Holding

The Court set aside convictions under Section 116 with Sections 306 and 304B IPC as untenable, but upheld the conviction under Section 498A IPC with enhanced fines.

Summary

The case involved Tejinder Pal Kaur, who attempted suicide after alleged dowry‑related cruelty by her husband Satvir Singh and his parents. The trial court convicted the accused under Section 116 read with Sections 306 and 304B IPC and under Section 498A IPC. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that Section 306 IPC punishes abetment of suicide only where the suicide actually occurs, so it cannot be applied to a mere attempt; consequently, conviction under Section 116 with Section 306 was untenable. The Court also ruled that Section 304B IPC, which deals with dowry‑related deaths, requires the death of the woman and the cruelty to have occurred "soon before" the death, neither of which was proved, so conviction under Section 116 with Section 304B was also unsustainable. The Court affirmed the conviction under Section 498A IPC, enhancing the fine to Rs.1 lakh per accused and ordering compensation of Rs.3 lakh to the victim. The convictions under Sections 116/306 and 116/304B were set aside, and the appeal was disposed of.

Issues considered

Whether conviction under Section 116 read with Section 306 IPC is justified for abetment of an attempted suicide.
Whether conviction under Section 116 read with Section 304B IPC is permissible when the woman did not die.
Whether Section 511 IPC can be invoked for an attempt to commit an offence under Section 304B.
The meaning of "soon before her death" in Section 304B IPC.
Whether a payment of Rs.20,000 after three years of marriage can be presumed to be dowry.
Whether the conviction under Section 498A IPC is sustainable.

Legislation cited

Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961s. 2
Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 113A
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 116, s. 304B, s. 306, s. 309, s. 498A, s. 511

Subjects

abetmentsuicideattempted suicidedowry deathSection 304BSection 306Section 498Asoon before deathevidencecompensationcriminal appeal

Judgment

SATVIR SINGH AND ORS. A
v.
STATE OF PUNJAB AND ANR.

SEPTEMBER 27, 2001

[K.T. THOMAS AND S.N. VARIAVA, JJ.] B

Penal Code, 1860:

Section 306-Abetment-Conviction under-Victim survived attempt to
commit suicide-Held, conviction not justified-Condition precedent .for
punishment is that the o.ffence abetted should necessarily have been committed.
c
Section 116 read with Section 306-Conviction under-Held, not
justified-Since there cannot be abetment o.f an abetment.

- Section 3048-Conviction under-Attempt to commit suicide on account
of cruelty at nuptial home-Insufficiency of evidence to show that victim
subjected to cruelty for demand of dowry soon be.fore attempt to commit
D

suicide-Held, conviction notjust!fied-For invoking the section cruelty should
have been caused 'Soon before her death '-If the interval between the cruelty
and death is wide, the court is to decide the interval in the facts of the case.
E
Sections 511 and 498 A-Conviction under-Cruelty to victim by
accused-Victims' attempt to commit suicide-Held, conviction under Section
498 A justified but not under Section 5Jl since the act is covered under Section
498A.

Words and Phrases : 'Dowry '-Meaning of-In the context of Section p'
304 B /PC and Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 'Soon before herdeath'-Meaning
of-In the context of Section 304 B /PC.

Victim (PWS) attempted to commit suicide on acc.ount of the cruel
treatment suffered by her in her nuptial home. Appellants accused were
convicted under Section 116 read with Sections 306 and 498 A IPC relying G
on the testimony of PWS. In her evidence PWS stated that she was ill-
treated for insufficiency of dowry after 4 of 5 months of the marriage, and
that a sum of Rs. 20,000 was paid after three yeas of marriage but neither
she nor her father testified that the said amount was paid as part of dowry.
High Court concurred with Sessions Court. However, conviction under H
353
354 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.
A Section 306 was substituted by Section 304 B read with Section 116 and
sentence was enhanced.

ln appeal to this Court the victim contended that payment of Rs.
20,000 after three years of marriage should be presumed as part of old
demand for further dowry.
B
Appellant-accused contended that Section 304 B could not apply to a
case of suicide since Section 306 IPC is intended to cover all cases of suicide
including dowry related suicide, in view of Section 113 A of the Evidence
Act; and that the concept of abetment of an offence under Section 304 B is
C inconceivable in the absence of death of a woman within the statutory
period. ·

Disposing of the appeal, the Court

D
HELD : 1. Section 306 IPC renders the person who abets the
commission of suicide punishable for which the condition precedent is that
suicide should necessarily have been committed. It is possible to abet the
-
commission of suicide. But nobody would abet a mere attempt to commit
suicide. It would be preposterous if law could afford to penalise an abetment ,_
to the offence of mere attempt to commit suicide. [358-F; G]
E 2. Sessions Judge went wrong in convicting the appellants under
Section 116 linked with Section 306 IPC. The former is "abetment of
offence punishable with imprisonment- if - offence be not committed". But
the crux of the offence under Section 306 itself is abetment. In other words,
if there is no abetment there is no question of the offence under Section
F 306 coming into play. It is inconceivable to have abetment of an
abetment. Hence there cannot be an offence under Section 116 read with
Section 306 IPC. Therefore, the High Court was correct in altering the
conviction from the penalising provisions fastened with the appellants by
Sessions Court. [358-G-H; 359-A]
G 3.1. Section· 306 IPC when read with Section 113 A of the Evidence
Act has only enabled the Court to punish a husband or his relative who
subjected a woman to cruelty (as envisaged in Section 498 A IPC) if such
woman committed suicide within 7 years of her marriage. It is immaterial
for Section 306 IPC whether the cruelty or harassment was caused "soon
H before her death" or earlier. If it was caused "soon before her death" the
SATVIR SINGH v. STATE 355
special provision in Section 304 B IPC would be invokable, otherwise A

..
resort can be made to Section 306 IPC. [361-F; G]

3.2. If death occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances
within 7 years of the marriage as a sequel to the cruelty or harassment
inflicted on a woman with demand of dowry, soon before her death,
Parliament intended such a case to be treated as a very serious offence B
punishable even upto imprisonment for life/in appropriate cases. It is for
the said purpose that such cases are separated from the general category
provided under Section 306 IPC (read with Section 113 A of the Evidence
Act) and made a separate offence. [362-A; BJ

Smt. Shanti & Am: v. State of Haryana, [1991] 1 SCC 371 and Kans Raj
c
v. State of Punjab & Ors., [2000] 5 SCC 207, referred to.

4.1. Prosecution, in a case of offence under Section 304 B IPC cannot
escape from the burden of proof that the harassment of cruelty was related
to the demand for dowry and also that such cruelty or harassment was D
caused "soon before her death". The word "dowry" in Section 304 B has to
be understood as it is defined in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act,
1961. The dowry mentioned in Section 304 B should be any property or
valuable security given or agreed to be given in connection with the
marriage. [362-F; 363-D]
E
4.2. There is dearth of evidence to show that (PW-5) was subjected to
cruelty or harassment connected with the demand for dowry, soon before
the attempt to commit suicide. [364-E]

4.3. It is not enough that harassment or cruelty was caused to the
F
woman with a demand for dowry at some time, if Section 304 B is to be
invoked. But it should have happened "soon before her death". The said
phrase, no doubt, is an elastic expression and can refer to a period either
immediately before her death or within a few days or even a few weeks
before it. But the proximity to her death is the pivot indicated by that
expression. The legislative object in providing such a radius of time by G
employing the words "soon before her death" is to emphasise the idea that
death should, in all probabilities, have been the aftermath of such cruelty
or harassment. In other words, there should be a perceptible nexus between
her death and the dowry related harassment or cruelty inflicted on her. If
the interval elapsed between the infliction of such harassment or cruelty H
356 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2001] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.
A and her death is wide the. court would be in a position to gauge that in all
probabilities the death would not have been the immediate cause of her
death. It is hence for the court to decide, on the facts and circumstances of ·
each case, whether the said interval in that particular case was sufficient to
snuff its cord from the concept "soon before her death". [363-D-G]
..
B 5. If the act of the accused asking PW 5 to go and commit suicide had
driven her to proceed to the railway track for ending her life then it is
expressly made punishable under Section 498 A IPC. When it is so expressly
made punishable the act involved therein stands lifted out of the purview
of Section 511 IPC. The very policy underlying Section 511 seems to be for
providing it as a residuary provision. Therefore, the accused, in this case,
c cannot be convicted under Section 511 on account of the acts alleged
against him. [360-C; D]
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Crii:ninal Appeal No. 1319
of 1998.

D From the Judgment and Order dated 27 .10.98 of the Punjab and Haryana
High Court in Crl. A. No. 415-SB of 1998.

WITH

Crl. Appeal No. 123/1999.

E R.S. Cheema and U.R. Lalit, Ms. Kanwaljit Kochar, Ms. Jyotsana Singh,
S.C. Paul, H.S. Munjral, Sartej Narula for J.D. Jain, Ms. Neetu Sharma, Ujjal
Singh, D.B. Vohra, Satinder S. Gulati and Rajeev Sharma for the appearing
parties.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
F
THOMAS, J. A young mother of two kids, who is a double graduate,
ran into the rail in front of a running train to end her life as well as her miseries
once and for all. She was driven to that action o'n account of the cruel treatments
suffered by her at her nuptial home. But the destiny also was cruel to her as
the locomotive which she desired to be her destroyer, instead of snuffing her
G life out in a trice, converted her into a veritable vegetable. She lost her left hand
from shoulder joint and got her spinal cord ruptured. She turned into a paraplegic.
She herself described her present plight as "a living corpse". Thus the miseries
she longed to end transformed into a monstrous dimension clutching her as
long as she is alive.

H Her husband, father-in-law and mother-in-law (the appellants before us)
SATVIR SINGH v. STATE [THOMAS, J.] 357
were convicted by the Sessions Court under Section 116 read with Section 306 A
IPC, besides Section 498A. On the first count they were sentenced to rigorous
imprisonment for two and a half years and a fine of Rs.10,000/- each, and on
the second count they were sentenced to imprisonment for two years and a fine
of Rs.5,000/- each. When the appellants filed an appeal before the High Court
in challenge of the said conviction and sentence the victim also made a motion
before the same High Court as she felt that condign punishment has not been
B
meted out to the guilty persons. Both were disposed of by the impugned
judgment delivered by a Single Judge of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana.
The findings made by the Sessions Court were concurred with by the High
Court. However, an alteration was made by substituting Section 306 IPC with
Section 304B IPC to be read. with Section 116 IPC. Commensurate alteration c
was made in the quantum of sentence by escalating it to RI for five years each.

It was during the wee hours of 17 .6.1996 that Tejinder Pal Kaur (PW-
5) ran in front of a train. The events which culminated in the said tragedy have
been set out by the prosecution like this:
D
Tejinder Pal Kaur (PW-5) daughter of Narender Singh (PW-6) obtained
B.A. degree and B.Ed. degree before her marriage. On 15.11.1992 she was
given in marriage to Satvir Singh (A-1), a businessman, and thenceforth she
was living in her husband's house. Devinder Singh (A-2) and Paramjit Kaur(A-
3) who are the parents of Satvir Singh(A-1) were also living in the same house.
Though dowry was given at the time of marriage the appellants started harassing E
the bride after about 4 or 5 months of the wedding for not giving a car and a
house as part of the dowry. They used to hurl taunts on her pertaining to the
subject, including telling her that she had brought rags instead of wedding
costumes. After about a year·a male child was born to her and about one and
a half years thereafter she gave birth to another male child. F
In the month of November 1995 her father Narender Singh (PW-6) paid
Rs.20,000/- to her husband Satvir Singh presumably for appeasing him so that
he would desist from causing any harassment to Tejinder Pal Kaur. But that
appeared to be only a modicum of pelf for abating the shower of abuses heaped
up on the housewife. G
The immediate cause for the tragic episode happened on the night of
16.6.1996. When food was served to Satvir Singh (A-1) in the night, it was
noticed that one of the items in the meals (salad) contained excessive salt.
(According to PW-5 the salt was added to the salad by her mother-in-law).
After tasting the salad Satvir Singh became furious and he unleashed abuses H
358 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.
A on his wife and then he was profusely supported by his mother and later they
were reinforced by his father. They went to the extent of suggesting to her "why
not end your life in front of one of the trains as many such trains are running
nearby".

On 17 .6.1996 Tejinder Pal Kaur (PW-5) left the house all alone at about
B 4 A.M. and reached the railway line yonder, expecting the arrival of a train
from Jallandhar. Within 15 minutes the expected train arrived and Tejinder Pal
Kaur, standing on the track, was run over by that train. What happened thereafter
need not be narrated in detail over again except pointing out that she was
devastatingly maimed, yet survived. There is practically no dispute that she
c went to the railway track on that morning and in an attempt to end her life she
allowed the train to pass over her. As the doctors expressed the opinion that
the testimonial capacity ofTejinder Pal Kaur (PW-5) was not seriously impaired
prosecution examined her as the prime witness in the case. The trial court and
the High Court believed her testimony. There is no reason to dissent from the
finding regarding reliability of her evidence.
D
At the outset we may point out that on the aforesaid facts no offence
linked with Section 306 IPC can be found against any of the appellants. The
said section penalises abetment of suicide. It is worded thus: "If any person
commits suicide, whoever abets the commission of such suicide, shall be
punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend
E
to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine." It is a unique legal phenomenon
in the Indian Penal Code that the only act, the attempt of which alone will
become an offence. The person who attempts to commit suicide is guilty of the
offence under Section 309 IPC whereas the person who committed suicide
cannot be reached at all. Section 306 renders the person who abets the
F commission of suicide punishable for which the condition precedent is that
suicide should necessarily have been committed. It is possible to abet the
commission of suicide. But nobody would abet a mere attempt to commit
suicide. It would be preposterous if law could afford to penalise an abetment
to th.e offence of mere attempt to commit suicide.
G Learned Sessions Judge went wrong in convicting the appellants under
section 116 linked with Section 306 IPC. The former is "abetment of offence
punishable with imprisonment - if offence be not committed". But the crux of
the offence under Section 306 itself is abetment. In other words, if there is no
abetment there is no question of the offence under Section 306 coming into
H play. It is inconceivable to have abetment of an abetment. Hence there cannot
SATVIR SINGH v. STATE [THOMAS, J.] 359
be an offence under Section 116 read with Section 306 IPC. Therefore, the A
~ High Court was correct in altering the conviction from the penalising provisions
fastened with the appellants by Sessions Court.

Now, we have to see whether the appellants can be convicted under
Section 511 read with Section 304B IPC. For that purpose it is necessary to
extract Section 511 as under: B
"511.Punishment for attempting to commit offences punishable with
imprisonment for life or other imprisonment.- Whoever attempts to
commit an offence punishable by this Code with imprisonment for life
or imprisonment, or to cause such an offence to be committed, and in
such attempt does any act towards the commission of the offence, shall,
c
where no express provision is made by this Code for the punishment
of such attempt, be punished with imprisonment of any description
provided for the offence, for a term which may extend to one-half of
the imprisonment for life or, as the case may be, one-half of the longest
term of imprisonment provided for that offence or with such fine as D
is provided for the offence, or with both."

The above section is the solitary provision included in the last chapter
of the IPC under the title "Of Attempts to Commit Offences". It makes attempt
to· commit an offence punishable. The offence attempted should be one
punishable by the Code with imprisonment. The conditions stipulated in the E
provision for completion of the said offence are: ( 1) The offend<:r should have
done so~e act towards commission of the main offence. (2) Such an attempt
is not expressly covered as a penal provision elsewhere in the Code.

Thus, "attempt" on the part of the accused is sine qua non for the offence
F
under Section 511. Before considering the question as to what is meant by
doing "any act towards the commission of the offence" as an inevitable part
of the process of attempt, we may point out that the last act attributed to the
accused in this case is that they asked Tejinder Pal Kaur (PW-5) to go to the
rail track and commit suicide. That act of the accused is alleged to have driven
the young lady to proceed to the railway line on the next morning to be. run G
over by the train. Assuming that the said act was perpetrated by the appellants
and that the said act could fall within the ambit of "attempt" to commit the
offence under section 304B it has to be considered whether there is any other
express provision in the Code which makes such act punishable. For this
purpose we have to look at Section 498A which has been added to the IPC by H
360 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.
A Act 46 of 1983. That provision makes "cruelty" (which a husband of a woman
or his relative subjects her to) as a punishable offence. One of the categories
included in the explanation to the said section (by which the word cruelty is
defined) is thus:

"(a) .;\ny willful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive
B the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life,
limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman;"

Thus, if the act of the accused asking Tejinder Pal Kaur (PW-5) to go
and commit suicide had driven her to proceed to the railway track for ending
her life then it is expressly made punishable under Section 498A IPC. When
c it is so expressly made punishable the act involved therein stands lifted out of
the purview of Section 511 IPC. The very policy underlying in Section 511
seems to be for providing it as a residuary provision. The corollary, therefore,
is that the accused, in this case, cannot be convicted under Section 511 on
account of the acts alleged against him.
D
Now, we have to consider whether the High Court was correct in convicting
the appellants under Section 116 read with Section 304B IPC. Shri R.S. Cheema,
leltrned senior counsel for the appellants advanced two contentions against it.
Firs~is that Section 304B cannot apply to a case of suicide at all, whether it
is sequel to cruelty or harassment with the demand for dowry or not. Second
E is that the concept of abetment of an offence under Section 304-B is inconceivable
in the absence of death of a woman within the statutory period mentioned in
that provision. In elaborating the first contention learned senior counsel submitted
that Section 306 IPC is now intended to cover all cases of suicide in view of
Section l 13A of the Evidence Act (which was brought in by Act 46 of 1983).
F
Both the contentions are fallacious. The essential components of Section
304B are: (i) Death of a woman occurring otherwise than under normal
circum§tances, within 7 years of marriage. (ii) Soon before her death she should
have been subjected to cruelty and harassment in connection with any demand
for dowry. When the above ingredients are fulfilled, the husband or his relative,
G who subjected her to such cruelty or harassment, can be presumed to be guilty
of offence under Sec;tion 304B. To be within the province of the first ingredient
the provision stipulates that "where the death of a woman is caused by any
burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances".
It may appear that the former limb which is described by the words "death
H caused by burns or bodily injury" is a redundancy because such death would
SATVIR SINGH v. STATE [THOMAS, J.] 361
also fall within the wider province of "death caused otherwise than under A
normal circumstances". The former limb was inserted for highlighting that by
no means death caused by burns or bodily injury should be treated as falling
outside the ambit of the offence. In the present context it is advantageous to
read Section 113A of the Evidence Act. It is extracted below:

"113A.Presumption as to abetment of suicide by a married woman.- B
When the question is whether the commission of suicide by a woman
had been abetted by her husband or any relative of her husband and
it is shown that she had committed suicide within a period of seven
years from the date of her marriage and that her husband 0r such
relative of her husband had subjected her to cruelty, the Court may C
presume, having regard to all the other circumstances of the case, that
such suicide had been abetted by her husband or by such relative of
her husband."

Learned senior counsel submitted that since the word "cruelty" employed
therein is a virtual importation of that word from Section 498A IPC, the offence D
envisaged in Section 306 IPC is capable of enveloping all cases of suicide
within its ambit, including dowry related suicide. According to him, the second
limb of the Explanation to Section 498A which defines the word "cruelty" is
sufficient to clarify the position. That limb ~·eads thus:

"For the purpose this section, cruelty means- E
(b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to
coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand
for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her
or any person related to her to meet such demand."

At the first blush we thought that there was force in the said contention
F
but on a deeper analysis we found that the contention is unacceptable. Section
306 IPC when read with Section l 13A of the Evidence Act has only enabled
the court to punish a husband or his relative who subjected a woman to cruelty
(as envisaged in Section 498A IPC) if such woman committed suicide within
7 years of her marriage. It is immaterial for Section 306 IPC whether the cruelty G
or harassment was caused "soon before her death" or earlier. If it was caused
"soon before her death" the specia: provision in Section 304B IPC would be
invokable, otherwise resort can be made to Section 306 IPC.

No doubt Section 306 IPC read with Section 113A of the Evidence Act
is wide enough to take care of an offence under Section 304B also. But the H
362 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.
A latter is made a more serious offence by providing a much higher sentence and
also by imposing a minimum period of imprisonment as the sentence. In other
words, if death occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within 7
years of the marriage as a sequel to the cruelty or harassment" inflicted on a
woman with demand of dowry, soon before her death, Parliament intended
such a case to be treated as a very serious offence punishable .even upto
B
imprisonment for life in appropriate cases. It is for the said purpose that such
cases are separated from the general category provided under Section 306 IPC
(read with Section 113A of the Evidence Act) and made a separate offence.

We are, therefore, unable to concur with the contention that if the dowry
c related death is a case of suicide it would not fall within the purview of Section
304B IPC at all. In Smt. Shanti and Am: v. State of Haryana, [1991] 1 SCC
371 and in Kans Raj v. State of Pubjab and Ors., [2000] 5 SCC 207 this Court .
has held that suicide is one of the modes of death falling within the ambit of
Section 304B IPC.

D Now we have to consider whether the appellants are liable to be punished
under Section 116 linked with section 304B IPC. We have already noted above·
that according to the learned senior counsel for the appellant~ there is no
question of considering Section 304B unless death of a woman had occurred.
In the present case, death did not occur. Before considering that contention we
may delve into the question whether Tejinder Pal Kaur (PW-5) was subjected
E
to cruelty or harassment in connection with the demand for dowry "soon before
her death", on a hypothetical assumption that her attempt to commit suicide had
succeeded.

Prosecution, in a case of offence under Section 304B IPC cannot escape
p from the burden of proof that the harassment or cruelty was related to the
demand for dowry and also that such cruelty or harassment was caused "soon
'uefore her death". The word "dowry" in Section 304B has to be understood
as it is defined in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. That definition
reads thus:

G "In this Act, 'dowry' means any property or valuable security given
or agreed to be given either directly or indirectly-

(a) by one party to marriage to the other party to the marriage; or

(b) by the parents of either party to a marriage or by any other person,
H to either party to the marriage or to any other person;
SATVIR SINGH v. STATE [THOMAS, J.) 363
at or before or any time after the marriage in connection with the A
marriage of the said parties, but does not include dower or mahr
in the case of persons to whom the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat)
applies."

Thus, there are three occasions related to dowry. One is before the
marriage, second is at the time of marriage and the third is "at any time" after B
the marriage. The third occasion may appear to be an unending period. But the
crucial words are "in connection with the marriage of the said parties". This
means that giving or agreeing to give any property or valuable security on any
of the above three stages should have been in connection with the marriage of
the parties. There can be many other instances for payment of money or giving c
property as between the spouses. For example, some customary payments in
connection with birth of a child or other ceremonies are prevalent in different
societies. Such pa,yments are not enveloped within the ambit of "dowry".
Hence the dowry mentioned in Section 304B should be any property or valuable
security given or agreed to be given in connection with the marriage.
-., D
It is not enough that harassment or cruelty was caused to the woman with
a demand for dowry at some time, if Section 304B is to be invoked. But it
should have happened "soon before her death". 1'he said phrase, no doubt, is
an elastic expression and (;an refer to a period either immediately before her
death or within a few days or even a few weeks before it. But the proximity E
to her death is the pivot indicated by that expression. The legislative object in
providing such a radius of time by employing the words "soon before her
death" is to emphasise the idea that her death should, in all probabilities, have
been the aftermath of such cruelty or harassment. In other words, there should
be a perceptible nexus between her death and the dowry related harassn;ient or
cruelty inflicted on her. If the interval elapsed between the infliction of such F
harassment or cruelty and her death is wide the court would be in a position
to gauge that in all probabilities the death would not have been the immediate
cause of her harrasment or cruelty. It is hence for the court to decide, on the
facts and circumstances of each case, whether the said interval in that particular
case was sufficient to snuff its cord from the concept "soon before her death". G
Applying the said principle in this case we have to refer to the evidence
of the prosecution to know whether the findings made by the High Court on
the facts warrant interference. PW-5 Tejinder Pal Kaur in her evidence said that
4 or 5 months after her marriage, she was ill-treated on the ground of insufficiency
of dowry and then she reported the matter to her father. But PW-5 did not say H
364 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2001] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.
A one word in her evidence regarding any other ill treatment relating to dowry
thereafter. It is true, she said in her evidence that in November 1995, a sum
of Rs.20,000/- was paid by her father. But neither PW-5 (Tejinder Pal Kaur)
nor PW-6 (Narendra Singh) testified that the said amount was paid as part of
the dowry or in connection with the marriage. We cannot overlook two important
events which had happened in the family during the said long interregnum of r
B
three years. One is the birth of the elder son on 12.11.1993 and the other is the
birth of the second son on 10.6.1995. We have to bear in mind the payment
of Rs.20,000/- was made five months after the birth of the second son. Even
PW-6 had no case that his daughter was subjected to any ill treatment in
connection with the demand for dowry on any day after she reported to him
C about the demand for further dowry way back in the early 1993 months. All
amounts paid by the in-laws of the husband of a woman cannot become dowry.

Shri U.R. Lalit, learned senior counsel for Tejinder Pal Kaur (PW-5)
contended that payment of Rs.20,000/- in November 1995 should be presumed
as part of the three year old demand for further dowry. When the very participants
D in the deliberations have no such case it is not proper for the court to make an
incriminating presumption against the accused on a very crucial ingredient of
the offence, more so when it is quite possible to draw a presumption the other
way around as well.

E Thus, there is dearth of evidence to s~ow that Tejinder Pal Kaur (PW-
5) was subjected to cruelty or harassment connected with the demand for
dowry, soon before the attempt to commit suicide. When the position is such
it is an unnecessary exercise on our part to consider whether Section 116 IPC
can ever be linked with the offence under Section 304B IPC.

F We, therefore, conclude that appellants cannot be convicted under Section
116 IPC either by linking it with Section 306 or with Section 304B. Hence the
conviction and sentence passed on them under Section 116 IPC is set aside.

We have no reason to interfere with the conviction passed on the appellants
under Section 498A IPC. We do confirm the same. We are told that first
G appellant Satvir Singh (A-1) has undergone the substantial portion of the
sentence of imprisonment imposed on him and the remaining appellants have
also undergone a long period of imprisonment by now in connection with this
case. But we feel that the fine portion of the sentence imposed on the appellants
is too insufficient, particularly when such fine was intended to be disbursed as
H compensation to PW-5. In our view PW-5 Tejinder pal Kaur should get at least
SATVIR SINGH v. STATE [THOMAS, J.] 365
three lakhs of rupees as c~mpensation from the appellants. We are told that A- A
2 Devinder Singh and A-3 Paramjit Kaur have now become aged as both have
crossed the age of 70. We therefore, modify the sentence under Section 498A
IPC in the following terms:

The sentence of imprisonment imposed on the appellants shall stand
reduced to the period which they have already undergone. We enhance the fine B
part of the sentence for the offence under Section 498A IPC, to Rs. one lakh
each for all the three appellants. They shall remit the fine amount in the trial
court, within three months from today, failing which each of the defaulter shall
undergo imprisonment for a further period of nine months. The appeals are
disposed of in the above terms. c
K.K.T. Appeals disposed.

r