SCINDIA EMPLOYEES UNIONversusSTATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ORS.

                   SCINDIA EMPLOYEES UNION                                    A
                                    v.
              STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ORS.

                              MAY 9, 1996

 [i<.. RAMASWAMY, FAIZAN UDDIN AND G.B. PATTANAIK, JJ.]                       B

      Land Acquisition Act, 1894:

       Ss. 3(d), 4(1), 5A, 6-Acquisition of land on which a work shop was
situated for expansion of Dockyard for defence purposes-Workers' Union        C
challenging Notification under s. 4(1) and declaration published under s. 6
as also the award claiming themselves to be 'person interested'-Held, a
person entitled to compensation or by implication bound by award of com-
pensation or excess conzpensation is an interested person-Petitioner Union
is not a person interested-Notice and hearing of it u/s. 5A(2) , is not D
mandatory-Scope of inquiry u/s. 5A is whether the land sought to be
acquired is needed for a public purpose and whether the land is suitable for
the purpose or is an arable land-Expansion of dockyard for defence purpose
is'public purpose-T7ie very object of compulsory acquisition is in exercise of
the power of eminent domain by the State-So long as public purpose subsists
exercise of power of eminent domain cannot be questioned-Publication of E
declaration u/s. 6 is conclusive.evidence ofpublic purpose-Claims for a"ears
of salary of employees and for their rehabilitation are not gennane for
disposal of this case.

      Words and Phrases: 'Eminent domain', 'person interested' and 'public
p!irpose'-£xplained.          ·                                               F

     CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Special Leave Petition (C)
No. 11043 of 1996.

     From the Judgment and Order dated 19.3.96 of the Bombay High G
Court in A. No. 74/91 in W.P. No. 3305/90, 3:308/89.

       Ms. I11dira Jaisingh, Ms. Arnita Shenoy and Sanjay Parikh for the
Petitioner.

      The following Order of the Court was delivered :                        H
                                  647
    648                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A          We have heard Ms. Indira Jaisingh, learned senior counsel for the
    petitioner. Notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act,
    1894 (1 of 1894) (for short, the 'Act') was published on May 17, 1988
    acquiring land over which the workshop was situated for public purpose,
    namely for the expansion of dockyard for defence purpose. The petitioner
B   had challenged the validity of the said notification and the Jeclaration
    published under Section 6 on May 25, 1989 on diverse grounds. Sub-
    sequently, the award came to be passed on January 15, 1991 and the same
    also came to be challenged by the petitioner-Union. The main controversy
    raised by the petitioner is that they are the 'persons interested' within the
    meaning of Section 3( d) of the Act and in conducting enquiry under
C   Section 5(A), the Land Acquisition Officer had not given any notice under
    sub-section (2) of Section SA. Issuance of notice and hearing of it is
    mandatory and the failure to comply with the mandatory requirement
    vitiates the declaration published under Section 6 of the Act. We find no
    force in the contention.

D
           The only scope of the enquiry under Section SA is whether the land
    sought to be acquired is needed for a public purpose and whether the land
    is suitable for the purpose or is an arable land. Besides these questions,
    the inter se claim of the employer and the workmen of payment of wages
    and extent thereof are alien to the enquiry, sub-section (3) of Section SA
E   makes the scope beyond pale of doubt. If the interested person is entitled
    to compensation or by implication bound by award of compensation or
    excess compensation is an interested person. Therefore, the petitioners
    cannot claim to be persons interested for the purpose of an enquiry under
    Section SA.
F
         Obvious, therefore, the petitioners have contended that the acquisi-
  tion is not for a public purpose; it is a ma/a fide acquisition and a vague
  public purpose of defence and so acquisition is not valid in law. Precedents
  have been copiously cited in the High Court in that behalf. The learned
  single Judge and the Division Bench elaborately considered them and held
G that acquisition for defence purpose is a public purpose. Rodrigue case to
  Tamil Nadu Housi11g Board case settled the controversy holding that
  acquisition for housing development is not a vague purpose. Eitpansion of
  dockyard for defence purpose is a public purpose. Publication of declara-
  tior. under section 6 accords conclusiveness to public purpose. It is for the
H appropriate Government to take a decision whether a particular land is
                        SCINDIA EMPLOYEES UNION v. STATE                          649

->.-
       needed for a public purpose or not and the Court cannot substitute its           A
       opinion on the public purpose to that of the appropriate Government. We
       wholly agree with the view taken by the High Court in that behalf. As
       regards person interested this Court dealt with the controversy from
       Himalayan Tiles to Neively Lignites C01poration case and the Constitution
       Bench decision, per majority. The petitioner, therefore, is not a person
       interested. Notice and hearing of it under _Section 5A(2) is not mandatory.
                                                                                        B

              It is next contended that since the management has gone before the
       appropriate Government under the Industrial Disputes Act for closure of
       the workshop and the Government had refused to give such permission, in
       the absence of such a permissi6n, the acquisition cannot be proceeded c
       with. While the Industrial Disputes Act permits the workshop to be con-
       tinued in operation, the Ad deprives the workmen of that right and,
       therefore, the petitioner is entitled to be heard in that behalf. We find that
 '
       the contention is wholly misconceived and the petitioner has chartered out
       a mistaken course of action. It is true that as a consequence of the
                                                                                      D
       acquisition of land, the workshop was likelf to be closed. The material
       circumstance to be considered is whether the State is entitled to acquire
       the land over which the workshop stands. )'he very object of compulsory
       acquisition is in exercise of the powe~ ·O"f eminent domain by the State
       against the wishes or willingness of the owner 'or person interested in the
       land. Therefore, so long as the public purp6sc subsists the exercise of the E
       power of eminent domain cannot be questioned. Publication of declaration
       under Section 6 is conclusive evidence of public purpose. In view of the
       finding that it is a question of expansion of dockyard for defence purpose,
       it is a public purpose. The Government have exercised the power of
       eminent domain and had got published notification under Section 4(1).
                                                                                      F
       After conducting the enquiry under Section 5A, declaration under Section
       6 was published which is conclusive evidence of public purpose. The
       question of their disabilities due to acqui,ition is collateral to the enquiry
       under Section 5A. Therefore, there was no need to give notice under
       Section 5A(2) nor to hear the petitioners.
                                                                                        G
             It is next contended that the petitioners are entitled to the salary and
       the arrears are getting mounted up. If the proper compensation is not
       determined _and the payment be made, they would stand to lose. We find
~
       no force in the contention. The compensation is required to be determined
       as provided under Section 23(1) of the Act. It is the function of the Land H
    650                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 2S.C.R.

A Acquisition Officer to determine the compensation. If the person is ag-
    grieved of the compensation so determined, procedure of reference under
    Section 18 and a further appeal under Section 54 of the Act have been
    provided for and the aggrieved person is only to pursue the remedies
    provided under the Act.

B         It is then contended that since the petitioner/employees already had
    the order for recovery of the arrears from the owner of the property, they
    are interested persons and that, therefore, they should be heard. It is seen
    that an award has already been made by the Land Acquisition Officer
    under Section 11. If the owner or the person interested refused to receive
C   the compensation, the procedure as contemplated under Section 31 of the
    Act requires to be followed. We are informed that the petitioners have
    approached the Land Acquisition Officer for being impleaded as a party
    interested for compensation in the award enquiry under Section 11 which
    request was rejected. If that be so, appropriate remedy is elsewhere or to
    have the compensation attached and to recover as arrears of revenue. But
D   in an enquiry under Section 5A such a question does not arise.

           It is then contended that on account of the acquisition, the
    petitioners have Jost their jobs and since the Government of India is
    acquiring the property for public purpose, the Government have got a
E   corresponding public duty to rehabilitate the workmen in any appropriate
    industry particularly in Mazgaon Docks Ltd. which also is a public under-
    taking. They require to be rehabilitated therein. That question is not
    germane for the disposal of this case. It may be open to the petitioners to
    pursue the appropriate remedy, if available.

F          The special leave petition is dismissed accordingly.

    R.P.                                                     Petition dismissed.