SATISH @ DHANNAversusSTATE OF M.P. & ORS.

                        [2009] 6 S.C.R. 486

                                                                    1'
A                       SATISH @ DHANNA
                                 v.
                      STATE OF M.P. & ORS.
                 (Criminal Appeal No. 761 of 2009)

                          APRIL 17, 2009
B
           [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT AND ASOK KUMAR
                        GANGULY, JJ.]
                                                                    J.

        JUVENILE JUSTICE (CARE AND PROTECTION OF
c CHILDREN) ACT, 2000:
       ss.2 (K), 16 and 20 - 'Juvenile' - On date of occurrence,
  1986 Act was in operation - Subsequently 2000 Act coming
  into force - Held: On the date of occurrence and on the date
  of production of offender in court, he had not completed 18
D
  years of age - He cannot be denied benefit of 2000 Act -
  Referring him to Juvenile Board at this stage would not be
  proper - While sustaining the conviction, sentence restricted
  to period already undergone - Penal Code, 1860 - ss. 147,
  148, 3021149.
E
          In the instant appeal filed by the appellant, who faced
    trial along with others for offences punishable u/ss. 147,
    148 and 3021149 IPC, it was contended that on the date
    of occurrence he was a juvenile.
F
        Allowing the appeal, the Court

       HELD: It is to be noted that the Juvenile Justice Act,
  1986 was in operation on the date of occurrence.
  Subsequently, the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection
G of Children) Act, 2000 was enacted and it came into force
  w.e.f. 1.4.2001. Under s.2(h) of the 1986 Act, a juvenile is
  one who is below the age of 16 years whereas uls 2(k) of
  the 2000 Act, a juvenile or child means a person who has

H                               486
    SATISH @ DHANNA v. STATE OF M.P. & ORS.                  487


 not completed 18 years of age. The fact that on the date           A
 of occurrence and the date of production before the
 court the appellant had not completed 18 years of age
 stands fully established on record. At this distant point
 of time to refer the appellant to the Juvenile Board would
 not be proper. Therefore, while sustaining the conviction          B
 for the offence for which he has been found guilty, the
 sentence awarded is restricted to the period already
 undergone. [Para 3] [488-C-E; 489-A-B]

     Bhola Bhagat v. State of Bihar 1997 (8) SCC 720;
 Gopinath Ghosh v. State of West Bengal 1984 Supp SCC               C
 228 and Bhoop Ram v. State of UP. 1989 (3) SCC 1, relied
 on.

                   · Case Law Reference:
                                                                    D
     1997 (8) sec 120           relied on             para 3

     1984 Supp sec 228          relied on             para 3

     1989 (3) sec 1             relied on             para 3

     CRIMINAL APP ELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal             E
 No. 761 of 2009.

      From the Judgment & Order dated 09.08.2007 of the High
. Court of M.P. Bench at Indore in Criminal No. 152/98.
                                                                    F
    Shashindra Tripathi, Pratibha Sharma, Sharad Tripathi and
 Debasis Misra for the Appellants.

     C.D. Singh, Sunny Chaudhary, Aditya Singh, Upasana
 Nath and Arvind Verma for the Respondents.
                                                                    G
     The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

     DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. 1. Leave granted.

     2. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of a Division
                                                                    H
    488      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2009] 6 S.C.R.


A Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court, Indore Bench. Stand
  of the present appellant was that he was juvenile when the
  occurrence took place. His date of birth was 12.11.1980.
  Various accused persons faced trial for offence punishable
  under Sections 147, 148, 302 read with Section 149 of the
B Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short the 'IPC'). Learned counsel
  for the appellant submitted that since the accused was juvenile,
  his trial could not have been held alongwith others. Learned
  counsel for the respondent-State on the other hand submitted
  !hat the question whether the appellant was a juvenile y.tas never
C raised earlier.

          3. It is to be noted that prior to the date of occurrence the
    Madhya Pradesh Children Act, 1928 (in short the ·Children Act')
    was in force. The Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 (in short · 1986 Act')
    was in operation on the date of occurrence. Subsequently, the
D   Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000
    (hereinafter referred to as '2000 Act') has been enacted. Under
    section 2(h) of the 1986 Act, a juvenile is one who is below the
    age of 16 years. Under the 2000 Act under Section 2(k), a
    juvenile or child means a person who has not completed 18
E   years of age. The fact that on the date in question, i.e. on the
    date of occurrence and the date of production before the Court
    the appellant had not completed 18 years of age stands fully
    established on record. Section 16 of the 2000 Act provides that
    no juvenile shall be sentenced to death or imprisonment for life
F   or committed to prison in default of payment of fine or in default
    of furnishing security. Section 20 provides for special provisions
    in respect of pending cases. The 2000 Act came into force on
    1.4.2001. In Bhoia Bhagat v. State of Bihar (1997 (8) SCC
    720) this Court after referring to the decision in Gopinath Ghosh
G   v. State of West Bengal (1984 Supp SCC 228) and Bhoop
    Ram v. State of UP. (1989 (3) sec 1) held that an accused
    who was juvenile cannot be denied the benefit of provisions of
    2000 Act. The course this Court adopted in Gopinath's and
    Bhola Bhagat's cases (supra) was to sustain the conviction,
H
      SATISH @ DHANNA v. STATE OF M.P. & ORS.                    489
               [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
  but at the same time modify the sentence awarded to the                A
  convict. At this distant point of time to refer the appellant to the
  Juvenile Board would not be proper. Therefore, while sustaining
· the conviction for the offence for which he has been found guilty,
  the sentence awarded is restricted to the period already
  undergone. The appellant be released from custody forthwith            B
  unless required to be in custody in connection with any other
  case.

        4. The appeal is allowed.

 R.P.                                              Appeal allowed.       C