SEEMA SINGHversusCENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION & ANR.

                        [2018] 3 S.C.R. 355                              355


                          SEEMA SINGH                                    A
                                  v.
       CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION & ANR.
                 (Criminal Appeal No. 569 of 2018)
                          APRIL 18, 2018                                 B
          [A. K. SIKRI AND ASHOK BHUSHAN, JJ.]
       Bail – Grant of – When justified – Appellant’s daughter got
married to respondent no.2 but thereafter went to live at appellant’s
place due to social non-acceptance of the marriage by family
                                                                         C
members of respondent No.2 – Subsequently, Respondent No.2
planned a trip with his wife, to New Delhi/Leh, who died during the
course of their journey as the car they were travelling in allegedly
met with an accident – FIR registered by appellant u/ss. 498-A, 302
and 120-B IPC – State Government transferred the case to CBI –
Respondent no.2 was arrested but granted bail by High Court – On         D
appeal, held: No doubt, the offence with which respondent no.2 is
charged is a serious one, however, that by itself cannot be the ground
to outrightly deny the benefit of bail if there are other overwhelming
circumstances justifying grant of bail – It is not disputed that after
the incident, appellant, other family members as well as some doctors
                                                                         E
who were close to the family had arrived and post mortem was
conducted in their presence but nobody nurtured any suspicion –
FIR was lodged nine days after the incident – Further, evidentiary
value of reports of CRRI, AIIMS, CFSL and IIT relied on by appellant
are yet to be tested, more so, when these reports are given on the
basis of studies undertaken much after the incident – Impugned           F
order is a speaking order – Reasons given by High Court for
granting bail to respondent no.2, cannot be termed as perverse –
Penal Code, 1860 – ss. 498-A, 302 and 120.
      Dismissing the appeals, the Court
      HELD: 1.1 Having regard to the limited scope of                    G
interference with an order granting bail and keeping in mind the
parameters on which such an order can be interdicted, the reasons
given by the High Court to grant bail to respondent No. 2, cannot
be termed as perverse. The High Court kept in mind the relevant
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                                  355
356            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2018] 3 S.C.R.


A     factors while considering the bail application. No doubt, the
      offence with which respondent No. 2 is charged is a serious one.
      That by itself cannot be the ground to outrightly deny the benefit
      of bail if there are other overwhelming circumstances justifying
      grant of bail. The High Court has discussed those factors. No
      doubt, the appellants have extensively referred to the reports of
B
      CRRI, AIIMS, CFSL and IIT. Their evidentiary value is yet to
      be tested, more so, when these reports are given on the basis of
      studies undertaken much after the incident. Report of AIIMS is
      based on the photographs and not on the basis of postmortem of
      the body of the deceased. Moreover, the respondent No. 2 has
C     made a submission that AIIMS has not given any conclusive
      opinion. According to him, same is the position qua other reports
      as well. These reports are not to be examined in depth at this
      stage as that exercise has to be done by the trial court when
      these reports are proved by the makers of the report and they
      are cross-examined thereupon. Moreover, in a criminal case
D
      where respondent No. 2 is charged of committing murder, the
      burden is upon the prosecution to establish, beyond reasonable
      doubts, that the death of appellant’s daughter was the result of a
      murder and that it is respondent No. 2 who committed the said
      murder. His defence about alleged accident is only one of the
E     factors that would be looked into as to whether such a story put
      forth by him is correct or not and the effect thereof. The High
      Court has taken into consideration relevant factors while granting
      the bail to respondent No.2. The impugned order is also a
      speaking order with reasons. [Paras 13, 14][370-G-H; 371-A, E-G]
            1.2 It was not disputed that after the incident, the appellant,
F
      other family members as well as some doctors who were close to
      the family had arrived. Postmortem was conducted in their
      presence. At that stage, nobody nurtured any suspicion. FIR
      was lodged nine days after the incident. The material collected
      by the CBI during investigation is documentary in nature which
G     are given on the basis of photographs produced before them and
      had to be tested during trial. [Para 15] [372-G-H]
            Neeru Yadav v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. (2016)
            15 SCC 422 : [2015] 10 SCR 802; Prasanta Kumar
            Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee & Anr. (2010) 14 SCC 496 :
H           [2010] 12 SCR 1165 – held inapplicable.
SEEMA SINGH v. CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION &                         357
                      ANR.

      Dataram Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. (2018)              A
      3 SCC 22 – relied on.
      Tomaso Bruno and Anr. v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2015)
      7 SCC 178 : [2015] 1 SCR 721; Siddharam Satlingappa
      Mhetra v. State of Maharashtra & Ors. (2011) 1 SCC
      694 : [2010] 15 SCR 201 – referred to.                             B
                       Case Law Reference
[2015] 10 SCR 802                held inapplicable         Para 11
[2010] 12 SCR 1165               held inapplicable         Para 11
[2015] 1 SCR 721                 referred to               Para 12       C
[2010] 15 SCR 201                referred to               Para 12
(2018) 3 SCC 22                  relied on                 Para 14
      CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
569 of 2018.                                                             D
      From the Judgment and Order dated 09.03.2017 of the High Court
of Judicature at Allahabad in Criminal Misc. Bail Application No. 4652
of 2017
                                 WITH
                                                                         E
      Crl. A. No. 570 of 2018.
      Maninder Singh, ASG, Rana Mukherjee, Manan Kumar Mishra,
Sr. Advs., Prashant Bhushan, Ms. Neha Rathi, Pranav Sachdeva,
Ms. Sushma Manchanda, Rajesh Singh Chauhan, Ms. Daisy Hannah,
Ms. Kasturika Kaumudi, Ms. Sreoshi Chatterjee, Ms. Ekta Pradhan,         F
Mukesh Kumar Maroria, Sai Girdhar, Ms. Anjul Dwivedi, Anjani Kumar
Mishra, Prakash Gautam, Advs. for the appearing parties.
      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
      A. K. SIKRI, J. 1. Delay condoned in Diary No. 26339 of 2017.
      2. Leave granted.                                                  G

       3. In the Criminal Appeal arising out of Special Leave Petition
(Crl.) No. 5611 of 2017, the appellant, on whose complaint case is
registered against respondent No.2 herein under Sections 498-A, 302
and 120-B IPC, has challenged order dated March 09, 2017 passed by
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358            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2018] 3 S.C.R.


A     the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, whereby respondent No. 2
      has been enlarged on bail subject to the following conditions:
            “(a) The applicant shall not tamper with the prosecution evidence.
            (b) The applicant shall not pressurize the prosecution witnesses.
B           (c) The applicant shall appear on the date fixed by the trial court.
            (d) The applicant shall not commit an offence similar to the offence
            of which he is accused, or suspected of the commission, of which
            he is suspected.
            (e) The applicant shall not directly or indirectly make any
C           inducement, threat or promise to any person acquainted with the
            facts of the case so as to dissuade him from disclosing such facts
            to the Court or to any police officer or tamper with the evidence.
                In case of default of any of the conditions enumerated above,
            it would be open to the opposite party to approach the Court
D           concerned for cancellation of bail.
                However, it is directed that the aforesaid case pending before
            the court below be decided expeditiously, if possible within a period
            of one year strictly, on day to day basis in accordance with Section
            309 Cr.P.C. and also in view of principle as has been laid down in
E           the recent judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of
            Vinod Kumar v. State of Punjab; 2015 (3) SCC 220 if there is no
            legal impediment.
                It is made clear that in case, the witnesses are not appearing
            before the court concerned, liberty is being given to the concerned
F           court to take necessary coercive measures in accordance with
            law for ensuring the presence of the witnesses.
               Apart from the aforesaid conditions, it is further provided that
            the applicant shall surrender his passport within a period of two
            weeks’ from the date of his release before the concerned court
G           and shall co-operate with the investigation. It is further provided
            that the applicant shall present himself before the court concerned
            on each and every date and will not seek any adjournment
            whatsoever and in case any adjournment is sought on any
            exceptional circumstances, the court concerned shall specify the

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SEEMA SINGH v. CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION &                                359
                ANR. [A. K. SIKRI, J.]

      reasons in the order itself while granting such adjournment. It is        A
      also provided that in case, there is any change of address, the
      concerned S.S.P. and the Court shall be immediately informed.
            Liberty is also being given to the learned counsel for the
      complainant to file a bail cancellation application before the court
      concerned itself, in case, there is any violation on the part of the      B
      applicant of the aforesaid conditions.”
       4. Other appeal is preferred by the Central Bureau of Investigation
(CBI) for the same relief as CBI also feels aggrieved by the same very
order granting bail to respondent No. 2, who is facing trial in the aforesaid
case.                                                                           C
       5. The gravamen of the charge against respondent No. 2 is that
he has murdered his wife Smt. Sara Singh. The allegations in the
chargesheet are that respondent No. 2 got married to the deceased at
Arya Samaj Mandir, Lucknow on July 27, 2013 where after the deceased
went to live at her mother’s place due to the social non-acceptance of          D
their marriage by the family members of respondent No. 2. She used to
live at her mother’s place when suddenly respondent No. 2 started
behaving cordially with his wife and planned a trip in July, 2015 along
with her to New Delhi/Leh. During the course of their journey, the
Maruti Swift Car allegedly met with an accident on July 09, 2015 near
Sirsaganj, District Firozabad. It was not an accident but a pre-planned         E
plot to get rid of the deceased and subsequently a FIR dated July 18,
2015 was registered by the appellant herein who is the mother of the
deceased. Consequently the Case Crime No. 387 of 2015 under Sections
498-A, 302 and 120-B IPC, Police Station Sirsaganj, District Firozabad
was registered. The State Government transferred the case to the CBI            F
vide notification issued on July 24, 2015 and another notification was
issued by the Department of Personnel & Training, Government of India,
New Delhi on October 14, 2015. In pursuance of the above notifications,
the CBI registered a case bearing No. RC No. 6(S)/2015/ SCU.V/SC.II/
CBI dated October 19, 2015 and accordingly the CBI commenced the
investigation of the aforesaid case on October 19, 2015. Subsequently,          G
on the basis of evidence collected by the CBI, respondent No. 2 was
arrested on November 25, 2016. Thereafter, respondent No. 2 filed his
bail application before the Special Judicial Magistrate, CBI, Ghaziabad
which was rejected vide order dated December 15, 2016. Another bail
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360            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2018] 3 S.C.R.


A     application was rejected vide order dated January 13, 2017. Eventually
      the bail application was filed before the High Court of Judicature at
      Allahabad which has been allowed vide impugned order dated March
      09, 2017 and bail is granted.
             6. It becomes clear from the above that respondent No. 2 maintains
B     that incident in question was merely an accident in which his wife died.
      On the other hand, the prosecution alleges that in reality, respondent No.
      2 murdered his wife and thereafter stage managed the said accident in
      order to project that Sara Singh died in the said accident.
             7. According to respondent No.2, when their car met with an
C     accident on July 09, 2015 which was being driven by him and his wife
      Sara Singh was also sitting therein, she got badly injured and while she
      was taken to the hospital, she expired and was declared brought dead by
      the District Hospital, Ferozabad. Postmortem of the body was conducted
      and as per the report, the cause of death was due to the injuries received
      in the said accident. Sara Singh was cremated thereafter. However,
D     on July 18, 2015, the FIR was lodged doubting the postmortem report
      and alleging that Sara Singh was murdered. After the investigation of
      the case was transferred to the CBI, CBI has obtained the report from
      Central Road Research Institute (CRRI), report of the Medical Board
      constituted by the All India Institute of Medical Sciences (AIIMS), New
E     Delhi, report from Central Forensic Science Laboratory (CFSL), New
      Delhi as well as from Indian Institute of Technology (IIT). On the basis
      of these reports and further investigation, chargesheet was prepared
      and submitted to the CBI court, Ferozabad.
             8. Respondent No. 2 was arrested on November 25, 2016 and
F     was granted bail on March 09, 2017. He, thus, remained in custody for
      three and half months.
              9. The case set up by respondent No. 2 in support of his plea for
      bail in the High Court was that the accused and his wife had planned a
      trip to Leh and when they reached Ferozabad, the accused found that a
G     small school girl was coming on her bicycle from the other side. In
      order to save her, the accused had to apply sudden brakes on his vehicle
      which was being driven at a high speed and diverted the stearing as a
      result of which the car went out of control and fell in a ditch alongside
      road. The result was that the car skidded and over-turned. It was also
      pleaded that there were no eye-witnesses of the incident and no evidence
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SEEMA SINGH v. CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION &                             361
                ANR. [A. K. SIKRI, J.]

whatsoever which could show the participation of respondent No. 2 as         A
per the role assiged by the CBI. The prosecution, while opposing the
bail, had drawn the attention to the reports of CRRI, AIIMS, CFSL and
IIT. On the basis of these reports, it was contended that there was
clear evidence to show that it was not an accident as narrated by
respondent No. 2 and, therefore, it was the result of a pre-planned
                                                                             B
murder. Referring to the report of the AIIMS, it was argued that Sara
Singh was initially strangulated and thereafter crime scene was created
in which the accident became the culminating point. It was also
emphasised that respondent No. 2 had a criminal history of three cases.
      10. The order of the High Court shows that in coming to the
conclusion that respondent No. 2 was entitled to bail, pending trial,        C
following factors weighed with it:
      (a) Videography of the postmortem was not done.
       (b) After the alleged accident, respondent No. 2 had informed
about the same to the family members of the deceased. On receiving           D
this information, mother of the deceased had arrived and postmortem
was done in her presence and other family members. At that time, certain
doctors who were close and well-known to the family of the deceased
were also present at the spot and they had taken certain photographs of
the body before the postmortem was done. At that time, none of these
persons raised any objection with regard to the videography of the           E
postmortem not being done. They did not demand second postmortem
either in case they had suspicion.
      (c) Insofar as the report of AIIMS is concerned, it is solely based
on photographs which were provided to the panel of doctors and, thus,
doctors never conducted any postmortem on the body of the deceased.          F
      (d) There is no eye-witness account which may show that the girl
was either tortured or threatened on the way or she was injured, though
vague allegations have been made in this behalf but without any
supporting documents.
                                                                             G
       (e) After investigation, the chargesheet had been filed by the CBI.
The main crux of the chargesheet is only the documentary evidence and
not any eye-witness account. Documentary evidence is already available
with the CBI. Therefore, there is no possible apprehension of respondent
No. 2 in either hampering with the investigation or tampering with the
evidence or threatening anybody in case he is released on bail.              H
362               SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2018] 3 S.C.R.


A              (f) There is no likelihood of accused absconding as well.
              11. Mr. Prashant Bhushan, who argued on behalf of the
      complainant, and Mr. Maninder Singh, learned Additional Solicitor
      General, who argued for CBI, read out extensively from the aforesaid
      reports of the expert bodies, namely, CRRI, AIIMS, CFSL and IIT. It
B     was submitted by them that the report of the CRRI clearly depicted that
      there was no likelihood of any such accident as narrated by respondent
      No. 2 having regard to the condition of the car and the place of accident.
      It was, thus, a make-belief story putforth by the accused. From the
      report submitted by the doctors from the AIIMS, it was pointed out that
      cause of death was fatal pressure over neck by ligature and this would
C     indicate Sara Singh had not died in the accident but was strangulated to
      death by the accused. Reports of CFSL and IIT, likewise, were read
      out to support the aforesaid case put up by the prosecution, namely,
      alleged accident as projected by respondent No. 2 could not have
      happened and, therefore, he was making a false case that Sara Singh
D     had died in an accident. It was also argued that the defence set up by
      respondent No. 2 was false inasmuch as both were sitting in the said car
      when the alleged incident took place and how it was possible that insofar
      as one passenger (namely, Sara Singh) is concerned, she died and the
      other one (namely, respondent No. 2) did not suffer even minor injuries.
      It was, thus, pleaded that when there was nothing to show that
E     chargesheet was false and it has also come on record that accused is a
      history-sheeter and belongs to influential political family, bail should not
      have been granted by the High Court. Mr. Bhushan also referred to the
      following judgments of this Court in support of his contention that it was
      a fit case for setting aside the order of the High Court granting bail:
F              (i) Neeru Yadav v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr.1
                  “15. This being the position of law, it is clear as cloudless sky
                  that the High Court has totally ignored the criminal antecedents
                  of the accused. What has weighed with the High Court is the
                  doctrine of parity. A history-sheeter involved in the nature of
G                 crimes which we have reproduced hereinabove, are not minor
                  offences so that he is not to be retained in custody, but the
                  crimes are of heinous nature and such crimes, by no stretch of
                  imagination, can be regarded as jejune. Such cases do create
                  a thunder and lightning having the effect potentiality of torrential
      1
H         (2016) 15 SCC 422
    SEEMA SINGH v. CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION &                                363
                    ANR. [A. K. SIKRI, J.]

            rain in an analytical mind. The law expects the judiciary to be         A
            alert while admitting these kind of accused persons to be at
            large and, therefore, the emphasis is on exercise of discretion
            judiciously and not in a whimsical manner.
                   xxx                   xxx                   xxx
            18. Before parting with the case, we may repeat with profit             B
            that it is not an appeal for cancellation of bail as the cancellation
            is not sought because of supervening circumstances. The
            annulment of the order passed by the High Court is sought as
            many relevant factors have not been taken into consideration
            which includes the criminal antecedents of the accused and
                                                                                    C
            that makes the order a deviant one. Therefore, the inevitable
            result is the lancination of the impugned order [Budhpal v.
            State of U.P., 2014 SCC OnLine All 14815].”
         (ii) Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee & Anr.2
            “9. We are of the opinion that the impugned order is clearly            D
            unsustainable. It is trite that this Court does not, normally,
            interfere with an order passed by the High Court granting or
            rejecting bail to the accused. However, it is equally incumbent
            upon the High Court to exercise its discretion judiciously,
            cautiously and strictly in compliance with the basic principles
            laid down in a plethora of decisions of this Court on the point.        E
            It is well settled that, among other circumstances, the factors
            to be borne in mind while considering an application for bail
            are:
              (i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground to
                  believe that the accused had committed the offence;               F

              (ii) nature and gravity of the accusation;
              (iii) severity of the punishment in the event of conviction;
              (iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if released
                  on bail;                                                          G
              (v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing of the
                  accused;
              (vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated;
2
    (2010) 14 SCC 496                                                               H
364      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2018] 3 S.C.R.


A         (vii)reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being
              influenced; and
          (viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by grant of
                 bail.
      [See State of U.P. v. Amarmani Tripathi (SCC p.31, para 18),
B     Prahlad Singh Bhati v. NCT of Delhi, and Ram Govind
      Upadhyay v. Sudarshal Singh.]
      10. It is manifest that if the High Court does not advert to these
      relevant considerations and mechanically grants bail, the said order
      would suffer from the vice of non-application of mind, rendering
C     it to be illegal. In Masroor, a Division Bench of this Court, of
      which one of us (D.K. Jain, J.) was a member, observed as
      follows: (SCC p. 290, para 13)
         “13...Though at the stage of granting bail an elaborate
         examination of evidence and detailed reasons touching the merit
D        of the case, which may prejudice the accused, should be
         avoided, but there is a need to indicate in such order reasons
         for prima facie concluding why bail was being granted
         particularly where the accused is charged of having committed
         a serious office.”
E        (See also State of Maharashtra v. Ritesh, Panchanan Mishra
         v. Digambar Mishra, Vijay Kumar v. Narendra and Anwari
         Begum v. Sher Mohammad.)
      11. We are constrained to observe that in the instant case, while
      dealing with the application of the accused for grant of bail, the
F     High Court completely lost sight of the basic principles enumerated
      above. The accused, in the present case, is alleged to have
      committed a heinous crime of killing an old helpless lady by
      strangulation. He was seen coming out of the victim’s house by
      a neighbour around the time of the alleged occurrence, giving rise
      to a reasonable belief that he had committed the murder. We
G
      feel that under the given circumstances, it was not the stage at
      which bail under Section 439 of the Code should have been granted
      to the accused, more so, when even charges have not yet been
      framed.”

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    SEEMA SINGH v. CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION &                             365
                    ANR. [A. K. SIKRI, J.]

       12. Mr. Manan Kumar Mishra, learned senior counsel appearing              A
for the accused, strongly refuted the aforesaid submissions. He referred
to the same very reports of the expert bodies and submitted that these
very reports when read minutely, would indicate that none of these
reports have given any final and conclusive opinion. He laid much
stress on the fact that these reports were based on postmortem of the
                                                                                 B
‘photographs’ of deceased and not of the ‘body of the deceased’ and,
therefore, could not be given much credence in any case. He also
pointed out that insofar as opinion of doctors of AIIMS is concerned,
while assigning the cause of death, the Medical Board itself had cautioned
that same should be corroborated with the circumstantial evidence of
the investigation in this case. On that basis, he reiterated his submissions     C
which were accepted by the High Court, as mentioned above, and argued
that the High Court had rightly exercised its discretion in granting bail to
respondent No. 2. He further argued that once such a discretion is
exercised, unless it is shown that the same is perverse, the Court should
not interfere with the same. In support, he relied upon the judgments of
                                                                                 D
this Court in:
       (i) Tomaso Bruno and Anr. v. State of Uttar Pradesh3:
            “36. In the second post-mortem report, Ext. Ka-11, substantially
            there were no changes except signs of decomposition. The
            second post-mortem report reiterates that cause of death is
                                                                                 E
            “asphyxia as a result of strangulation”. According to the medical
            opinion, a hard blunt substance appears to have been used to
            cause strangulation leading to the death on account of asphyxia.
            However, no such hard or blunt substance was found or seized
            from the room. Doctors have not found any physical signs of
            internal injuries viz. any extravasation of blood in the tissue or   F
            any laceration in the underlying muscles.
            37. Considering the post-mortem reports, Exts. Ka-10 and Ka-
            11 and the evidence of PWs 10 and 11, in our view, reasonable
            doubts arise as to the cause of death due to asphyxia as a
            result of strangulation. Let us consider the injuries found on       G
            the body of deceased Francesco Montis vis-à-vis symptoms
            of strangulation. As per Modi’s Medical Jurisprudence And
            Toxicology, 24th Edn. 2011, p. 453 the symptoms of
            strangulation are stated as under:
3
    (2015) 7 SCC 178                                                             H
366   SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2018] 3 S.C.R.


A        “(b)Appearances due to Asphyxia.—The face is puffy
         and cyanosed, and marked with petechiae. The eyes are
         prominent and open. In some cases, they may be closed.
         The conjunctivae are congested and the pupils are dilated.
         Petechiae are seen in the eyelids and the conjunctivae. The
         lips are blue. Bloody foam escapes from the mouth and
B
         nostrils, and sometimes, pure blood issues from the mouth,
         nose and ears, especially if great violence has been used.
         The tongue is often swollen, bruised, protruding and dark in
         colour, showing patches of extravasation and occasionally
         bitten by the teeth. There may be evidence of bruising at
C        the back of the neck. The hands are usually clenched. The
         genital organs may be congested and there may be discharge
         of urine, faeces and seminal fluid.
         (ii) Internal Appearance.—The neck and its structures
         should be examined after removing the brain and the chest
D        organs, thus allowing blood to drain from the neck to the
         blood vessels. There is extravasation of blood into the sub-
         cutaneous tissues under the ligature mark or finger marks,
         as well as in the adjacent muscles of the neck, which are
         usually lacerated. Sometimes, there is laceration of the
         sheath of the carotid arteries, as also their internal coats
E        with effusion of blood into their walls. The cornua of the
         hyoid bone may be fractured also the superior cornua of
         thyroid cartilage but fracture of the cervical vertebrae is
         extremely rare. These should be carefully dissected in situ
         as they are difficult to distinguish from dissection artefacts
F        in the neck.”
                                                 (emphasis in original)
                  xxx             xxx              xxx
      40. The courts, normally would look at expert evidence with a
      greater sense of acceptability, but it is equally true that the
G
      courts are not absolutely guided by the report of the experts,
      especially if such reports are perfunctory and unsustainable.
      We agree that the purpose of an expert opinion is primarily to
      assist the court in arriving at a final conclusion but such report

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    SEEMA SINGH v. CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION &                             367
                    ANR. [A. K. SIKRI, J.]

            is not a conclusive one. This Court is expected to analyse the       A
            report, read it in conjunction with the other evidence on record
            and then form its final opinion as to whether such report is
            worthy of reliance or not. As discussed earlier, serious doubts
            arise about the cause of death stated in the post-mortem
            reports.”
                                                                                 B
         (ii) Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetra v. State of Maharashtra
         & Ors.4:
         “87. The complaint filed against the accused needs to be thoroughly
         examined including the aspect whether the complainant has filed
         a false or frivolous complaint on earlier occasion. The court should    C
         also examine the fact whether there is any family dispute between
         the accused and the complainant and the complainant must be
         clearly told that if the complaint is found to be false or frivolous,
         then strict action will be taken against him in accordance with
         law. If the connivance between the complainant and the
         investigating officer is established then action be taken against       D
         the investigating officer in accordance with law.
         88. The gravity of charge and the exact role of the accused must
         be properly comprehended. Before arrest, the arresting officer
         must record the valid reasons which have led to the arrest of the
         accused in the case diary. In exceptional cases the reasons could       E
         be recorded immediately after the arrest, so that while dealing
         with the bail application, the remarks and observations of the
         arresting officer can also be properly evaluated by the court.
         89. It is imperative for the courts to carefully and with meticulous
         precision evaluate the facts of the case. The discretion must be        F
         exercised on the basis of the available material and the facts of
         the particular case. In cases where the court is of the considered
         view that the accused has joined investigation and he is fully
         cooperating with the investigating agency and is not likely to
         abscond, in that event, custodial interrogation should be avoided.      G
                       xxx                 xxx                     xxx
         115. In Joginder Kumar case [(1994) 4 SCC 260 : 1994 SCC
         (Cri) 1172] a three-Judge Bench of this Court has referred to the
4
    (2011) 1 SCC 694
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368      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2018] 3 S.C.R.


A     3rd Report of the National Police Commission, in which it is
      mentioned that the quality of arrests by the police in India mentioned
      the power of arrest as one of the chief sources of corruption in
      the police. The Report suggested that, by and large, nearly 60%
      of the arrests were either unnecessary or unjustified and that such
      unjustified police action accounted for 43.2% of the expenditure
B
      of the jails.
      116. Personal liberty is a very precious fundamental right and it
      should be curtailed only when it becomes imperative according to
      the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case.
C     117. In case, the State considers the following suggestions in proper
      perspective then perhaps it may not be necessary to curtail the
      personal liberty of the accused in a routine manner. These
      suggestions are only illustrative and not exhaustive:
      (1) Direct the accused to join the investigation and only when the
D     accused does not cooperate with the investigating agency, then
      only the accused be arrested.
      (2) Seize either the passport or such other related documents,
      such as, the title deeds of properties or the fixed deposit receipts/
      share certificates of the accused.
E     (3) Direct the accused to execute bonds.
      (4) The accused may be directed to furnish sureties of a number
      of persons which according to the prosecution are necessary in
      view of the facts of the particular case.
      (5) The accused be directed to furnish undertaking that he would
F
      not visit the place where the witnesses reside so that the possibility
      of tampering of evidence or otherwise influencing the course of
      justice can be avoided.
      (6) Bank accounts be frozen for small duration during the
      investigation.
G
      118. In case the arrest is imperative, according to the facts of the
      case, in that event, the arresting officer must clearly record the
      reasons for the arrest of the accused before the arrest in the case
      diary, but in exceptional cases where it becomes imperative to

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SEEMA SINGH v. CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION &                             369
                ANR. [A. K. SIKRI, J.]

   arrest the accused immediately, the reasons be recorded in the            A
   case diary immediately after the arrest is made without loss of
   any time so that the court has an opportunity to properly consider
   the case for grant or refusal of bail in the light of reasons recorded
   by the arresting officer.
   119. Exercise of jurisdiction under Section 438 CrPC is an                B
   extremely important judicial function of a Judge and must be
   entrusted to judicial officers with some experience and good track
   record. Both the individual and society have vital interest in orders
   passed by the courts in anticipatory bail applications.
   120. It is imperative for the High Courts through its judicial            C
   academies to periodically organise workshops, symposiums,
   seminars and lectures by the experts to sensitise judicial officers,
   police officers and investigating officers so that they can properly
   comprehend the importance of personal liberty vis-à-vis social
   interests. They must learn to maintain fine balance between the
   personal liberty and the social interests.                                D

   121. The performance of the judicial officers must be periodically
   evaluated on the basis of the cases decided by them. In case,
   they have not been able to maintain balance between personal
   liberty and societal interests, the lacunae must be pointed out to
   them and they may be asked to take corrective measures in future.         E
   Ultimately, the entire discretion of grant or refusal of bail has to
   be left to the judicial officers and all concerned must ensure that
   grant or refusal of bail is considered basically on the facts and
   circumstances of each case.
   122. In our considered view, the Constitution Bench in Sibbia             F
   case [(1980) 2 SCC 565 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 465] has
   comprehensively dealt with almost all aspects of the concept of
   anticipatory bail under Section 438 CrPC. A number of judgments
   have been referred to by the learned counsel for the parties
   consisting of Benches of smaller strength where the Courts have           G
   observed that the anticipatory bail should be of limited duration
   only and ordinarily on expiry of that duration or standard duration,
   the court granting the anticipatory bail should leave it to the regular
   court to deal with the matter. This view is clearly contrary to the

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370            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2018] 3 S.C.R.


A           view taken by the Constitution Bench in Sibbia case [(1980) 2
            SCC 565 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 465] . In the preceding para, it is
            clearly spelt out that no limitation has been envisaged by the
            legislature under Section 438 CrPC. The Constitution Bench has
            aptly observed that “we see no valid reason for rewriting Section
            438 with a view, not to expanding the scope and ambit of the
B
            discretion conferred on the High Court or the Court of Session
            but, for the purpose of limiting it”.
            123. In view of the clear declaration of law laid down by the
            Constitution Bench in Sibbia case [(1980) 2 SCC 565 : 1980 SCC
            (Cri) 465] , it would not be proper to limit the life of anticipatory
C           bail. When the Court observed that the anticipatory bail is for
            limited duration and thereafter the accused should apply to the
            regular court for bail, that means the life of Section 438 CrPC
            would come to an end after that limited duration. This limitation
            has not been envisaged by the legislature. The Constitution Bench
D           in Sibbia case [(1980) 2 SCC 565 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 465] clearly
            observed that it is not necessary to rewrite Section 438 CrPC.
            Therefore, in view of the clear declaration of the law by the
            Constitution Bench, the life of the order under Section 438 CrPC
            granting bail cannot be curtailed.
E           124. The ratio of the judgment of the Constitution Bench in Sibbia
            case [(1980) 2 SCC 565 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 465] perhaps was not
            brought to the notice of Their Lordships who had decided the
            cases of Salauddin Abdulsamad Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra
            [(1996) 1 SCC 667 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 198] , K.L. Verma v. State
            [(1998) 9 SCC 348 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 1031] , Adri Dharan Das v.
F           State of W.B. [(2005) 4 SCC 303 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 933] and
            Sunita Devi v. State of Bihar [(2005) 1 SCC 608 : 2005 SCC
            (Cri) 435] .”
             13. We have deliberated on the respective arguments in conjunction
      with the record of the case. Since we are concerned with the order of
G     the High Court whereby respondent No. 2 has been granted bail, having
      regard to the limited scope of interference with such an order and keeping
      in mind the parameters on which such an order can be interdicted, we
      are of the view that the reasons given by the High Court to grant bail to

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    SEEMA SINGH v. CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION &                           371
                    ANR. [A. K. SIKRI, J.]

respondent No. 2, cannot be termed as perverse. It can be discerned            A
from the reading of the impugned order, from which we have culled out
circumstances, that the High Court kept in mind the relevant factors
while considering the bail application. No doubt, the offence with which
respondent No. 2 is charged is a serious one. That by itself cannot be
the ground to outrightly deny the benefit of bail if there are other
                                                                               B
overwhelming circumstances justifying grant of bail. The High Court
has discussed those factors which are reproduced above in para 9. No
doubt, the counsel for the appellants have extensively referred to the
reports of CRRI, AIIMS, CFSL and IIT. Their evidentiary value is yet
to be tested, more so, when these reports are given on the basis of
studies undertaken much after the incident. Report of AIIMS is based           C
on the photographs and not on the basis of postmortem of the body of
the deceased. Moreover, the learned counsel for respondent No. 2 has
made a submission that AIIMS has not given any conclusive opinion.
According to him, same is the position qua other reports as well. We are
not supposed to examine these reports in depth at this stage as that
                                                                               D
exercise has to be done by the trial court when these reports are proved
by the makers of the report and they are cross-examined thereupon.
Moreover, in a criminal case where respondent No. 2 is charged of
committing murder, the burden is upon the prosecution to establish, beyond
reasonable doubts, that the death of Sara Singh was the result of a murder
and that it is respondent No. 2 who committed the said murder. His             E
defence about alleged accident is only one of the factors that would be
looked into as to whether such a story putforth by him is correct or not
and the effect thereof. We have to keep in mind that, at this juncture,
the limited question is as to whether the High Court is rightly used its
discretion to grant the bail.
                                                                               F
       14. We are of the opinon that the High Court has taken into
consideration relevant factors while granting the bail to respondent No.2.
The impugned order is also a speaking order with reasons that need to
be given in brief while deciding as to whether the undertrial is entitled to
bail or not. Therefore, the judgment cited by the learned counsel for the
complainant would not apply to the facts of this case. We may refer to         G
a recent judgment dated February 06, 2018 in the case of Dataram
Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr.5 wherein this Court (speaking
through Madan B. Lokur, J.) made the following pertinent observations:

5
    (2018) 3 SCC 22                                                            H
372            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2018] 3 S.C.R.


A           “2. A fundamental postulate of criminal jurisprudence is the
            presumption of innocence, meaning thereby that a person is believed
            to be innocent until found guilty. However, there are instances in
            our criminal law where a reverse onus has been placed on an
            accused with regard to some specific offences but that is another
            matter and does not detract from the fundamental postulate in
B
            respect of other offences. Yet another important facet of our
            criminal jurisprudence is that the grant of bail is the general rule
            and putting a person in jail or in a prison or in a correction home
            (whichever expression one may wish to use) is an exception.
            Unfortunately, some of these basic principles appear to have been
C           lost sight of with the result that more and more persons are being
            incarcerated and for longer periods. This does not do any good to
            our criminal jurisprudence or to our society.
            3. There is no doubt that the grant or denial of bail is entirely the
            discretion of the judge considering a case but even so, the exercise
D           of judicial discretion has been circumscribed by a large number of
            decisions rendered by this Court and by every High Court in the
            country. Yet, occasionally there is a necessity to introspect whether
            denying bail to an accused person is the right thing to do on the
            facts and in the circumstances of a case.
E                    xxx                    xxx                    xxx
            7. However, we should not be understood to mean that bail should
            be granted in every case. The grant or refusal of bail is entirely
            within the discretion of the judge hearing the matter and though
            that discretion is unfettered, it must be exercised judiciously and
F           in a humane manner and compassionately. Also, conditions for
            the grant of bail ought not to be so strict as to be incapable of
            compliance, thereby making the grant of bail illusory.”
             15. It has not been disputed that after the incident in which Sara
      Singh died, mother of the deceased, other family members as well as
G     some doctors who were close to the family had arrived. Postmortem
      was conducted in their presence. At that stage, nobody nurtured any
      suspicion. FIR was lodged nine days after the incident. The material
      collected by the CBI during investigation is documentary in nature which
      are given on the basis of photographs produced before them and had to
      be tested during trial. Insofar as allegations of threat are concerned, it
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SEEMA SINGH v. CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION &                                  373
                ANR. [A. K. SIKRI, J.]

was argued by Mr. Manan that the police examined the same and found               A
to be false. In any case, the High Court has given liberty to the prosecution
to apply for cancellation of bail in case any such threat is extended or
there is any violation on the part of respondent No. 2 to any of the
conditions of the bail. The High Court has imposed strict conditions of
bail keeping in view the interest of the prosecution as well.
                                                                                  B
       16. We, therefore, do not find any merit in these appeals which
are accordingly dismissed.


Divya Pandey                                                 Appeals dismissed.
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