Supreme Court of India
SATISH AMBANNA BANSODEversusSTATE OF MAHARASHTRA
- Citation
- 2009 INSC 318
- Decided
- 5 March 2009
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Bench
- ARIJIT PASAYAT
Holding
A dying declaration, if proved true, voluntary and made by a person fit to testify, may alone support a conviction under Section 302 IPC without corroboration.
Summary
The appellant was convicted of murder under Section 302 IPC on the basis of his wife's dying declaration that he had set her on fire. The appellant challenged the conviction, arguing that the victim was not fit to give a dying declaration and that the statement was unreliable. The Supreme Court examined the principles governing dying declarations under Section 32 of the Evidence Act, emphasizing that such statements can be the sole basis of conviction if they are true, voluntary, and made by a person in a fit state of mind. The Court held that the medical opinion did not outweigh the eyewitness testimony that the victim was capable of making the declaration. Consequently, the Court found no infirmity in the dying declaration and dismissed the appeal.
Issues considered
- Can a conviction under Section 302 IPC be sustained solely on a dying declaration without corroborative evidence?
- Was the victim's dying declaration reliable and made by a person fit to testify despite her severe burns?
- Does a medical opinion that the victim was unfit to give a statement invalidate the dying declaration?
Legislation cited
Subjects
dying declarationsection 302 IPCevidencecorroborationcriminal lawadmissibilitymedical testimonyconviction
Judgment
[2009] 3 S.C.R. 1166
A SATISH AMBANNA BANSODE
v.
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA
(Criminal Appeal No. 435 of 2009)
MARCH 5, 2009
B
[DR. ARIJIT PASA YAT AND ASOK KUMAR
GANGULY, JJ.]
Penal Code, 1860 - s. 302 - Conviction under - Victim
c set on fire by her husband - Dying declaration of victim -
Conviction, on basis thereof by courts below - Held: Justified
- Dying declaration does not suffer from infirmity - Courts
below examined evidence in detail to place reliance on the.
dying declaration - Evidence Act, 1872.
D
Evidence Act, 1872 - s. 32 - Dying declaration -
Governing principles - Stated.
The question which arose for consideration in this
appeal was whether the courts below were justified in
E convicting the appellant-husband uls. 302 IPC on basis
of the dying declaration of the victim-wife.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1.1. The situation in which a person is on the
F
deathbed is so solemn and serene when he is dying that
the grave position in which he is placed, is the reason in
law to accept the veracity of his statement. It is for this
reason that the requirements of oath and cross-
-
examination are dispensed with. Besides, should the
G dying declaration be excluded, it will result in the
miscarriage of justice because the victim being generally
the only eyewitness in a serious crime, the exclusion of
the statement would leave the court without a scrap of
evidence. [Para 11] [1172-B, CJ
H 1166
SATISH AMBANNA BANSODE v. STATE OF 1167
MAHARASHTRA
1.2. Though a dying declaration is entitled to great A
weight, it is worthwhile to note that the accused has no
power of cross-examination. Such a power is essential
for eliciting the truth as an obligation of oath could be.
This is the reason the court also insists that the dying
declaration should be of such a nature as to inspire full B
confidence of the court in its correctness. The court has
to be on guard that the statement of the deceased was
not as a result of either tutoring, or prompting or a product
of imagination. The court must be further satisfied that the
deceased was in a fit state of mind after a clear c
opportunity to observe and identify the assailant. Once
the court is satisfied that the declaration was true and
voluntary, undoubtedly, it can base its conviction on the
same without any further corroboration. It cannot be laid
~·
down as an absolute rule of law that the dying
D
declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction
unless it is corroborated. The rule requiring corroboration
is merely a rule of prudence. [Para 12] [1172-0, E, F]
1.3. The dying declaration is only a piece of untested
evidence and must, like any other evidence, satisfy the E
~ court that what is stated therein is the unalloyed truth and
\
that it is absolutely safe to act upon it. If after careful
scrutiny, the court is satisfied that it is true and free from
any effort to induce the deceased to make a false
statement and if it is coherent and consistent, there shall F
be no legal impediment to make it the basis of conviction,
even if there is no corroboration. [Paras 13] [117 4-E]
2.1. In the instant case, the basis of conviction of the
accused is the dying declaration. In the light of the
G
governing dying declaration principles, the acceptability
of the alleged dying declaration has to be considered. As
regard the statement of doctor, a hypothetical answer was
given to a question regarding the effect of the patient who
H
1168 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 3 S.C.R.
,
A suffered burn of a very high percentage. The doctor
categorically stated that the patient who gave dying
declaration was in a position to do so. The stand taken
before the trial court and before the High Court was
rejected as there was no accidental burn due to fall of
B small lantern. This plea is clearly without substance.
[Paras 10, 11and13] [1172-A; 1174-D; 1171-G]
2.2. When the evidence on record has been
examined in great detail by the trial court and the High
Court to place reliance on the dying declaration, the
C c,onclusions cannot be in any way faulted. [Paras 13 and
14] [1174-G]
Paniben v. State of Gujarat 1992(2) SCC 474; Munnu
Raja v. State of M.P. 1976 (3) SCC 104; State of UP. v. Ram
D Sagar Yadav 1985(1) SCC 552; Ramawati Devi v. State of
Bihar 1983(1) SCC 211; K. Ramachandra Reddy v. Public
Prosecutor 1976 (3) SCC 618; Rasheed Beg v. State of M.P.
1974(4) SCC 264; Kake Singh v. State of M.P.1981 Supp.
SCC 25; Ram Manorath v. State of u.P. 1981(2) SCC 654;
E State of Maharashtra v. Krishnamurti Laxmipati Naidu 1980
Supp. SCC 455; Surajdeo Ojha v. State of Bihar 1980
Supp.sec 769; Nanhau Ram v. State of M.P. 1988 Supp.
SCC 152; State of UP. v. Madan Mohan 1989 (3) SCC 390;
Mohan/al Gangaram Gehani v. State of Maharashtra 1982 (1)
F SCC 700 and Gangotri Singh v. State of U.P.1993 Supp (1) --
SCC 327, Relied on.
Case Law Reference:
1992(2) sec 474 Relied on. Para 12
G 1976 (3) sec 104 Relied on. Para 12
1985(1 l sec 552 Relied on. Para 12
1983(1) sec 211 Relied on. Para 12
H 1976 (3) sec 618 Relied on. Para 12
SATISH AMBANNA BANSODE v. STATE OF 1169
MAHARASHTRA
1974(4) sec 264 Relied on. Para 12 A
1981 Supp. sec 25 Relied on. Para 12
1981 (2) sec 654 Relied on. Para 12
1980 Supp. sec 455 Relied on. Para 12
B
1980 Supp.sec 769 Relied on. Para 12
1988 Supp. sec 152 Relied on. Para 12
1989 (3) sec 390 Relied on. Para 12
c
1982 (1) sec 100 Relied on. Para 12
1993 Supp (1) sec 327 Relied on. Para 13
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
,'
~
No. 435 of 2009. D
.. From the Judgment and Order dated 2.02.2006 of the High
Court of Judicature at Bombay in Appeal No. 663 of 2001.
Javed Mahmud Rao for the Appellant.
Madhavi Divan, Atul Dakh and R.K. Adsure for the E
Respondent.
... ~
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. 1. Leave granted.
F
2. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of a Division
Bench of the Bombay High Court dismissing the appeal filed
by the appellant who was convicted for offence punishable
under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short the
'IPC') and was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment
G
tor life and to pay a fine of Rs.100/- with default stipulation.
3. Prosecution version in a nutshell is as follows:
Satyawwa (hereinafter referred to as 'the deceased') aged
28 years at the time of alleged incident was married to the H
1170 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 3 S.C.R.
A acq1sed about 15 years ago and it can be said that it was a
child marriage. At the time of incident, the couple was gifted
with two daughters, namely, Renuka and Chandrawwa. But the
daughters were staying in Indira Nagar locality of Sangli, where
the parents of deceased Satyawwa were residing. Satyawwa
B and accused were staying at Visa Pure Galli Miraj.
4. The incident took place on the night of 4th and 5th
Ootober, 1999 at about 2.30 a.m. on 5th" October, 1999. As
stated by Satyawwa before her death, accused - husband was
dr!!nk; he abruptly woke up at about 2.30 a.m. and started
c beating her and she got scared. Accused picked up kerosene
tin from the house, poured it on her person and ignited her by
using a match-stick. She also stated that as the saree caught
fire, she started shouting. At this juncture, husband tried to
remove saree from her person and in that process, he suffered
D burn injuries on both his hands. Neighbours also gathered and
both were taken to Civil Hospital, Sangli in a rickshaw.
5. Subhash Koli, Police Head Constable (P.W.3) attached
to Vishrambaug Police Station, was posted on duty at Civil
Hospital. After admission of Satyawwa at about 4.00 a.m.,
E
intimation was sent by the hospital to the police station and
therefore, he was instructed by the police officials to record the
•
Statement of patient. He accordingly recorded statement of
Satyawwa, only after obtaining opinion from Dr. M.G. Madhu '
Kumar between 6.30 a.m. to 7.00 a.m. on 5.10.1999. Satyawwa
F ,succumbed to burn injuries at about 10 a.m. It appears that
.:lying declaration was treated as an F.l.R. by Miraj police
station, and Crime No.194 of 1999 was registered. The
investigation was carried out in parts by P.S.I. Shri Ramesh
Bhokare (P.W.6) and A.l.P. Shri. Baliram Waghchavre (P.W.7).
G The dying declaration was treated as an First Information
Report by Miraj Police Station and the case was registered.
After completion of investigation charge sheet was filed. The
accused pleaded innocence, therefore trial was held. It is
needless to say that the trial ended in conviction by the judgment
H which was challenged before the High Court.
SATISH AMBANNA BANSODE v. STATE OF 1171
MAHARASHTRA [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
.,
6. Apart from P.W.3 Subhash Koli Police Head Constable, A
Dr. Madhu Kumar (P.W.4) Medical Officer was present when
the patient was admitted and also when the dying declaration
was recorded. Shabbir Guiab Mulla (P.W. 1) who is the
neighbour of the accused and victim, and Mohd. Hanif Dastgir
(P.W.2), who is the landlord of the accused provided some B
details about the incident. Dr. Nandkurnar Banage (P .W.5) was
the medical officer attached to Civil Hospital, Sangli at the
~
material time. He had performed autopsy and by post mortem
notes he has recorded his opinion regarding cause of death
due to 'Septicemia' shock due to 95% of superficial to deep c
"' burns.
·'
7. Stand of the accused appellant before the trial Court was
that on the basis of the dying declaration the conviction should
<4. not have been recorded. Further, the deceaseq was not fit to
'
If make any statement and, therefore, the so called dying D
declaration is not trustworthy. The trial Court did not accept the
plea. Before the High Court the plea taken before the trial Court
was re-iterated which came to be rejected by the impugned
judgment and the appeal was dismissed.
E
8. In support of the appeal learned counsel for the appellant
suumitted that the evidence of doctor clearly indicated that the
victim was not in a condition to give dying declaration and that
the statement was the result of tutoring.
9. Learned counsel for the respondent-State on the other F
hand supported the judgment.
10. So far as the statement of doctor is concerned, a
hypothetical answer was given to a question regarding the
effect of the patient who suffered burn of a very high percentage.
The doctor has categorically stated that the patient who gave G
dying declaration was in a position to do so. The stand taken
before the trial Court and before the High Court was rejected
as there was no accidental burn due to fall of small lantern. This
plea is clearly without substance as rightly noted by the trial
H
11172 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009) 3 S.C.R.
,,,
A Court and the High Court.
11. This is a case where the basis of conviction of the
accused is the dying declaration. The situation in which a
person is on the deathbed is so solemn and serene when he
is dying that the grave position in which he is placed, is the
B reason in law to accept the veracity of his statement. It is for
this reason that the requirements of oath and cross-examination
are dispensed with. Besides, should the dying declaration be
excluded, it will result in the miscarriage of justice because the
,-
-
victim being generally the only eyewitness in a serious crime,
c the exclusion of the statement would leave the court without a
scrap of evidence.
12. Though a dying declaration is entitled to great weight,
it is worthwhile to note that the accused has no power of cross- ,,.
D examination. Such a power is essential for eliciting the truth as
an obligation of oath could be. This is the reason the court also '
insists that the dying declaration should be of such a nature as
to inspire full confidence of the court in its correctness. The court
has to be on guard that the statement of the deceased was not
as a result of either tutoring, or prompting or a product of
E
imagination. The court must be further satisfied that the
deceased was in a fit state of mind after a clear opportunity to
observe and identify the assailant. Once the court is satisfied
that the declaration was true and voluntary, undoubtedly, it can
base its conviction on the same without any further
F corroboration. It cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law
that the dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of
conviction unless it is corroborated. The rule requiring
corroboration is merely a rule of prudence. This Court has laid
down in several judgments the principles governing dying
G declaration, which could be summed up as under as indicated
in Paniben v. State of Gujarat (1992(2) SCC 474) (SCC
pp.480-81, paras 18-19)
(1) There is neither rule of law nor of prudence that dying
H declaration cannot be acted upon without corroboration. l-
SATISH AMBANNA BANSODE v. STATE OF 1173
MAHARASHTRA [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
[See: Munnu Raja v. State of M.P., (1976 (3) SCC 104)) A
(ii) If the court is satisfied that the dying declaration is true
and voluntary it can base conviction on it, without
corroboration. (See: State of U.P. v. Ram Sagar Yadav
(1985(1) SCC 552) and Ramawati Devi v. State of Bihar
1983(1) sec 211)) B
(iit) The court has to scrutinise the dying declaration
carefully and must ensure that the declaration is not the
result of tutoring, prompting or imagination. The deceased
had an opportunity to observe and identify the assailants c
and was in a fit state to make the declaration. [See: K.
Ramachandra Reddyv. Public Prosecutor(1976(3) SCC
618)))
(iv) Where a dying declaration is suspicious, it should not
~ be acted upon without corroborative evidence. [See: D
Rasheed Beg v. State of M.P. (1974(4) SCC 264))
(v) Where the deceased was unconscious and could never
make any dying declaration the evidence with regard to it
is to be rejected. [See: Kake Singh v. State of M.P.(1981
E
Supp. sec 25)]
(vt) A dying declaration which suffers from infirmity cannot
~ form the basis of conviction. [See: Ram Manorath v. State
of U.P. (1981(2)SCC 654]
(vii) Merely because a dying declaration does not contain F
the details as to the occurrence, it is not to be rejected. ·
(See State of Maharashtra v. Krishnamurti Laxmipati
Naidu [1980 Supp. SCC 455)]
(viii) Equally, merely because it is a brief statement, it is G
not to be discarded. On the contrary, the shortness of the
statement itself guarantees truth. [See: Surajdeo Ojha v.
State of Bihar (1980 Supp.sec 769)]
(ix) Normally, the court in order to satisfy whether the
deceased was in a fit mental condition to make the dying H
(·
1174 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2009) 3 S.C.R.
A declaration looks up to the medical opinion. But where the '4
eyewitness said that the deceased was in a fit and
conscious state to make the dying declaration, the medical
opinion cannot prevail. [See: Nanhau Ram v. State of
M.P.(1988 Supp. sec 152)]
B (x) Where the prosecution version differs from the version
as given in the dying declaration, the said declaration
cannot be acted upon. [See: State of U.P. v. Madan ...
Mohan (1989 (3) SCC 390)]
c (x1) Where there are more than one statements in the
nature of dying declaration, the one first in point of time
must be preferred. Of course, if the plurality of the dying
declaration could be held to be trustworthy and reliable, it
has to be accepted. [See: Mohan/a/ Gangaram Gehani
D v. State of Maharashtra (1982 (1) SCC 700)]
13. In the light of the above principles, the acceptability of '
the alleged dying declaration in the instant case has to be
considered. The dying declaration is only a piece of untested
evidence and must, like any other evidence, satisfy the court
E that what is stated therein is the unalloyed truth and that it is
absolutely safe to act upon it. If after careful scrutiny, the court
is satisfied that it is true and free from any effort to induce the
{'-
deceased to make a false statement and if it is coherent and
consistent, there shall be no legal impediment to make it the
F basis of conviction, even if there is no corroboration. (See
Gangotri Singh v. State of U.P. (1993 Supp(1)SCC 327).
14. When the evidence on record has been examined in
great detail by the trial Court and the High Court to place
reliance on the dying declaration, the conclusions cannot be in
G any way faulted.
15. The appeal is without merit, deserves dismissal which
we direct.
N.J. Appeal dismissed.
H
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