Holding

The death resulted from a single stab injury inflicted without intention to kill, and the offence falls under Section 304 Part II IPC, not Section 302.

Summary

Satish Narayan Sawant was accused of stabbing Rauji Dulba Sawant, resulting in the latter's death. The trial court acquitted all accused, but the High Court convicted Sawant under Section 302 IPC and sentenced him to life imprisonment. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined whether the FIR was tainted by Section 162 CrPC and whether there was a delay violating Section 157, and found no procedural breach. It assessed eye‑witness and post‑mortem evidence, concluding that only a single stab wound caused death, there was no intention to kill, and the act occurred amid provocation and a sudden scuffle. Consequently, the Court held that the proper charge is culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 Part II, sentencing Sawant to seven years imprisonment. The appeal was disposed of.

Issues considered

The FIR recorded was hit by the provisions of Section 162 of the CrPC.
Whether there was a delay in forwarding the FIR to the magistrate violating Section 157 of the CrPC.
The reliability of related eye‑witness testimony despite minor discrepancies.
Whether the fatal injury constitutes murder under Section 302 IPC or culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 Part II.
The effect of provocation and the spur‑of‑the‑moment nature of the incident on the appropriate charge.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 157, s. 162, s. 173
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 143, s. 147, s. 149, s. 302, s. 304(Part II), s. 323

Subjects

murderculpable homicide not amounting to murderSection 304 Part IIprovocationeye‑witness testimonyFIRSection 162 CrPCSection 157 CrPCIndian Penal CodeCriminal Procedure Codeappellate jurisdiction

Judgment

[2009) 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R. 464

A SATISH NARAYAN SAWANT
v.
STATE OF GOA
(Criminal Appeal No. 854 of 2002)

SEPTEMBER 14, 2009
B
[DALVEER BHANDARI AND DR. MUKUNDAKAM
SHARMA, JJ.]

Penal Code, 1860 - ss. 304 (Part II) and 302 - Murder
c +
of one and injuries to others by accused persons - Acquittal
by trial court u/ss. 302, 323, 143, 147 and 149- Set aside by
High Court - Conviction of main accused uls. 302 and
s(f!ntenced to life imprisonment - On appeal, held: Fatal injury
was caused by stabbing and other injuries were superficial in
D nature - There was no intention to kill or to inflict an injury of
a particular degree of seriousness - There wasi provocation .
-\.
and incident happened at the spur of the moment - No delay
in recording FIR nor in sending it to the magistrate - FIR not
hit by provisions of s.162 Cr.P.C. - Eye-witnesses though
E related witnesses, were natural witnesses - Discrepancies
between ocular evidence vis-a-vis medical evidence, not very
vital - Thus, conviction of accused altered to s. 304 (Part-II)
and sentenced to 7 years imprisonment - Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 - ss. 162 and 157 - Evidence.
F According to the prosecution, appellant along with
the other accused and two children had formed an
unlawful assembly and in furtherance of the common
object stabbed the deceased resulting in his death and
assaulted PW1, PW2, PWS and PW18. Accused persons
G were tried for commission of offence u/ss. 302, 323, 143,
147 and 149 IPC. The Trial Court acquitted the accused
persons. High Court convicted the appellant-accused
no.1 uls. 302 IPC and accused nos.2 and 3 for offence
punishable u/s. 323 read with s. 34 IPC. Hence the
H 464
SATISH NARAYAN SAWANT v. STATE OF GOA 465

" r present appeal by the appellant. A

Disposing of the appeal, the Court

HELD: 1.1. It is quite clear from the evidence on
record that PW-1- Investigating Officer received the
information about the death of the deceased from PSI of 8
the Police Station without any detail as to how the
incident had happened and who had caused the incident.
_... It was a very cryptic information received by him
regarding the death of a person residing within the
jurisdiction of his police station pursuant to an incident C
taking place on 10.04.1988 between 8.30 p.m. to 8.45 p.m.
and, therefore, it appears that there was not enough
information available to him either to get a G.D. entry
... recorded or to get an FIR lodged. In order to verify the
·J information received, PW-21 went to the place of D
occurrence and found the entire house in total darkness.
He went around the house and saw blood marks on the
walls of the verandah and also in the courtyard and came
to learn about the incident by using torch light. When he
reached at the place of occurrence even the complainant E
party was not available there but at a .later stage they came
,/ _. there. Therefore, he brought them along with the
residents of the house who were found to be there
namely accused no. 3 and the two juvenile offenders who
were all ladies. After reaching the police station and at the F
request of PW-1, FIR was recorded at 3.00 a.m. in the
morning. He received the information about the incident
on telephone at about 10.45 p.m. and reached the place
of occurrence at about 11.30 p.m. and he must have been
there for quite some time and thereafter returned to the G
....._ police station which must have taken another about 1.30
to 2 hours. Therefore, recording of the FIR at about 3.00
a.m. in the morning was justified and properly explained
and it cannot be said that there was any delay in
(

H
466 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 14 (ADDL) S.C.R.

~
~
A recording the FIR. Besides, the fact of his going to the
place of occurrence would not amount to making an
investigation. There is no evidence to show that at that
point of time, PW-21 seized any articles or interrogated
any witnesses or took any other action in initiating or in
B furtherance of investigation. [Para 14] [481-G-H; 482-A-F]
1.2. Even assuming that PW-21 could have entered ·,
the said information received from PSI of the Police
Station in the general diary, yet the said entry could not
+
have been held or treated to be an FIR. The information
c received by him was very cryptic and without any detail
about the incident in question and, in any case, there was
no possibility of recording an FIR at that stage. The place
of occurrence was in total darkness and even the ...
persons belonging to the complainant side were not
D available, therefore, bringing them to the pn!ice station k
where there was sufficient light. and recording the
complaint at 3.00 a.m. cannot cast any doubt on the
veracity of the prosecution case. Thus, it cannot be said
that the FIR was hit by the provisions of s. 162 of Cr.P.C.
E [Para 16] [484-B-E]
State of U.P. v. Bhagwant Kishore Joshi (1964) 3 SCR >- \..,'
71; Animireddy Venkata Ramana and Others v. Public
Prosecutor High Court of Andhra Pradesh (2008) 5 SCC 368,
F Held applicable.
2. The submission that there was violation of s. 157
Cr.P.C is without any basis for the defer.ce never cross-
examined PW-21 on the aforesaid issue. So long the
defence is not able to establish from the records by
G cogent evidence that there was any delay in sending the J..
FIR to the Magistrate, it cannot be held that there was any
such delay. There is no evidence on record to hold either
way for no such issue was raised either before the trial
~
court or before the High Court nor any evidence was led
H
SATISH NARAYAN SAWANT v. STATE OF GOA 467

by the defence in respect of the said issue which is A
" 'T sought to be raised at this stage. From the evidence on
record it does not appear that any suggestion was given
-1
to the said witness to the effect that the copy of the FIR
was not sent or that it was dispatched late, which if given,
would have given an opportunity to the witness to afford B
some explanation or to show as to when the FIR was
sent to and received by the Magistrate. It cannot be said
.... that delay in transmitting the FIR to the Magistrate stands
proved. [Para 17] [484-E-H; 485-A]
+
3.1. PWs. 1, 2, 8 and 18 as eye-witnesses to the
c
occurrence stated that the incident had happened initially
in the hall where there was some light for accused no. 3
has brought a lamp to the hall and apart from that another
\

-
----\
..J
lamp was also burning which was attached to the ceiling.
Blood was found by the police on the wall of the
verandah and in the courtyard. It is also established from
the evidence on record that the street light having tube
D

light was giving sufficient light to the place of occurrence
and that it was directed towards the house which was the
place of occurrence; Besides, all the said eye-witnesses E
were inmates of the house and they would know as to
who had given the blows for they specifically stated that
'<, ,j initially the appellant did not have the knife in his hand
.{
but when the deceased and others went to the balcony
then he went inside the house and brought a knife with F
i which he gave stab injuries to the deceased which
became fatal and as a result of which the deceased died
while he was being taken to the hospital. [Para 18 and 19]
[485-8-F]
G
3.2. The eye-witnesses, although, are related
~ witnesses, were natural witnesses for they were the
inmates of the house where the incident had taken place.
The said eye-witnesses are consistent about the principal
act of the appellant in stabbing the deceased. The
H
468 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A discrepancies which were sought to be pointed out are
~
minor discrepancies without in any manner affecting the ~
substratum of the prosecution case and therefore, minor
discrepancies in the evidence of the eyewitnesses are
immaterial. [Para 20] [485-G-H]
B
Dinesh.Kumarv. State of Rajasthan (2008) 8 SCC 270,
referred to.

3.3. The eye-witnesses were cross-examined at "-
length but even after such lengthy cross-examination
c these eye-witnesses account could not be shaken. The +
postmortem report indicates that there were sixteen
injuries as against the two as adduced in ocular evidence.
A perusal of record clearly shows that the doctor who
conducted the postmortem (PW-7) stated in his evidence
D that there were total 16 injuries when external ,..,>
examination was done by him and the knife could have ,-\-
caused the injuries no. 1, 2, 3 and 4. He further stated that
the death was caused due to hemorrhage and shock as
a result of stab injury. He further stated that injury no. 1
.
E was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of
nature. On being cross-examined, PW-7 categorically
stated that death due to stab injury was in consequence
of injury no. 1 and all other injuries were superficial in ).- \, ..
nature. There is no doubt that four injuries are indicated )'II

F in the post mortem report shown to have been received
}
by the deceased but the fact that the deceased was given \.
stab injuries by the appellant with the help of a knife
brought by him from inside the house is clearly
established from the ocular evidence. There is therefore
one particular injury, being injury no. 1 caused because
G
of stabbing and the rest being superficial in nature could
be caused during scuffle. Therefore, the alleged
discrepancy cannot be said to be very vital. Ocular
evidence cannot be brushed aside only because, to some
extent, it is not in consonance with the medical evidence.
H
SATISH NARAYAN SAWANT v. STATE OF GOA 469

[Para 21) [486-G-H; 487-A-D] A

State of U. P. v. Krishna Gopal (1988) 4 SCC 302; Anwar
v. State of Haryana (1997) 9 SCC 766; Ravi Kumar v. State
of Punjab, (2005) 9 SCC 315; Munivel v. State of T.N. (2006)
9 SCC 394, referred to. B
4.1. There is cogent and reliable evidence on record
to prove and establish that the· appellant accused has
~ committed the act of stabbing as a result of which the
deceased died. [Para 22] [489-F]
c
4.2. There was an altercation preceding the incident.
-The place of occurrence is a residence inhabited. by both
the parties and there is no evidence on record that the
deceased was armed with any weapon. Initially the
• accused-appellant also did not have any weapon with o
him but during the course of the incident he went inside
and got a knife with the help of which he stabbed the
deceased. PW-7 in his cross examination categorically
stated that death due to stab injury was in consequence
of injury no. 1 and all other injuries were superficial in E
nature. So, it was only injury no. 1 which was fatal in
..,,, J... nature. Therefore, there was only one main injury caused
due to stabbing and that also was given on the back side
of the deceased and therefore, it cannot be said that there
was any intention to kill or to inflict an injury of a F
particular degree of seriousness. Records clearly
establish that there was indeed a scuffle between the
parties with regard to the availability of electricity in a
particular room and during the course of scuffle the
appellant also received an injury which was simple in
....;. nature and that there was heated exchange of words and G
scuffle between the parties before the actual incident of
stabbing took place. Therefore, there is provocation and
the incident happened at the spur of the moment In view
of the facts, the instant case cannot be said to be a case
u/s. 302 IPC but it is a case falling u/$. 304 (Part II). H
470 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 14 (ADDL.) $.C.R.

A Section 304 (Part II) comes into play when the death is 4
~
caused by doing an act with knowledge that it is likely to ~
--~
cause death but there is no intention on the part of the
accused either to cause death or to cause such bodily
injury as is likely to cause d~ath. Thus, the appellant is
B convicted u/s.304 (Part II) and sentenced to undergo
imprisonment for a period of 7 years. [Para 28 and 29]
(494-D-H; 495-A·B]

State of A.P. v. Rayavarapu Punnayya (1976) 4 SCC
382; Abdul Waheed Khan v. State of A.P. (2002) 7 SCC 175;
c Ruli
-+---
-
Ram v. State of Haryana (2002) 7 SCC 691; Augustine
Saldanha v. State of Karnataka (2003) 10 SCC 472; State of
U. P. v. Virendra. Prasad (2004) 9 SCC 37; Chacko v. State
of Kera/a (2004) 12 SCC 269; S. N. Bhadolkar v. State of f-
Maharasthra (2005) 9 SCC 71; Jagriti Devi v. State of H. ·P.
D JT 2009 (8) SC 648, relied on.
~
-
Case Law Reference:
(1964) 3 SCR 71 Held applicable Para 13
E (2008) s sec 368 Held applicable Para 15
(2008) 8 sec 210 Referred to Para 20
(1988) 4 scc 302
1

Referred to Para 21
> ,,
(1997) s sec 766 Referred to Para 21
F
(2005) 9 sec 315 Referred to Para 21
(200&) s sec 394 Referred to Para 21
-(1976) 4 sec 382 Relied on. Para 25
G
(2002) 1 sec 115 Relied on. Para 26
~.
_ (2002) 1 sec 691 Relied on. Para 27
(2003) 10 sec 472 Relied on. Para 27
H
SATISH NARAYAN SAWANT v. STATE OF GOA 471

(2004) 9 sec 37 Relied on. Para 27 A

(2004) 12 sec 269 Relied on. Para 27

(2oos) s sec 11 Relied on. Para 27

JT 2009 (8) SC 648. Relied on. Para 27
B
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
No. 854 of 2002.

From the Judgment & Order dated 1.7.2002 of the High
Court of Bombay at Goa in Criminal Appeal No. 6 of 2000. c
R. Sundaravardhan, Arun R. Pedneker, Chinmoy
Khaladkar, V.N. Raghupathy for the Appellant.

A. Subhashini for the Respondent.
'*(!- D
~ The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Dr. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J. 1. The present appeal
arises out of the judgment and order dated 01.07.2002 passed
by the High Court of Bombay at Goa in Criminal Appeal No. 6
of 2000 convicting the accused-appellant under Section 302 E
of the Indian Penal Code (for short the 'the IPC') and sentencing
him to undergo life imprisonment for the offence by setting aside
the order of acquittal passed by the trial court.

2. Facts giving rise to the present appeal may be stated F
>,
first so as to enable us to appreciate the arguments raised by
the parties more effectively.

On 19.04.1988 between 8.30 p.m. and 8.45 p.m., Satish
Narayan Sawant, the appellant (Accused No. 1) along with two
other accused persons and also with two delinquent children G
allegedly formed an unlawful assembly and that in furtherance
of the said common object stabbed one Rauji Dulba Sawant,
the deceased and also assaulted Baby Dulba Sawant (PW-1),
......
'
Ashok Dulba Sawant (PW-2), Kunda Rauji Sawant (PW-8) and
_, H
472 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R. •

4
A Laxmi Dulba Sawant (PW-18) who are the sister, brother, wife ~

and mother respectively of the deceased. It is also the case of
the prosecution that as a result of the aforesaid stab injuries
given to the deceased, he expired on the same day i.e. on
19.04.1988. P.S. Joaquim Dias (PW-21) who was attached to
B the Panda Police Station as P.S.I. received a phone call at
about 10.45 p.m. from P.S.I. K.K. Desai of the Panaji Police
Station that a person named Rauji Dulba Sawant had been
brought in police jeep by police constable Jaisingrao Rane and
that while he was being taken to the Goa Medical College, he '+-
c expired. He was informed that the deceased had died as a
result of stab injuries received and, therefore, he was to take
necessary steps. On receipt of the aforesaid message, PW-
21 along with ASI Tabit Mamlekar went to the scene of offence.
They reached the scene of offence at about 11.30 p.m. but ~-
.
D
found the entire place plunged into darkness and with the help
of torch light, PW-21 surJeyed the scene of offence. During the
survey made at the place of occurrence, PW-21 noticed some
•
blood-stains in the front courtyard of the house and a pipe of
length Of about 1 foot or slightly !'JSS lying in the courtyard having
blood-stains. Thereafter, PW-21, along with P.I. D'Sa gave a
E call to the inmates of the house to open the door and on hearing
the call, one lady opened the door. On enquiring from her, PW-
21 learnt that her name was 'Yeshoda' who was later on
arrayed as Accused No. 3. Two juvenile girls named, Sarita and
Sharmila, who are the sisters of the appellant were found in the
F house. In the meantime, PW-1, PW-2 and PW-8 came to the
house from whom PW-21 made certain inquiries and brought
them along with Accused No. 3 and her two juvenile girls to the
Police Station. Not finding the appellant and accused no.2 in
the house, Dy. S.P. Shri Raikar and P.I. Shri_Alan O'Sa were
G sent in their search.
After reaching the police station, a complaint, which is
marked as Exhibit PW 1/A was lodged by PW-1, in which it
was alleged that PW-1, PW-8, PW-18, the deceased Rauji and
H
SATISH NARAYAN SAWANT v. STATE OF GOA 473
[DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.]
-t
his brother Narayan were residing in one house in Banastari A
~
y
and they used to share a common kitchen between them. It was
further alleged by PW-1 that two or three days before the
Ganesh Festival, deceased Rauji had informed Narayan that.
he would install statue of Lord Ganesh in the house and
accordingly, he had purchased the same. Religious ceremony B
was performed by installing the statue of Lord Ganesh in the,
house and while the said religious ceremony was being.
/
performed, Accused No. 2 started uttering insults while standing
~ in the kitchen. Accused No. 3 told the appellant not to do
anything in the ceremony and insulted the family members of c
Rauji.

PW-1 also alleged that on 19.04.1988 the deceased Rauji
returned from his duty at about 6.30 p.m. and thereafter went
to purchase some articles. On his return, he went to take bath
D
""' -)_
and after having bath, he went and switched off the light of the
room. As soon as the deceased switched off the light, the
appellant came from the room and started abusing Rauji. There
was a heated exchange of words between Rauji and the
appellant switched on the light, which was again switched off
by Rauji, the deceased. Thereupon, the appellant went :md E
removed the fuse of the said light. Accused No. 3 had then lit
\ a kerosene lamp and brought the same in the hall. There was
/ ~ already an oil lamp burning which was attached to the ceiling
by a brass chain. Meanwhile, Accused No. 3 started abusing
PW-1, PW-8, PW-18, and the deceased Rauji. F

Thereafter, the appellant and the two other alleged
accused namely, Accused Nos. 2 and 3 and the two juvenile
offenders gathered in the hall to assault Rauji, the deceased,
PW-1 and PW-8. According to PW-1, in order to avoid th~
G
assault by all of them, they went to "bulcao" (balcony). When
they went there, the appellant went to his mother's room and
brought a knife with which he stabbed Rauji. At that time all the
accused persons were in the balcony. It was also alleged that
after the deceased Rauji fell down on the ground, Accused No.
H

' '
474 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A 3 kicked him. At that time, the appellant who was holding the
knife in his hand, handed over the same to Accused No. 3 by
which she assaulted PW-8 but PW-8 caught the knife in her
hand which caused injury to her right palm. Thereafter,
according to PW-1, Accused No. 3 handed back the knife to
6 · the appellant and Accused No. 2 brought the oil lamp which was
hung in the room and hit the oil lamp on the head of Rauji, the
deceased. It was also alleged that when PW-8 tried to
intervene, the other three accused started assaulting her with
fists and slaps. At that time, PW-2 came there and questioned
c the accused persons as to what they were doing, whereupon,
the appellant.and Accused no. 2 started assaulting PW-2 also.
Then, Accused No. 3 told the appellant and Accused No. 2 to
finish off Rauji first. PW-8, PW-18 and PW-1 then lifted Rauji
and brought him in the courtyard. In the meanwhile, residents
of the locality had gathered in the courtyard and told the
0
accused persons not to assault Rauji. The juvenile offender,
Sarita went inside the house and brought out one iron pipe
which she handed over to the appellant who t!".en hit the said
pipe on the right leg of PW-1 and also gave a blow with the
E said pipe on Rauji's di;1hl nand. It was also alleged that the
other juvenile offender, Sharrnila brought a cement block
shaped like an elephant trunk, which she handed over to
Accused No. 3 with which Accused No. 3 started assaulting
Rauji. PW-1, however, intervened and removed the said piece
of cement block from the hand of Accused No. 3 but, Accused
F No. 3 then picked up one stone and tried to throw it on Rauji
by saying that she was going to kill him with that stone.
However, PW-1 again intervened and removed the said stone
from the hand of Accused No.3. PW-18 rushed to the rescue
--
of deceased Rauji. The accused then started assaulting her and
G PW-8 with slaps. In the meantime, police jeep arrived at the
scene and on seeing the police jeep, all the accused ran away
from the courtyard and went inside. PW - 1 and others asked
the police to take Rauji to the Hospital whereupon the police
took him to the hospital in the police jeep along with PW-1, PW
H -2 and PW -8. On the basis of complaint made by PW-1, an
-j

SATISH NARAYAN SAWANT v. STATE OF GOA 475
[DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.]
~

" FIR was registered and the accused came to be arrested. A

3. On completion of the investigation, the police submitted
the charge-sheet against the accused persons namely the
present appellant (Accused No. 1), Accused Nos. 2 and 3 and
the two juvenile offenders, namely Sarita and Sharmila.
B
4. The trial court framed charges against all the accused
persons for the offence under Sections 302, 323, 143, 147 and
.~
149 of the IPC. The accused pleaded not guilty and claimed
to be tried. Since there were two juvenile offenders there cases
were segregated and the trial against Accused Nos. 1, 2 and c
3 was conducted during the course of which a number of eye-
witnesses were examined on behalf of the prosecution. After
,.. completion of the arguments the trial court reserved the verdict.
The trial court passed an order on 04.08.1998 acquitting all the
--J.
accused persons from the offences under Sections 302, 323, :D
143, 147 and 149 of IPC.

5. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment and order
of acquittal the State filed an appeal in the High Court against
Accused Nos. 1 to 3. The High Court by impugned judgment
E
....t-. convicted appellant (Accused No. 1) under Section 302 IPC
;
._ and Accused Nos. 2 and 3 were held guilty of an offence
punishable under Section 323 read with Section 34 of the IPC.

6. The appellant herein, being aggrieved by the aforesaid

- order of conviction and sentence, filed the present appeal on
which we have heard the learned counsel appearing for the
appellant and also the learned counsel appearing for the State.
F

7. Mr. R. Sundaravardhan, learned senior counsel
appearing for the appellant very forcefully submitted that the G
High Court was not justified in setting aside the order of acquittal
passed in respect of the present appellant. He submitted that
although the incident in question had taken place at about 8.45
" p.m. the same came to be reported to the police at 3.00 a.m.
He also submitted that the police officer (PW-21) who received
H
476 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

-#'
A the information about the incident started investigation without ~

recording either any general diary (for short G.D.) entry or the ...
FIR and, therefore, the FIR which has been proved in the trial
court is hit by the provisions of Section 162 of the Criminal
Procedure Code (for short "the CrPC"). He also submitted that
B the High Court has not given any reason for setting aside the
appeal against acquittal which was passed after appreciating
the entire evidence on record. He further submitted that there
was not only shifting of time of the alleged occurrence but also
shifting of the place of occurrence from the hall to the outside
+-
c verandah and courtyard to suit the convenience of the
prosecution case. He has drawn our attention towards the
entire evidence on record including the cross-examination part
and with the help of the same he submitted that the entire
alleged incident in question had taken place when there was ,...
complete darkness at the scene of occurrence. A scuffle started
D \--
between the nephew and the uncle in which the accused
persons also received injuries and, therefore, the right of private
defence of the appellant was available and in that view of the
matter, the order of conviction and sentence is liable to be set
aside.
E
8. It was further submitted that the alleged eye-witnesses
of the occurrence were examined by the police belatedly and ,. I

that the medical evidence adduced in the case does not in any
manner support the ocular evidence and if at all it would not
F be a case of culpable homicide amounting to murder but a
case of culpable homicide not amounting to murder. He also
submitted that if two views are possible and if there are lacunae
in the case of the prosecution, the benefit must go to the
accused. He next submitted that there was no evidence on
G record as to when the FIR reached the Magistrate and that
none of the courts below considered the said aspect. He
submitted that since there was violation of the provisions of
Section 162 of the CrPC, the accused-appellant is liable to be
•
acquitted.
H
SATISH NARAYAN SAWANT v. STATE OF GOA 477
[DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.)
9. Ms. A. Subhashini, learned counsel appearing for the A
., respondent-State, however, strenuously submitted that none of
the aforesaid submissions could be accepted by this Court as
it is a foolproof case of conviction of the appellant under
Section 302 IPC. She submitted that the High Court rightly
interfered with the order of acquittal passed by the trial court B
after critically examining the evidence on record. It was
submitted by her that the trial court examined the evidence in
the present case in a very summary and cryptic manner and
thereby arrived at a wrong conclusion that the accused persons
4 were required to be acquitted. She has drawn our attention to c I

the findings recorded by the High Court while setting aside the
order of acquittal observing that the evidence of eye-witnesses
namely PWs. 1, 2, 8 and 18 is convincing and reliable but so
far as the evidence of PW-4 is concerned, the High Court has
made an observation that he is not a reliable witness. Counsel D
,.,,.,
" . for the respondent has, therefore, taken us through the evidence
of PWs. 1, 2, 8 and 18 and on the basis thereof submitted that
their evidence clearly prove and establish the role of the
appellant herein in stabbing the deceased with the knife which
he had brought from the other room with the intention of killing
the deceased and, therefore, it is a clear case of conviction
E
under Section 302 IPC.

/". 10. In the light of the aforesaid submissions of the counsel
appearing for the parties we have given our in-depth
consideration to the facts of the present case. F

.... 11. The starting point of the incident in question as
indicated from the evidence on record is the hall where
apparently a dispute started between the parties with regard
to the electricity connection in the house. The deceased tried G
to put off the light of one particular room at which the appellant
.. __,. and other accused persons became annoyed and the appellant
switched on the light which was again switched off by the
dece~sed. At this, the deceased became annoyed and the
appellant removed the fuse of the electricity which act of his
H
478 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A plunged the entire house into darkness. It is also clear and
established that thereafter a lamp was brought by Accused No.
3 to the room besides another lamp which was already burning
in the said room itself. But, in any case, there was an electricity
light post in the front of the house which was giving enough light
B to the house. There is also evidence on record to show that
even outsiders were watching the incident from the road which
indicates that there was sufficient light for them to see what was
happening in the house where the incident had taken place.
There was indeed some scuffle between the parties during the
c course of which Accused No. 1 received simple injuries and
the deceased died of the two stab injuries inflicted by the
present appellant. The said fact is proved by the evidence of
PWs. 2, 8, 18 and the complainant herself (PW-1). The
deceased was taken to the hospital and while so taken he died.
PW-21 who was at that time attached to Kanda Police Station
0
as PSI was informed at about 10.45 p.m. that the deceased
while was being brought in the police jeep by a police constable
Jaisingrao Rane and was being taken to the Government
Medical College but before the deceased could be admitted
he died. PW-21 was also informed by said by said PSI K.K.
E Desai of Panaji Police Station that it was a case of assault and
that the incident had taken place at verandah and that the said
matter pertains to his police station and, therefore, he should
take appropriate action. On receiving the said message he
••
went to the place of occurrence along with PSI K.K. Desai and
F upon reaching the place of occurrence at 11.30 p.m. he found
the entire place plunged in total. darkness. Therefore, he
proceeded to survey the place of occurrence with the help of
torches. He, in his deposition specifically stated that he found
that the back door a$ well as the front door of the house were
G latched from inside and in front of the house there was a road
where there was an electricity pole and there was a street tube
light bywhich the house could be visible and even the lights of
the vehicles were flashed at the house. He stated that although
the house had electricity connection, but was not having the
H electricity supply. He gave instructions to his subordinate and
SATISH NARAYAN SAWANT v. STATE OF GOA 479
[DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.]

also to the people around that nobody should touch any article A
- " lying at the scene of occurrence. He stated that he made
preliminary enquiry and brought Yashoda and her two daughters
to the police station and sent two other officers in search of
Accused Nos. 1 and 2 who were not found in the house. He
also stated that he got the complaint registered at the police B
• station which was lodged by PW-1 and that on the next day he
.
-t again went to the scene of offence and seized the properties
involved in the crime which were sealed. He also recovered the
-A;- knife at the instance of accused Sharmila which he seized. On
28.04.1988, that is, after about 9 days of the incident, Accused c
Nos. 1 and 2 surrendered before the police and on their
surrender they were taken into custody. It was found that
Accused No. 1 was having injury on his back and he was
medically examined. On medical examination his injury was
:'"'-. found to be simple. D
- 12. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant was
critical of the manner in which PW-21 initiated the investigation
without recording any G.D. entry and without getting any FIR
recorded. He submitted that since the investigation in the
instant case was started by the police without recording an FIR, E
such an FIR is necessarily hit by the provisions of Section 162
,.. of the Cr.P.C. He next submitted that no evidence having been
-" led by the prosecution about the time when the FIR reached
the Magistrate, therefore, there is also violation of the provisions
of Section 157 of the Cr.P.C. F

13. The issue with regard to the initiation of the
investigation without recording the FIR was succinctly
addressed by this Court in the case of State of U.P. v.
Bhagwant Kishore Joshi, (1964) 3 SCR 71, (per Mudholkar J.) G
~~
observed as follows:

"17. What is investigation is not defined in the Code of
Criminal Procedure; but in H.N. Rishbud and lnder Singh
v. State of Delhi1 this Court has described, the procedure,
for investigation as follows: H
480 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A "Thus, under the Code investigation consists generally of "( \

the following steps, ( 1) Proceeding to the spot, (2)
Ascertainment of the facts and circumstances of the case,
t3) Discovery and arrest of the suspected offender, (4)
Collection of evidence relating to the commission of the
B offence which may consist of (a) the examination of various •
persons (including the accused) and the reduction of their
statements into writing, if the officer thinks fit, (b) the search
of places of seizure of things considered necessary for the
investigation and to be produced at the trial, and (5) +
c formation of the opinion as to whether on the material
collected there is a case to place the accused before a
Magistrate for trial and if so taking the necessary steps for
the same by the filing of a charge-sheet under Section
173."
D This Court, however, has not said that if a police officer )--
takes merely one or two of the steps indicated by it, what
he has done must necessarily be regarded as
investigation. Investigation, in substance, means collection
of evidence relating to the commission of the offence. The
E Investigating Officer is, for this purpose, entitled to question
persons who, in this opinion, are able to throw light on the
offence which has been committed and is likewise entitled -'- ~
to question the suspect and is entitled to reduce the
statements of persons questioned by him to writing. He is
F also entitled to search the place of the offence and to
search other places with the object of seizing articles
connected with the offence. No do~bt, for this purpose he
has to proceed to the spot where the offence was
committed and do various other things. But the main object
G of investigation being to bring home the offence to the
offender the essential part of the duties of an investigating ~ ~
officer in this connection is, apart from arresting the
offender, to collect all material necessary for establishing
the accusation against the offender. Merely making some
H preliminary enquire upon receipt of information from an
SATISH NARAYAN SAWANT v. STATE OF GOA 481
[DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.]

anonymous source or a source of doubtful reliability for A
checking up the correctness of the information does not
amount to collection of evidence and so cannot be
regarded as investigation. In the absence of any
prohibition in the Code, express or implied, I am of
opinion that it is open to a police officer to make B
preliminary enquiries before registering an offence and
making a full scale investigation into it. No doubt, Section
5-A of the Prevention of Corruption Act was enacted for
preventing harassment to a government servant and with
this object in view investigation, except with the previous c
permission of a Magistrate, is not p·ermitted to be made
by an officer below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of
Police. Where, however, a police officer makes some
preliminary enquiries, does not arrest or even question an
accused or question any witnesses but merely makes a 0
few discreet enquiries or looks at some documents without
making any notes, it is difficult to visualise how any
possible harassment or even embarrassment would result
therefrom to the suspect or the accused person. If no
harassment to the accused results from the action of a
police officer how can it be said to defeat the purpose E
underlying Section 5-A? Looking at the matter this way, I
hold that what Mathur did was something very much short
of investigation and, therefore, the provisions of Section
5-A were not violated. Since no irregularity was committed
by him there is no occasion to invoke the aid of the F
curative provisions of the Code."

(emphasis underlined)

14. In the instant case, it is quite clear from the evidence G
on record that PW-1 received the information about the death
of the deceased from PSI of Panaji Police Station without any
detail as to how the incident had happened and who had
caused the incident. It was a very cryptic information received
by him· regarding the death of a person residing within the
H
482 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009) 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A jurisdiction of his police station pursuant to an incident taking
place on 10.04.1988 between 8.30 p.m. to 8.45 p.m. and,
therefore, it appears that there was not enough information
available to him either to get a G.D. entry recorded or to get
an FIR lodged. In orderto verify the information received, PW-
8 21 went to the place of occurrence and found the entire house
in total darkness. He went around the house and saw blood
marks on the walls of the verandah and also in the courtyard
and came to learn about the incident by using torch light When
he reached at the place of occurrence even the complainant
c party was not available there but at a later stage they came
there. Therefore, he brought them along with the residents of
the house who were found to be there namely Accused No. 3
and the two juvenile offenders namely Sarita and Sharmila, who
were all ladies. After reaching the police station and at .the
0 request of PW-1 the FIR was recorded at 3.00 a.m. in the
morning. He received the information about the incident on
telephone at about 10.45 p.m. and reached the place of
occurrence at about 11.30 p.m. and he must have been there
for quite some time and thereafter returned to the police station
which must have taken another about 1.30 to 2 hours.
E Therefore, recording of the FIR at about 3.00 a.m. in the
morning was justified and properly explained and it cannot be
said that there was any delay in recording the FIR. Besides,
the fact of his going to the place of occurrence would not amount
to making an investigation. There is no evidence to show that
F at that point of time, PW-21 seized any articles or interrogated
any witnesses or took any other action in initiating or in
furtherance of investigation. The ratio of the decision in
Bhagwant Kishore Joshi (supra) is applicable to the facts of
the present case as the police officer merely visited the spot
· G and place of occurrence and made some survey which cannot
be regarded as investigation.

15. In Animireddy Venkata Ramana and Others v. Public
Prosecutor, High Court of Andhra Pradesh, (2008} 5 SCC
. H 368, at page 374, this Court while considering a similar case
SATISH NARAYAN SAWANT v. STATE OF GOA 483
[DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.]

observed as follows: A

"10. Certain basic facts are not denied or disputed.
The deceased died in the bus at about 10.30 p.m. on 23-
6-1998 while travelling to his village home from Tuni. PW
1 also sustained injuries in the said incident. Immediately
8
after the incident, hearing cries of passengers, the driver
of the bus stopped the bus. Not only the accused persons
fled away, all others also did, including PWs 3 and 4. They
came back after a short while hearing the cries of PW 1.
They acceded to his request to take the bus to his house.
From the records, it appears that the distance between the C
place where the accident took place and the village .in
question was not much. In ahy event, the destination of the
bus was the said village and they were bound to take the
bus thereat. PW 1 informed about the incident to PW 2,
another son of the deceased. D

11. The dead body of the deceased was brought
down from the bus and taken to the house. The conductor
of the bus sent an information to the Depot Manager of the
State- Road Transport Corporation at Tuni. The E
investigating officer was also informed. A report to that
effect might have been noted in the general diary but the
same could not have been treated to be an FIR. When an
information is received by an officer in charge of a police
station, he in terms of the provisions of the Code was F
expected to reach the place of occurrence as early as
possible. It was not necessary for him to take that step only
on the basis of a first information report. An information
received in regard to commission of a cognizable offence
is not required to be preceded by a first information report. G
Duty of the State to protect the life of an injured as also
an endeavour on the part of the responsible police officer
to reach the place of occurrence in a situation of this
-nature is his implicit duty and responsibility. If some
incident had taken place in a bus, the officers of Road H
484 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A Transport Corporation also could not ignore the same.
They reached the place of occurrence in another bus at
about 1 a.m. The deceased and the injured were only then
shifted to Tuni Hospital."

16. The ratio of the aforesaid decision is squarely
8
applicable to the facts of the present case. Even assuming that
PW-21, the Investigating Officer could have entered the
aforesaid information received from PSI of Panaji Police
Station in the general diary, yet the said entry could not have
been held or treated to be an FIR. The information received by
C him was very cryptic and without any detail about the incident
in question and, therefore, in any case, there was no possibility
of recording an FIR at that stage. The place of occurrence was
in total darkness and even the persons belonging to the
complainant side were not available, therefore, bringing them
D to the police station where there was sufficient light and
recording the complaint at 3.00 a.m. cannot, in any manner, cast
any doubt on the veracity of the. prosecution case. In that view
of the matter it cannot be said that the FIR' was in any manner
hit by the provisions of Section 162 of CrPC.
E
17. So far contention that there was violation of Section
157 of the CrPC is concerned, the same is also without any
basis for the defence never cross-examined PW-21 on the
aforesaid issue. So long the defence is not able to establish
F from the records by cogent evidence that there was any delay
in sending the FIR to the Magistrate, it cannot be held that there
was any such delay. There is no evidence on record before us
to hold either way for no such issue was raised either before
the trial court or before the tligh Court nor any evidence was
led by the defence in respect of the said issue which is sought
G to be raised at this stage. From the evidence on record it does
not appear to us that any suggestion was given to the said
witness to the effect that the copy of the Fl R was not sent or
that it was dispatched late, which if given, would have given an
·opportunity to the witness to afford some explanation or to show
H
SATISH NARAYAN SAWANT v. STATE OF GOA 485
[DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.]

'f as to when the FIR, was sent to and received by the Magistrate. A
In that view of the matter we do not agree with the counsel
appearing for the appellant that delay in transmitting the FIR to
the Magistrate stands .proved in the present case.

18. The next contention that we proceed to discuss now B
is about whether sufficient light was available at the place of
occurrence for the eye-witnesses to see the occurrence as
stated by them in the evidence. We have PWs. 1, 2, 8 and 18
~ as eye-witnesses to th~ occurrence. These eye-witnesses have
stated that the incident had happened initially in the hall where
c
- there was some light for Accused No. 3 has brought a lamp to
the hall and apart from that another lamp was also burning which
was attached to the ceiling. Blood was found by the police on
the wall of the verandah and in the courtyard. It is also
·.4' established from the evidence on record for it is clearly stated
~ that the street light having tube light was giving sufficient light
D
to the place of occurrence and that it was directed towards the
house which was the place of occurrence.
19. Besides, all the aforesaid eye-witnesses were inmates
of the house and they would know as to who had given the E
blows for they specifically stated that initially the appellant did
.; not have the knife in his hand but when the deceased and others
-+went to the balcony then he went inside the house and brought
a knife with which he gave stab injuries to the deceased which
became fatal and as a result of which the deceased died while F
he was being taken to the hospital.

20. The aforesaid eye-witnesses, although, are related
witnesses, were natural witnesses for they were the inmates of
the house where the incident had taken place. The said eye-
witnesses are consistent about the principal act of the appellant G
1
1i in stabbing the deceased. The discrepancies which were

sought to be pointed out are minor discrepancies without in any
manner affecting the substratum of the prosecution case and
therefore, minor discrepancies in the evidence of the eye-
witnesses are immaterial. This Court has observed as follows H
486 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A in the case of Dinesh
,,- Kumar v. State of Rajasthan, (2008) 8
SCC 270, at page 273 :

"11. It is to be noted that PWs 7 and 13 were the injured
witnesses and PW 10 was another eyewitness and was
the informant. Law is fairly well settled that even if acquittal
B
is recorded in respect of the co-accused on the ground
that there were exaggerations and embellishments, yet
conviction can be recorded if the evidence is found cogent,
credible and truthful in respect of another accused. The
mere fact that the witnesses were related to the deceased
c cannot be a ground to discard their evidence.

12. In law, testimony of an injured witness is given
importance. When tlie eyewitnesses are stated to be
interested and inimically disposed towards the accused,
D it has to be noted that it would not be proper to conclude
that they would shield the real culprit and rope in innocent
persons. The truth or otherwise of the evidence has to be
weighed pragmatically. The court would be required to
analyse the evidence of related witnesses and those
E witnesses who are inimically disposed towards the
accused. But if after careful analysis and scrutiny of their
evidence, the version given by the witness-es appears to
be clear, cogent and credible, there is no reason to
discard the same. Conviction can be made on the basis
F of such evidence."

21. The aforesaid eye-witnesses were cross-examined-at
length but even after such lengthy cross-examination these eye-
witnesses account could not be shaken. The postmortem report
indicates that there were sixteen injuries as against the two as
G adduced in ocular evidence and, therefore, a submission was
made by the counsel appearing for the appellant that the
medical evidence adduced in the present case is not
supporting the ocular evidence. However, a perusal of record
clearly shows that the doctor who conducted the postmortem
H (PW-7) stated in his evidence that there were in total 16 injuries
SATISH NARAYAN SAWANT v. STATE OF GOA 487
[DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.]

1> when external examination was done by him and the knife M. A
0. 11 could have caused the injuries no. 1, 2, 3 and 4. He further
stated that the death was caused due to hemorrhage and shock
as a result of stab injury. He further stated that Injury No. 1 was
sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. On
being cross-examined, PW-7 categorically stated that death e
due to stab iniury was in consequence of Injury No. 1 and all
other injuries were superficial in nature. There is no doubt that
four injuries are indicated in the postmortem report shown to
have been received by the deceased but the fact that the
deceased was given stab injuries by the appellant with the help c
of a knife brought by him from inside the house is clearly
established from the ocular evidence. There is therefore one
particular injury, being injury No. 1 caused because of stabbing
and the rest being superficial in nature could be caused during
scuffle. Therefore, the alleged discrepancy cannot be said to
0
be very vital as it has been held by this Court in several
decisions that ocular evidence cannot be brushed aside only
because, to some extent, it is not in consonance with the
medical evidence. Reference in this regard may be made to
the decision of this Court in State of U. P. v. Krishna Gopal, E
(1988) 4 SCC 302; Anwar v. State of Haryana, (1997) 9 SCC
766; Ravi Kumar v. State of Punjab, (2005) 9 SCC 315;
Munivel v. State of T.N., (2006) 9 SCC 394.

22. All the contentions raised by learned counsel appearing
for the appellant were considered by us in the light of evidence F
on record and we find that none of the aforesaid submissions
has any basis. There is cogent and reliable evidence on record
to prove and establish that the accused has committed the act
of stabbing as a result of which the deceased had died.

23. Before dwelling further into the factual matrix of the
'G
case on the basis of which the High Court convicted the
appellant under Section 302 IPC; it would be useful to briefly
recapitulate the law on the point.

24. Section 299 and Section 300 IPC deals with the H
488 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A definition of culpable homicide and murder respectively.
Section 299 defines culpable homicide as the act of causing
death; (i) with the intention of causing death or (ii) with the
intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death
or (iii) with the knowledge that such act is likely to cause death.
B The bare reading of the section makes it crystal clear that the
first and the second clause of the section refer to intention apart
from the knowledge and the third clause refers to knowledge
alone and not intention. Both the expression "intent" and
"knowledge" postulate the existence of a positive mental attitude
c which is of different degrees. The mental element in culpable
homicide i.e. mental attitude towards the consequences of
conduct is one of intention and knowledge. If that is caused in
any of the aforesaid three circumstances, the offence of

0
culpable homicide is said to have been committed. Section 300
IPC, however, deals with murder although there is no clear ...
definition of murder provided in Section 300 IPC. It has been
repeatedly held by this Court that culpable homicide is the
genus and murder is species and that all murr!ers are culpable
homicide but not vice versa. Section 300 IPC further provides
for the exceptions which will constitute culpable homicide not
E amounting to murder and punishable under Section 304. When
and if there is intent and knowledge then the same would be a
case of Section 304 Part I and if it is only a case of knowledge
and riot the intention to cause murder and bodily injury, then the
same would be a case of Section 304 Part II. The aforesaid
F distinction between an act ·amounting to murder and an act not
amounting to murder has been brought out in the numerous
decisions of this Court.

25. In the case of State of A.P. v. Rayavarapu Punnayya,
G (1976) 4 SCC 382, this Court observed as follows at page 386:

"12. In the scheme of the Penal Code, "culpable
homicides" is genus and "murder" its specie. All "murder"
is "culpable homicide" but not vice-versa. Speaking (

generally, "culpable homicide" sans "special
H
SATISH NARAYAN SAWANT v. STATE OF GOA 489
[DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.]

characteristics of murder", is "culpable homicide not A
amounting to murder". For the purpose of fixing
punishment, proportionate to the gravity of this generic
offence, the Code practically recognises three degrees of
culpable homicide. The first is, what may be called,
"culpable homicide of the first degree". This is the greatest B
form of culpable homicide, which is defined in Section 300
as "murder". The second may be termed as "culpable
homicide of the second degree". This is punishable under
the first part of Section 304. Then, there is "culpable
homicide of the third degree". This is the lowest type of c
• culpable homicide and the punishment provided for it is,
also, the lowest among the punishments provided for the
three grades. Culpable homicide of this degree is
punishable under the second part of Section 304."

26. Placing strong reliance on the aforesaid decision, this D
Court in the case of Abdul Waheed Khan v. State of A.P.,
(2002) 7 sec 175, observed as follows at page 184:

"13. Clause (b) of Section 299 corresponds with clauses
(2) and (3) of Section 300. The distinguishing feature of E
the mens rea requisite under clause (2) is the knowledge
possessed by the offender regarding the particular victim
being in such a peculiar condition or state of health that
the internal harm caused to him is likely to be fatal,
notwithstanding the fact that such harm would not in the F
ordinary way of nature be sufficient to cause death of a
person in normal health or condition. It is noteworthy that
the "intention to cause death" is not an essential
requirement of clause (2). Only the intention of causing the
bodily injury coupled with the offender's knowledge of the G
likelihood of such injury causing the death of the particular
victim, is sufficient to bring the killing within the ambit of
this clause. This aspect of clause (2) is borne out by
\\lustration (b) appended to Section 300.

14. Clause (b) of Section 299 does not postulate any such H
490 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A knowledge on the part of the offender. Instances of cases
falling under clause (2) of Section 300 can be where the
assailant causes death by a fist-blow intentionally given
knowing that the victim is suffering from an enlarged liver,
or enlarged spleen or diseased heart and such blow is
B likely to cause death of that particular person as a result
of the rupture of the liver, or spleen or the failure of the
heart, as the case may be. If the assailant had no such
knowledge about the disease or special frailty of the victim,
nor an intention to cause death or bodily injury sufficient in
c the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the offence
will not be murder, even if the injury which caused the
death, was intentionally given. In clause (3) of Section 300,
instead of the words "likely to cause death" occurring in
the corresponding clause (b) of Section 299, the words
"sufficient in the ordinary course of nature" have been used.
D
Obviously, the distinction lies between a bodily injury likely
to cause death and a bodily injury sufficient in the ordinary
course of nature to cause death. The distinction is fine but
real and if overlooked, may result in miscarriage of justice.
The difference between clause (b) of Section 299 and
E
clause (3) of Section 300 is one of degree of probability
of death resulting from the intended bodily injury. To put it
more broadly, it is the degree of probability of death which
determines whether a culpable homicide is of the gravest,
medium or the lowest degree. The word "likely" in clause
F (b) of Section 299 conveys the sense of probable as
distinguished from a mere possibility. The words "bodily
injury ... sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause
death" mean that death will be the "most probable" result
of the injury, having regard to the ordinary course of nature.
G
15. For cases to fall within clause (3), it is not necessary
that the offender intended to cause death, so long as the
death ensues from the intentional bodily injury or injuries
sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature.
H Rajwant Singh v. State of Kera/a 3 is an apt illustration of
SATISH NARAYAN SAWANT v. STATE OF GOA 491
[DR MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.]

this point. A

16. In Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab4 Vivian Bose, J.
speaking for the Court, explained the meaning and scope
of clause (3). It was observed that the prosecution must
prove the following facts before it can bring a case under 8
Section 300 "thirdly". First, it must establish quite
objectively, that a bodily injury is present; secondly, the
nature of the injury must be proved. These are purely
objective investigations. Thirdly, it must be proved that
there was an intention to inflict that particular injury, that is C
to say, that it was not accidental or unintentional or that
some other kind of injury was intended. Once these three
elements are proved to be present, the enquiry proceeds
further, and fourthly, it must be proved that the injury of the
type just described made up of the three elements set out
above was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course D
of nature. This part of the enquiry is purely objective and
inferential and has nothing to do with the intention of the
offender.

17. The ingredients of clause "thirdly" of Section 300 IPC E
were brought out by the illustrious Judge in his terse
language· as follows: (AIR p. 467, para 12)

"12. To put it shortly, the prosecution must prove the
following facts before it ca~ bring a case under Section
F
300 'thirdly';

First, it must establish, quite objectively, that a bodily
injury is present;

Secondly, the nature of the injury must be proved; G
These are purely objective investigations.

Thirdly, it must be proved that there was an intention
to inflict that particular bodily injury, that is to say, that it was
not accidental or unintentional, or that some other kind of
injury was intended. H
492 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009) 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A Once these three elements are proved to be present,
the enquiry proceeds further and,

Fourthly, it must be proved that the injury of the type.
just described made up of the three elements set out
B
above is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course
of nature. This part of the enquiry is purely objective and
inferential and has nothing to do with the intention of the
offender."

18. The learned Judge explained the third ingredient in the
c following words (at p. 468): (AIR para 16)

"The question is not whether the prisoner intended to inflict
a serious injury or a trivial one but whether he intended to
inflict the injury that is proved to be present. If he can show
D that he did not, or if the totality of the circumstances justify
such an inference, then, of course, the intent that the
section requires is not proved. But if there is nothing
beyond the injury and the fact that the appellant inflicted it,
the only possible inference is that he Intended to inflict it. ·
Whether he knew of its seriousness, or intended serious
E
consequences, is neither here nor there. The question, so
far as the intention is concerned, is not whether he intended
to kill, or to inflict an injury of a particular degree of
seriousness, but whether he intended to inflict the injury in
question; and once the existence of the injury is proved the
F intention to cause it will be presumed unless the evidence
or the circumstances warrant an opposite conclusion."

19. These observations of Vivian Bose, J. have become
locus classicus. The test laid down by Virsa Singh case4
G for the applicability of clause "thirdly" is now ingrained in
our legal system and has become part of the rule of law.
Under clause thirdly of Section 300 IPC, culpable homicide
is murder, if both the following conditions are satisfied i.e.
(a) that the act which causes death is done with the
H intention of causing death or is done with the intention of
SATISH NARAYAN SAWANT v. STATE OF GOA 493
[DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.]

causing a bodily injury; and (b) that the injury intended to A
be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to
cause death. It must be proved that there was an intention
to inflict that particular bodily injury which, in the ordinary
course of nature, was sufficient to cause death viz. that the
injury found to be present was the injury that was intended B
to be inflicted.

20. Thus, according to the rule laid down in Virsa Singh
case4 even if the intention of the accused was limited to
the infliction of a bodily injury sufficient to cause death in C
the ordinary course of nature, and did not extend to the
intention of causing death, the offence would be murder.
Illustration (c) appended to Section 300 clearly brings out
this point.

21. Clause (c) of Section 299 and clause (4) of Section D
300 both require knowledge of the probability of the act
causing death. It is not necessary for the purpose of this
case to dilate much on the distinction between these
corresponding clauses. It will be sufficient to say that
clause (4) of Section 300 would be applicable where the . E
knowledge of the offender as to the probability of death
of a person or persons in general as distinguished from
a particular person or persons - being caused from his
imminently dangerous act, approximates to a practical
certainty. Such knowledge on the part of the offender must F
be of the highest degree of probability, the act having
been committed by the offender without any excuse for
incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as
aforesaid.

22. The above are only broad guidelines and not cast-iron G
imperatives. In most cases, their observance will facilitate
the task of the court. But sometimes the facts are so
intertwined and the second and the third stages so
telescoped into each, that it may not be convenient to give
a separate treatment to the matters involved in the second H
494 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A and third stages." -I ~

27. The aforesaid principles have been consistently
followed by this Court in several decisions. Reference in this
regard may be made to the decision of this Court in Ruli Ram
B v. State of Haryana, (2002) 7 SCC 691; Augustine Saldanha
v. State of Kamataka, (2003) 10 SCC 472; State of U. P. v.
Virendra Prasad, (2004) 9 SCC 37; Chacko v. State of Kera/a,
(2004) 12 SCC 269; S. N. Bhadolkar v. State of Maharasthra,
(2005) 9 SCC 71; and Jagriti Devi v. State of H. P., JT 2009
(8) SC 648.
c
28. That being the well settled legal position, when we test
· the factual background of the present case on the principles
laid down by this Court in the aforesaid decisions, we are
unable to agree with the views taken by the High Court. As
D already noted, it is quite clear from the record that there was ,..
an altercation preceding the incident. The place of occurrence
is a residence inhabited by both the parties and there is no
evidence on record that the deceased was armed with any
weapon. Initially the accused-appellant also did not have any
E weapon with him but during the course of the incident he went
inside and got a knife with the help of which he stabbed the
deceased. PW-7 in his cross examination has categorically
stated that death due to stab injury was in consequence of Injury -t-
No. 1 and all other injuries were superficial in nature. So, it was
F only Injury No. 1 which was fatal in nature. Factually therefore,
there was only one main injury caused due to stabbing and that
also was given on the back side of the deceased and therefore,
it cannot be said that there was any intention to kill or to inflict
an injury of a particular degree of seriousness. Records clearly
G establish that there was indeed a scuffle between the parties
with regard to the availability of electricity in a particular room J. ~

and during the course of scuffle the appellant also received an
injury which was simple in nature and that there was heated
exchange of words and scuffle between the parties before the
actual incident of stabbing took place. There is, therefore,
H
SATISH NARAYAN SAWANT v. STATE OF GOA 495
[DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.]
1
~ )
provocation and the incident happened at the spur of the A
moment. That being the factual position, we are of the
considered view that the present case cannot be said to be a
case under Section 302 IPC but it is a case falling under
Seption 304 Part II IPC. It is trite law that Section 304 Part II
comes into play when the death is caused by doing an act with B
knowledge that it is likely to cause death but there is no
intention on the part of the accused either to cause death or to
cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death.
~
29. Accordingly, we convict the appellant under Section
304, Part II of IPC and sentence him to undergo imprisonment
c
for a period of 7 years. His bail bonds shall stand cancelled
and the appellant shall surrender immediately to serve out the
remaining period of sentence. If, however, the appellant does
- ~
not surrender by himself, the State shall take necessary steps
to rearrest him to undergo the remaining part of sentence. D

30. The appeal stands disposed of in terms of aforesaid
order.

N.J. Appeal disposed of;
E

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