Supreme Court of India
SATISH CHANDRA YADAVversusUNION OF INDIA & ORS
- Citation
- 2022 INSC 1024
- Decided
- 26 September 2022
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Bench
- SURYA KANT
Holding
The dismissal of the appellants was lawful as the employer was entitled to terminate their services for deliberately suppressing material information in the verification form, and the appeals are dismissed.
Summary
The appellants, Satish Chandra Yadav and Pushpendra Kumar Yadav, were dismissed from the CRPF while on probation after it was discovered that they had answered "No" to questions about pending criminal cases in the verification Form-25, despite an FIR and subsequent criminal proceedings against them. The Supreme Court held that the dismissal was lawful because the suppression of material information in the verification form demonstrated a lack of integrity, justifying termination without a departmental inquiry. The Court reiterated that an acquittal or pending case does not automatically entitle a candidate to appointment, and the employer may consider the nature of the offence and the candidate's antecedents. The appeals under Article 136 were dismissed, with the Court emphasizing the limited scope of its special leave jurisdiction and the discretion vested in public employers. The judgment also clarified the principles governing suppression of information, the need for truthful disclosures, and the standards applicable to uniformed services.
Issues considered
- The validity of terminating a probationer for suppressing or falsifying material information in a verification form
- The effect of a pending criminal case or subsequent acquittal on suitability for appointment in a disciplined force
- Whether a departmental inquiry is required before dismissal of a probationer in such circumstances
- The scope and limits of the Supreme Court's power under Article 136 to entertain special leave petitions in service matters
Legislation cited
- Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965s. Rule 5
- Central Reserve Police Force Rules, 1955s. Rule 27
- CRPF Act, 1949s. Section 11
Subjects
service lawprobationsuppression of informationverification formCRPFtermination of serviceArticle 136special leavecriminal antecedentspublic employmentdisciplinary forcemisrepresentationfalse statementappointmentcharacter verification
Judgment
[2022] 10 S.C.R. 537 537
SATISH CHANDRA YADAV A
v.
UNION OF INDIA & ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 6955 of 2022)
SEPTEMBER 26, 2022 B
[SURYA KANT AND J. B. PARDIWALA, JJ.]
Service Law – Appointment – Suppression of information/
submitting false information in the verification form – Dismissal of
the appellants from service – Correctness of – Held: In case of
C
appellant in Civil Appeal arising out of the SLP (C) No. 20860 of
2019, what led to the termination of his services was not his
involvement in the criminal case which was then pending, and in
which he was acquitted subsequently but the fact that he had withheld
relevant information while filling in the verification Form – Appellant
was given appointment on probation subject to the verification of D
facts given in the verification Form – Therefore, if an enquiry
revealed that the facts given were wrong, the respondent was at
liberty to dispense with the services of the appellant – In the
connected Appeal arising out of the SLP (C) No. 5170 of 2021, the
appellant had put in about four years of service before he came to
E
be terminated, however the said appeal also fails on the very same
line of reasoning – Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules,
1965 – r.5 – CRPF Act, 1949 – Central Reserve Police Force Rules,
1955 – r.27.
Service Law – Appointment – Public employment – Criminal
F
Antecedents – Suppression of information or submitting false
information in the verification Form – Principles of law to be made
applicable to such litigations – Held: Each case should be scrutinised
thoroughly by the public employer concerned, through its designated
officials- more so, in the case of recruitment for the police force,
who are under a duty to maintain order, and tackle lawlessness, G
since their ability to inspire public confidence is a bulwark to
society’s security – Even in a case where the employee has made
declaration truthfully and correctly of a concluded criminal case,
the employer still has the right to consider the antecedents, and
cannot be compelled to appoint the candidate – Further, acquittal
H
537
538 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 10 S.C.R.
A in a criminal case would not automatically entitle a candidate for
appointment to the post – It would be still open to the employer to
consider the antecedents and examine whether the candidate
concerned is suitable and fit for appointment to the post –
Generalisations about the youth, career prospects and age of the
candidates leading to condonation of the offenders conduct, should
B
not enter the judicial verdict and should be avoided.
Service Law – Appointment – Suppression of information/
submitting false information in the verification form – Criminal
prosecution, arrest or pendency of a criminal case – Precedent of
Avtar Singh case – Position of law post Avtar Singh – Discussed.
C
Constitution of India – Article 136 – Scope of appeal under
– Held: Unless, it is shown that exceptional and special
circumstances exist; that substantial and grave injustice have been
done and the case and question present features of sufficient gravity
to warrant a review of the decision appealed against, Supreme Court
D would not exercise its overriding powers u.Article 136(1) – The
wide discretionary power invested u/Article 136 is to be exercised
sparingly and in exceptional cases only.
Dismissing the appeals, the Court
E HELD: 1. The only reason to refer to and look into the
various decisions rendered by this Court over a period of time is
that the principles of law laid therein governing the subject are
bit inconsistent. Even after, the larger Bench decision in the case
of Avtar Singh different courts have enunciated different
principles. In such circumstances, this Court has undertaken
F some exercise to shortlist the broad principles of law which should
be made applicable to the litigations of the present nature. The
principles are as follows:
a) Each case should be scrutinised thoroughly by the public
employer concerned, through its designated officials–more so,
G in the case of recruitment for the police force, who are under a
duty to maintain order, and tackle lawlessness, since their ability
to inspire public confidence is a bulwark to society’s security.
[See Raj Kumar]
b) Even in a case where the employee has made declaration
H truthfully and correctly of a concluded criminal case, the employer
SATISH CHANDRA YADAV v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 539
still has the right to consider the antecedents, and cannot be A
compelled to appoint the candidate. The acquittal in a criminal
case would not automatically entitle a candidate for appointment
to the post. It would be still open to the employer to consider the
antecedents and examine whether the candidate concerned is
suitable and fit for appointment to the post.
B
c) The suppression of material information and making a
false statement in the verification Form relating to arrest,
prosecution, conviction etc., has a clear bearing on the character,
conduct and antecedents of the employee. If it is found that the
employee had suppressed or given false information in regard to
the matters having a bearing on his fitness or suitability to the C
post, he can be terminated from service.
d) The generalisations about the youth, career prospects
and age of the candidates leading to condonation of the offenders’
0conduct, should not enter the judicial verdict and should be
avoided. D
e) The Court should inquire whether the Authority
concerned whose action is being challenged acted mala fide.
f) Is there any element of bias in the decision of the
Authority? E
g) Whether the procedure of inquiry adopted by the
Authority concerned was fair and reasonable? [Paras 68, 69][586-
G-H; 587-A-G]
Avatar Singh v. Union of India, (2016) 8 SCC 471 :
[2016] 7 SCR 445; Commissioner of Police v. Raj F
Kumar, (2021) 8 SCC 347 – referred to.
2. Article 136 of the Constitution empowers the Supreme
Court to grant special leave in its discretion against any judgment,
decree, determination, sentence or order in any cause or matter
passed or made by any court or tribunal except by any court or G
tribunal constituted by or under any law relating to the armed
forces. The jurisdiction conferred by Article 136 is divisible into
two stages: the first stage is upto the disposal of prayer for the
special leave to file an appeal and the second stage commences,
H
540 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 10 S.C.R.
A if and when, the leave to appeal is granted and the special leave
petition is converted into an appeal. Thus, the principles of law
discernible from the aforesaid are that unless, it is shown that
exceptional and special circumstances exist; that substantial and
grave injustice have been done and the case and question present
features of sufficient gravity to warrant a review of the decision
B
appealed against, this Court would not exercise its overriding
powers under Article 136(1) of the Constitution. The wide
discretionary power with which this Court is invested under Article
136 is to be exercised sparingly and in exceptional cases only.
[Paras 70, 71 & 75][587-G-H; 588-C-D; 592-E-F]
C Pritam Singh v. State, AIR 1950 SC 169:[1950] SCR
453; P.S.R. Sadhanantham v. Arunachalam and Another,
(1980) 3 SCC 141 : [1980] 2 SCR 873 – followed.
Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala, (2000) 6 SCC 359 :
[2000] 1 Suppl. SCR 538; Khoday Distilleries Ltd. v.
D Mahadeshwara Sahakara Sakkare Karkhane Ltd.,
(2019) 4 SCC 376 : [2019] 3 SCR 411; Hem Raj, Son
of Devilal Mahajan of Bijainagar, Condemned Prisoner,
at Present Confined in the Central Jail, Ajmer v. State
of Ajmer, AIR 1954 SC 462 : [1954] SCR 1133 – relied
E on.
3.1 In so far as the Appeal arising out of the Special Leave
Petition (C) No. 20860 of 2019 filed by ‘SCY’ is concerned, the
same should fail. This Court is not at all convinced with the case
put forward by ‘SCY’ for informing the respondent herein that
F there was no criminal case pending against him on the date he
filled up the verification form. The explanation offered by ‘SCY’
is nothing but his own understanding of what is prosecution and
pendency of a criminal case. If he knows that trial is deemed to
have commenced with the framing of charge, then he knows and
understands what is criminal prosecution. Indisputably, ‘SCY’ was
G still under probation at the time, his services had been terminated.
It is also apparent from the record that ‘SCY’ had been given
appointment on probation subject to the verification of facts given
in the verification Form. Therefore, if an enquiry revealed that
H
SATISH CHANDRA YADAV v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 541
the facts given were wrong, the respondent herein was at liberty A
to dispense with the services of the appellant ‘SCY’ as the
question of any stigma and penal consequences at this stage would
not arise. It bears repetition that what has led to the termination
of the services of the appellant ‘SCY’ is not his involvement in
the criminal case which was then pending, and in which he had
B
been acquitted subsequently but the fact that he had withheld
relevant information while filling in the verification Form. He could
be said to have exhibited or displayed such a tendency which
shook the confidence of the respondent. Administrative law has
traditionally approached the review of decisions classified as
discretionary separately from those seen as involving the C
interpretation of rules of law. The rule has been that the decisions
classified as discretionary may only be reviewed on limited
grounds such as the bad faith of decision-makers, the exercise of
discretion for an improper purpose, and the use of irrelevant
considerations. A general doctrine of “unreasonableness” has
D
also sometimes been applied to the discretionary decisions. These
doctrines incorporate two central ideas — those discretionary
decisions, like all other administrative decisions, must be made
within the bounds of the jurisdiction conferred by the statutory
rules, but that considerable deference will be given to the decision-
makers by the courts in reviewing the exercise of that discretion E
and determining the scope of the decision-makers’ jurisdiction.
These doctrines recognise that it is the intention of a legislature,
when using statutory language that confers broad choices on the
administrative agencies, that courts should not lightly interfere
with such decisions, and should give considerable respect to the
F
decision-makers when reviewing the manner in which discretion
was exercised. However, discretion must still be exercised in a
manner that is within a reasonable interpretation of the margin of
manoeuvre contemplated by the legislature, in accordance with
the principles of the rule of law. [Paras 76-78][592-F-H; 593-A-
G] G
3.2 The learned ASG has rightly relied on Kendriya Vidyalaya
Sangathan in which this Court held that the purpose of requiring
an employee to furnish information regarding prosecution/
conviction, etc. in the verification Form was to assess his character
and antecedents for the purpose of employment and continuation H
542 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 10 S.C.R.
A in service; that suppression of material information and making
a false statement in reply to the queries relating to prosecution
and conviction had a clear bearing on the character, conduct and
antecedents of the employee; and that where it is found that the
employee had suppressed or given false information in regard to
the matters which had a bearing on his fitness or suitability to the
B
post, he could be terminated from service during the period of
probation without holding any inquiry. This Court also made it
clear that neither the gravity of the criminal offence nor the
ultimate acquittal therein was relevant when considering whether
a probationer who suppresses a material fact (of his being involved
C in a criminal case, in the personal information furnished to the
employer), is fit to be continued as a probationer. The observations
in the aforesaid case are fully applicable to the appeal filed by
‘SCY’. It was a deliberate attempt on the part of the appellant
‘SCY’ to withhold the relevant information and it is this omission
which has led to the termination of his service during the probation
D
period. So far as the connected Appeal arising out of the Special
Leave Petition (C) No. 5170 of 2021 filed by ‘PKY’ is concerned,
the same also fails on the very same line of reasoning. The only
difference in the case of the appellant ‘PKY’ is that he had put in
about four years of service before he came to be terminated.
E [Paras 79-82][593-H; 594-A-F]
Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan and Others v. Ram Ratan
Yadav, (2003) 3 SCC 437 : [2003] 2 SCR 361 – relied
on.
Union of India and Others v. Methu Meda, (2022) 1
F SCC 1; Union of India and Others v. M. Bhaskaran,
AIR (1996) SC 686 : [1995] 4 Suppl. SCR 526; Delhi
Administration, v. Sushil Kumar, (1996) 11 SCC 605 :
[1996] 7 Suppl. SCR 199; Kamal Nayan Mishra v. State
of Madhya Pradesh and Others, (2010) 2 SCC 169 :
G [2009] 16 SCR 237; R. Radhakrishnan v. Director
General of Police and Others, (2008) 1 SCC 660 :
[2007] 11 SCR 456; Union of India and Others v. Bipad
Bhanjan Gayen, (2008) 11 SCC 314 : [2008] 8 SCR
99; State of Haryana and Others v. Dinesh Kumar (2008)
(3) SCC 222 : [2008] 1 SCR 281; Daya Shankar Yadav
H
SATISH CHANDRA YADAV v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 543
v. Union of India and Others, (2010) 14 SCC 103 : A
[2010] 13 SCR 1076; Commissioner of Police and
Others. v. Sandeep Kumar (2011) 4 SCC 644 : [2011]
3 SCR 964; Jainendra Singh v. State of U.P. Tr. Prinl.
Sec. Home and Others, (2012) 8 SCC 748 : [2012] 6
SCR 1047; Avtar Singh v. Union of India and Others,
B
(2016) 8 SCC 471 : [2016] 7 SCR 445; Commissioner
of Police, New Delhi and Another v. Mehar Singh,
(2013) 7 SCC 685 : [2013] 13 SCR 432; Union
Territory, Chandigarh Administration and Others v.
Pradeep Kumar and Another, (2018) 1 SCC 797 :
[2018] 1 SCR 112; State of Madhya Pradesh and Others C
v. Bunty, (2020) 17 SCC 654; State of Rajasthan and
Others v. Love Kush Meena, (2021) 8 SCC 774; Union
of India (UOI) v. Dilip Kumar Mallick, (2022) 6 Scale
108; Pawan Kumar v. Union of India, (2022) SCC
OnLine SC 532; Rajasthan Rajya Vidyut Prasaran
D
Nigam Limited and another v. Anil Kanwariya, (2021)
10 SCC 136; Mohammed Imran v. State of Maharashtra
and Others (2019) 17 SCC 696 – referred to.
Case Law Reference
[2016] 7 SCR 445 referred to Para 8 E
[1995] 4 Suppl. SCR 526 referred to Para 37
[1996] 7 Suppl. SCR 199 referred to Para 39
[2003] 2 SCR 361 relied on Para 40
[2009] 16 SCR 237 referred to Para 42 F
[2007] 11 SCR 456 referred to Para 44
[2008] 8 SCR 99 referred to Para 45
[2008] 1 SCR 281 referred to Para 46
[2010] 13 SCR 1076 referred to Para 48 G
[2011] 3 SCR 964 referred to Para 50
[2012] 6 SCR 1047 referred to Para 52
[2016] 7 SCR 445 referred to Para 54
H
544 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 10 S.C.R.
A [2013] 13 SCR 432 referred to Para 54
[2018] 1 SCR 112 referred to Para 58
[2000] 1 Suppl. SCR 538 relied on Para 71
[2019] 3 SCR 411 relied on Para 71
B [1950] SCR 453 followed Para 72
[1954] SCR 1133 relied on Para 73
[1980] 2 SCR 873 followed Para 74
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.6955
C of 2022.
From the Judgment and Order dated 15.04.2019 of the High Court
of Delhi at New Delhi in Writ Petition (C) No.1167 of 2018.
With
D Civil Appeal No.6956 of 2022.
Ms. Jyoti Dutt Sharma, Ms. Jaikriti S. Jadeja, C. K. Bhatt,
Himanshu Gautam, M. M. Singh, Jitendra Kumar, Rameshwar Prasad
Goyal, Advs. for the Appellants.
Ms. Madhavi Divan, ASG, Merusagar Samantray, Ms. B. Sunita
E Rao, Ms. Nidhi Khanna, Raghav Sharma, A. K. Sharma, B. V. Balaram
Das, Advs. for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
J. B. PARDIWALA, J. :
F 1. Leave granted.
2. Since the issues raised in both the captioned matters are almost
the same and the principles of law applicable are also common, those
were taken up for hearing analogously and are being disposed of by this
common judgment and order.
G 3. We first take up the Appeal arising out of the Special Leave
Petition (Civil) No. 20860 of 2019.
Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 20860 of 2019
4. This appeal is at the instance of an unsuccessful writ applicant
of a writ application being the Writ Petition (C) No. 1167 of 2018 filed in
H
SATISH CHANDRA YADAV v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 545
[J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
the High Court of Delhi and is directed against the judgment and order A
dated 15.04.2019 by which a Division Bench of the High Court rejected
the writ application filed by the writ applicant (appellant herein) thereby
affirming the dismissal of the appellant herein from service as a Constable
(General Duty) with the CRPF.
5. The facts giving rise to this appeal may be summarised as B
under:
5.1 The appellant herein was serving as a Constable (General
Duty) with the CRPF. He was recruited as a temporary employee of
the post of Constable (GD) in the CRPF on 28.07.2014. After undergoing
the basic training, he reported at the 179th Battalion on 17.12.2015. C
5.2 While filling up the requisite verification Form–25 at the time
of his recruitment in the CRPF in Column 12 in response to the question
whether any case was pending against him, the appellant answered in
the negative.
5.3 Thereafter, under Rule 14 of the CRPF Rules, the Character D
and Antecedents verification Form of the appellant was sent to the
Collector, District Sant Kabir Nagar, Uttar Pradesh. The Collector, vide
his letter dated 25.02.2015, informed the Deputy Inspector General of
Police (DIGP), Group Centre, CRPF Rampur that the Criminal Case
No. 1015 of 2008 had been registered against the appellant herein at the E
P.S. Khalilabad Sant Kabir Nagar, Police Station for the offences
punishable under Sections 147, 323, 324, 504 and 506 resply of the Indian
Penal Code (for short, “IPC”). Upon receipt of the information as
aforesaid, the services of the appellant herein came to be terminated in
exercise of the powers conferred under Rule 5(1) of the Central Civil
Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965 vide the order dated 11.03.2016 F
on the ground that he had concealed the information as aforesaid while
filling up the Form–25.
5.4 The further appeal addressed by the appellant herein to the
Inspector General (IG) was also dismissed.
G
5.5 The appellant herein challenged his dismissal from service by
filing the Writ Petition (C) No. 10558 of 2016 in the High Court of Delhi.
The said Writ Petition was disposed of by a Division Bench of the High
Court on 25.09.2017 remitting the matter to the Revisionary Authority
for fresh consideration within a period of six weeks from the date the
appellant herein would make a representation. H
546 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 10 S.C.R.
A 5.6 The representation filed by the appellant herein ultimately came
to be rejected and a fresh order dated 05.01.2018 reiterating the
termination of the appellant’s services was passed.
5.7 The appellant herein once again preferred a fresh Writ Petition
(C) No. 1167 of 2018 challenging the impugned order dated 05.01.2018
B terminating his services.
5.8 The High Court rejected the writ petition vide order dated
15.04.2019 holding as under:
“9. The fact remains that FIR No. 1015/2008 was registered
at P.S. Khalilabad against the Petitioner and placed under
C Sections 147/323/324/504/506 IPC. Admittedly, the Petitioner
got bail in the above Criminal case which was for cognizable
offences. It is not therefore the case where the time of filing
up of the verification form-25 the Petitioner was not aware
of the pendency of the Criminal case against him.
D x x x
11. In the present case, on the date of filling up of the
verification form the criminal case against the Petitioner was
very much pending. The fact that the charge sheet had been
filed after the filling up the form will not make any difference
E to the fact that the Petitioner deliberately gave a wrong answer
to the question whether any case was pending against the
Petitioner. This could not be termed as innocent. The Petitioner
is applying for the post of Constable in a para military
organization and is expected to be truthful in all responses to
F the columns in the verification form. At the time of filling up
of that form the Petitioner was very much aware of the
pendency of the criminal case. Therefore, there could be no
excuse for not filling up the correct answer in response to the
question under Column 12.
12. For the aforementioned reasons, the Court finds no reason
G
to interfere with the impugned order of the DA which was
confirmed by the AA.”
6. In such circumstances referred to above, the appellant is here
before this Court with the present appeal.
H
SATISH CHANDRA YADAV v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 547
[J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
Submissions on behalf of the Appellant A
7. Ms. Jyoti Dutt Sharma, the learned counsel appearing for the
appellant vehemently submitted that the High Court committed a serious
error in passing the impugned order. She would submit that the prosecution
against the appellant was of a very trivial nature. It did not involve any
moral turpitude. The suppression, if at all believed, by itself, cannot be a B
ground to deny public employment. It was argued that the appellant had
no knowledge of the pendency of the criminal case on the date when the
verification Form was filled up. She submitted that for the purpose of
determining whether the suppression was with a guilty mind, the
attestation/verification Form should be very specific and not vague so as
to confuse the person filling up such Forms. It was further argued that at C
the relevant point of time, the appellant was 19 years of age. The criminal
prosecution against him along with the others was on account of a family
dispute. The appellant had been falsely arrayed as an accused in the
said case. There was a settlement between the parties before the local
village panchayat. Ultimately, the appellant herein along with the other D
co-accused came to be acquitted by the trial court.
8. The learned counsel placed strong reliance on the decision of
this Court in the case of Avatar Singh v. Union of India, (2016) 8 SCC
471 to fortify her submission that while passing the order of termination
of services for giving false information, the employer must take notice E
of the special circumstances of the case, if any. The High Court, in the
first round of litigation, had taken notice of such non-application of mind
and thought fit to remit the case for fresh consideration. It was argued
that even upon fresh consideration, the Authority committed the very
same mistake while reiterating the termination.
F
9. In the last, the learned counsel submitted that the High Court
failed to consider an important question of fact that the Form CRP– 25
was quite vague and not specific about the information in regard to the
criminal antecedents. It is on account of such vagueness that the appellant
was not able to understand the question in a proper manner and answered
the same accordingly which is now being treated as false information. G
10. In such circumstances referred to above, the learned counsel
prays that there being merit in her appeal, the same may be allowed and
the impugned order passed by the High Court may be set aside and the
appellant may be ordered to be reinstated in service with full back wages.
H
548 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 10 S.C.R.
A Submissions on behalf of the Respondent
11. On the other hand, this appeal has been vehemently opposed
by Ms. Madhavi Divan, the Additional Solicitor General (ASG) submitting
that no error, not to speak of any error of law, could be said to have been
committed by the High Court in passing the impugned order. She would
B submit that the appellant is guilty of “suppression” of material facts which,
by itself, was sufficient to terminate his services. It was argued that the
services of the appellant herein were terminated because he was found
guilty of submitting false information or to put in other words, guilty of
suppression of material facts. The learned ASG vehemently submitted
that the appellant herein not only suppressed information about his arrest
C but also suppressed the information about the criminal case which was
pending against him at the time he filled up the verification Form.
12. The learned ASG further submitted that the appellant herein
and the other co-accused were not honourably acquitted. They all came
to be acquitted as the prosecution witnesses turned hostile. The learned
D ASG, while relying on the decision of this Court in the case of Avtar
Singh (supra), more particularly, the para 38.4 therein submitted that
the Authority concerned is duty bound to take into account the gravity of
the offence in a situation where acquittal is not recorded at the time of
filling up of the verification Form.
E 13. It was argued that in a disciplined force which seeks to maintain
high standards of integrity the suppression of material facts cannot be
countenanced.
14. In the last, the learned ASG submitted that the judicial review
under Article 136 of the Constitution in matters pertaining to the suitability
F of a candidate is limited to the extent of determining if the Authority
concerned had acted with malice, mindlessness or gross illegality. She
placed strong reliance on the decision of this Court in the case of
Commissioner of Police v. Raj Kumar, (2021) 8 SCC 347 to fortify
her submission that the scope of judicial review in the matters of the
G present type is very limited. She placed reliance on the following
observations made by this Court:
“28. Courts exercising judicial review cannot second guess
the suitability of a candidate for any public office or post.
Absent evidence of malice or mindlessness (to the materials),
or illegality by the public employer, an intense scrutiny on
H
SATISH CHANDRA YADAV v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 549
[J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
why a candidate is excluded as unsuitable renders the courts’ A
decision suspect to the charge of trespass into executive power
of determining suitability of an individual for appointment.
This was emphasised by this Court in M.V. Thimmaiah v. UPSC
[M.V. Thimmaiah v. UPSC, (2008) 2 SCC 119 : (2008) 1 SCC
(L&S) 409] which held as follows : (SCC pp. 131, 135-36,
B
paras 21 & 30)
“21. Now, comes the question with regard to the selection
of the candidates. Normally, the recommendations of the
Selection Committee cannot be challenged except on the
ground of mala fides or serious violation of the statutory
rules. The courts cannot sit as an appellate authority to C
examine the recommendations of the Selection Committee
like the court of appeal. This discretion has been given to
the Selection Committee only and courts rarely sit as a court
of appeal to examine the selection of the candidates nor is
the business of the court to examine each candidate and D
record its opinion. …
x x x x
31. Public service — like any other, presupposes that the State
employer has an element of latitude or choice on who should
enter its service. Norms, based on principles, govern essential E
aspects such as qualification, experience, age, number of
attempts permitted to a candidate, etc. These, broadly constitute
eligibility conditions required of each candidate or applicant
aspiring to enter public service. Judicial review, under the
Constitution, is permissible to ensure that those norms are F
fair and reasonable, and applied fairly, in a non-
discriminatory manner. However, suitability is entirely
different; the autonomy or choice of the public employer, is
greatest, as long as the process of decision-making is neither
illegal, unfair, or lacking in bona fides.”
G
15. The learned ASG also placed strong reliance on the decision
of this Court in the case of Union of India and Others v. Methu Meda,
(2022) 1 SCC 1, more particularly, in the following observations as under:
“17. In view of the above, in the facts of the present case, as
per paras 38.3, 38.4.3 and 38.5 of Avtar Singh case [Avtar
H
550 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 10 S.C.R.
A Singh v. Union of India, (2016) 8 SCC 471 : (2016) 2 SCC
(L&S) 425] , it is clear that the employer is having right to
consider the suitability of the candidate as per government
orders/instructions/rules at the time of taking the decision for
induction of the candidate in employment. Acquittal on
technical ground in respect of the offences of heinous/serious
B
nature, which is not a clean acquittal, the employer may have
a right to consider all relevant facts available as to the
antecedents, and may take appropriate decision as to the
continuance of the employee. Even in case, truthful declaration
regarding concluded trial has been made by the employee,
C still the employer has the right to consider antecedents and
cannot be compelled to appoint the candidate.”
16. In such circumstances referred to above, the learned ASG
prayed that there being no merit in this appeal, the same may be dismissed.
Analysis
D
17. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties
and having gone through the materials on record, the only question that
falls for our consideration is whether the High Court committed any
error in passing the impugned order?
E 18. The following facts are not in dispute:
a) The verification Form was filled up by the appellant on
02.09.2014.
b) A First Information Report was registered against the
appellant herein and others on 26.05.2008 for the offences
F punishable under Sections 147, 148, 323, 324, 504 and 506
resply of the IPC.
c) Upon registration of the FIR on 26.05.2008, the appellant
herein filed two applications in the Court of the Chief Judicial
Magistrate, Sant Kabir Nagar, one application seeking to
G surrender himself before the Court in connection with the
FIR referred to above and the second application seeking
for regular bail.
d) It appears that the appellant upon surrendering before the
Chief Judicial Magistrate was taken in deemed judicial
H custody with effect from 06.06.2008 and was ordered to
SATISH CHANDRA YADAV v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 551
[J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
be released on bail on 10.06.2008. It appears that the A
appellant was not actually put behind bars as asserted by
the appellant.
e) At the end of the investigation, the Investigating Officer
filed chargesheet in the Court of the Chief Judicial
Magistrate which culminated in the Criminal Case No. 1015 B
of 2008. The appellant herein and the other co-accused
were put to trial and vide the judgment and order dated
13.01.2016 passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate District
Sant Kabir Nagar came to be acquitted.
f) At the time when the services of the appellant came to be C
terminated, he was a probationer.
g) In the verification Form, more particularly in clause 12, the
following questions are to be found:
“(a) Have you ever been arrested? Yes/No
D
(b) Have you ever been prosecuted? Yes/No
(c) Have you ever been kept under detention Yes/No
x x x x
(i) Is any case pending against you in any Court Yes/No
E
of Law at the time of filling up this Verification Roll?”
19. Against all the aforesaid questions, the appellant put a tick on
“NO”, as above.
20. The Authority concerned reached to the conclusion that the
appellant had not only suppressed the fact that an FIR was registered F
against him but also suppressed the fact that he had surrendered before
the Chief Judicial Magistrate who, in turn, had released him on regular
bail. He also suppressed the fact that there was a Criminal Case No.
1015 of 2008 registered against him and pending in the court of Chief
Judicial Magistrate for the offences enumerated above. G
21. In such circumstances, a notice was issued to the appellant
herein to show cause as to why his services should not be terminated.
Upon conclusion of the enquiry the appellant ultimately came to be
dismissed from service.
H
552 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 10 S.C.R.
A 22. We now look into the connected Appeal arising out of the
Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 5170 of 2021.
Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 5170 of 2021.
23. This appeal is at the instance of an unsuccessful writ applicant
of a writ application being the Writ Petition (Civil) No. 9456 of 2018 filed
B in the High Court of Delhi and is directed against the judgment and order
dated 04.02.2020 by which a Division Bench of the High Court rejected
the writ application filed by the writ applicant (appellant herein) thereby
affirming the dismissal of the appellant herein from service as a Sub-
Inspector/GD, 45th Battalion, CRPF.
C 24. The facts giving rise to this appeal may be summarised as
under:
24.1 The appellant herein was serving on the post of SI/GD with
the CRPF.
D 24.2 In August, 2011, the appellant had applied for the post of SI
in the CRPF pursuant to a call for applications by the Union Public
Service Commission.
24.3 As part of the said application, the appellant was required to
fill the CRP-25 verification Form. While filling up the form in August,
2011, in response to the question of whether any criminal proceeding is
E
pending against him in any court of law, he answered in the negative.
24.4 The appellant came to be inducted in the CRPF as an SI.
24.5 The appellant received an order dated 19.11.2015 from the
office of the Deputy Inspector General of Police (DIGP), Rampur, UP
F whereby he was informed that an inquiry would commence on the Article
of Charge (AOC) under Section 11 of the CRPF Act r/w Rule 27 of the
CRPF Rules, 1955 that had been framed against him. The translated
version of the statement of the AOC reads as under:
“That No. 115213628 SI/GD Pushpendra Kumar Yadav, C/
G 45 Battalion, CRPF, while working on the post of Sub
Inspector / GD, being the member of force, has committed the
misconduct and misbehaviour, in which at the time of
recruitment, personnel gave false information in the Past
Antecedents Verification Form (CRP Form – 25) at column
No. 12 (a and b) that no case is pending against the personnel
H
SATISH CHANDRA YADAV v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 553
[J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
in any court, however before the recruitment of personnel, a A
case Crime No. 261/2002 under Section 147, 149, 323, 325,
504, 506, 307 IPC was registered against him at Police Station
Khajni, District Gorakhpur (UP. Personnel, during his
recruitment, has concealed the information regarding criminal
case pending against him and misguided the department by
B
giving wrong information, which is an offence punishable
under Section 11 (1) of CRPF Act, 1949 and Rule 27 of the
Central Reserve Police Force Rules, 1955.”
24.6 By an order dated 23.09.2016, the office of the DIGP imposed
a penalty of removal from service on the applicant.
24.7 Departmental inquiry came to be conducted in which the C
appellant submitted his defence statement. The Inquiry Officer submitted
his report to the Commandant, 45th Battalion, who in turn submitted it to
the DIG.
24.8 The appellant offered inter alia the following reasons in his
defence: D
(i) He was entirely unaware about the pendency of a case against
him in Rampur as he “was studying outside the village.”
(ii) When he met some of the co-accused, they “assured” him
that a compromise had been reached in the criminal case.
(iii) He never received any summons nor appeared before any E
Court.
(iv) He could not understand the meaning of the contents of the
12(a) and (b) of the verification Form.
24.9 Upon considering the aforesaid reasons put forth by the
appellant and his response to the questions in column 12 (a) and (b) of F
the verification Form, the DIGP, Rampur vide order dated 23.09.2016
imposed the penalty of removal of service on the appellant.
24.10 The appeal filed by the appellant in the office of the Inspector
General of Police (IGP), Lucknow also came to be dismissed.
24.11 The revision petition filed by the appellant in the office of G
SDG also came to be rejected.
24.12 The appellant thereafter preferred the writ petition being
the Writ Petition No. 9456 of 2018 in the High Court questioning the
legality and validity of the action of removal from service.
H
554 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 10 S.C.R.
A 24.13 The High Court adjudicated the Writ Petition and vide the
impugned judgment and order dated 04.02.2020 rejected the same. The
High Court while rejecting the writ application held as under:
“26. The Court has perused all the impugned orders, which
have taken note of the facts surrounding the Petitioner’s case,
B as noted in the foregoing paragraphs, and arrived at the
decision to remove the Petitioner from service. The Petitioner’s
contention that the Respondents in accordance with the
decision in Avtar Singh (supra) were required to factor in the
relevant facts as to his antecedents, is untenable. In order for
the Petitioner to demand that the Respondents consider his
C antecedents before passing an order of termination from
service, as per paragraph 34 (4) (c) of Avtar Singh (supra),
the Petitioner ’s acquittal should have been before his
appointment. Admittedly, the Petitioner’s case is not one of
acquittal before his appointment.
D 27. In any event, the order of the DA has set out detailed
reasons for rejecting every contention raised by the Petitioner
in his representation against the findings in the inquiry report.
The orders of the AA, RA as well as the DG, CRPF also do not
merely reiterate the findings of each lower authority, but offer
E their reasons for affirming the penalty of removal of service,
while having regard to the CRPF Act and Rules. The Court,
therefore, is not convinced by the Petitioner’s argument
alleging “non-application of mind” on the part of the
Respondents.
F 28. As regards the Petitioner’s submission that the Respondents
had not complied with the DoPT’s instructions on the handling
of anonymous/pseudonymous complaints as put forth in
several OMs issued in this regard, it bears mentioning, firstly,
that the OM dated 11th October, 2002 upon which the
Petitioner relied, which stipulated that prior concurrence of
G the CVC was required to taken to look into the verifiable facts
contained in such anonymous/pseudonymous complaints, has
since been withdrawn by an OM dated 26th November, 2014.
29. Turning to OM dated 18th October 2013, paragraph 3
(iii) thereof reads as under:
H
SATISH CHANDRA YADAV v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 555
[J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
“(iii) If a complaint contains verifiable allegations, the A
administrative Ministry/Department may take cognizance
of such complaint with the approval of the competent
authority to be designated by the Ministry/Department as
per their distribution of work. In such cases, the complaint
will be first sent to the complainant for owning/disowning,
B
as the case may be. If no response is received from the
complainant within 15 days of sending the complaint, a
reminder will be sent. After waiting for 15 days after sending
the reminder, if still nothing is heard, the said complaint
may be filed as pseudonymous by the Ministry/
Department.” C
30. It must be noticed, at this juncture, that it is not the
Petitioner’s case that the paragraph reproduced hereinabove
was not complied with by the Respondents. In any event, the
aforesaid paragraph 3 (iii) makes provision for the method
of ascertaining the identity of the complainant before such a D
complaint may be filed as “pseudonymous.” A bare perusal
of the record of the case evinces that such an attempt was
made by the Respondents by engaging in correspondence with
the SP, Gorakhpur, through which the Petitioner’s involvement
in criminal proceedings was incontrovertibly established.
Indeed, nowhere has the Petitioner denied his involvement in E
the case thereafter. Hence, the Respondents cannot be faulted
for relying solely on an unsubstantiated pseudonymous
complaint in proceeding against the Petitioner.
31. Learned counsel for the Petitioner then referred to a letter
dated 1st February 2012 issued by the Ministry of Home F
Affairs announcing ‘Policy Guidelines for considering cases
of candidates for appointment in the CAPFs - pendency of
criminal cases against candidates- the effect of:.’ He referred
in particular to para 2 (iii) of the said document which lists
out instances where the candidate ‘will not be considered for G
recruitment’ and to the first proviso thereto which states
“Provided further that the candidate shall not be debarred in
the above cases, if only an FIR has been registered/the case
is under investigation and no charges have been framed
either or FIR or on the complaint in any court of law.” Learned
H
556 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 10 S.C.R.
A counsel for the Petitioner submitted that in the instant case
since at the time of his filling up the form in August 2011,
only an FIR registered against him and charges were not yet
framed, the above proviso would apply.
32. This Court is unable to accept the above submission. The
B said policy guidelines do not excuse the candidate from giving
correct answers to the questions posed in the application/
attestation form. In fact, it presupposes that the candidate
has been truthful about the pending FIR. However, in the
present case, it is not in dispute that the Petitioner did not
give the correct answers to the critical questions about
C pendency of the criminal case against him. The proviso to
para 2 (iii) above, therefore, does not help the Petitioner.
33. For all the aforementioned reasons, the Court finds no
merit in the petition and dismisses it, as such.”
D 25. In such circumstances referred to above, the appellant is here
before this Court with the present appeal.
Submissions on behalf of the appellant:
26. Mr. M. M. Singh, learned counsel appearing for the writ
applicant vehemently submitted that the High Court committed a serious
E error in passing the impugned order. He would submit that the criminal
prosecution did not involve any moral turpitude. He laid much stress on
the fact that in the year 2002 when the criminal prosecution was instituted
the appellant was just 19 years of age and was not even residing in the
village as he was pursuing his studies at some other place. He pointed
F out that as it was a family dispute, the same came to be resolved. The
settlement was arrived at between the parties.
27. In the aforesaid context, the learned counsel invited the attention
of this Court to page 163 of the paper book. The document at page 163
of the paper book is in the form of a settlement recorded before the local
village panchayat in writing duly signed by the parties concerned. The
G
same reads thus:
“SETTLEMENT BY THE PANCHAYAT
We, Ram Prit Yadav S/o Ishwari Yadav resident of village –
Nakdah, police station-Khajani, District- Gorakhpur
H
SATISH CHANDRA YADAV v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 557
[J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
….First party A
And
We, Paramhansh Yadav S/o late Ram Bali Yadav R/o village-
Nakdah, police station-Khajani, District- Gorakhpur
…..Second party B
We both parties are resident of same village and are Pattidar
with each other. On the issue of land of khalihan near our
house and on ‘paimaish’ a quarrel had occurred between us
on 28.6.2002 and due to confusion and misunderstanding,
me first party has submitted written complaint at police station. C
But now we both sides after sitting together is settling our
dispute through panchayat on 7.7.2002. Now onwards all
disputes have been mutually settled/over between us. I Ram
Prit Yadav first party do station Khajani, regarding this
Panchayati settlement tomorrow and will make written request
that no further action is required to be taken regarding the D
incident occurred on 28.6.2002 because now we both sides
do not want any further action in the matter in court. We both
sides have settled the issue mutually.
Second party First party
E
Sd/-Paramhansh Sd/-Ram Prit
Paramhash Yadav Ram Prit Yadav
Witnesses:
1. Ramawati
F
2. Subhash Chandra Gupta
3. Anil Kumar Gupta
4. Chandra Bhan
5. Shyam Sunder
G
6. Ram Sagar
Date: 07.07.2002"
28. The learned counsel further submitted that the form was filled
up by the appellant almost after a period of nine years from the date of
H
558 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 10 S.C.R.
A the registration of the FIR in the year 2002. As it was a family dispute
which ultimately came to be compromised, the appellant all throughout
remained under the impression that nothing further was required to be
done in regard to the criminal case. He further pointed out that the charge
was framed by the trial court in 2011 i.e. almost after nine years from
the date of registration of the FIR. The trial ultimately resulted in acquittal
B
in view of the settlement arrived at between the parties.
29. The learned counsel would submit that the appellant bona
fide believed that in view of the settlement arrived at between the parties,
there was no criminal case thereafter pending against him and the others.
C 30. The learned counsel submitted that even filling up of the
verification Form, the previous record of the appellant was got verified
through the District Magistrate who in turn sent a report to the DIG,
CRPF through the letter dated 28.11.2011 wherein it was stated that
nothing adverse was found in the police records. He submitted that on
27.02.2015, one unknown person named Brijesh Yadav (who was later
D found to be not traceable) made a complaint with the respondent/
department against the appellant regarding the pendency of the case.
That the complaint was received by the Department, and a report was
called for by the office of the DIG, CRPF from the office of the SSP,
Gorakhpur. In pursuance of this, the SSP Gorakhpur got an investigation
E carried out by the Circle Officer, Khajani, Gorakhpur and the Circle
Officer submitted his report to the SSP. In the report, it was mentioned
that no such person by name Brijesh Yadav was found and the Crime
Case No. 261/2002 was at the stage of settlement but since charge
sheet was filed, it was pending in the Court. The report was sent by the
SSP Gorakhpur to the DIG CRPF. He further pointed out that on
F 28.07.2015, the appellant was acquitted from all the charges by the Ld.
Additional Sessions Judge, Gorakhpur in the Crime Case No. 261/2002
on merits vide the judgment and order dated 28.07.2015.
31. The learned counsel further submitted that the appellant served
for about 5 years in the CRPF with utmost sincerity and loyalty. Most of
G the time during his (appellant herein) service, i.e. about 4 years, he served
in the region of Kashmir. His service record has been commendable and
time and again he was rewarded for his service. He further pointed out
that the appellant was also selected in the CISF as an ASI in 2010-11,
but as he was already in service with the CRPF he could not join the
CISF. He made a fervent appeal that one chance may be given to the
H
SATISH CHANDRA YADAV v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 559
[J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
appellant as the termination from service will come in his way in all A
future employments public or private.
32. In such circumstances, referred to above, the learned counsel
prayed that there being merit in his appeal, the same may be allowed
and the appellant may be ordered to be reinstated in service by set asiding
the impugned order passed by the High Court as well as by the B
Department.
Submissions on behalf of the Respondent:
33. On the other hand, this appeal has been vehemently opposed
by Ms. Madhavi Divan, the learned ASG appearing for the respondent.
She submitted that no error, not to speak of any error of law, could be C
said to have been committed by the High Court in passing the impugned
order. She reiterated the very same submissions as canvassed by her
while opposing the connected appeal.
34. Ms. Divan, the learned ASG submitted that there being no
merit in the present appeal, the same may be dismissed. D
35. The following facts are not in dispute:
a) The FIR was registered against the appellant herein and others
dated 28.06.2002 at the Khajani Police Station bearing Crime Case No.
261/2002 for the offences punishable under Sections 147, 148, 323, 325,
307, 504 & 506 resply of the IPC; E
b) The accused persons including the appellant herein were
arrested & later ordered to be released on bail by the Sessions Court,
Gorakhpur;
c) At the end of the investigation, chargesheet was filed in the
court of the Judicial Magistrate, Gorakhpur. Upon filing of the chargesheet, F
the Criminal Case No. 3266 of 2009 came to be registered on the file of
the court of the Judicial Magistrate, Gorakhpur;
d) The Judicial Magistrate Court No. 24, Gorakhpur vide order
dated 02.08.2011 committed the case to the Court of Sessions in exercise
of his powers under Section 207 of the CrPC; G
e) The Sessions Court at Gorakhpur framed charge vide order
dated 23.12.2011 for the offences punishable under Sections 147, 323,
325, 307, 504 and 506 resply r/w 149 of the IPC;
f) The trial court ultimately acquitted all the accused persons as
the prosecution witnesses turned hostile; H
560 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 10 S.C.R.
A g) The material on record would indicate that at the time of filling
of verification Form on 20.08.2011, the appellant was on bail. On
09.07.2002 chargesheet was filed and on 02.08.2011, a copy of the
chargesheet was also furnished to the appellant;
h) In the verification Form, more particularly in clause 12, the
B following questions are to be found:
“(a) Have you ever been arrested? Yes/No
(b) Have you ever been prosecuted? Yes/No
(c) Have you ever been kept under detention Yes/No
C x x x x
(i) Is any case pending against you in any Court Yes/No
of Law at the time of filling up this Verification
Roll?”
D 36. Against all the aforesaid questions, the appellant put a tick on
“NO”, as above.
Position of Law
37. In Union of India and Others v. M. Bhaskaran, AIR (1996)
E SC 686, this Court held that when an appointment is procured by a
workman on the basis of a bogus and forged casual labourer service
card, it would amount to misrepresentation and fraud on the employer.
Therefore, it would create no equity in favour of the workman or any
estoppel against the employer and for such misconduct, termination would
be justified without any domestic inquiry. This Court held:
F
“6. ... Consequently, it has to be held that the respondents
were guilty of misrepresentation and fraud perpetrated on
the appellant-employer while getting employed in railway
service and had snatched such employment which would not
have been made available to them if they were not armed with
G such bogus and forged labourer service cards. ...
… It was clearly a case of fraud on the appellant- employer.
If once such fraud is detected, the appointment orders
themselves which were found to be tainted and vitiated by
fraudand acts of cheating on the part of employees, were
H
SATISH CHANDRA YADAV v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 561
[J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
liable to be recalled and were at least voidable at the option A
of the employer concerned. …
… The aggrieved are all those who had similar or even better
qualifications than the appointee or appointees but who had
not applied for the post because they did not possess the
qualifications mentioned in the advertisement. It amounts to B
a fraud on public to appoint persons with inferior
qualifications in such circumstances unless it is clearly stated
that the qualifications are relaxable. No court should be a
party to the perpetuation of the fraudulent practice. It is of
course true as noted by the Tribunal that the facts of the case
in the aforesaid decision were different from the facts of the C
presentcase. And it is also true that in that case pending the
service which was continued pursuant to the order of the
Tribunal the candidate concerned acquired the requisite
qualification and hence his appointment was not disturbed
by this Court. But that is neither here nor there. As laid down D
in the aforesaid decision, if by committing fraud any
employment is obtained, such a fraudulent practice cannot
be permitted to be countenanced by a court of law. …”
38. M. Bhaskaran (supra) was a case of fraud as forgery was
committed. E
39. In Delhi Administration, v. Sushil Kumar, (1996) 11 SCC
605, this Court laid stress on the fact that the verification of character
and antecedents is one of the important criteria to test whether the selected
candidate is suitable to a post under the State.
40. In Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan and Others v. Ram F
Ratan Yadav, (2003) 3 SCC 437, this Court held that:
“12. … In the present case the respondent was to serve as a
Physical Education Teacher in Kendriya Vidyalaya. The
character, conduct and antecedents of a teacher will have
some impact on the minds of the students of impressionable G
age. The appellants having considered all the aspects passed
the order of dismissal of the respondent from service. The
Tribunal after due consideration rightly recorded a finding
of fact in upholding the order of dismissal passed by the
appellants. …”
H
562 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 10 S.C.R.
A 41. In the aforesaid case, this Court held that the purpose of
requiring an employee to furnish information regarding prosecution/
conviction, etc. in the verification Form was to assess his character and
antecedents for the purpose of employment and continuation in service;
that suppression of material information and making a false statement in
reply to queries relating to prosecution and conviction had a clear bearing
B on the character, conduct and antecedents of the employee; and that
where it is found that the employee had suppressed or given false
information in regard to matters which had a bearing on his fitness or
suitability to the post, he could be terminated from service during the
period of probation without holding any inquiry. This Court also made it
C clear that neither the gravity of the criminal offence nor the ultimate
acquittal therein was relevant when considering whether a probationer
who suppresses a material fact (of his being involved in a criminal case,
in the personal information furnished to the employer), is fit to be continued
as a probationer.
42. In Kamal Nayan Mishra v. State of Madhya Pradesh and
D Others, (2010) 2 SCC 169, the ratio decidendi in Ram Ratan Yadav
(supra) was discussed and clarified as follows:
“14. Therefore, the ratio decidendi of Ram Ratan Yadav (2003)
3 SCC 437 is, where an employee (probationer) is required to
give his personal data in an attestation form in connection
E with his appointment (either at the time of or thereafter), if it
is found that the employeehad suppressed or given false
information in regard to matters which had a bearing onhis
fitness or suitability to the post, he could be terminated from
service during the period of probation without holding any
inquiry. The decision dealt with a probationerand not a holder
F
of a civil post, and nowhere laid down a proposition that a
confirmed employee holding a civil post under the State, could
be terminated from service for furnishing false information
in an attestation form, without giving an opportunity to meet
the charges against him.” [Emphasis supplied]
G 43. Thus, this Court in Kamal Nayan Mishra (supra) held that
an employee who is found to have suppressed material facts at the time
of appointment, must be given an opportunity to defend the charges
against him and cannot be terminated without due notice.
44. In R. Radhakrishnan v. Director General of Police and
H Others, (2008) 1 SCC 660, this Court considered the case of a candidate
SATISH CHANDRA YADAV v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 563
[J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
for appointment as a Fireman who had furnished wrong information A
about his involvement in a criminal case, though he was acquitted. This
Court held that the standards expected of a person intended to serve in
such a service are different from the one of the persons who intended to
serve in other services. It was also concluded that the candidate knew
and understood the implications of the omission in his statement to disclose
B
vital information. The candidate by not disclosing his involvement in a
criminal case, prevented the Authority from verifying his character as a
suitable appointment. This Court, therefore, declined to exercise its
equitable jurisdiction in favour of such a candidate who had suppressed
such material facts.
45. Similarly, in the Union of India and Others v. Bipad Bhanjan C
Gayen, (2008) 11 SCC 314, this Court dealt with the validity of the
termination of the candidate, who had been selected for training as a
constable in the Railway Protection Force. This Court recognised that
different standards are to apply to the different services while determining
the question of validity of the termination when material facts are D
suppressed. It was held as under:
“10. It bears repetition that what has led to the termination of
service of the respondent is not his involvement in the two
cases which were then pending, and in which he had been
discharged subsequently, but the fact that he had withheld E
relevant information while filling in the attestation form. We
are further of the opinion that an employment as a police
officer pre- supposes a higher level of integrity as such a
person is expected to uphold the law, and on the contrary,
such a service born in deceit and subterfuge cannot be
tolerated.” F
[Emphasis supplied]
46. In State of Haryana and Others v. Dinesh Kumar (2008)
(3) SCC 222, this Court considered the case of an employee (constable
driver for State Police) who had answered “No” to a query as to whether
G
he was arrested. The employee had argued that as a layman, his
understanding of arrest did not match with the legal definition of arrest.
The candidate said he had voluntarilyappeared before the Magistrate,
without being taken into formal custody, was granted bail and was
ultimately acquitted. This Court held as under:
H
564 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 10 S.C.R.
A “12. One of the common questions which, therefore, need to
be answered in both these appeals is whether the manner in
which they had appeared before the Magistrate and had been
released without being taken into formal custody, could
amount to “arrest” for the purpose of the query in Column
13(A). …
B
x x x x
31. In our view, the reasoning given in Dinesh Kumar’s case
in that context is a possibleview and does not call for
interference under Article 136 of the Constitution. Conversely,
C the decision rendered in the writ petitions filed by Lalit Kumar
and Bhupinder has to be reversed to be in line with the decision
in Dinesh Kumar’s case. When the question as to what
constitutes “arrest” has for long engaged the attention of
different High Courts as also this Court, it may not be
altogether unreasonable to expect a layman to construe that
D he had never been arrested on his appearing before the court
and being granted bail immediately. The position would have
been different, had the person concerned not been released
on bail. We would, in the facts of these cases, give the benefit
of a mistaken impression, rather than that of deliberate and
E wilful misrepresentation and concealment of facts, to the
appellants in the second of the two appeals as well, while
affirming the view taken by the High Court in Dinesh Kumar’s
case.”
[Emphasis supplied]
F 47. Thus, it was held that even if what transpired may technically
amount to arrest, the benefit of a mistaken impression rather than the
consequences of a deliberate and willful misrepresentation and
concealment of facts, should be extended to the employee.
48. This Court in the case of Daya Shankar Yadav v. Union of
G India and Others, (2010) 14 SCC 103 was faced with a similar issue
wherein a CRPF officer upon suppression of material facts was
terminated from the service. This Court while referring to its previous
decisions, summarised the position as follows:
“14. … The purpose of seeking the said information is to
H ascertain the character and antecedents of the candidate so
SATISH CHANDRA YADAV v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 565
[J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
as to assess his suitability for the post. Therefore, the A
candidate will have to answer the questions in these columns
truthfully and fully and any misrepresentation or suppression
or false statement therein, by itself would demonstrate a
conduct or character unbefitting for a uniformed security
service.”
B
15. When an employee or a prospective employee declares in
a verification form, answers to the queries relating to
character and antecedents, the verification thereof can
therefore lead to any of the following consequences:
(a) If the declarant has answered the questions in the C
affirmative and furnished the details of any criminal case
(wherein he was convicted or acquitted by giving benefit
of doubt for want of evidence), the employer may refuse to
offer him employment (or if already employed on probation,
discharge him from service), if he is found to be unfit having
regard to the nature and gravity of the offence/crime in D
which he was involved.
(b) On the other hand, if the employer finds that the criminal
case disclosed by the declarant related to offences which
were technical, or of a nature that would not affect the
declarant’s fitness for employment, or where the declarant E
had been honourably acquitted and exonerated, the
employer may ignore the fact that the declarant had been
prosecuted in a criminal case and proceed to appoint him
or continue him in employment.
(c) Where the declarant has answered the questions in the F
negative and on verification it is found that the answers
were false, the employer may refuse to employ the declarant
(or discharge him, if already employed), even if the
declarant had been cleared of the charges or is acquitted.
This is because when there is suppression or non- G
disclosure of material information bearing on his character,
that itself becomes a reason for not employing the
declarant.
(d) Where the attestation form or verification form does
not contain proper or adequate queries requiring the
H
566 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 10 S.C.R.
A declarant to disclose his involvement in any criminal
proceedings, or where the candidate was unaware of
initiation of criminal proceedings when he gave the
declarations in the verification roll/attestation form, then
the candidate cannot be found fault with, for not furnishing
the relevant information. But if the employer by other means
B
(say police verification or complaints etc.) learns about
the involvement of the declarant, the employer can have
recourse to courses (a) or (b) above.
16. Thus an employee on probation can be discharged from
service or a prospectiveemployee may be refused employment:
C
(i) on the ground of unsatisfactory antecedents and
character, disclosed from his conviction in a criminal case,
or his involvement in a criminal offence (even if he was
acquitted on technical grounds or by giving benefit of
doubt) or other conduct (like copying in examination) or
D rustication or suspension or debarment from college etc.;
and
(ii) on the ground of suppression of material information
or making false statement in reply to queries relating to
prosecution or conviction for a criminal offence (even if
E he was ultimately acquitted in the criminal case).
This ground is distinct from the ground of previous antecedents
and character, as it shows a current dubious conduct and
absence of character at the time of making the declaration, thereby
making him unsuitable for the post.”
F
49. This Court in the aforesaid case while deliberating on the very
same questions as were asked in the verification Form from the appellant
in the present case, held that:
“24. We are satisfied that the appellant had knowingly made
a false statement that he was not prosecuted in any criminal
G
case. Therefore, the employer (CRPF) was justified in
dispensing with his services for not being truthful in giving
material information regarding his antecedents which were
relevant for employment in a uniformed service, and that itself
justified his discharge from service. Consequently, we dismiss
H this appeal as having no merit.”
SATISH CHANDRA YADAV v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 567
[J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
50. In the case of Commissioner of Police and Others. v. A
Sandeep Kumar (2011) 4 SCC 644, the candidate after clearing the
test, disclosed his involvement in a criminal case which was compromised
and later on such compromise was acquitted. A Show-Cause notice
was issued to him asking him to show cause as to why his candidature
for the post should not be cancelled as he had concealed the fact of his
B
involvement in the criminal case and had made a wrong statement in his
application form. The authorities were not satisfied with the explanation
offered and went on to terminate his employment. A challenge was made
by him before the Administrative Tribunal which declined to interfere.
However, the High Court granted the relief by setting aside the proposal
for cancellation of his candidature. This Court upheld the order of the C
High Court by granting the relief and held as under:
“12. It is true that in the application form the respondent did
not mention that he was involved in a criminal case under
Sections 325/34 IPC. Probably he did not mention this out of
fear that if he did so he would automatically be disqualified. D
At any event, it was not such a serious offence like murder,
dacoity or rape, and hence a more lenient view should be
taken in the matter.”
51. The Court in the aforesaid took into consideration the fact
that the incident had happened when the respondent was 20 years of E
age. The Court held that young people are not expected to behave in as
mature a manner as the older people. The Court highlighted that the
approach should be to condone minor indiscretions made by young people
rather than to brand them as criminals for the rest of their lives.
52. In the case of Jainendra Singh v. State of U.P. Tr. Prinl. F
Sec. Home and Others, (2012) 8 SCC 748, this Court, while referring
to its previous precedents set on the issue of suppression of material
facts being a ground for termination laid down certain principles to be
considered. This Court also called for the constitution of a larger Bench
to settle the issue.The yardsticks laid down by this Court are as below:
G
“29. As noted by us, all the above decisions were rendered by
a Division Bench of this Court consisting of two-Judges and
having bestowed our serious consideration to the issue, we
consider that while dealing with such an issue, the Court will
have to bear in mind the various cardinal principles before
granting any relief to the aggrieved party, namely: H
568 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 10 S.C.R.
A 29.1 Fraudulently obtained orders of appointment could be
legitimately treated as voidable at the option of the employer
or could be recalled by the employer and in such cases merely
because the respondent employee has continued in service
for a number of years, on the basis of such fraudulently
obtained employment, cannot get any equity in his favour or
B
any estoppel against the employer.
29.2 Verification of the character and antecedents is one of
the important criteriato test whether the selected candidate is
suitable to the post under the State andon account of his
antecedents the appointing authority if find it not desirable
C to appoint a person to a disciplined force can it be said to be
unwarranted.
29.3 When appointment was procured by a person on the basis
of forged documents, it would amount to misrepresentation
and fraud on the employer and, therefore, it would create no
D equity in his favour or any estoppel against the employer
while resorting to termination without holding any inquiry.
29.4 A candidate having suppressed material information and/
or giving false information cannot claim right to continue in
service and the employer, having regard to the nature of
E employment as well as other aspects, has the discretion to
terminate his services.
29.5 The purpose of calling for information regarding
involvement in any criminal case or detention or conviction
is for the purpose of verification of the character/antecedents
at the time of recruitment and suppression of such material
F information will have clear bearing on the character and
antecedents of the candidate in relation to his continuity in
service.
29.6 The person who suppressed the material information and/
or gives false information cannot claim any right for
G appointment or continuity in service.
29.7 The standard expected of a person intended to serve in
uniformed service is quite distinct from other services and,
therefore, any deliberate statement or omission regarding a
vital information can be seriously viewed and the ultimate
H decision of the appointing authority cannot be faulted.
SATISH CHANDRA YADAV v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 569
[J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
29.8 An employee on probation can be discharged from service A
or may be refused employment on the ground of suppression
of material information or making false statement relating to
his involvement in the criminal case, conviction or detention,
even if ultimately he was acquitted of the said case, inasmuch
as such a situation would make a person undesirable or
B
unsuitable for the post.
29.9 An employee in the uniformed service presupposes a
higher level of integrity as such a person is expected to uphold
the law and on the contrary such a service born in deceit and
subterfuge cannot be tolerated.
29.10 The authorities entrusted with the responsibility of C
appointing constables, are under duty to verify the
antecedents of a candidate to find out whether he is suitable
for the post of a constable and so long as the candidate has
not been acquitted in the criminal case, he cannot be held to
be suitable for appointment to the post of constable.” D
53. The Court while referring the issues to larger Bench observed
in paras 30 and 31 resply as under:
“30. When we consider the above principles laid down in the
majority of the decisions, the question that looms large before
us is when considering such claim by the candidates who E
deliberately suppressed information at the time of recruitment,
can there be different yardsticks applied in the matter of grant
of relief.
31. Though there are very many decisions in support of the
various points culled out in the above paragraphs, inasmuch
F
as we have noted certain other decisions taking different view
of coordinate Benches, we feel it appropriate to refer the
abovementioned issues to a larger Bench of this Court for an
authoritative pronouncement so that there will be no conflict
of views and which will enable the courts to apply the law
uniformly while dealing with such issues.” G
54. This Court before settling the issues in the case of Avtar Singh
v. Union of India and Others, (2016) 8 SCC 471, discussed the said
principles extensively in the matter of Commissioner of Police, New
Delhi and Another v. Mehar Singh, (2013) 7 SCC 685. In this case, a
candidate for the post of constable in the Delhi Police had disclosed his H
570 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 10 S.C.R.
A involvement in a criminal case, wherein he was acquitted on technical
grounds. The candidate had his candidature for the post rejected by the
Standing Committee. The candidate argued that as he had been acquitted,
the Standing Committee by rejecting his candidature had overreached
the decision of the competent Authority. This Court, whiledeciding on
the issue and whether the respondent was honourably acquitted, held as
B
under:
“25. The expression “honourable acquittal” was considered
by this Court in S. Samuthiram 2013 (1) SCC 598. In that
case this Court was concerned with a situation where
disciplinary proceedings were initiated against a police
C officer. Criminal case was pending against him under Section
509 IPC and under Section 4 of the Eve-Teasing Act. He was
acquitted in that case because of the non-examination of key
witnesses. There was a serious flaw in the conduct of the
criminal case. Two material witnesses turned hostile. Referring
D to the judgment of this Court in RBI v. Bhopal Singh Panchal
(1994) 1 SCC 541 where in somewhat similar fact situation,
this Court upheld a bank’s action of refusing to reinstate an
employee in service on the ground that in the criminal case
he was acquitted by giving him benefit of doubt and, therefore,
it was not an honourable acquittal, this Court held that the
E High Court wasnot justified in setting aside the punishment
imposed in the departmental proceedings. This Court observed
that the expressions “honourable acquittal”, “acquitted of
blame” and “fully exonerated” are unknown to the Criminal
Procedure Code or the Penal Code. They are coined by
F judicial pronouncements. It is difficult to define what is meant
by the expression “honourably acquitted”. This Court
expressed that when the accused is acquitted after full
consideration of the prosecution case and the
prosecutionmiserably fails to prove the charges levelled
against the accused, it can possibly be said that the accused
G was honourably acquitted.
26. In light of the above, we are of the opinion that since the
purpose of the departmental proceedings is to keep persons,
who are guilty of serious misconduct or dereliction of duty or
who are guilty of grave cases of moral turpitude, out of the
H
SATISH CHANDRA YADAV v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 571
[J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
department, if found necessary, because they pollute the A
department, surely the above principles will apply with more
vigour at the point of entry of a person in the police department
i.e. at the time of recruitment. If it is found by the Screening
Committee thatthe person against whom a serious case
involving moral turpitude is registered is discharged on
B
technical grounds or is acquitted of the same charge but the
acquittal isnot honourable, the Screening Committee would
be entitled to cancel his candidature. Stricter norms need to
be applied while appointing persons in a disciplinary force
because public interest is involved in it.
x x x x C
34. The respondents are trying to draw mileage from the fact
that in their application and/or attestation form they have
disclosed their involvement in a criminal case. We donot see
how this fact improves their case. Disclosure of these facts in
the application/attestation form is an essential requirement. D
An aspirant is expected to state these facts honestly. Honesty
and integrity are inbuilt requirements of the police force.The
respondents should not, therefore, expect to score any brownie
points because of this disclosure. Besides, this has no
relevance to the point in issue. It bears repetition to state that E
while deciding whether a person against whom a criminal
case was registered and who was later on acquitted or
discharged should be appointed to a post inthe police force,
what is relevant is the nature of the offence, the extent of
hisinvolvement, whether the acquittal was a clean acquittal
or an acquittal by giving benefit of doubt because the F
witnesses turned hostile or because of some serious flaw in
the prosecution, and the propensity of such person to indulge
in similar activities infuture. This decision, in our opinion,
can only be taken by the Screening Committee created for
that purpose by the Delhi Police. If the Screening Committee’s G
decision is not mala fide or actuated by extraneous
considerations, then, it cannot be questioned.
35. The police force is a disciplined force. It shoulders the
great responsibility of maintaining law and order and public
order in the society. People repose great faith and confidence H
572 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 10 S.C.R.
A in it. It must be worthy of that confidence. A candidate wishing
to join the police force must be a person of utmost rectitude.
He must have impeccable character and integrity. A person
having criminal antecedents will not fit in this category. Even
if he is acquitted or discharged in the criminal case, that
acquittal or discharge order will have to be examined to see
B
whether he has been completely exonerated in the case
because even a possibility of his taking to the life of crimes
poses a threat to the discipline of the police force. The
Standing Order, therefore, has entrusted the task of taking
decisions in these matters to the Screening Committee. The
C decision of the Screening Committee must be taken as final
unless it is mala fide. In recent times, the image of the police
force is tarnished. Instances of police personnel behaving in
a wayward manner by misusing power are in public domain
and are a matter of concern. The reputation of the police
force has taken a beating. In such a situation, we would not
D
like to dilute the importance and efficacy of a mechanism
like the Screening Committee created by the Delhi Police to
ensure that persons who are likely to erode its credibility do
not enter the police force. At the same time, the Screening
Committee must be alive to the importance of trust reposed in
E it and must treat all candidates with even hand.”
[Emphasis supplied]
Precedent of Avtar Singh
55. In the case of Avtar Singh (supra), a three-Judge Bench of
F this Court looked into the conflict of opinion in the various decisions
highlighted in Jainendra Singh (supra). The larger Bench considered
plethora of decisions on the question of suppression of information or
submitting false information in the verification Form, also as to the question
of having been criminally prosecuted, arrested or as to the pendency of
a criminal case. After analysing all the previous decisions of this Court
G on the subject, the larger Bench held as follows:
“30. The employer is given ‘discretion’ to terminate or
otherwise to condone the omission. Even otherwise, once
employer has the power to take a decision when at the time of
filling verification form declarant has already been convicted/
H acquitted, in such a case, it becomes obvious that all the facts
SATISH CHANDRA YADAV v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 573
[J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
and attending circumstances, including impact of suppression A
or false information are taken into consideration while
adjudging suitability of an incumbent for services in question.
In case the employer comes to the conclusion that suppression
is immaterial and even if facts would have been disclosed it
would not have adversely affected fitness of an incumbent,
B
for reasons to be recorded, it has power to condone the lapse.
However, while doing so employer has to act prudently on
due consideration of nature of post and duties to be rendered.
For higher officials/higher posts, standard has to be very
high and even slightest false information or suppression may
by itself render a person unsuitable for the post. However, C
same standard cannot be applied to each and every post. In
concluded criminal cases, it has to be seen what has been
suppressed is material fact and would have rendered an
incumbent unfit for appointment. An employer would be
justified in not appointing or if appointed, to terminate
D
services of such incumbent on due consideration of various
aspects. Even if disclosure has been made truthfully, the
employer has the right to consider fitness and while doing so
effect of conviction and background facts of case, nature of
offence, etc. have to be considered. Even if acquittal has been
made, employer may consider nature of offence, whether E
acquittal is honourable or giving benefit of doubt on technical
reasons and decline to appoint a person who is unfit or of
dubious character. In case employer comes to conclusion that
conviction or ground of acquittal in criminal case would not
affect the fitness for employment incumbent may be appointed
F
or continued in service.”
56. The larger Bench stated that an objective criterion must be
applied while terminating an employee who had suppressed material
facts. The Court held that mere suppression cannot be the sole reason
for termination and due consideration must be paid to the facts of the
case. The Court, while discussing the objective yardsticks that are to be G
applied held as under:
“34. No doubt about it that verification of character and
antecedents is one of the important criteria to assess suitability
and it is open to employer to adjudge antecedents of the
H
574 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 10 S.C.R.
A incumbent, but ultimate action should be based upon objective
criteria on due consideration of all relevant aspects.
35. Suppression of “material” information presupposes that
what is suppressed that “matters” not every technical or trivial
matter. The employer has to act on due consideration of rules/
B instructions if any in exercise of powers in order to cancel
candidature or for terminating the services of employee.
Though a person who has suppressed the material information
cannot claim unfettered right for appointment or continuity
in service but he has a right not to be dealt with arbitrarily
and exercise of power has to be in reasonable manner with
C objectivity having due regard to facts of cases.
36. What yardstick is to be applied has to depend upon the
nature of post, higher post would involve more rigorous
criteria for all services, not only to uniformed service. For
lower posts which are not sensitive, nature of duties, impact
D of suppression on suitability has to be considered by
authorities concerned considering post/nature of duties/
services and power has to be exercised on due consideration
of various aspects.”
57. The Court proceeded to hold further that a chance of
E reformation should be afforded to the young offenders in suitable cases
while exercising the power for cancelling candidature. The Court
thereafter summarised the discussion on the issue by way of laying down
certain guidelines as stated below:
“38. We have noticed various decisions and tried to explain
F and reconcile them as far as possible. In view of aforesaid
discussion, we summarize our conclusion thus:
38.1. Information given to the employer by a candidate as to
conviction, acquittal or arrest, or pendency of a criminal case,
whether before or after entering into service must be true
G and there should be no suppression or false mention of
required information.
38.2. While passing order of termination of services or
cancellation of candidature for giving false information, the
employer may take notice of special circumstances of the case,
H if any, while giving such information.
SATISH CHANDRA YADAV v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 575
[J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
38.3. The employer shall take into consideration the A
Government orders/instructions/rules, applicable to the
employee, at the time of taking the decision.
38.4. In case there is suppression or false information of
involvement in a criminal case where conviction or acquittal
had already been recorded before filling of the application/ B
verification form and such fact later comes to knowledge of
employer, any of the following recourse appropriate to the
case may be adopted: -
38.4.1. In a case trivial in nature in which conviction had
been recorded, such as shouting slogans at young age or for C
a petty offence which if disclosed would not have rendered
an incumbent unfit for post in question, the employer may, in
its discretion, ignore such suppression of fact or false
information by condoning the lapse.
38.4.2. Where conviction has been recorded in case which is D
not trivial in nature, employer may cancel candidature or
terminate services of the employee.
38.4.3. If acquittal had already been recorded in a case
involving moral turpitude or offence of heinous/serious nature,
on technical ground andit is not a case of clean acquittal, or E
benefit of reasonable doubt has been given, the employer may
consider all relevant facts available as to antecedents, and
may take appropriate decision as to the continuance of the
employee.
38.5 In a case where the employee has made declaration F
truthfully of a concluded criminal case, the employer still has
the right to consider antecedents, and cannot be compelled
to appoint the candidate.
38.6. In case when fact has been truthfully declared in
character verification form regarding pendency of a criminal
G
case of trivial nature, employer, in facts and circumstances of
the case, in its discretion may appoint the candidate subject
to decision of such case.
38.7. In a case of deliberate suppression of fact with respect
to multiple pendingcases such false information by itself will
H
576 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 10 S.C.R.
A assume significance and an employer may pass appropriate
order cancelling candidature or terminating services as
appointment of a person against whom multiple criminal cases
were pending may not be proper.
38.8. If criminal case was pending but not known to the
B candidate at the time of filling the form, still it may have
adverse impact and the appointing authority would take
decision after considering the seriousness of the crime.
38.9. In case the employee is confirmed in service, holding
Departmental enquiry would be necessary before passing
C order of termination/removal or dismissal on the ground of
suppression or submitting false information in verification
form.
38.10. For determining suppression or false information
attestation/verification form has to be specific, not vague.
D Only such information which was required to be specifically
mentioned has to be disclosed. If information not asked for
but is relevant comes to knowledge of the employer the same
can be considered in an objective manner while addressing
the question of fitness. However, in such cases action cannot
be taken on basis of suppression or submitting false
E information as to a fact which was not even asked for.
38.11. Before a person is held guilty of suppressio veri or
suggestio falsi, knowledge of the fact must be attributable to
him.”
F Position of law post Avtar Singh
58. In Union Territory, Chandigarh Administration and Others
v. Pradeep Kumar and Another, (2018) 1 SCC 797 the issue of the
respondent therein being honourably acquitted and entitled to being
reinstated was raised. This Court, while relying upon Mehar Singh
(supra) and holding that the nature of the offences must be looked into,
G
held as follows:
“13. It is thus well settled that acquittal in a criminal case
does not automatically entitlehim for appointment to the post.
Still it is open to the employer to consider the antecedents
and examine whether he is suitable for appointment to the
H
SATISH CHANDRA YADAV v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 577
[J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
post. From the observations of this Court in Mehar Singh A
(2013) 7 SCC 685 and Parvez Khan (2015) 2 SCC 591 cases,
it is clear that a candidate to be recruited to the police service
must be of impeccable character and integrity. A person
having criminal antecedents will not fit in this category. Even
if he is acquitted or discharged, it cannot be presumed that
B
he was honourably acquitted/completely exonerated. The
decision of the Screening Committee must be taken as final
unless it is shown to be mala fide. The Screening Committee
also must be alive to the importance of the trust reposed in it
and must examine the candidate with utmost character.
x x x x C
15. From the above details, we find that the Screening
Committee examined each and every case of the respondents
and reasonings for their acquittal and taken the decision.
While deciding whether a person involved in a criminal case
has been acquitted or discharged should be appointed to a D
post in a police force, nature of offence in which he is involved,
whether it was an honourable acquittal or only an extension
of benefit of doubt because of witnesses turned hostile and
flaws in the prosecution are all the aspects to be considered
by the Screening Committee for taking the decision whether E
the candidate is suitable for the post.”
[Emphasis supplied]
59. In the case of State of Madhya Pradesh and Others v.
Bunty, (2020) 17 SCC 654, the candidate had not disclosed the fact that
he had criminal proceedings pending against him at the time of F
verification. The criminal proceedings were based on the candidate
impersonating a police officer and this Court treated it to be a case
which involved moral turpitude. The candidate was granted benefit of
doubt. The candidate had been acquitted on the technical ground of a
witness being held hostile. This Court held that the perception formed by
the Screening Committee, that he was unfit to be inducted in the disciplined G
police force, was appropriate. Further it was held that, the decision of
the Scrutiny Committee could not be said to be such which warranted
judicial interference unless there is a mala fide intent involved.
60. In the case of State of Rajasthan and Others v. Love Kush
Meena, (2021) 8 SCC 774, the respondent was charged under Sections H
578 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 10 S.C.R.
A 302, 323, 341/34 resply of the IPC and was acquitted as the prosecution
failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. The witnesses had
turned hostile. The candidate had disclosed the said fact at the time of
applying; however, his appointment was cancelled relying on Avtar Singh
(supra). This Court held as under:
B “24. Examining the controversy in the present case in the
conspectus of the aforesaid legal position, what is important
to note is the fact that the view of this Court has depended on
the nature of offence charged and the result of the same. The
mere fact ofan acquittal would not suffice but rather it would
depend on whether it is a clean acquittal based on total
C absence of evidence or in the criminal jurisprudence
requiring the case to be proved beyond reasonable doubt,
that parameter having not been met, benefit of doubt has been
granted to the accused. …
x x x x
D
26. The judgment in Avtar Singh’s case (2016) 8 SCC 471 on
the relevant parameter extracted aforesaid clearly stipulates
that where in respect of a heinous or serious nature of crime
the acquittal is based on a benefit of reasonable doubt, that
cannot make the candidateeligible.”
E
[Emphasis supplied]
61. In the case of Union of India and Others v. Methu Meda,
(2022) 1 SCC1, the respondent had applied for the post of constable in
the CISF and was selected. The respondent had disclosed about the
F case in which he was acquitted. However, his selection was subsequently
cancelled. The respondent challenged the same vide a writ petition, which
the High Court allowed. This Court, however, set aside the High Court’s
order and discussed the consequence of an acquittal on technical grounds.
It was also reiterated that a person joining the police force must be of
impeccable character and must not have any criminal antecedents. This
G Court held as under:
“17. In view of the above, in the facts of the present case, as
per paras 38.3, 38.4.3 and 38.5 of Avtar Singh case (supra)
(2016) 8 SCC 471, it is clear that the employer is having
right to consider the suitability of the candidate as per
H government orders/instructions/rules at the time of taking the
SATISH CHANDRA YADAV v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 579
[J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
decision for induction of the candidate in employment. A
Acquittal on technical ground in respect of the offences of
heinous/serious nature, which is not a clean acquittal, the
employer may have a right to consider all relevant facts
available as to the antecedents, and may take appropriate
decision as to the continuance of the employee. Even in case,
B
truthful declaration regarding concluded trial has been made
by the employee, still the employer has the right to consider
antecedents and cannot be compelled to appoint the
candidate.
x x x x
C
20. In view of the aforesaid, it is clear the respondent who
wishes to join the police force must be a person of utmost
rectitude and have impeccable character and integrity.A
person having a criminal antecedents would not be fit in this
category. The employer is having right to consider the nature
of acquittal or decide until he is completely exonerated D
because even a possibility of his taking to the life of crimes
poses a threat to the discipline of the police force. The
Standing Order, therefore, has entrusted the task of taking
decisions in these matters to the Screening Committee and the
decision of the Committee would be final unless mala fide. … E
21. As discussed hereinabove, the law is well-settled. If a
person is acquitted giving himthe benefit of doubt, from the
charge of an offence involving moral turpitude or because
the witnesses turned hostile, it would not automatically entitle
him for the employment, that too in disciplined force. The F
employer is having a right to consider his candidature in terms
of the circulars issued by the Screening Committee. The mere
disclosure of the offences alleged and the result of the trial is
not sufficient. In the said situation, the employer cannot be
compelled to give appointment to the candidate. ….” G
[Emphasis supplied]
62. In the Union of India (UOI) v. Dilip Kumar Mallick, (2022)
6 Scale 108, a CRPF officer had suppressed the fact that the proceedings
under the IPC were pending against him. The Court, while referring to
Avtar Singh (supra), held that the suppression can be a ground for an H
580 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 10 S.C.R.
A employer to cancel the candidature or to terminate the services. The
respondent served in the organization since 2003 and continued to remain
as an under trial accused without theknowledge of the organisation. The
respondent received an honourable acquittal from the trial court. This
Court held as under:
B “13. Thus, it remains beyond the pale of doubt that the cases
of non-disclosure of material information and of submitting
false information have been treated as being of equal gravity
by this Court and it is laid down in no uncertain terms that
non-disclosure by itself may be a ground for an employer to
cancel the candidature or to terminate services. Even in the
C summation above- quoted, this Court has emphasized that
information given to the employer by a candidate as to criminal
case including the factors of arrest or pendency of the case,
whether before or after entering into service, must be true
and there should be no suppression or false mention of the
D required information.
14. In case of suppression, when the facts later come to the
knowledge of employer, different courses of action may be
adopted by the employer depending on the nature of fault as
also the nature of default; and this Court has indicated that
E if the case is of trivial nature, like that of shouting slogans at
a young age etc., the employer may ignore such suppression
of fact or false information depending on the factors as to
whether the information, if disclosed, would have rendered
incumbent unfit for the post in question.
F 14.1. However, the aforesaid observations do not lead to the
corollary that in a case of the present nature where a criminal
case was indeed pending against the respondent and the facts
were altogether omitted from being mentioned, the employer
would be obliged to ignore such defaults and shortcomings.
…
G
x x x x
16. In the given set of facts and circumstances, where
suppression of relevant information is not a matter of dispute,
there cannot be any legal basis for the Court to interfere in
the manner that the employer be directed to impose ‘any lesser
H
SATISH CHANDRA YADAV v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 581
[J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
punishment’, as directed by the Division Bench of the High A
Court. The submissions seeking to evoke sympathy and calling
for leniency cannot lead to any relief in favour of the
respondent.”
[Emphasis supplied]
63. In the case of Pawan Kumar v. Union of India, (2022) SCC B
OnLine SC 532, a case was registered against the appellant for the
offences punishable under Sections 148, 149, 323, 356 and 506 resply of
the IPC. The appellant was honourably acquitted. However, the fact of
the said criminal prosecution was not disclosed in the attestation form
filled by the petitioner. On such ground, the appellant was discharged C
from service. The High Court upheld the discharge. While allowing the
appeal, this Court held as follows:
“13. What emerges from the exposition as laid down by this
Court is that by mere suppression of material/false information
regardless of the fact whether there is a conviction or acquittal D
has been recorded, the employee/recruit is not to be
discharged/terminated axiomatically from service just by a
stroke of pen. At the same time, the effect of suppression of
material/false information involving in a criminal case, if any,
is left for the employer to consider all the relevant facts and
circumstancesavailable as to antecedents and keeping in view E
the objective criteria and the relevant service rules into
consideration, while taking appropriate decision regarding
continuance/suitability of the employee into service. What
being noticed by this Court is that mere suppression of
material/false information in a given case does not mean that F
the employer can arbitrarily discharge/terminate the employee
from service.
x x x x
18. The criminal case indeed was of trivial nature and the
nature of post and nature of duties to be discharged by the G
recruit has never been looked into by the competent authority
while examining the overall suitability of the incumbent
keeping in view Rule 52 of the Rules 1987 to become a member
of the force. Taking into consideration the exposition
expressed by this Court in Avtar Singh (supra), in our
H
582 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 10 S.C.R.
A considered view the order of discharge passed by the
competent authority dated 24th April, 2015 is not sustainable
and in sequel thereto the judgment passed by the Division
Bench of High Court of Delhi does not hold good and deserves
to be set aside.”
[Emphasis supplied]
B
64. In the case of Rajasthan Rajya Vidyut Prasaran Nigam
Limited and another v. Anil Kanwariya, (2021) 10 SCC 136, this Court
gave altogether a different dimension to the issue in question. In the said
case, the respondent had applied for the post of Technical Helper on the
establishment of the appellant Nigam. The respondent was appointed as
C a Technical Helper on probation for a period of two years w.e.f.
06.05.2015. The appointment of the respondent was subjected to the
production of a character certificate/verification report to be issued by
the Superintendent of Police of the native district of the respondent. The
Superintendent, Sawai Madhopur vide his report dated 05.06.2015
informed the appellant that a criminal case bearing No. 13 of 2011 for
D
the offences punishable under Sections 143, 341 and 323 resply of the
IPC was registered against the respondent and the respondent came to
be convicted vide the judgment and order dated 05.08.2013 passed by
the trial court. The report of Superintendent of Police further stated that
the respondent was given the benefit under the Probation of Offenders
E Act, 1958. In other words, although the respondent stood convicted for
the alleged offence yet the trial court thought fit to release him on
probation. This fact was supressed by the respondent at the time of his
appointment. In such circumstances, action was taken and ultimately
the respondent’s services came to be terminated. The respondent
challenged the order of termination in the High Court. The learned Single
F Judge of the High Court set aside the order of termination and directed
the appellant to reinstate the respondent. The appellant Nigam preferred
an intra-court appeal before the Division Bench. The appeal came to be
dismissed. The appellant Nigam ultimately came to this Court and
challenged the orders passed by the High Court. This Court while allowing
G the appeal filed by the Nigam held in Para 14 as under:
“14. The issue/question may be considered from another angle,
from the employer’s point of view. The question is not about
whether an employee was involved in a dispute of trivial nature
and whether he has been subsequently acquitted or not. The
question is about the credibility and/or trustworthiness of such
H an employee who at the initial stage of the employment, i.e.,
SATISH CHANDRA YADAV v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 583
[J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
while submitting the declaration/verification and/or applying A
for a post made false declaration and/or not disclosing and/
or suppressing material fact of having involved in a criminal
case. If the correct facts would have been disclosed, the
employer might not have appointed him. Then the question is
of TRUST. Therefore, in such a situation, where the employer
feels that an employee who at the initial stage itself has made B
a false statement and/or not disclosed the material facts and/
or suppressed the material facts and therefore he cannot be
continued in service because such an employee cannot be
relied upon even in future, the employer cannot be forced to
continue such an employee. The choice/option whether to C
continue or not to continue such an employee always must be
given to the employer. At the cost of repetition, it is observed
and as observed hereinabove in catena of decision such an
employee cannot claim the appointment and/orcontinue to be
in service as a matter of right.”
[Emphasis Supplied] D
65. Thus, this Court took the view that irrespective of the fact
whether the dispute is of a trivial nature or not, it is the credibility/
trustworthiness of a particular employee which matters the most when
it comes to public employment. This Court took the view that if a particular
employee supresses something important or makes any false declaration E
with a view to secure public employment then such employee could be
said to have exhibited a tendency which is likely to shake the confidence
of the employer. In such circumstances, it would be within the discretion
of the employer whether to continue or not to continue such an employee
who has exhibited a tendency which reflects on his overall character or
credibility. F
66. We now proceed to look into the decision of this Court in the
case of Mohammed Imran v. State of Maharashtra and Others (2019)
17 SCC 696, upon which strong reliance has been placed on behalf of
the appellant herein. In the said case, the appellant Mohammed Imran
was denied appointment in judicial service on the ground of moral turpitude G
as he had to face criminal prosecution for the offences punishable under
Sections 363 and 366 resply r/w 34 of the IPC. The appellant had been
acquitted of the charge under Sections 363 and 366 r/w 34 of the IPC
much before he cleared the examination for appointment in the judicial
service in the year 2009. Thus, it was a case wherein the criminal
H
584 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 10 S.C.R.
A prosecution came in the way of the appellant. Although he stood acquitted
by the trial court yet he was denied appointment on the ground of “Moral
Turpitude”. The appellant lost before the High Court of Bombay. This
Court while allowing his appeal observed as under:
“5. Employment opportunities are a scarce commodity in our
country. Every advertisement invites a large number of
B
aspirants for limited number of vacancies. But that may not
suffice to invoke sympathy for grant of relief where the
credentials of the candidate may raise serious questions
regarding suitability, irrespective of eligibility. Undoubtedly,
judicial service is very different from other services and the
C yardstick of suitability that may apply to other services, may
not be the same for a judicial service. But there cannot be
any mechanical or rhetorical incantation of moral turpitude,
to deny appointment in judicial service simplicitor. Much will
depend on the facts of a case. Every individual deserves an
opportunity to improve, learn from the past and move ahead
D in life by self- improvement. To make past conduct,
irrespective of all considerations, an albatross around the
neck of the candidate, may not always constitute justice.
Much will, however depend on the fact situation of a case.
6. That the expression “moral turpitude” is not capable of
E precise definition was considered in Pawan Kumar v. State of
Haryana, [(1996) 4 SCC 17 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 583] , opining
: (SCC p. 21, para 12)
“12. “Moral turpitude” is an expression which is used in
legal as also societal parlance to describe conduct which
is inherently base, vile, depraved or having any connection
F
showing depravity.”
7. The appellant by dint of hard academic labour was
successful at the competitive examination held on 16- 8-2009
and after viva voce was selected and recommended for
appointment by the Maharashtra Public Service Commission
G on 14-10-2009. In his attestation form, he had duly disclosed
his prosecution and acquittal. Mere disclosure in an
appropriate case may not be sufficient to hold for suitability
in employment. Nonetheless the nature of allegations and the
conduct in the facts of a case would certainly be a relevant
factor. While others so recommended came to be appointed,
H
SATISH CHANDRA YADAV v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 585
[J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
the selection of the appellant was annulled on 4-6-2010 in A
view of the character verification report of the police.
8. It is an undisputed fact that one Shri Sudhir Gulabrao
Barde, who had been acquitted on 24-11-2009 in Case No.
3022 of 2007 under Sections 294, 504 and 34 IPC, has been
appointed. We are not convinced, that in the facts and
B
circumstances of the present case, the appellant could be
discriminated and denied appointment arbitrarily when both
the appointments were in judicial service, by the same selection
procedure, of persons who faced criminal prosecutions and
were acquitted. The distinction sought to be drawn by the
respondents, that the former was not involved in a case of C
moral turpitude does not leave us convinced. In Joginder
Singh [Joginder Singh v. State (UT of Chandigarh), (2015) 2
SCC 377: (2015) 1 SCC (L&S) 490], it was observed as
follows: (SCC pp. 383-84, para 25)
“25. Further, apart from a small dent in the name of this
D
criminal case in which he has been honourably acquitted,
there is no other material on record to indicate that the
antecedents or the conduct of the appellant was not up to
the mark to appoint him to the post.”
9. In the present proceedings, on 23-3-2018 [Mohd. Imran v.
State of Maharashtra, (2019) 17 SCC 700], this Court had E
called for a confidential report of the character verification
as also the antecedents of the appellant as on this date. The
report received reveals that except for the criminal case under
reference in which he has been acquitted, the appellant has a
clean record and there is no adverse material against him to
F
deny him the fruits of his academic labour in a competitive
selection for the post of a judicial officer. In our opinion, no
reasonable person on the basis of the materials placed before
us can come to the conclusion that the antecedents and
character of the appellant are such that he is unfit to be
appointed as a judicial officer. An alleged single misadventure G
or misdemeanour of the present nature, if it can be considered
to be so, cannot be sufficient to deny appointment to the
appellant when he has on all other aspects and parameters
been found to be fit for appointment. The law is well settled
in this regard in Avtar Singh v. Union of India [(2016) 8 SCC
H
586 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 10 S.C.R.
A 471 : (2016) 2 SCC (L&S) 425] . If empanelment creates no
right to appointment, equally there can be no arbitrary denial
of appointment after empanelment.
10. In the entirety of the facts and circumstances of the case,
we are of the considered opinion that the consideration of
the candidature of the appellant and its rejection are afflicted
B
by a myopic vision, blurred by the spectacle of what has been
described as moral turpitude, reflecting inadequate
appreciation and application of facts also, as justice may
demand.
11. We, therefore, consider the present a fit case to set aside
C the order dated 4-6-2010 and the impugned order [Mohd.
Imran v. State of Maharashtra, 2017 SCC OnLine Bom 9939]
dismissing the writ petition, and direct the respondents to
reconsider the candidature of the appellant. Let such fresh
consideration be done and an appropriate decision be taken
in the light of the present discussion, preferably within a
D maximum period of eight weeks from the date of receipt and
production of the copy of the present order. In order to avoid
any future litigation on seniority or otherwise, we make it
clear that in the event of appointment, the appellant shall not
be entitled to any other reliefs.”
E 67. Thus, this Court took the view that although employment
opportunity is a scarce commodity in the present times being circumscribed
within a limited vacancies yet by itself may not suffice to invoke sympathy
for grant of relief where the credentials of a candidate may raise any
question regarding his suitability, irrespective of eligibility. However, at
the same time, this Court observed that there should not be any mechanical
F or rhetorical incantation of moral turpitude to deny appointment in a
government service simplicitor which would depend on the facts of each
case. The judicial philosophy flowing through the mind of the judges is
that every individual deserves an opportunity to improve, learn from the
past and move ahead in life for self-improvement. To make past conduct,
irrespective of all considerations, may not always constitute justice. It
G
would all depend on the fact situation of the given case.
68. The only reason to refer to and look into the various decisions
rendered by this Court as above over a period of time is that the principles
of law laid therein governing the subject are bit inconsistent. Even after,
the larger Bench decision in the case of Avtar Singh (supra) different
H courts have enunciated different principles.
SATISH CHANDRA YADAV v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 587
[J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
69. In such circumstances, we undertook some exercise to shortlist A
the broad principles of law which should be made applicable to the
litigations of the present nature. The principles are as follows:
a) Each case should be scrutinised thoroughly by the public
employer concerned, through its designated officials–more so,
in the case of recruitment for the police force, who are under
B
a duty to maintain order, and tackle lawlessness, since their
ability to inspire public confidence is a bulwark to society’s
security. [See Raj Kumar (supra)]
b) Even in a case where the employee has made declaration
truthfully and correctly of a concluded criminal case, the
employer still has the right to consider the antecedents, and C
cannot be compelled to appoint the candidate. The acquittal in
a criminal case would not automatically entitle a candidate for
appointment to the post. It would be still open to the employer
to consider the antecedents and examine whether the candidate
concerned is suitable and fit for appointment to the post.
D
c) The suppression of material information and making a false
statement in the verification Form relating to arrest, prosecution,
conviction etc., has a clear bearing on the character, conduct
and antecedents of the employee. If it is found that the
employee had suppressed or given false information in regard
to the matters having a bearing on his fitness or suitability to E
the post, he can be terminated from service.
d) The generalisations about the youth, career prospects and
age of the candidates leading to condonation of the offenders’
conduct, should not enter the judicial verdict and should be
avoided.
e) The Court should inquire whether the Authority concerned F
whose action is being challenged acted mala fide.
f) Is there any element of bias in the decision of the Authority?
g) Whether the procedure of inquiry adopted by the Authority
concerned was fair and reasonable?
Scope of Appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution G
70. Article 136 of the Constitution empowers the Supreme Court
to grant special leave in its discretion against any judgment, decree,
determination, sentence or order in any cause or matter passed or made
by any court or tribunal except by any court or tribunal constituted by or
under any law relating to the armed forces. It reads as under: H
588 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 10 S.C.R.
A “136. Special leave to appeal by the Supreme Court.—
(1) Notwithstanding anything in this Chapter, the Supreme
Court may, in its discretion, grant special leave to appeal
from any judgment, decree, determination, sentence or order
in any cause or matter passed or made by any court or
tribunal in the territory of India.
B
(2) Nothing in clause (1) shall apply to any judgment,
determination, sentence or order passed or made by any court
or tribunal constituted by or under any law relating to the
Armed Forces.”
71. The jurisdiction conferred by Article 136 is divisible into two
C stages: the first stage is upto the disposal of prayer for the special leave
to file an appeal and the second stage commences, if and when, the
leave to appeal is granted and the special leave petition is converted into
an appeal. The legal position as summarised by this Court in
Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala, (2000) 6 SCC 359; affirmed in
D Khoday Distilleries Ltd. v. Mahadeshwara Sahakara Sakkare
Karkhane Ltd., (2019) 4 SCC 376, regarding the scope of two stages
reads as under:
“(1) While hearing the petition for special leave to appeal,
the Court is called upon to see whether the petitioner should
be granted such leave or not. While hearing such petition,
E the Court is not exercising its appellate jurisdiction; it is merely
exercising its discretionary jurisdiction to grant or not to grant
leave to appeal. The petitioner is still outside the gate of entry
though aspiring to enter the appellate arena of the Supreme
Court. Whether he enters or not would depend on the fate of
F his petition for special leave;
(2) If the petition seeking grant of leave to appeal is dismissed,
it is an expression of opinion by the Court that a case for
invoking appellate jurisdiction of the Court was not made
out.
(3) If leave to appeal is granted, the appellate jurisdiction of
G
the Court stands invoked; the gate for entry in the appellate
arena is opened. The petitioner is in and the respondent may
also be called upon to face him, though in an appropriate
case, in spite of having granted leave to appeal, the Court
may dismiss the appeal without noticing the respondent.
H (4) In spite of a petition for special leave to appeal having
SATISH CHANDRA YADAV v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 589
[J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
been filed, the judgment, decree or order against which leave A
to appeal has been sought for, continues to be final, effective
and binding as between the parties. Once leave to appeal
has been granted, the finality of the judgment, decree or order
appealed against is put in jeopardy though it continues to be
binding and effective between the parties unless it is a nullity
or unless the Court may pass a specific order staying or B
suspending the operation or execution of the judgment, decree
or order under challenge.”
72. In Pritam Singh v. State, AIR 1950 SC 169, the Constitution
Bench of this Court has explained the scope and powers of this Court
under Article 136 of the Constitution in detail: C
“9. On a careful examination of Article 136 along with the
preceding article, it seems clear that the wide discretionary
power with which this Court is invested under it is to be
exercised sparingly and in exceptional cases only, and as far
as possible a more or less uniform standard should be adopted
D
in granting special leave in the wide range of matters which
can come up before it under this article. By virtue of this
article, we can grant special leave in civil cases, in criminal
cases, in income tax cases, in cases which come up before
different kinds of tribunals and in a variety of other cases.
The only uniform standard which in our opinion can be laid E
down in the circumstances is that Court should grant special
leave to appeal only in those cases where special circumstances
are shown to exist. The Privy Council have tried to lay down
from time to time certain principles for granting special leave
in criminal cases, which were reviewed by the Federal Court
in Kapildeo v. King. It is sufficient for our purpose to say that F
though we are not bound to follow them too rigidly since the
reasons, constitutional and administrative, which sometimes
weighed with the Privy Council, need not weigh with us, yet
some of those principles are useful as furnishing in many
cases a sound basis for invoking the discretion of this Court G
in granting special leave. Generally speaking, this Court will
not grant special leave, unless it is shown that exceptional
and special circumstances exist, that substantial and grave
injustice has been done and that the case in question presents
features of sufficient gravity to warrant a review of the decision
appealed against. Since the present case does not in our H
590 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 10 S.C.R.
A opinion fulfil any of these conditions, we cannot interfere
with the decision of the High Court, and the appeal must be
dismissed.”
[Emphasis supplied]
73. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in the case of Hem Raj,
B Son of Devilal Mahajan of Bijainagar, Condemned Prisoner, at
Present Confined in the Central Jail, Ajmer v. State of Ajmer, AIR
1954 SC 462, held as under:
“2. Unless it is shown that exceptional and special
circumstances exist that substantial and grave injustice has
been done and the case in question presents features of
C sufficient gravity to warrant a review of the decision appealed
against, this Court does not exercise its overriding powers
under Article 136(1) of the Constitution and the circumstance
that because the appeal has been admitted by special leave
does not entitle the appellant to open out the whole case and
D contest all the findings of fact and raise every point which
could be raised in the High Court. Even at the final hearing
only those points can be urged which are fit to be urged at
the preliminary stage when the leave to appeal is asked for.
The question for consideration is whether this test is satisfied
in either of these two appeals. After hearing the learned
E counsel in both the appeals we are satisfied that none of them
raise any questions which fall within the rule enunciated
above.”
[Emphasis supplied]
74. The Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of P.S.R.
F Sadhanantham v. Arunachalam and Another, (1980) 3 SCC 141, has
explained the Article 136 of the Constitution as under:
“7. …..In express terms, Article 136 does not confer a right
of appeal on a party as such but it confers a wide discretionary
power on the Supreme Court to interfere in suitable cases.
The discretionary dimension is considerable but that relates
G
to the power of the court. The question is whether it spells by
implication, fair a procedure as contemplated by Article 21.
In our view, it does. Article 136 is a special jurisdiction. It is
residuary power; it is extraordinary in its amplitude, its limit,
when it chases injustice, is the sky itself. This Court
H functionally fulfils itself by reaching out to injustice wherever
SATISH CHANDRA YADAV v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 591
[J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
it is and this power is largely derived in the common run of A
cases from Article 136. Is it merely a power in the court to be
exercised in any manner it fancies? Is there no procedural
limitation in the manner of exercise and the occasion for
exercise? Is there no duty to act fairly while hearing a case
under Article 136, either in the matter of grant of leave or,
after such grant, in the final disposal of the appeal? We have B
hardly any doubt that here is a procedure necessarily implicit
in the power vested in the summit court. It must be remembered
that Article 136 confers jurisdiction on the highest court. The
founding fathers unarguably intended in the very terms of
Article 136 that it shall be exercised by the highest judges of C
the land with scrupulous adherence to judicial principles well
established by precedents in our jurisprudence. Judicial
discretion is canalised authority, not arbitrary eccentricity.
Cardozo, with elegant accuracy, has observed: [Benjamin
Cardozo : The Nature Of The Judicial Process, Yale University
Press (1921)] D
“The Judge, even when he is free, is still not wholly free.
He is not to innovate at pleasure. He is not a knight-errant
roaming at will in pursuit of his own ideal of beauty or of
goodness. He is to draw his inspiration from consecrated
principles. It is not to yield to spasmodic sentiment, to vague E
and unregulated benevolence. He is to exercise a discretion
informed by tradition, methodized by analogy, disciplined
by system, and subordinated to ‘the primordial necessity
of order in the social life’. Wide enough in all conscience
is the field of discretion that remains.”
8. It is manifest that Article 136 is of composite structure, is F
power-cum-procedure — power in that it vests jurisdiction in
the Supreme Court, and procedure in that it spells a mode of
hearing. It obligates the exercise of judicial discretion and
the mode of hearing so characteristic of the court process. In
short, there is an in-built prescription of power and procedure G
in terms of Article 136 which meets the demand of Article 21.
9. We may eye the issue slightly differently. If Article 21 is
telescoped into Article 136, the conclusion follows that fair
procedure is imprinted on the special leave that the court may
grant or refuse. When a motion is made for leave to appeal
against an acquittal, this Court appreciates the gravity of the H
592 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 10 S.C.R.
A peril to personal liberty involved in that proceeding. It is fair
to assume that while considering the petition under Article
136 the court will pay attention to the question of liberty, the
person who seeks such leave from the court, his motive and
his locus standi and the weighty factors which persuade the
court to grant special leave. When this conspectus of
B processual circumstances and criteria play upon the
jurisdiction of the court under Article 136, it is reasonable to
conclude that the desideratum of fair procedure implied in
Article 21 is adequately answered.
xxx xxx xxx
C 11. The wider the discretionary power the more sparing its
exercise. Times out of number this Court has stressed that
though parties promiscuously “provoke” this jurisdiction, the
court parsimoniously invokes the power. Moreover, the court
may not, save in special situations, grant leave to one who is
not eo nomine a party on the record. Thus, procedural
D
limitations exist and are governed by well worn rules of
guidance.”
[Emphasis supplied]
75. Thus, the principles of law discernible from the aforesaid are
that unless, it is shown that exceptional and special circumstances exist;
E that substantial and grave injustice have been done and the case and
question present features of sufficient gravity to warrant a review of the
decision appealed against, this Court would not exercise its overriding
powers under Article 136(1) of the Constitution. The wide discretionary
power with which this Court is invested under Article 136 is to be
F exercised sparingly and in exceptional cases only.
76. In so far as the Appeal arising out of the Special Leave Petition
(C) No. 20860 of 2019 filed by Satish Chandra Yadav is concerned, the
same should fail. We are not at all convinced with the case put forward
by Satish Chandra Yadav for informing the respondent herein that there
was no criminal case pending against him on the date he filled up the
G verification form. The explanation offered by Satish Chandra Yadav is
nothing but his own understanding of what is prosecution and pendency
of a criminal case. If he knows that trial is deemed to have commenced
with the framing of charge, then we are sure he knows and understands
what is criminal prosecution.
H
SATISH CHANDRA YADAV v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 593
[J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
77. Indisputably, Satish Chandra Yadav was still under probation A
at the time, his services had been terminated. It is also apparent from
the record that Satish Chandra Yadav had been given appointment on
probation subject to the verification of facts given in the verification
Form. To our mind, therefore, if an enquiry revealed that the facts given
were wrong, the respondent herein was at liberty to dispense with the
services of the appellant Satish Chandra Yadav as the question of any B
stigma and penal consequences at this stage would not arise. It bears
repetition that what has led to the termination of the services of the
appellant Satish Chandra Yadav is not his involvement in the criminal
case which was then pending, and in which he had been acquitted
subsequently but the fact that he had withheld relevant information while C
filling in the verification Form. He could be said to have exhibited or
displayed such a tendency which shook the confidence of the respondent.
78. Administrative law has traditionally approached the review of
decisions classified as discretionary separately from those seen as
involving the interpretation of rules of law. The rule has been that the
decisions classified as discretionary may only be reviewed on limited D
grounds such as the bad faith of decision-makers, the exercise of
discretion for an improper purpose, and the use of irrelevant
considerations. A general doctrine of “unreasonableness” has also
sometimes been applied to the discretionary decisions. In our opinion,
these doctrines incorporate two central ideas — those discretionary E
decisions, like all other administrative decisions, must be made within
the bounds of the jurisdiction conferred by the statutory rules, but that
considerable deference will be given to the decision-makers by the courts
in reviewing the exercise of that discretion and determining the scope of
the decision-makers’ jurisdiction. These doctrines recognise that it is the
intention of a legislature, when using statutory language that confers F
broad choices on the administrative agencies, that courts should not lightly
interfere with such decisions, and should give considerable respect to
the decision-makers when reviewing the manner in which discretion
was exercised. However, discretion must still be exercised in a manner
that is within a reasonable interpretation of the margin of manoeuvre
contemplated by the legislature, in accordance with the principles of the G
rule of law.
79. Ms. Madhavi Divan, the learned ASG has rightly relied on
Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan (supra) in which this Court held that
the purpose of requiring an employee to furnish information regarding
prosecution/conviction, etc. in the verification Form was to assess his H
594 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 10 S.C.R.
A character and antecedents for the purpose of employment and
continuation in service; that suppression of material information and
making a false statement in reply to the queries relating to prosecution
and conviction had a clear bearing on the character, conduct and
antecedents of the employee; and that where it is found that the employee
had suppressed or given false information in regard to the matters which
B had a bearing on his fitness or suitability to the post, he could be terminated
from service during the period of probation without holding any inquiry.
This Court also made it clear that neither the gravity of the criminal
offence nor the ultimate acquittal therein was relevant when considering
whether a probationer who suppresses a material fact (of his being
C involved in a criminal case, in the personal information furnished to the
employer), is fit to be continued as a probationer.
80. We find that the observations in the aforesaid case are fully
applicable to the appeal filed by Satish Chandra Yadav. We are of the
opinion that it was a deliberate attempt on the part of the appellant Satish
Chandra Yadav to withhold the relevant information and it is this omission
D which has led to the termination of his service during the probation period.
81. In view of the aforesaid, the Appeal arising out of the Special
Leave Petition (C) No. 20860 of 2019 filed by Satish Chandra Yadav
fails and is hereby dismissed.
82. So far as the connected Appeal arising out of the Special
E Leave Petition (C) No. 5170 of 2021 filed by Pushpendra Kumar Yadav
is concerned, the same also fails on the very same line of reasoning
adopted by us. The only difference in the case of the appellant Pushpendra
Kumar Yadav is that he had put in about four years of service before he
came to be terminated.
F 83. In the result, both the appeals fail and are hereby dismissed
with no order as to costs.
84. Pending application, if any, stands disposed of.
Divya Pandey Appeals dismissed.
(Assisted by : Mahendra Yadav, LCRA)
G
H
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