Created byFuzzy Cloud

Supreme Court of India

SATNAM SINGH AND ORS.versusPUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT AND ORS.

Citation
1997 INSC 122
Decided
7 February 1997
Disposal
Appeal(s) allowed
Bench
S VERMA

Holding

Rules 16 and 30, being administrative provisions, came into force on 1 March 1974.

Summary

The Supreme Court examined whether Rules 16 and 30 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court Establishment (Appointment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1973—rules that dealt with recruitment quota and seniority—came into force on 1 March 1974 or on 23 January 1975. The Court held that the proviso to Article 229(2) of the Constitution requires Governor’s approval only for rules relating to salaries, allowances, leave or pensions, and not for purely administrative rules. Consequently, the High Court could enforce the administrative rules immediately by order of the Chief Justice, without waiting for the Gazette notification. The Court therefore declared that Rules 16 and 30 became effective on 1 March 1974. The High Court’s earlier judgment treating the entire set of rules as commencing on the Gazette date was set aside, and the vacancy calculations for direct recruits and promotees were to be based on the earlier date. The appeal was allowed.

Issues considered

  • Did Rules 16 and 30 of the 1973 High Court Establishment Rules, being administrative provisions, come into force on 1 March 1974 or on 23 January 1975?
  • Does the proviso to Article 229(2) of the Constitution require Governor’s approval for all rules or only for those relating to salaries, allowances, leave or pensions?
  • Was the High Court correct in applying the decision in Sunder Sham Kapoor v. Chief Justice to the present rules?

Legislation cited

Subjects

Service lawConstitutional interpretationArticle 229High Court establishment rulesQuota ruleSeniority determinationAdministrative vs financial rulesProviso construction

Judgment

A                   SATNAM SINGH AND ORS.
                              v.
           PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT AND ORS.

                                FEBRUARY 7, 1997

B                  (J.S. VERMA AND S.P. KURDUKAR, JJ.]

          Service Law:

         Punjab and Haryana High Court Establishment (Appointment and
C   Conditions of Services) Rules, 1973: Rules 16, 26, 27, 30, 34, Schedules /,
    I-A and III.

           Recruitment Rules-Conditions of service of officers and servants of
    High Court-Notification of-Date of coming into effec~Administrative and
    financial provisions only forwarded to Governor for approvaHleld: Finan-
D   cial provisions only and not administrative provisions required approval of   'l
    Governor-Hence, administrative provisions came into force from date fu:ed
    by Chief Justice whereas financial provisions came into force from date of
    notification in Official Gazette-Constitution of India, 1950, Arts. 229(2)
    proviso and 231.
E
          Interpretation of Statutes:

          Internal aids-Proviso-Held: To be strictly construed because it is an
    exception to the general rule.

F        The Chief Justice of the High Court made Rules known as the
  Punjab and Haryana High Court Establishment (Appointment and Con-
  ditions of Service) Rules, 1973 in exercise of his powers under Article
  239(2) read with Article 231 of the Constitution. The Rules, which related
  to administration, were made applicable with effect from 1-3-1994 whereas
G the Rules involving financial implications were referred to the Governor
  for approval as required under proviso to Article 229(2) of the Constitu-
  tion. A notification for publication of the Rules in the Gazette of India was
  issued on 23-1-1975. Rule 16 prescribed quota for filling up of the posts            .y
  and Rule 30 prescribed method of determining the seniority. The dispute
  in this appeal related to Rules 16 and 30 as to whether they came into force
H from 1-3-1974 or from 23-1- 1975.
                                       1038
                   SA1NAMSINGHv. PB.ANDHARYANAH.C.                            1039
           Allowing the appeal, this Court                                             A
            HELD: 1. The proviso to Article 229(2) of the Constitution carves
     out the exception, requiring the approval of the Governor of the State only
     in respect of other rules "so far as they relate to salaries, allowances, leave
     or pensions". To read the proviso to require approval thereunder to the
     entire set of Rules including those which do not relate to "salaries, allowan-    B
     ces, leave or pensions" would be to enlarge the scope of the proviso by
     reading into it more than what is enacted therein. The plain words of the
     proviso to Article 229(2) leave no doubt that the requirement of approval
     thereunder is confined to the rules only so far as they relate to salaries
     etc., and no more. It was open to the High Court to frame two sets of rules,      c
     one for administrative matters and the other for financial matters, and to
     refer only financial rules to the Governor for approval. The result cannot
     be any different if only one set of rules is made by the Chief Justice
     incorporating both kinds of rules. Rules 16 and 30 of the Punjab and
     Haryatta High Court Establishment (Appointment and Conditions of Ser-
•.   vice) Rules, 1973, being administrative provisions, came into force from
     1-3-1974. [1043-C-D, 1044-B-C]
                                                                                       D

          Sunder Sham Kapoor & Ors. v. Hon'ble Chief Justice, Punjab and
     Haryana High· Court, (1987) 4 SLR 460 (P&H), referred to.
                                                                                       E
           2. A proviso has to be strictly construed inasmuch as it carves out
     an exception to the general rule. The general rule enacted in the main part
     is not to be unduly restricted by expanding the content of the proviso,
     which is intended to carve out the exception from the general rule. [1043-E]

"         CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 3705 of                      p
     1990 Etc.

          From the Judgment and Order dated 21.2.89 of the Punjab &
     Haryana High Court in C.W.P. No. 642 of 1987.

           H.N. Salve, V.C. Mahajan, Pradeep Gupta, K.K. Mohan, Gaurav                 G
     Jain, Ms. Abha Jain, P.P. Tripathi, Suresh C. Gupta, Ms. Rekha Pandey,
     Gaurav K. Banerjee and Naveen Prakash for the appearing parties.

           The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

           J.S. VERMA, J. High Court Establishment (Appointment and Con-               H
    1040                 SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [1997) 1 S.C.R.
A ditions of Service) Rules, 1973 (for short the "Rules") were made by the
    Chief Justice of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in exercise of
    powers conferred by Clause (2) of Article 229 read with Article 231 of the
    Constitution of India. By order dated March 18, 1974, the Chief Justice of
    the High Court made these rules applicable with effect from March 1, 1974;
B   and the rules involving financial implications were referred to the Central
    Government through Chandigarh Administration for obtaining approval as
    required by the Proviso to Clause (2) of Article 229 of the Constitution. It
    was expressly mentioned in the order that "all new appointments made
    after March 1, 1974 have been regulated by the new rules". The Chief
    Justice also directed the office by the order dated April 19, 1974 to
C   circulate the new rules to the entire staff and all concerned. Publication of
    rules in this manner was made and the rules, except those involving
    financial implications, came into force in actual working with effect from
    March 1, 1974. The circulation note dated April 24, 1974 of the Deputy
    Registrar, Administration clearly records this fact.
D         Rule 16 of the above Rules prescribed the quota for filling the posts     ·..
    of Assistants by specifying that 50% of the posts shall be filed by direct
    recruitment and the remaining 50% posts were to be filled by promotl'on
    from the clerks on the establishment of the Court. Rule 30 prescribed the
    method of determining seniority. These rules did not involve any financial
E   implications and according to the aforesaid order of the Chief Justice of
    the High Court they were treated as effective from March 1, 1974.

          A controversy has arisen about the date on which rules 16 and 30
    came into force because the rules involving financial implications are held
    to have come into force from a later date.
F
          This date has significance because the quota provided by these rules
    was abolished from January 20, 1978 and the availability of number of
    vacancies for the direct recruits would be more if the period of quota rule
    is longer. Writ Petitions filed in the High Court have led to the impugned
G   judgment. Neither side is fully satisfied with the decision. Civil Appeal No.
    3704 is by promotees and Civil Appeal No. 3705 is by direct recruits against
    the same judgment dated February 21, 1989.

         As earlier stated, the High Court sent a proposal for approval of the
   Government to the rules involving financial implications at the time of
 H applying these rules with effect from March 1, 1974 by order of the Chief
        SATNAMSINGHv. PB.ANDHARYANAH.C.[J.S. VERMA,J.]                    1041

  Justice. The proposal for approval was made only in respect of rules 26,        A
  27 and 34 and Schedules 1, IA, II and III of the said Rules. These rules
  related to pay, special pay and pension etc. so that they undoubtedly
  related to financial matters and required the approval envisaged by the
  Proviso to Clause (2) of Article 229 of the Constitution. The correspon-
  dence between the High Court and the Government is clear to indicate
                                                                                  B
  that the proposal for approval of the Government and the approval ac-
  corded to the same related only to rules 26, 27 and 34 and Schedules I, IA,
  II and III only. The Government of India, Ministry of Law and Justice
  (Department of Justice) letter No. 30/8/83-Jus., dated September 25, 1985
' to the Home Secretary, Union Territory Administration, Chandigarh with
  a copy to the Registrar, High Court, clearly says that the approval of the      c
  President was only to these rules involving financial implications. There can
  be no doubt whatsoever that the entire exercise, from the proposal by the
  High Court to approval of the President related only to rules 26, 27 and
  34 and Schedules I, iA, II and III of the said Rules relating to certain
  conditions of service involving financial implications and not to the remain-   D
  ing rules contained in the High Court Establishment (Appointment and
  Conditions of Service) Rules, 1973. Our concern in these matters is con-
  fined only to the date of enforcement of rules 16 and 30 prescribing the
  quota for the direct recruits and promotees and the mode of determination
  of seniority between them.                                         .    .
                                                                                  E
        The contention of the direct recruits is that rules 16 and 30 along
  with remaining rules which did not involve financial implications and,
  therefore, did not require approval of the Government came into force with
  effect from March 1, 1974 by order of the Chief Justice of the High Court.
  On the other hand, the· promotees ·contend that the entire set of rules came    p
  into force only on January 23, 1975, the date of the notification which was
  published in the Gazette dated February 1, 1975. The contention of the
  promotees is based on the decision in an earlier litigation which related to
  applicability of the rules involving financial implications. That decision is
  Sunder Sham Kapoor and Others v. The Hon'ble Chief !llStice, Punjab and
  Haryana High Court, Chandigarh and Others, (1987) 4 SLR 460.                    G

        As earlier stated, the significance of the date on which rules 16 and
  30 along with the remaining rules, other than those sent for approval of the        f

  Government is for the reason .that the number of posts available for
  recruitment from the two sources - direct recruits and promotees - has to       H
    1042                  SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [1997) 1 S.C.R.

A be calculated from that date only. There was no prescription of quota prior
    to that date and subsequent to January 20, 1978 when by amendment made
    in the Rules the provision for quota was abolished. It is only between the
    date of enforcement of the quota rule and its abolition on January 20, 1978
    that this question arises and it assumes significance because the longer
B   period of quota rule is beneficial to the direct recruits.

            In the present case the High Court has taken the view that the
     commencement of the entire set of Rules including rules 16 and 30 was.
     from January 23, 1975 and not March 1, 1974. The view taken in the earlier
     decision in Sunder Sham Kapoor has been followed. In our opinion, the
C significant distinction between the present case and Sunder Sham Kapoor
     has been overlooked by the High Court. In Sunder Sham Kapoor the
     subject matter related to salaries and allowances with other consequential
     benefits and, therefore, they involved financial implications governed by the
     Rules which required approval of the Governm~nt in accordance with the
     proviso .to Clause 2 of Article 229. That being so, the rules on which the
D-, claim was based in Sunder Sham Kapoor came into force only when the              .,,
   : approval of the President was accorded with the direction that the same
   · would be effective from the date of their issue. The publication of the
     notification dated January 23, 1975 made in the Gazet\e was, therefore,
     treated as the date of enforcement of the Rules which required approval
E of the President under the proviso to Clause 2 of Article 229. No such
     approval was required for the remaining rules including Rules 16 and 30
     and, therefore, the order of the Chief Justice enforcing the Rules with
     effect from March 1, 1974 brought into force these remaining rules on that
     day. This distinction has been overlooked by the High Court in applying
F the decision of Sunder Sham Kapoor in the present case also.
           The relevant part of Article 229 is as under :

             "229. Officers and servants and the expenses of High Courts.-

             (1) xxx        xxx         xxx
G
             (2) Subject to the provisions of any law made by the Legislature
             of the State, the conditions of service of officers and servants of a
             High Court shall be such as may be prescribed by rules made by
             the Chief Justice of the Court Qr by some other Judge or officer
H            of the court authorised by the Chief Justice to make rules for the
             SA1NAM SINGH v. PB. AND HARYANA H.C. (J.S. VERMA, J.)              1043

                purpose:                                                                 A
                   Provided that the rules made under this clause shall, so far as
                they relate to salaries allowance, leave or pensions, require the
                approval of the Governor of the State.

                (3) xxx        xxx         xxx"                                          B
       Clause (2) of Article 229 enacts that conditions of service of officers and
       servants of High Court shall be such as may be prescribed by Rules made
       by the Chief Justice of the Court, subject to the provisions of any law made
       by the Legislature of the State. The proviso carves out the exception,
       requiring the approval of the Governor of the State only in respect of the
                                                                                         c
       rules "so far as they relate to salaries, allowances, leave or pensions". Thus
       the approval according to the proviso is required only in respect of those
       rules which relate to salaries, allowances, leave or pensions and not to other
       rulesrelating to the conditions of service of the officers and servants of the
       High Court. To read the proviso to require approval thereunder to the             D
       entire set of rules including those which do not relate to "salaries, allowan-
       ces, leave or pensions" would be to enlarge the scope of the proviso by
       reading into it more than what is enacted therein. A proviso has to be
       strictly construed inasmuch as it carves out an exception to the general rule.
       The general rule enacted in the main part is not to be unduly restricted by
                                                                                         E
       expanding the content of the proviso which is intended to carve out the
       exception from the general rule. The plain words of the proviso to Clause
       (2) of Article 229 leave no doubt that the requirement of approval there-
       under is confined to the rules only so far as they relate to salaries etc., and
       no more. ,It is settled that a proviso cannot expand or limit the clear
-'J_
       meaning of the main provision.                                                    F

              Viewed at from a different angle the conclusion reached is the same.
       It is open to the Chief Justice to frame two different sets of rules whereby
       the rules relating to salaries, allowances, leave or pensions are made
       separately in one set while the other set relates to other conditions of
       service. If the exercise is performed in this manner only that set of rules       G
       which relates to salaries etc. involving financial implications requires the
       approval according to the proviso to Article 229(2) while the other set does
       not require any such approval and can be enforced by Chief Justice straight
       away by his order. The result cannot be any different if only one set of rules
       is made by the Chief Justice incorporating both kinds of rules.                   H
    1044                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [1997] 1 S.C.R.
A          We have no doubt that all the rules framed by the Chief Justice
    except for Rules 26, 27 and 34 and Schedules I, IA, 2 and 3 which alone
    were sent for approval according to the proviso to clause (2) of Article 229,
    came into force with effect from March 1, 1974 by virtue of the order of
    Chief Justice of the High Court. This is how the High Court understood it
    till some doubt was created because of the significant distinction in the
B   decision in Sunder Sham Kapoor being overlooked. It is, therefore, clear
    that Rules 16 providing for the quota and Rule 30 prescribing the mode of
    determining seniority came into force with effect from March 1, 1974. The
    quota for the direct recruits and promotees has to be worked out accord-
    ingly and the vacancies have to be filled on that basis. The High Court is
C   required to calculate the vacancies and adjust the appointments to the
    vacancies on this basis.


         For the aforesaid reason the impugned judgment of the High Court
  is set aside. The High Court would now proceed to calculate the number
D of vacancies available to direct recruits and promotees on this basis and to
  make consequential adjustment in the cadre of assistants, accordingly.


        This appeal was heard along with Civil Appeal No. 3705 of 1990,
  Satnam Singh and Others v. The Punjab and Haryana High Court at Cha11-
E digarh and Others and Civil Appeal No. 3704 of 1990, S.K Singal and Ors.
  v. The High Court of Punjab and Ha1yana, Chandigarh, through its Registrar
  and Others. Learned counsel for the appellant in this appeal squarely stated
  that this appeal would be rendered infructuous if the date of enforcement
  of the relevant rules providing for the quota rule ~s held to be March 1,
F 1974 as claimed by the direct recruits and not January 23, 1975 as claimed
  by the promotees. In our judgment rendered today in the connected Civil
  Appeal No. 3704 of 1990 by the promotees and Civil Appeal No. 3705 of
  1990 by the direct recruits, we have held that the date of commencement
  of the relevant rules prescribing the quota is March 1, 1974. This appeal ·
  has, therefore, to be dismissed.
G
             Consequently, this appeal is dismissed.


    v.s.s.                                      Appeal No. 3705 of 1990 allowed
                                               and appeal No. 8720/94 dismissed.


Search Indian case law

Ask in plain English, not just keywords. 25,000 AI words free, no card.

Try "Service law"Sign in to search

For a digitally signed copy suitable for filing, refer to the court's own website. Only the court can issue one.