates a
D greater responsibility on Judges, defense and prosecution – They
need to be extra careful during conducting criminal trials relating
to s. 304-B.
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: ss. 233, 232 – Entering upon
defence – Right to accused u/s. 233 – Held: Under s. 232 if, after
E taking the evidence for the prosecution, examining the accused and
hearing the prosecution and the defence on the point, the Judge
considers that there is no evidence that the accused committed the
offence, the Judge shall record an order of acquittal – Once the
trial court decides that the accused is not eligible to be acquitted as
F per the provisions of s. 232, it must move on and fix hearings
specifically for defence evidence, calling upon the accused to
present his defense as per the procedure provided u/s. 233, which
is also an invaluable right provided to the accused – Existence of
such procedural right cohesively sits with the rebuttable presumption
as provided u/s. 113B, Evidence Act.
G
Judicial guidelines: Dowry death cases – Trial of – Held: Guidelines
have been laid down for the trial of dowry death cases.
Allowing the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1.1 Considering the significance of s. 304-B IPC, a
H strict interpretation would defeat the very object for which it was
SATBIR SINGH & ANOTHER v. STATE OF HARYANA 271
enacted. Therefore, it is safe to deduce that when the legislature A
used the words, ‘soon before’ they did not mean immediately
before. Rather, they left its determination in the hands of the
courts. The factum of cruelty or harassment differs from case to
case. Even the spectrum of cruelty is quite varied, as it can range
from physical, verbal or even emotional. This list is certainly not
B
eXhaustive. No straitjacket formulae can therefore be laid down
by this Court to define what eXacts the phrase soon before entails.
Therefore, Courts should use their discretion to determine if
the period between the cruelty or harassment and the death of
the victim would come within the term soon before. What is pivotal
to the above determination, is the establishment of a proximate C
and live link between the cruelty and the consequential death of
the victim. [Paras 14, 15][282-C-E; 283-A-B]
Major Singh v. State of Punjab (2015) 5 SCC 201 :
[2015] 5 SCR 777; Commissioner of Customs (Import),
Mumbai v. Dilip Kumar & Company (2018) 9 SCC 1 : D
[2018] 7 SCR 1191; [State of Gujarat v. Mansukhbhai
Kanjibhai Shah 2020 SCC OnLine SC 412]; Kans Raj
v. State of Punjab (2000) 5 SCC 207 : [2000] 3 SCR
662; Rajinder Singh v. State of Punjab (2015) 6 SCC
477 : [2015] 2 SCR 835 – Referred to
E
1.2 When the prosecution shows that “soon before her death
such woman has been subjected by such person to cruelty or
harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry”, a
presumption of causation arises against the accused under Section
113B of the Evidence Act. Thereafter, the accused has to rebut
this statutory presumption. The usage of rebuttable presumption F
of causality, under Section 113B, Evidence Act, creates a greater
responsibility on Judges, defense and prosecution. They need to
be extra careful during conducting criminal trials relating to
Section 304B, IPC. In order to address this precarious situation,
procedural law has some safeguards. [Paras 16, 19][283-B-C; G
284-A-C]
Bansi Lal v. State of Haryana (2011) 11 SCC 359 :
[2011] 1 SCR 724 – referred to
H
272 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 7 S.C.R.
A 1.3 It is a matter of grave concern that, often, Trial Courts
record the statement of an accused under Section 313, CrPC in a
very casual and cursory manner, without specifically questioning
the accused as to his defense. The examination of an accused
under Section 313, CrPC cannot be treated as a mere procedural
formality, as it is based on the fundamental principle of fairness.
B
This provision incorporates the valuable principle of natural
justice” “audi alteram partem”, as it enables the accused to offer
an explanation for the incriminatory material appearing against
him. Therefore, it imposes an obligation on the part of the Court
to question the accused fairly, with care and caution. The Court
C must put incriminating circumstances before the accused and seek
his response. A duty is also cast on the counsel of the accused to
prepare his defense, since the inception of the trial, with due
caution, keeping in consideration the peculiarities of Section
304B, IPC read with Section 113B, Evidence Act. [Para 20]
[284-C-F]
D
1.4 Section 232, CrPC assumes importance, which reads
as, “if, after taking the evidence for the prosecution, examining
the accused and hearing the prosecution and the defence on the
point, the Judge considers that there is no evidence that the
accused committed the offence, the Judge shall record an order
E of acquittal”. Once the trial court decides that the accused is not
eligible to be acquitted as per the provisions of Section 232 it
must move on and fix hearings specifically for defence evidence,
calling upon the accused to present his defense as per the
procedure provided u/s. 233 which is also an invaluable right
F provided to the accused. Existence of such procedural right
cohesively sits with the rebuttable presumption as provided under
Section 113B Evidence Act. [Para 21][284-E-H]
1.5 The second contentious part relating to Section 304B,
IPC is that it does not take a pigeonhole approach in categorizing
G death as homicidal or suicidal or accidental, as was done earlier.
The reason for such non categorization is due to the fact that
death occurring “otherwise than under normal circumstances” can,
in cases, be homicidal or suicidal or accidental. However, Section
304B endeavors to also address those situations wherein
murders or suicide are masqueraded as accidents. Thus, if all
H
SATBIR SINGH & ANOTHER v. STATE OF HARYANA 273
the other ingredients of Section 304B IPC are fulfilled, any death A
whether caused by burns or by bodily injury or occurring otherwise
than under normal circumstances shall, as per the legislative
mandate, be called a “dowry death” and the woman’s husband or
his relative “shall be deemed to have caused her death” unless
proved otherwise. The section clearly specifies what constitutes
B
the offence of dowry death and also identifies the single offender
or multiple offenders who has or have caused the dowry death.
[Paras 22, 23][284-H; 285-A-D]
Maya Devi v. State of Haryana (2015) 17 SCC 405:[
2015] 11 SCR 903; Shanti v. State of Haryana (1991)
1 SCC 371: [1990] 2 Suppl. SCR 675 – referred to. C
1.6 In the instant case, the deceased victim succumbed to
burns. As the death was relatable to burn injuries within seven
years of marriage, it clearly satisfies the first two ingredients of
the offence. [Para 25][285-E-F]
D
1.7 The chain of circumstances proves that there existed a
live and proximate link between the instances of demand of dowry
and the death of the deceased. The trial court, and the High Court,
upon a close appreciation of the said witnesses came to the
conclusion that the statements were corroborative and consistent.
They found the witnesses to be reliable and on the basis of the E
same held that the deceased was subjected to cruelty soon before
her death as she failed to bring sufficient dowry. The said finding
of the trial court and the High Court is accepted. [Para 27]
[286-B-D]
1.8 It is clear that the prosecution was able to successfully F
prove that the death of the deceased due to burn injuries took
place within approximately one year of her marriage. It has further
been proved that soon before her death she was subjected to
harassment and cruelty pursuant to demands of dowry. Since the
ingredients of Section 304B, IPC stand satisfied, the presumption G
under section 113B, Evidence Act operates against the appellants,
who are deemed to have caused the offence specified under
Section 304B IPC. [Para 28][286-D-F]
1.9 The burden therefore shifts on the accused to rebut
the presumption u/s. 113-B. However, the accused persons failed
H
274 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 7 S.C.R.
A to place any evidence on record to prove that the death was
accidental or unconnected with the accused persons. It ought to
be noted that, according to the evidence of the doctor, the entire
body of the deceased was doused with kerosene oil. Therefore,
the possibility of an accident can be safely ruled out. Therefore,
the presumption adumbrated in Section 113B, Evidence Act takes
B
full effect in this particular case, which has not been rebutted by
the accused-appellants. The appellants have failed to make out a
case for this Court to interfere in the concurrent opinions of the
Courts below, convicting the accused-appellants under Section
304B, IPC. [Paras 29-31][286-F-H; 287-B-C]
C 1.10 For the offence under Section 306, IPC the prosecution
needs to first establish that a suicide has been committed.
Secondly, the prosecution must also prove that the person who
is said to have abetted the commission of suicide, has played an
active role in the same. With respect to this latter requirement,
D Section 113A, Evidence Act creates a presumption against the
husband and/or his relative with respect to the abetment of suicide
of a married woman, under certain conditions. A perusal of the
provision indicates that such presumption shall be attracted only
if the factum of suicide has been established by the prosecution
first. [Para 33][287-E-G]
E
Wazir Chand v. State of Haryana (1989) 1 SCC 244 –
Referred to
1.11 In the instant case, the Trial Court and the High Court
have concluded that the deceased committed suicide. However,
F the conclusion reached by the Courts below is based on
assumptions, as there is no evidence on record to support the
same. There was insufficient evidence to prove the factum of
suicide beyond reasonable doubt, the presumption u/s 113-A,
Evidence Act, is not of much help for the prosecution. The essential
ingredient of deceased committing suicide has not been proved
G by the prosecution by adducing sufficient evidence. Thus, the
prosecution has failed to establish that the death occurred due to
suicide. [Paras 34, 35][288-B-C, D-F]
1.12 The law under Section 304B, IPC read with Section
113B, Evidence Act can be summarized below:
H
SATBIR SINGH & ANOTHER v. STATE OF HARYANA 275
i. Section 304B, IPC must be interpreted keeping in mind A
the legislative intent to curb the social evil of bride burning and
dowry demand.
ii. The prosecution must at first establish the existence of
the necessary ingredients for constituting an offence under Section
304B, IPC. Once these ingredients are satisfied, the rebuttable B
presumption of causality, provided under Section 113B, Evidence
Act operates against the accused.
iii. The phrase “soon before” as appearing in Section 304"B,
IPC cannot be construed to mean immediately before. The
prosecution must establish existence of “proximate and live link” C
between the dowry death and cruelty or harassment for dowry
demand by the husband or his relatives.
iv. Section 304B, IPC does not take a pigeonhole approach
in categorizing death as homicidal or suicidal or accidental. The
reason for such non categorization is due to the fact that death D
occurring “otherwise than under normal circumstances” can, in
cases, be homicidal or suicidal or accidental.
v. Due to the precarious nature of Section 304B, IPC read
with 113B, Evidence Act, judges, prosecution and defence should
be careful during conduct of trial. E
vi. It is a matter of grave concern that, often, trial courts
record the statement under Section 313, CrPC in a very casual
and cursory manner, without specifically questioning the accused
as to his defense. It ought to be noted that the examination of an
accused under Section 313, CrPC cannot be treated as a mere F
procedural formality, as it based on the fundamental principle of
fairness. The said provision incorporates the valuable principle
of natural justice “audi alteram partem” as it enables the accused
to offer an explanation for the incriminatory material appearing
against him. Therefore, it imposes an obligation on the court to
question the accused fairly, with care and caution. G
vii. The Court must put incriminating circumstances before
the accused and seek his response. A duty is also cast on the
counsel of the accused to prepare his defense since the inception
of the trial with due caution, keeping in consideration the
H
276 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 7 S.C.R.
A peculiarities of Section 304B, IPC read with Section 113B,
Evidence Act.
viii. Section 232, CrPC provides that, “if, after taking the
evidence for the prosecution, examining the accused and hearing
the prosecution and the defence on the point, the Judge considers
B that there is no evidence that the accused committed the offence,
the Judge shall record an order of acquittal”. Such discretion must
be utilized by the trial courts as an obligation of best efforts.
ix. Once the trial court decides that the accused is not
eligible to be acquitted as per the provisions of Section 232, CrPC,
C it must move on and fix hearings specifically for defence evidence,
calling upon the accused to present his defense as per the
procedure provided under Section 233, CrPC, which is also an
invaluable right provided to the accused.
x. In the same breath, trial courts need to balance other
D important considerations such as the right to a speedy trial. In
this regard, the provisions should not be allowed to be misused
as delay tactics.
xi. The presiding Judge should follow the guidelines laid
down by this Court while sentencing and imposing appropriate
E punishment.
xii. Undoubtedly, the menace of dowry death is increasing
day by day. However, it is also observed that sometimes family
members of the husband are roped in, even though they have no
active role in commission of the offence and are residing at distant
F places. In these cases, the Court need to be cautious in its
approach. [Para 36][288-F-H; 289-A-H; 290-A-E]
1.13 After perusing the relevant material and the evidence
available, it is found that the High Court and trial court have not
committed any error in convicting the appellants under Section
304B, IPC as the appellants failed to discharge the burden under
G
Section 113B, Evidence Act. However, upon appreciation of facts
and circumstances the offence under Section 306, IPC is not made
out. Therefore, the conviction and sentence under Section 306,
IPC is set aside. [Para 37][290-E-G]
H
SATBIR SINGH & ANOTHER v. STATE OF HARYANA 277
Global study on Homicide: Gender-related killing of A
women and girls, published by the United Nations
Office on Drugs and Crime – referred to.
Case Law Reference
[2015] 5 SCR 777 Referred to Para 8
B
[2018] 7 SCR 1191 Referred to Para 9
[2000] 3 SCR 662 Referred to Para 14
[2015] 2 SCR 835 Referred to Para 14
[2011] 1 SCR 724 Referred to Para 17
C
[2015] 11 SCR 903 Referred to Para 23
[1990] 2 Suppl. SCR 675 Referred to Para 23
[1989] 1 SCC 244 Referred to Para 33
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal D
Nos. 1735-1736 of 2010
From the Judgment and Order dated 06.11.2008 of the High Court
of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh, in Criminal Appeal No. 3-SB and
16-SB1998 in FIR No. Dated 31.07.1995 u/s 304B/306/34.
Divyadeep Chaturvedi, Naveen Sharma, Advs. for the Appellants. E
Raj Singh Rana, AAG., Pankaj Kumar Singh, Sanjay Kumar Visen,
Advs. for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
N. V. RAMANA, CJI F
1. The present appeals arise out of the impugned judgment dated
06.11.2008 passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at
Chandigarh in Criminal Appeal Nos. 3-SB of 1998 and 16-SB of 1998,
whereby the High Court dismissed the appeals preferred by the
appellants and upheld the order of conviction and sentence passed by G
the Trial Court on 11.12.1997.
2. The case of the prosecution is that the deceased and accused-
appellant no.1 were married on 01.07.1994. On 31.7.1995, at about 4 or
4.30 P.M, some persons informed the complainant that his daughter was
H
278 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 7 S.C.R.
A ailing and admitted in the hospital. On this information he, along with his
wife and son, reached the hospital and found that the deceased passed
away due to burn injuries.The prosecution’s case was that the deceased
committed suicide by setting herself ablaze just after one year of her
marriage and that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty
and harassment on account of bringing less dowry by both the accused.
B
3. The appellants were convicted by the Trial Court vide order
dated 11.12.1997 for the offences under Sections 304-B and 306, IPC
and were sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for seven years
for the offence punishable under Section 304-B, IPC and to undergo
rigorous imprisonment for five years for the offence punishable under
C Section 306, IPC.
4. Aggrieved thereby, the appellants approached the High Court
to set aside the order of conviction and sentence passed by the Trial
Court. The High Court vide impugned judgment dated 06.11.2008, upheld
the order of the Trial Court and dismissed the appeal filed by the
D appellants. The appellants have filed the present appeals by way of
Special Leave, challenging the concurrent findings of the Courts below.
5. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants
submitted that the possibility of accidental fire has not been ruled out in
the present case. Moreover, most importantly, the prosecution failed to
E prove that there was a demand for dowry. Lastly, the prosecution has
failed to prove that the demand, assuming there was one, was made
proximate to the death of the deceased-victim.
6. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent-
State submitted that the appellants had not been able to show any material
F which would merit the interference of this Court in the concurrent findings
of the Courts below. The counsel especially emphasized upon the fact
that the suspicious death of the deceased victim occurred within almost
1 year of marriage. Moreover, the witnesses have stated the specific
instances of demand for dowry with consistency.
G 7. Having heard counsel appearing on either side and perusing
the material on record, this Court needs to answer following questions:
I. Whether the Trial Court, and the High Court, was correct in
convicting the accused on the charge under Section 304B,
IPC?
H
SATBIR SINGH & ANOTHER v. STATE OF HARYANA 279
[N. V. RAMANA, CJI]
II. Whether the Trial Court, and the High Court, was correct in A
convicting the accused on the charge under Section 306,
IPC?
ISSUE I
8. At the outset, it is pertinent to analyze the law on dowry death. B
Section 304-B IPC, which defines, and provides the punishment for dowry
demand, reads as under:
“304-B. Dowry death. —(1) Where the death of a woman is
caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than
under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage C
and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to
cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her
husband for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, such
death shall be called ‘dowry death’, and such husband or relative
shall be deemed to have caused her death.
D
Explanation. —For the purpose of this sub-section, ‘dowry’ shall
have the same meaning as in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition
Act, 1961 (28 of 1961).
(2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with
imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years E
but which may extend to imprisonment for life.”
Section 304B (1) defines ‘dowry death’ of a woman. It provides
that ‘dowry death’ is where death of a woman is caused by burning or
bodily injuries or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances,
within seven years of marriage, andit is shown that soon before her F
death, she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or
any relative of her husband, in connection with demand for dowry. Sub-
clause (2) provides for punishment for those who cause dowry death.
Accordingly, in Major Singh v. State of Punjab, (2015) 5 SCC 201, a
three-Judge Bench of this Court held as follows: G
“10. To sustain the conviction under Section 304-B IPC, the
following essential ingredients are to be established:
(i) the death of a woman should be caused by burns or bodily
injury or otherwise than under a ‘normal circumstance’;
H
280 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 7 S.C.R.
A (ii) such a death should have occurred within seven years of
her marriage;
(iii) she must have been subjected to cruelty or harassment by
her husband or any relative of her husband;
(iv) such cruelty or harassment should be for or in connection
B with demand of dowry; and
(v) such cruelty or harassment is shown to have been meted out
to the woman soon before her death.”
9. The first contentious part that exists in the interpretation of
C Section 304-B, IPC relates to the phrase “soon before” used in the
Section. Being a criminal statute, generally it is to be interpreted strictly.
However, where strict interpretation leads to absurdity or goes against
the spirit of legislation, the courts may in appropriate cases place reliance
upon the genuine import of the words, taken in their usual sense to resolve
such ambiguities. [refer Commissioner of Customs (Import),
D Mumbai v. Dilip Kumar & Company, (2018) 9 SCC 1, State of
Gujarat v. Mansukhbhai Kanjibhai Shah, 2020 SCC OnLine SC 412].
At this juncture, it is therefore necessary to undertake a study of the
legislative history of this Section, in order to determine the intention of
the legislature behind the inclusion of Section 304-B, IPC.
E
10. Section 304-B, IPC is one among many legislative initiatives
undertaken by Parliament to remedy a long-standing social evil. The
pestiferous nature of dowry harassment, wherein married women are
being subjected to cruelty because of covetous demands by husband
and his relatives has not gone unnoticed. The Parliament enacted the
F Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 as a first step to eradicate this social evil.
Further, as the measures were found to be insufficient, the Criminal
Law (Second Amendment) Act, 1983 (Act 46 of 1983) was passed
wherein Chapter XX-A was introduced in the IPC, containing Section
498-A.
G 11. However, despite the above measures, the issue of dowry
harassment was still prevalent. Additionally, there was a growing trend
of deaths of young brides in suspicious circumstances following demands
of dowry. The need for a stringent law to curb dowry deaths was suo
motu taken up by the Law Commission in its 91st Law Commission
Report. The Law Commission recognized that the IPC, as it existed at
H
SATBIR SINGH & ANOTHER v. STATE OF HARYANA 281
[N. V. RAMANA, CJI]
that relevant time, was insufficient to tackle the issue of dowry deaths A
due to the nature and modus of the crime. They observed as under:
“1.3 If, in a particular incident of dowry death, the facts are such
as to satisfy the legal ingredients of an offence already known to
the law, and if those facts can be proved without much difficulty,
the existing criminal law can be resorted to for bringing the offender B
to book. IN practice, however, two main impediments arise-
(i) either the facts do not fully fit into the pigeon-hole of any known
offence; or
(ii) the peculiarities of the situation are such that proof of directly
incriminating facts is thereby rendered difficult.” C
(emphasis supplied)
12. Taking into consideration the aforesaid Law Commission
Report, and the continuing issues relating to dowry related offences, the
Parliament introduced amendments to the Dowry Prohibition Act, as D
well as the IPC by enacting Dowry Prohibition (Amendment) Act, 1986
(Act 43 of 1986). By way of this amendment, Section 304-B, IPC was
specifically introduced in the IPC, as a stringent provision to curb the
menace of dowry death in India. Shrimati Margaret Alva, who presented
the Amendment Bill before Rajya Sabha observed as follows:
E
“This is a social evil and social legislation, as I said cannot correct
every thing. We are trying to see how and where we can make it
a little more difficult and therefore we have increased the
punishment. We have also provided for certain presumptions
because upto now one of our main problem has been the question
of evidence. Because the bride is generally burnt or the wife is F
burnt behind closed doors in her in-law’s home. You have never
really heard of a girl being burnt while cooking in her
mother’s house or her husband’s house. It is always in the
mother-in-law’s house that she catches fire and is burnt in
the kitchen. Therefore, getting evidence immediately
G
becomes a great bit problem. Therefore, we have brought
in a couple of amendments which give certain presumptions
where the burden of proof shifts to the husband and to his
people to show that it was not a dowry death or that it was
not deliberately done.”
(emphasis supplied) H
282 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 7 S.C.R.
A 13. There is no denying that such social evil is persisting even
today. A study titled “Global study on Homicide: Gender-related killing
of women and girls”, published by the United Nations Office on Drugs
and Crime, highlighted that in 2018female dowry deaths account for 40
to 50 percent of all female homicides recorded annually in India.The
dismal truth is that from the period 1999 to 2016, these figures have
B
remained constant. In fact, the latest data furnished by the National
Crime Records Bureau indicates that in 2019 itself, 7115 cases were
registered under Section 304-B, IPC alone.
14. Considering the significance of such a legislation, a strict
interpretation would defeat the very object for which it was enacted.
C Therefore, it is safe to deduce that when the legislature used the words,
“soon before” they did not mean “immediately before”. Rather, they left
its determination in the hands of the courts. The factum of cruelty or
harassment differs from case to case. Even the spectrum of cruelty is
quite varied, as it can range from physical, verbal or even emotional.
D This list is certainly not exhaustive. No straitjacket formulae can therefore
be laid down by this Court to define what exacts the phrase“soon before”
entails. The aforesaid position was emphasized by this Court, in the case
of Kans Raj v. State of Punjab, (2000) 5 SCC 207, wherein the three-
Judge Bench held that:
E “15. … “Soon before” is a relative term which is required to be
considered under specific circumstances of each case and no
straitjacket formula can be laid down by fixing any time-limit.
…In relation to dowry deaths, the circumstances showing
the existence of cruelty or harassment to the deceased are
not restricted to a particular instance but normally refer to
F a course of conduct. Such conduct may be spread over a
period of time.…. Proximate and live link between the effect
of cruelty based on dowry demand and the consequential
death is required to be proved by the prosecution. The
demand of dowry, cruelty or harassment based upon such
G demand and the date of death should not be too remote in
time which, under the circumstances, be treated as having
become stale enough.”
(emphasis supplied)
A similar view was taken by this Court in Rajinder Singh v.
H State of Punjab, (2015) 6 SCC 477.
SATBIR SINGH & ANOTHER v. STATE OF HARYANA 283
[N. V. RAMANA, CJI]
15. Therefore, Courts should use their discretion to determine if A
the period between the cruelty or harassment and the death of the victim
would come within the term “soon before”. What is pivotal to the above
determination, is the establishment of a“proximate and live link” between
the cruelty and the consequential death of the victim.
16. When the prosecution shows that ‘soon before her death such B
woman has been subjected by such person to cruelty or harassment for,
or in connection with, any demand for dowry’, a presumption of causation
arises against the accused under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act.
Thereafter, the accused has to rebut this statutory presumption. Section
113B, Evidence Act reads as under:
“113B. Presumption as to dowry death—When the question C
is whether a person has committed the dowry death of a woman
and it is shown that soon before her death such woman has been
subjected by such person to cruelty or harassment for, or in
connection with, any demand for dowry, the Court shall presume
that such person had caused the dowry death. D
Explanation. - For the purpose of this section, “dowry death” shall
have the same meaning as in section 304B of the Indian Penal
Code (45 of 1860)”
17. This Court, in the case of Bansi Lal v. State of Haryana,
(2011) 11 SCC 359, emphasizedthe mandatory application of the E
presumptionunder Section 113-B of the Evidence Act once the ingredients
of Section 304-B of IPC stood proved:
“19. It may be mentioned herein thatthe legislature in its
wisdom has used the word ‘shall’ thus, making a mandatory
application on the part of the court to presume that death
F
had been committed by the person who had subjected her
to cruelty or harassment in connection with any demand of
dowry.…Therefore, in view of the above, onus lies on the accused
to rebut the presumption and in case of Section 113-B relatable to
Section 304-B IPC, the onus to prove shifts exclusively and heavily
on the accused. … G
20. Therefore, in case the essential ingredients of such
death have been established by the prosecution, it is the
duty of the court to raise a presumption that the accused
has caused the dowry death.”
(emphasis supplied) H
284 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 7 S.C.R.
A 18. Therefore, once all the essential ingredients are established
by the prosecution, the presumption under Section 113-B, Evidence Act
mandatorily operates against the accused. This presumption of causality
that arises can be rebutted by the accused.
19. The usage of rebuttable presumption of causality, under Section
B 113-B, Evidence Act,creates a greater responsibility on Judges, defense
and prosecution. They need to be extra careful during conducting criminal
trials relating to Section 304-B, IPC. In order to address this precarious
situation, procedural law has some safeguards, which merits mentioning
herein.
20. It is a matter of grave concern that, often, Trial Courts record
C the statement of an accused under Section 313, CrPC in a very casual
and cursory manner, without specifically questioning the accused as to
his defense. It ought to be noted that the examination of an accused
under Section 313, CrPC cannot be treated as a mere procedural formality,
as it is based on the fundamental principle of fairness. This provision
D incorporates the valuable principle of natural justice- “audi alteram
partem”, as it enables the accused to offer an explanation for the
incriminatory material appearing against him. Therefore, it imposes an
obligation on the part of the Court to question the accused fairly, with
care and caution. The Court must put incriminating circumstances before
the accused and seek his response. A duty is also cast on the counsel of
E the accused to prepare his defense, since the inception of the trial,with
due caution, keeping in consideration the peculiarities of Section 304-B,
IPC read with Section 113-B, Evidence Act.
21. Section 232, CrPC assumes importance, which readsas, “If,
after taking the evidence for the prosecution, examining the accused
F and hearing the prosecution and the defence on the point, the Judge
considers that there is no evidence that the accused committed the
offence, the Judge shall record an order of acquittal”. Once the Trial
Court decides that the accused is not eligible to be acquitted as per the
provisions of Section 232,CrPC, it must move on and fix hearings
specifically for ‘defence evidence’, calling upon the accused to present
G
his defense as per the procedure provided under Section 233, CrPC,
which is also an invaluable right provided to the accused. Existence of
such procedural right cohesively sits with the rebuttable presumption as
provided under Section 113-B, Evidence Act.
22. The second contentious part relating to Section 304-B, IPC is
H that it does not take a pigeonhole approach in categorizing death as
SATBIR SINGH & ANOTHER v. STATE OF HARYANA 285
[N. V. RAMANA, CJI]
homicidal or suicidal or accidental, as was done earlier. The reason for A
such non categorization is due to the fact that death occurring “otherwise
than under normal circumstances” can, in cases, be homicidal or suicidal
or accidental. However, the Section 304-B, IPC endeavors to also
address those situations wherein murders or suicide are masqueraded
as accidents.
B
23. Therefore, if all the other ingredients of Section 304-B IPC
are fulfilled, any death whether caused by burns or by bodily injury or
occurring otherwise than under normal circumstances shall, as per the
legislative mandate, be called a "dowry death" and the woman's husband
or his relative "shall be deemed to have caused her death" unless proved
otherwise. The section clearly specifies what constitutes the offence of C
dowry death and also identifies the single offender or multiple offenders
who has or have caused the dowry death. [refer Maya Devi v. State of
Haryana, (2015) 17 SCC 405, Shanti v. State of Haryana, (1991) 1
SCC 371]
24. After having observed the law on Section 304-B, IPC, we D
may now turn to the merits of this case. It is clear that the submissions
of the counsel for the appellants must be rejected. It is an admitted fact
that the deceased and accused were married on 01.07.1994, and the
death of the lady occurred on 31.07.1995.
25. With respect to the cause of death, the doctor (P.W.3) found E
the smell of kerosene oil on the body of the deceased who had suffered
85% burn injuries. Therefore, in the present case, the deceased victim
succumbed to burns. As the death was relatable to burn injuries within
seven years of marriage, it clearly satisfies the first two ingredients of
the offence. F
26. Coming to the issue of dowry demand, the evidence on record
indicates that when the brother of the deceased (P.W.7) visited her in
the matrimonial house after one month of marriage on the occasion of
Raksha Bandhan, the deceased had disclosed that the accused, husband
and mother-in-law, used to physically harass her on the account of bringing
G
insufficient dowry. Furthermore, the accused persons had made a specific
demand of a scooter. Pursuant to this disclosure, she was brought back
to her paternal house where this fact was disclosed to father of the
deceased (P.W.6). It is pertinent to note that, only a month prior to her
death, the deceased had returned to her matrimonial house.However,
the accused still used to harass the deceased for dowry.The aforesaid H
286 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 7 S.C.R.
A fact was revealed by the deceased to her father, when she had come to
visit him.
27. It must be emphasized herein that, just a week before the
death, on the occasion of Teej festival, another brother of the deceased
(P.W.10) had visited her while she was in her matrimonial home. The
B deceased had reiterated her plight to her brother. Thereafter, on
31.07.1995, the father of the deceased was informed by some villagers
that his daughter has been admitted in the hospital. Upon reaching, the
father discovered that the deceased succumbed to burn injuries.The
aforesaid chain of circumstances proves that there existed a live and
proximate link between the instances of demand of dowry and the death
C of the deceased. The Trial Court, and the High Court, upon a close
appreciation of the aforesaid witnesses came to the conclusion that the
statements were corroborative and consistent.They found the witnesses
to be reliable and on the basis of the same held that the deceased was
subjected to cruelty soon before her death as she failed to bring sufficient
D dowry. We are in complete agreement with the aforesaid finding of the
Trial Court and the High Court.
28. From the above analysis, it is clear that the prosecution was
able to successfully prove that the death of the deceased due to burn
injuries took place within approximately one year of her marriage. It has
E further been proved that soon before her death she was subjected to
harassment and cruelty pursuant to demands of dowry. Since the
ingredients of Section 304-B, IPC stand satisfied, the presumption under
113-B, Evidence Act operates against the appellants, who are deemed
to have caused the offence specified under Section 304-B of IPC.
F 29. The burden therefore shifts on the accused to rebut the
aforesaid presumption. The counsel for the appellants has canvassed
before us that it was a case of accidental death, and hence no liability
can be fixed upon them. However, in the present case, the accused
persons failed to place any evidence on record to prove that the death
was accidental or unconnected with the accused persons.
G
30. Here, it ought to be noted that, according to the evidence of
the doctor, the entire body of the deceased was doused with kerosene
oil. Therefore, the possibility of an accident can be safely ruled out. As
the Trial Court concluded:
H
SATBIR SINGH & ANOTHER v. STATE OF HARYANA 287
[N. V. RAMANA, CJI]
“All these circumstances go to prove that either deceased A
committed suicide by sprinkling kerosene oil on her body or she
was burnt by sprinkling kerosene on her body either by the accused
or by somebody else and the plea of accident tried to be made out
by the learned counsel for the accused, is not at all proved.”
31. Therefore, the presumption adumbrated in Section 113-B, B
Evidence Act takes full effect in this particular case, which has not been
rebutted by the accused-appellants herein. The appellantshave failed to
make out a case for us to interfere in the concurrent opinions of the
Courts below, convicting the accused-appellants under Section 304-B,
IPC.
C
ISSUE II
32. Apart from their conviction under Section 304-B, IPC, the
appellantshavealso additionally challenged their conviction under Section
306, IPC. Section 306, IPC relates to the abetment of suicide and is
extracted below: D
“306.Abetment of suicide. —If any person commits suicide,
whoever abets the commission of such suicide, shall be punished
with imprisonment of either description for a term which may
extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.”
33. A bare reading of the provision indicates that for the offence E
under Section 306, IPC the prosecution needs to first establish that a
suicide has been committed. Secondly, the prosecution must also prove
that the person who is said to have abetted the commission of suicide,
has played an active role in the same. With respect to this latter
requirement, Section 113-A, Evidence Act creates a presumption against F
the husband and/or his relative with respect to the abetment of suicide
of a married woman, under certain conditions. Not going into the other
conditions, a perusal of the provision indicates that such presumption
shall be attracted only if the factum of suicide has been established by
the prosecution first. The necessary ingredients to constitute an offence
under Section 306, I.P.C. were considered by this court in Wazir Chand G
v. State of Haryana, (1989) 1 SCC 244, wherein this Court held that:
“5. …Reading Sections 306 and 307 (sic 107) together it is clear
that if any person instigates any other person to commit suicide
and as a result of such instigation the other person commits suicide,
the person causing the instigation is liable to be punished under H
288 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 7 S.C.R.
A Section 306 of the Penal Code, 1860 for abetting the commission
of suicide. A plain reading of this provision shows that before
a person can be convicted of abetting the suicide of any
other person, it must be established that such other person
committed suicide.”
B (emphasis supplied)
34. In the present case, the Trial Court and the High Court have
concluded that the deceased committed suicide. However, we are of
the considered opinion that the conclusion reached by the Courts below
is based on assumptions, as there is no evidence on record to support the
C same. The reasoning of the Trial Court in this regard is as follows:
“Further, there is no direct evidence having been adduced by the
prosecution the (sic) any of the accused caused death by sprinkling
kerosene on the body of the deceased, the only possibility is that
Meena Kumari put an end to her life by sprinkling kerosene on
D her body.”
35. In light of the fact that there was insufficient evidence to
prove the factum of suicide beyond reasonable doubt, the presumption
under Section 113-A, Evidence Act, is not of much help for the
prosecution.The essential ingredient of deceased committing suicide has
E not been proved by the prosecution by adducing sufficient evidence. In
the present case, the prosecution has failed to establish that the death
occurred due to suicide. Therefore, we are of the opinion that the finding
of the Courts below convicting the appellants under Section 306, IPC
merits interference by this Court.
F CONCLUSIONS
36. At the cost of repetition, the law under Section 304-B, IPC
read with Section 113-B, Evidence Act can be summarized below:
i. Section 304-B, IPC must be interpreted keeping in mind the
legislative intent to curb the social evil of bride burning and
G dowry demand.
ii. The prosecution must at first establish the existence of the
necessary ingredients for constituting an offence under
Section 304-B, IPC.Once these ingredients are satisfied, the
rebuttable presumption of causality, provided under Section
H 113-B, Evidence Act operates against the accused.
SATBIR SINGH & ANOTHER v. STATE OF HARYANA 289
[N. V. RAMANA, CJI]
iii. The phrase “soon before” as appearing in Section 304-B, A
IPC cannot be construed to mean ‘immediately before’. The
prosecution must establish existence of “proximate and live
link” between the dowry death and cruelty or harassment
for dowry demand by the husband or his relatives.
iv. Section 304-B, IPC does not take a pigeonhole approach in B
categorizing death as homicidal or suicidal or accidental. The
reason for such non categorization is due to the fact that
death occurring “otherwise than under normal
circumstances” can, in cases, be homicidal or suicidal or
accidental.
C
v. Due to the precarious nature of Section 304-B, IPC read
with 113-B, Evidence Act, Judges, prosecution and defence
should be careful during conduction of trial.
vi. It is a matter of grave concern that, often, Trial Courts record
the statement under Section 313, CrPC in a very casual and D
cursory manner, without specifically questioning the accused
as to his defense. It ought to be noted that the examination
of an accused under Section 313, CrPC cannot be treated
as a mere procedural formality, as it based on the fundamental
principle of fairness. This aforesaid provision incorporates
the valuable principle of natural justice “audi alteram partem” E
as it enables the accused to offer an explanation for the
incriminatory material appearing against him. Therefore, it
imposes an obligation on the court to question the accused
fairly, with care and caution.
vii. The Court must put incriminating circumstances before the F
accused and seek his response. A duty is also cast on the
counsel of the accused to prepare his defense since the
inception of the Trial with due caution, keeping in
consideration the peculiarities of Section 304-B, IPC read
with Section 113-B, Evidence Act. G
viii. Section 232, CrPC provides that, “If, after taking the
evidence for the prosecution, examining the accused and
hearing the prosecution and the defence on the point, the
Judge considers that there is no evidence that the accused
committed the offence, the Judge shall record an order of
H
290 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 7 S.C.R.
A acquittal”. Such discretion must be utilized by the Trial Courts
as an obligation of best efforts.
ix. Once the Trial Court decides that the accused is not eligible
to be acquitted as per the provisions of Section 232,CrPC, it
must move on and fix hearings specifically for ‘defence
B evidence’, calling upon the accused to present his defense
as per the procedure provided under Section 233, CrPC,
which is also an invaluable right provided to the accused.
x. In the same breath, Trial Courts need to balance other
important considerations such as the right to a speedy trial.
C In this regard, we may caution that the above provisions
should not be allowed to be misused as delay tactics.
xi. Apart from the above, the presiding Judge should follow the
guidelines laid down by this Court while sentencing and
imposing appropriate punishment.
D xii. Undoubtedly, as discussed above, the menace of dowry death
is increasing day by day. However, it is also observed that
sometimes family members of the husband are roped in, even
though they have no active role in commission of the offence
and are residing at distant places. In these cases, the Court
E need to be cautious in its approach.
37. In light of the above findings, after perusing the relevant material
and the evidence available, we find that the High Court and Trial Court
have not committed any error in convicting the appellants under Section
304-B, IPC as the appellantsfailed to discharge the burden under Section
F 113-B, Evidence Act. However, upon appreciation of facts and
circumstances we are of the opinion that the offence under Section 306,
IPC is not made out. We therefore set aside the conviction and sentence
under Section 306, IPC.
38. Appeals allowed to the above extent. Pending applications, if
any, stand disposed of.
G
Nidhi Jain Appeals allowed.
H
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