M/S. RAVI PLUMBING AND CONSTRUCTIONversusUNION OF INDIA

      C/SCA/844/2026                          ORDER DATED: 30/01/2026




            IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD


              R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 844 of 2026
==========================================================
                  M/S. RAVI PLUMBING AND CONSTRUCTION
                                   Versus
                           UNION OF INDIA & ORS.
==========================================================
Appearance:
MS VAIBHAVI K PARIKH(3238) for the Petitioner(s) No. 1
MR. ANTRIX KAPADIYA, ASSISTANT GOVERNMENT PLEADER for the
Respondent(s) No. 2
MR NEEL P LAKHANI(10679) for the Respondent(s) No. 3
MR PRADIP D BHATE(1523) for the Respondent(s) No. 1
==========================================================
 CORAM:HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE A.S. SUPEHIA
       and
       HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE PRANAV TRIVEDI

                           Date : 30/01/2026
                            ORAL ORDER
              (PER : HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE A.S. SUPEHIA)

1.     The present petition has been filed assailing the Show-
cause Notice as well as order dated 13.02.2025 as well as the
impugned order dated 20.11.2025 i.e. the Appellate Order.

2.     Since the petitioner did not file return of income under
Section 39 of the Central Goods and Service Tax Act (for short
“the CGST Act”), 2017, subsequent to the first quarter of the
Financial Year 2024-25, the respondent authorities issued the
Show-cause Notice in Form GST REG -17 dated 13.08.2024.

2.1    It is the case of the petitioner that the petitioner was
unaware of the impugned notice and he neither filed any
reply, nor appeared for personal hearing, and therefore, the
respondent authorities passed an ex-parte impugned order in
Form GST REG -19 dated 13.02.2025 under Section 29(2)(c)
of the CGST Act, 2017, cancelling the registration.


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      C/SCA/844/2026                       ORDER DATED: 30/01/2026




2.2    It is the case of the petitioner that the petitioner,
thereafter, made attempts for restoration of registration but
could not succeed due to technical glitches, and ultimately,
filed an appeal under Section 107 of the CGST Act in Form
GST APL-01 on 12.11.2025 challenging the order dated
13.02.2025 i.e. almost after a period of six months. The
Appellate Authority, vide order dated 20.11.2025, rejected the
appeal of the petitioner on the ground of delay.

3.     The afore mentioned facts are not in dispute. It is an
admitted fact that the petitioner was required to file an appeal
under Section 107 of the CGST Act before the Appellate
Authority within an initial period of 90 days, and thereafter,
an additional period of 30 days i.e. total period of 120 days.
However, he has filed the appeal after a lapse of six months.

4.     At this stage, we may refer to the observations of the
Apex Court in the case of Assistant Commissioner (CT) LTU,
Kakinada and Ors. v. Glaxo Smith Kline Consumer Health
Care Limited, (2020) 19 S.C.C 681. The Apex Court, while
examining the issue analogs to the issue of Sales Tax and
Value Added Tax, Andhra Pradesh Value Added Tax Act, 2005
and provisions of Section 31 of the Limitation Act, 1963,
which provides power of Appellate Authority to condone the
delay and power of High Court under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India has held that the Appellate Authority has
no power to condone the delay, if an appeal is preferred after
the aggregate period. However, it is held that though the
powers of High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India are wide, but certainly not wider than the plenary


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     C/SCA/844/2026                           ORDER DATED: 30/01/2026




powers bestowed on the Apex Court under Article 142 of the
Constitution. It is held as under :-

     “16.     Indubitably, the powers of the High Court under
     Article 226 of the Constitution are wide, but certainly not
     wider than the plenary powers bestowed on this Court under
     Article 142 of the Constitution. Article 142 is a conglomeration
     and repository of the entire judicial powers under the
     Constitution, to do complete justice to the parties. Even while
     exercising that power, this Court is required to bear in mind
     the legislative intent and not to render the statutory provision
     otiose. In a recent decision of a three Judge Bench of this
     Court in Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Limited vs. Gujarat
     Energy Transmission Corporation Limited & Ors., the statutory
     appeal filed before this Court was barred by 71 days and the
     maximum time limit for condoning the delay in terms of
     Section 125 of the Electricity Act, 2003 was only 60 days. In
     other words, the appeal was presented beyond the condonable
     period of 60 days. As a result, this Court could not have
     condoned the delay of 71 days. Notably, while admitting the
     appeal, the Court had condoned the delay in filing the appeal.
     However, at the final hearing of the appeal, an objection
     regarding appeal being barred by limitation was allowed to be
     raised being a jurisdictional issue and while dealing with the
     said objection, the Court referred to the decisions in Singh
     Enterprises vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Jamshedpur &
     Ors., Commissioner of Customs and Central Excise vs. Hongo
     India Private Limited & Anr., Chhattisgarh State Electricity
     Board vs. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission & Ors.
     and Suryachakra Power Corporation Limited vs. Electricity
     Department represented by its Superintending Engineer, Port
     Blair & Ors. and concluded that Section 5 of the Limitation
     Act, 1963 cannot be invoked by the Court for maintaining an
     appeal beyond maximum prescribed period in Section 125 of
     the Electricity Act.”


5.    Thus, the Apex Court in the case of Glaxo Smith Kline
Consumer Health Care Limited (supra) has cautioned that
the provision of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 cannot
be invoked by the Court (High Court) for maintaining an
appeal beyond the maximum period provided in Section 125 of



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    C/SCA/844/2026                             ORDER DATED: 30/01/2026




the Electricity Act, 2003, it has held as under :-

             “15.….. In the subsequent decision in Mafatlal
             Industries Ltd. v. Union of India, this Court went to
             observe that an Act cannot bar and curtail remedy
             under Article 226 or 32 of the Constitution. The
             Court, however added a word of caution and
             expounded that the Constitutional Court would
             certainly take note of the legislative intent
             manifested in the provisions of the Act and would
             exercise its jurisdiction consistent with the
             provisions of the enactment. To put it differently,
             the fact that the High Court has wide jurisdiction
             under Article 226 of the Constitution does not mean
             that it can disregard the substantive provisions of a
             statute and pas orders which can be settled only
             through a mechanism prescribed by the statute.”


6    The Apex Court has also referred to the array of
decisions dealing with provision of Section 29 (2) of the
Limitation Act, 1963 in case of Special Legislation. One of
such which has been rendered in the said decision is in the
case of Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Limited v. Gujarat
Energy Transmission Corporation Limited and Others, (2017)
5 S.C.C. 42, wherein it is held thus :-

    “15. From the aforesaid decisions, it is clear as crystal that
    the Constitution Bench in Supreme Court Bar Assn. v. Union of
    India, (1998) 4 SCC 409, has ruled that there is no conflict of
    opinion in Antulay case [A.R.Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, (1988) 2
    SCC 602] or in Union Carbide Corpn. case [Union Carbide
    Corpn. v. Union of India, (1991) 4 SCC 584] with the principle
    set down in Prem Chand Garg v. Excise Commr., AIR 1963 SC
    996. Be it noted, when there is a statutory command by the
    legislation as regards limitation and there is the postulate that
    delay can be condoned for a further period not exceeding sixty
    days, needless to say, it is based on certain underlined,
    fundamental, general issues of public policy as has been held
    in Union Carbide Corpn. case [Union Carbide Corpn. v. Union
    of India, (1991) 4 SCC 584]. As the pronouncement in
    Chhattisgarh     SEB     v.  Central    Electricity   Regulatory


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    C/SCA/844/2026                             ORDER DATED: 30/01/2026




    Commission, (2010) 5 SCC 23, lays down quite clearly that the
    policy behind the Act emphasising on the constitution of a
    special adjudicatory forum, is meant to expeditiously decide
    the grievances of a person who may be aggrieved by an order
    of the adjudicatory officer or by an appropriate Commission.
    The Act is a special legislation within the meaning of Section
    29(2) of the Limitation Act and, therefore, the prescription
    with regard to the limitation has to be the binding effect and
    the same has to be followed regard being had to its mandatory
    nature. To put it in a different way, the prescription of
    limitation in a case of present nature, when the statute
    commands that this Court may condone the further delay not
    beyond 60 days, it would come within the ambit and sweep of
    the provisions and policy of legislation. It is equivalent to
    Section 3 of the Limitation Act. Therefore, it is uncondonable
    and it cannot be condoned taking recourse to Article 142 of
    the Constitution.”

7    The Apex Court has further held in the case of Glaxo
Smith Kline Consumer Health Care Limited (supra) as
under :-


    “19. We may now revert to the Full Bench decision of the
    Andhra Pradesh High Court in Electronics Corporation of India
    Ltd. (supra), which had adopted the view taken by the Full
    Bench of      the Gujarat High Court in Panoli Intermediate
    (India) Pvt. Ltd. vs. Union of India & Ors.19 and also of the
    Karnataka High Court in Phoenix Plasts Company vs.
    Commissioner of Central Excise (AppealI), Bangalore 20. The
    logic applied in these decisions        proceeds on fallacious
    premise. For, these decisions are premised on the logic that
    provision such as Section 31 of the 1995 Act, cannot curtail
    the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227
    of the Constitution. This approach is faulty. It is not a matter of
    taking away the jurisdiction of the High Court. In a given case,
    the assessee may approach the High Court before the
    statutory period of appeal expires to challenge the assessment
    order by way of writ petition 19 AIR 2015 Guj 97 20 2013
    (298) ELT 481 (Kar.) 33 on the ground that the same is
    without jurisdiction or passed in excess of jurisdiction by
    overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction including in
    flagrant disregard of law and rules of procedure or in violation
    of principles of natural justice, where no procedure is
    specified. The High Court may accede to such a challenge and


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     C/SCA/844/2026                                  ORDER DATED: 30/01/2026




     can also nonsuit the petitioner on the ground that alternative
     efficacious remedy is available and that be invoked by the writ
     petitioner. However, if the writ petitioner choses to approach
     the High Court after expiry of the maximum limitation period
     of 60 days prescribed under Section 31 of the 2005 Act,the
     High Court cannot disregard the statutory period for redressal
     of the grievance and entertain the writ petition of such a party
     as a matter of course. Doing so would be in the teeth of the
     principle underlying the dictum of a three Judge Bench of this
     Court in Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Limited (supra). In
     other words, the fact that the High Court has wide powers,
     does not mean that it would issue a writ which may be
     inconsistent with the legislative intent regarding the
     dispensation explicitly prescribed under Section 31 of the
     2005 Act. That would render the legislative scheme and
     intention behind the stated provision otiose.

                                xxx     xxx    xxx

     22. Suffice it to observe that this decision is on the facts of that
     case and cannot be cited as a precedent in support of an
     argument that the High Court is free to entertain the writ
     petition assailing the assessment order even if filed beyond the
     statutory period of maximum 60 days in filing appeal. The
     remedy of appeal is creature of statute. If the appeal is
     presented by the assessee beyond the extended statutory
     limitation period of 60 days in terms of Section 31 of the 2005
     Act and is, therefore, not entertained, it is incomprehensible as
     to how it would become a case of violation of fundamental
     right, much less statutory or legal right as such.”


8.    Thus, the Apex Court has held that even if the writ
petition is filed after the expiry of maximum prescribed period
of   limitation,      though   alternative     efficacious        remedy       is
available, the High Court cannot disregard the statutory
period for redressal of the grievance and entertain the writ
petition of such a party as a matter of course and doing so
would be in teeth of principle of dictum underlying the dictum
of three Judge’s Bench of the Apex Court in the case of
Gujarat       Energy     Transmission          Corporation            Limited



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      C/SCA/844/2026                              ORDER DATED: 30/01/2026




(supra). The Apex Court has further held that, albeit, the
High Court has wide powers, but the same does not mean that
it would issue a writ which may be inconsistent with the
legislative       intent   regarding     the   dispensation       explicitly
prescribed under Section 31 of the Andhra Pradesh Value
Added Tax Act, 2005 and if the same is done, it would render
the legislative scheme and intention behind the stated
provision otiose. Thus, on the same principles as enunciated
by the Apex Court, we are not inclined to set aside the order
passed by the Appellate Authority and more particularly in
wake of unsatisfactory reason assigned by the petitioner for
delay.


9.     We may also refer to the observations of the Apex Court
in the case M/s. Singh Enterprise vs. Commissioner of Central
Excise,       Jamshedpur & Ors., rendered in Appeal (Civil)
No.5949 of 2007 decided on 14.12.2007 wherein the Apex
Court has refused to accept the reason of belatedly filing of
the appeal on the pretext of lack of experience and closure of
business.


10.    Section 107 (4) of the CGST Act grants discretion to the
Appellate Authority, to allow additional one month in case
he/she is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by
“sufficient cause” from presenting the appeal after 90 days,
but within a period of 30 days. Thus, the discretion of the
Appellate authority ends on the completion of additional 30
days. Such discretion does not extend to powers under Article
226 of the Constitution on India as well.            The statute, thus


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    C/SCA/844/2026                          ORDER DATED: 30/01/2026




provides additional one month to file the appeal, and all the
reasons satisfying the expression “sufficient cause” can be
raised by the appellant. Similar expression is found in section
5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, and Section 29 of Limitation
Act, 1963 which deals with “Savings”, which prevents the
overriding the provisions of specific statutes that have their
own distinct limitation periods. It permits such laws to govern
their own timelines while still leveraging the mechanics of the
Limitation Act. Thus, when an additional period of 30 days is
supplied by the statute over and above the basic period of 90
days, and the same stands exhausted, this Court cannot
exercise powers under Article 226 of the Constitution to dilute
the intention of the legislature and further extend the
limitation by condoning the delay by re-examining the
“sufficient cause”. The reason assigned by the petitioner that
he did not have his login I.d and password and in fact the GST
Portal, the mobile number and e-mail did not belong to the
present petitioner and the accountant’s persons e-mail and
phone were added in the GST Portal while taking the GST
registration appears to be a lame excuse. We clarify, that even
if the appellant had a valid reason and sufficient cause
explaining the delay, this Court cannot condone the delay
beyond 120 days unless the Appellate authority has fell in
error in calculating/mis-understanding the limitation period.
The tax payers are supposed to remain vigilant of all the
proceedings and have to timely verify the orders on the portal.
The taxing statutes operate in very strict time frame, and any
relaxation or easing of limitation period will have cascading
effect on the functioning of the revenue.


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       C/SCA/844/2026                                                     ORDER DATED: 30/01/2026




11.      In view of the settled legal precedents, this Court cannot
exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution
of India condoning the delay. Thus, the writ petition fails and
the same is dismissed.


                                                                                 (A. S. SUPEHIA, J)




                                                                             (PRANAV TRIVEDI,J)
BIMAL /14


Original copy of this order has been signed by the Hon'ble Judges.
Digitally signed by: BIMAL B CHAKRAVARTY(HC01089), PRIVATE SECRETARY, at High Court of Gujarat on 02/02/2026 12:41:11




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