Supreme Court of India
SEETHAKATHI TRUST MADRASversusKRISHNAVENI
- Citation
- 2022 INSC 48
- Decided
- 17 January 2022
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- SANJAY KISHAN KAUL
Holding
The decree of specific performance was obtained behind the backs of bona‑fide purchasers and could not be enforced, and the High Court erred in interfering with the lower courts' findings, leading to the appeals being allowed.
Summary
The dispute concerned a 0.08‑cent portion of a 120‑acre land parcel in Chengalpattu, where the appellant Seethakathi Trust claimed title based on a series of registered sale deeds dating back to 1963, while the respondent Krishnaveni sought specific performance of an earlier agreement and claimed possession of the same land. The respondent had obtained a decree for specific performance and execution of a sale deed in 1981, but the Trust argued that the land had already been transferred to bona‑fide purchasers (Niraja Devi and subsequent buyers) before the suit was filed. The Supreme Court examined whether a substantial question of law was properly framed under Section 100 of the CPC and whether the decree could be enforced against a transferee for value under Section 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act. It held that the respondent was fully aware of the prior registered transactions and that the decree was obtained behind the backs of bona‑fide purchasers, rendering it unenforceable. The Court also noted the respondent’s failure to appear in court and the manager’s unauthorized testimony, leading to an inference of estoppel. Consequently, the High Court’s interference with the lower courts’ findings was unwarranted, and the appeals were allowed, setting aside the High Court judgment and reinstating the dismissal of the respondent’s suit.
Issues considered
- Whether a substantial question of law was framed under Section 100 of the CPC before deciding the appeal.
- Whether the decree of specific performance obtained by the respondent is vitiated by the prior existence of a bona‑fide purchaser under Section 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act.
- Whether the respondent’s failure to depose and the manager’s unauthorized testimony give rise to estoppel and adverse inference.
- Whether the appellant’s title derived from registered deeds and adverse possession can be upheld despite the execution proceedings.
- Whether the High Court erred in re‑appreciating evidence and disturbing the concurrent findings of the trial and first appellate courts.
Legislation cited
Subjects
Specific performanceSection 19(b) of Specific Relief ActBona‑fide purchaserAdverse possessionSection 100 CPCFraming of substantial question of lawEstoppelExecution proceedingsLand registration
Judgment
322 [2022]REPORTS
SUPREME COURT 1 S.C.R. 322 [2022] 1 S.C.R.
A SEETHAKATHI TRUST MADRAS
v.
KRISHNAVENI
(Civil Appeal Nos. 5384-5385 of 2014)
B JANUARY 17, 2022
[SANJAY KISHAN KAUL AND M. M. SUNDRESH, JJ.]
Specific Relief Act, 1963: s.19(b) – A previous suit filed by
respondent for specific performance of agreement of sale of land
C was decreed and pursuant thereto, execution proceedings were
commenced – Surveyor was appointed by executing court to
demarcate 50 acres of land – Executing court executed sale deed –
Respondent filed suit against appellant praying for declaration of
title and delivery in her favour to the extent of 0.08 cents of the
land on the ground that the respondent took possession of 50 acres
D by way of execution proceedings and that the appellant had
trespassed over 0.08 cents of the same – Respondent did not appear
in witness box and manager who appeared on behalf of respondent
deposed that he was not authorised by respondent to conduct the
case – The manager deposed that he was aware of the sale of the
E suit land in favour of third person – Subsequent purchaser was not
impleaded – Suit was dismissed by trial court and first appellate
court – High Court held that courts below did not appreciate the
evidence particularly with respect to the execution proceedings –
On appeal, held: Respondent was fully aware of the prior registered
transaction in respect of the same property originally in favour of
F ‘N’ – This was as per the deposition of her manager – In such a
scenario, it was not possible to accept that a decree could have
been obtained behind the back of a bona fide purchaser, more so
when the transaction had taken place prior to the institution of the
suit for specific performance – The second vital aspect was that the
Respondent did not even step into the witness box to depose to the
G
facts – It was the manager who stepped into the witness box that
too without producing any proper authorisation – What he deposed
in a way ran contrary to the interest of the Respondent as it was
accepted that there was knowledge of the transaction with respect
to the same land between third parties and yet the Respondent chose
H
322
SEETHAKATHI TRUST MADRAS v. KRISHNAVENI 323
not to implead the purchasers as parties to the suit – Thus, the A
endeavour was to obtain a decree at the back of the real owners
and that is the reason, at least, in the execution proceedings that
the original vendor did not even come forward and the sale deed
had to be executed through the process of the Court – The case of
‘N’ and the subsequent purchasers including appellant fell within
B
the exception set out in s.19(b) being transferees who had paid
money in good faith and without notice of the original contract –
High Court ought not to have interfered with the concurrent findings
of the trial court and the first appellate court.
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908: s.100 – If the question of law
is not framed at the stage of admission, it should be framed at least C
before deciding the case.
Allowing the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1. The question of law ought to have been framed
under section 100 of CPC. Even if the question of law had not D
been framed at the stage of admission, at least before deciding
the case the said question of law ought to have been framed.
[Para 22][331-D-E]
Surat Singh (Dead) v. Siri Bhagwan and Ors. (2018) 4
SCC 562 : [2018] 4 SCC 562; Vidyadhar v. Manikrao E
and Anr. (1999) 3 SCC 573 : [1999] 1 SCR 1168 –
relied on.
Man Kaur (Dead) by LRs v. Hartar Singh Sangha (2010)
10 SCC 512 : [2010] 12 SCR 515; Lachhman Dass v.
Jagat Ram and Ors. (2007) 10 SCC 448 : [2007] 2 F
SCR 980 – referred to.
2. The Respondent was fully aware of the prior registered
transaction in respect of the same property originally in favour of
Niraja Devi. This is as per the deposition of her manager. In such
a scenario it is not possible to accept that a decree could have
G
been obtained behind the back of a bona fide purchaser, more so
when the transaction had taken place prior to the institution of
the suit for specific performance. The second vital aspect insofar
as the case of the Respondent is concerned is that the
H
324 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 1 S.C.R.
A Respondent did not even step into the witness box to depose to
the facts. It is the manager who stepped into the witness box that
too without producing any proper authorisation. What he deposed
in a way ran contrary to the interest of the Respondent as it was
accepted that there was knowledge of the transaction with respect
to the same land between third parties and yet the Respondent
B
chose not to implead the purchasers as parties to the suit. Thus,
the endeavour was to obtain a decree at the back of the real
owners and that is the reason, at least, in the execution
proceedings that the original vendor did not even come forward
and the sale deed had to be executed through the process of the
C Court. The case of Niraja Devi and the subsequent purchasers
including the Appellant would fall within the exception set out in
Section 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act, being transferees who
had paid money in good faith and without notice of the original
contract. The High Court ought not to have interfered with the
concurrent findings of the trial court and the first appellate court.
D
[Paras 24, 25 and 26][332-C-G; 333-A-B]
Case Law Reference
[1999] 1 SCR 1168 relied on Para 12
E [2010] 12 SCR 515 referred to Para 12
2007] 2 SCR 980 referred to Para 13
[2018] 4 SCC 562 relied on Para 22
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 5384-
F 5385 of 2014.
From the Judgment and Order dated 06.01.2012 of the High Court
of Judicature at Madras in S.A. No.1552 of 2003.
Chander Uday Singh, Sr. Adv., M. Yogesh Kanna, Raja
Rajeshwaran S., Advs. for the Appellant.
G
R. Basant, Sr. Adv., K. K. Mani, Ms. T. Archana, V. S. Dixit,
Advs. for the Respondent.
H
SEETHAKATHI TRUST MADRAS v. KRISHNAVENI 325
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by A
SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.
Facts:
1. Land measuring 0.08 cents (100 cents = 1 acre) has seen a
dispute spanning almost half a century. B
2. One C.D. Veeraraghavan Mudaliar was the original owner of
120 acres of land comprising S.No.44 and 45 at No.18, Othivakkam
Village, Chengalpattu Taluk. He entered into an agreement in October,
1959 to sell the Land in favour of Janab Sathak Abdul Khadar Sahib
who intended to purchase the same on behalf of the appellant Trust for C
a sale consideration of Rs.18,000. The appellant Trust was registered
under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 originally and now regulated
under the Tamil Nadu Societies Registration Act, 1975. The other story
is what is set up by the Respondent who claimed that C.D.
Veeraraghavan Mudaliar entered into an agreement of sale with her on D
10.04.1961 for sale of 50 acres in patta No.61 and paimash No.987/1 of
the Land.
3. It is the claim of the Appellant that C.D. Veeraraghavan Mudaliar
had sold 50 acres out of 120 acres of land to one Niraja Devi on 16.11.1963
vide registered sale deed, who took possession of the said land and enjoyed E
the same. These 50 acres were bounded by a hillock in the east, land
belonging to C.D. Veeraraghavan Mudaliar in the west, Government
Reserve Forest in the north and Hasanapuram grazing ground and lake
in the south. Niraja Devi sold the 50 acres of land to one Perumal Mudaliar
vide registered sale deed dated 19.04.1964, who also took possession of
the said land and enjoyed the same. As per the Appellant, Perumal F
Mudaliar sold the 50 acres of land to the Appellant Trust on 19.03.1968
vide a registered sale deed.
4. Insofar as the remaining 70 acres of land is concerned, C.D.
Veeraraghavan Mudaliar and his son sold the same to the Appellant vide
registered sale deed dated 19.3.1968. The said property is bounded by G
the land of Niraja Devi on the east, Kumuli Forest Line on the north,
boundary line of Kannivakam Village on the west, and boundary line of
Hasanapuram Village on the south. In respect of this 70 acres there is
no dispute.
H
326 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 1 S.C.R.
A History of the land dispute:
5. The Respondent filed a suit as O.S. No.31 of 1964 before the
Principal Sub-Court, Chengalpattu for specific performance of the
agreement dated 10.04.1964 against C.D. Veeraraghavan Mudaliar and
his son, which was dismissed on 13.08.1964. The Respondent preferred
B an appeal against the said order, as A.S. No.366/65 before the District
Judge, Changalpattu and the said appeal was also dismissed on 08.03.1966.
However, the fate of the Respondent brightened in the second appeal,
being S.A. No.1673 of 1966, before the High Court of Judicature at
Madras, when they succeeded in terms of the judgment dated 07.07.1970
whereby specific performance of the agreement dated 10.04.1961 was
C decreed. The High Court inter alia held that time was not the essence
of the contract and the land could be identified. In pursuance of the
decree so passed in the second appeal, the Respondent filed for execution,
being E.P. No.17 of 1976, before the Sub Court, Chengalpattu. The Sub-
Court appointed the Taluk head surveyor as Commissioner for
D demarcation of 50 acres of land, who subsequently filed his interim and
final reports. The Sub-Court purportedly executed the sale deed on
09.04.1981 through the officer of the Court and a delivery receipt dated
26.09.1981 was issued to Respondent.
6. The controversy insofar as the present case is concerned arose
E from a suit filed by the Respondent, being O.S. No.14 of 1984 before
the Court of District Munsif, Chengalpattu against the Appellant praying
for declaration of title and delivery in her favour to the extent of 0.08
cents of the land and delivery of the same. The suit was predicated
inter alia on a rationale that the Respondent had taken possession of 50
acres by way of the execution proceedings, and that the Appellant had
F trespassed over 0.08 cents of the same. The suit was, however, dismissed
on 07.09.1988 as the trial court formed an opinion that the Respondent
cannot be said to have taken possession of 50 acres of land as the delivery
receipt read that the delivery was effected by the Vetti. The crucial
aspect is that the Respondent, who was the best person to speak about
G the delivery of 50 acres of land chose not to appear in the witness box.
This proved fatal to her case as the manager of the Respondent who did
appear in the witness box deposed that he was not authorised by the
respondent to conduct the case. Thus, the case fell on the evidence led
by the Respondent themselves. The testimony of the manager also
became material as he admitted to possessing knowledge of the sale
H
SEETHAKATHI TRUST MADRAS v. KRISHNAVENI 327
[SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.]
deed effected by C.D. Veeraraghavan Mudaliar in favour of Niraja Devi. A
The manager acknowledged that he was aware of the same through the
corresponding encumbrance certificate before the filing of the suit in
1964, and also knew that Niraja Devi had sold 50 acres of land to Perumal
Mudaliar. The subsequent purchaser, to the knowledge of the Respondent,
was never impleaded as party in the suit nor did she seek to get the sale
B
deeds cancelled. It is in view thereof it was opined that the Respondent
was estopped from questioning the appellant’s purchase. The plea of
sale being hit by lis pendens was rejected and the appellant was held to
have adverse possession of the land as confirmed by the Panchayat
Board President, who appeared as a witness and deposed that the
Appellant had been enjoying the land for more than 30 years. The C
Appellant had no knowledge of the earlier proceedings in respect of the
suit for specific performance filed by the Respondent.
7. The Respondent preferred an appeal, being A.S. No.101 of
1998, before the Principal Sub Court, Chengalpet, which was dismissed
on 28.03.2002. The dismissal was predicated on a dual finding, i.e., that D
the appellant was in adverse possession of the land, and as per Section
114(3) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (hereinafter referred to as the
‘Evidence Act’) the expression “may be presumed” showed that the
court can infer the reality from available evidence and documents. The
delivery receipt was found to be not a real document of delivery of E
possession, but of mere paper delivery.
8. The aggrieved Respondent filed a second appeal before the
High Court of Judicature at Madras in S.A. No.1552 of 2003 claiming
she was the absolute owner of land to the extent of 50 acres pursuant to
the clear demarcation by the surveyor as well as the sale deed between F
her and C.D. Veeraraghava Mudaliar, which was executed on 09.04.1981
through the court process. The grievance against the Appellant was of
trespass upon 0.08 cents of land, as a barbed wire fence and a gate had
been put up on the same. It was Respondent’s case that possession of
the land had been taken over on 26.09.1981, and that the Appellant could
not contend that he had title over the land by adverse possession. She G
professed ignorance of the sale in favour of Niraja Devi and Perumal
Mudaliar as rationale for not impleading the Appellant, even though her
manager had deposed to the contrary while she had not entered the
witness box during the trial.
H
328 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 1 S.C.R.
A 9. The Appellant claimed title to 50 acres including 0.08 cents and
pointed out that Respondent’s grievance was made only with respect to
0.08 cents. The Appellant Trust, in fact, claimed the ownership of entire
120 acres of land. It was contended that no proper delivery had ever
been made as admitted by the amin and the possession was only a paper
delivery without actual physical possession. No question of law was left
B
to be determined as urged by the Appellant.
10. The High Court vide impugned judgment dated 06.01.2012,
however, allowed the second appeal and set aside the judgments passed
by the courts below on the ground that they did not properly appreciate
the evidence particularly with respect to the execution proceedings. The
C delivery of 50 acres of land by the amin in accordance with the surveyor’s
plans was found to be proof of possession by the Respondent. Further,
as per the surveyor’s report, persons belonging to the appellant trust did
endeavour to obstruct the possession proceedings but did not challenge
the vires of the delivery proceedings. The plea of adverse possession
D was also rejected.
Pleas of the Appellant before this Court:
11. Learned senior counsel for the appellant contended that no
substantial question of law was framed by the High Court, which itself is
a sine qua non of exercising jurisdiction under Section 100 of the Code
E of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘said Code’).
The manner in which the High Court proceeded, it was urged, amounted
to re-appreciating the evidence and disturbing the concurrent findings of
the courts below. The High Court had proceeded into a fact-finding
exercise, which was not within its jurisdiction under Section 100 of the
F said Code.
12. An aspect emphasised by learned counsel for the Appellant
was that the Respondent chose not to depose in support of her own
case, and the manager who deposed admitted that he had no power or
authority to do so. The Respondent alone had knowledge of the alleged
G facts as appeared from the deposition of the manager and, thus, an
adverse inference must be drawn against the Respondent in view of the
judicial pronouncements in Vidyadhar v. Manikrao and Anr.1 and Man
Kaur (Dead) by LRs v. Hartar Singh Sangha2. It has been held in
1
(1999) 3 SCC 573
H 2
(2010) 10 SCC 512
SEETHAKATHI TRUST MADRAS v. KRISHNAVENI 329
[SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.]
these judicial pronouncements that if a party to a suit does not appear in A
the witness box to state their own case and does not offer themselves to
be cross-examined by the other side, a presumption would arise that the
case set up is not correct. The latter of the two judgments has discussed
the earlier judgments and catena of other judicial views to the same
effect and opined that a plaintiff cannot examine his attorney holder in
B
his place, who did not have personal knowledge either of the transaction
or of his readiness and willingness in a suit for specific performance.
Thus, a third party who had no personal knowledge cannot give evidence
about such readiness and willingness, even if he is an attorney holder of
the person concerned.
13. The admission of the manager of the Respondent who C
appeared in the witness box acknowledging that the sale to Niraja Devi
by a registered conveyance deed dated 16.11.1963 prior to the filing of
the suit shows that the Respondent was aware of the further sale by
Niraja Devi to Perumal Mudaliar by another registered sale deed and
thereafter in favour of the Appellant. In such an eventuality, it was urged D
that the purchasers were necessary parties to the suit and a decree for
specific performance obtained behind their back would be a nullity. This
proposition was sought to be supported by a judgment of this Court in
Lachhman Dass v. Jagat Ram and Ors.3. In para 16 of the judgment,
it has been opined that a party’s right to own and possess a suit land
could not have been taken away without impleading the affected party E
therein and giving an opportunity of hearing in the matter, as the right to
hold property is a constitutional right in terms of Article 300-A of the
Constitution of India. Thus, if a superior right to hold a property is claimed,
procedure therefore must be complied with. In this context, it was urged
that as per Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, a registered F
transaction operates as a notice to all concerned. In the present case,
the first sale deed was already registered prior to the institution of the
suit by the Respondent for specific performance. Thus, that decree could
not be binding on the Appellant.
14. In the alternative, it was pleaded that the decree of specific G
performance was vitiated by a fraud with the purchaser of the property
being deliberately not impleaded in the suit. A reference was made to
Section 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as
the ‘Specific Relief Act’), which reads as under:
3
(2007) 10 SCC 448 H
330 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 1 S.C.R.
A “19. Relief against parties and persons claiming under them
by subsequent title.—Except as otherwise provided by this
Chapter, specific performance of a contract may be enforced
against—
xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx
B (b) any other person claiming under him by a title arising
subsequently to the contract, except a transferee for value who
has paid his money in good faith and without notice of the original
contract;”
15. Since Niraja Devi was a bona fide purchaser long prior to the
C institution of the suit for specific performance by the Respondent, specific
performance could not be enforced against her or her transferees as
they would fall within the exception of transferee for value who had
paid money in good faith and without notice of the original contract.
16. Lastly it was sought to be urged that Section 114 of the Evidence
D Act in the factual context has not been correctly appreciated. The
provision reads as under:
“114 Court may presume existence of certain facts. —The
Court may presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely
to have happened, regard being had to the common course of
E natural events, human conduct and public and private business, in
their relation to the facts of the particular case.”
17. The aforesaid was in the context that the delivery effected
was only a paper delivery and any infraction in effecting the delivery
was not curable. The amin had not followed the prescribed procedure in
F delivering possession and the appellant had continued in possession for
over 30 years. Moreover, the suit was only filed for 0.08 cents of land.
Pleas of the Respondent before this Court:
18. On the other hand learned senior counsel for the respondent
claimed that the Respondent and her daughter are quite old and do not
G have the wherewithal to pursue litigation. The litigation has been pending
since 1961. It was urged that the appellant had title only to 70 acres of
land and has trespassed into 0.08 cents of the land, which blocked the
entrance to respondent’s land. Thus, though the suit pertains only to a
smaller extent of land it affected the enjoyment by the respondent of
H their possession over larger extent of the land.
SEETHAKATHI TRUST MADRAS v. KRISHNAVENI 331
[SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.]
19. Learned counsel urged that the trial court and the lower court A
had overlooked crucial and vital evidence and, thus, the High Court rightly
exercised jurisdiction under Section 100 of the said Act. There was no
question of impleading the appellant or the prior purchasers as parties as
no issue had been framed in the suit in respect thereof. The presumption
under Section 114(e) of the Evidence Act must arise and the appellant
B
Trust was aware of the execution proceedings as some of the persons
belonging to the appellant Trust are stated to have obstructed the
Surveyor’s entry when he went to demarcate the land as well as by the
interim and final reports of the surveyor. The Trust never questioned the
same at the time and cannot question it now.
Conclusion: C
20. We have given our thought to the aforesaid aspect.
21. We find that there are more than one infirmities which make
it impossible for us to uphold the view taken by the High Court upsetting
the concurrent findings of the courts below.
22. The first aspect to be taken note of is that the question of law D
ought to have been framed under Section 100 of the said Code. Even if
the question of law had not been framed at the stage of admission, at
least before the deciding the case the said question of law ought to have
been framed. We may refer usefully to the judicial view in this behalf in
Surat Singh (Dead) v. Siri Bhagwan and Ors.4, wherein this Court E
has held that:
“29. The scheme of Section 100 is that once the High Court is
satisfied that the appeal involves a substantial question of law,
such question shall have to be framed under sub-section (4) of
Section 100. It is the framing of the question which empowers the
F
High Court to finally decide the appeal in accordance with the
procedure prescribed under sub-section (5). Both the requirements
prescribed in sub-sections (4) and (5) are, therefore, mandatory
and have to be followed in the manner prescribed therein. Indeed,
as mentioned supra, the jurisdiction to decide the second appeal
finally arises only after the substantial question of law is framed G
under sub-section (4). There may be a case and indeed there are
cases where even after framing a substantial question of law, the
same can be answered against the appellant. It is, however, done
only after hearing the respondents under sub-section (5).”
4
(2018) 4 SCC 562 H
332 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 1 S.C.R.
A 23. There is undoubtedly an element of dispute with respect to
possession raised by the two parties qua their respective 50 acres. Insofar
as 70 acres of land is concerned that undisputedly vests with the
Appellant. The dispute sought to be raised by the Respondent does not
pertain to 50 acres but only to 0.08 cents, a fraction of an acre (0.08 per
cent of an acre). It may, however, be noticed that according to the
B
Respondent the small area is important for the enjoyment purposes.
24. In our view, it is not necessary to go into the issue of adverse
possession as both parties are claiming title. The crucial aspect is the
decree obtained for specific performance by the Respondent and the
manner of obtaining the decree. The Respondent was fully aware of the
C
prior registered transaction in respect of the same property originally in
favour of Niraja Devi. This is as per the deposition of her manager. In
such a scenario it is not possible for us to accept that a decree could
have been obtained behind the back of a bona fide purchaser, more so
when the transaction had taken place prior to the institution of the suit
D for specific performance. Suffice to say that this view would find support
from the judgments in Vidyadhar v. Manikrao5 and Man Kaur v. Hartar
Singh Sangha6.
25. The second vital aspect insofar as the case of the Respondent
is concerned is that the Respondent did not even step into the witness
E box to depose to the facts. It is the manager who stepped into the witness
box that too without producing any proper authorisation. What he deposed
in a way ran contrary to the interest of the Respondent as it was accepted
that there was knowledge of the transaction with respect to the same
land between third parties and yet the Respondent chose not to implead
the purchasers as parties to the suit. Thus, the endeavour was to obtain
F
a decree at the back of the real owners and that is the reason, at least, in
the execution proceedings that the original vendor did not even come
forward and the sale deed had to be executed through the process of the
Court. The case of Niraja Devi and the subsequent purchasers including
the Appellant would fall within the exception set out in Section 19(b) of
G the Specific Relief Act, being transferees who had paid money in good
faith and without notice of the original contract. There are also some
question marks over the manner in which the possession is alleged to
5
(supra)
6
H (supra)
SEETHAKATHI TRUST MADRAS v. KRISHNAVENI 333
[SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.]
have been transferred although we are not required to go into that aspect, A
as we are concerned with only 0.08 cents of land.
26. We are, thus, unequivocally of the view that for all the aforesaid
reasons, the High Court ought not to have interfered with the concurrent
findings of the trial court and the first appellate court.
B
27. The suit of the Respondent stands dismissed in terms of the
judgment of the trial court and affirmed by the first appellate court and
the impugned judgment of the High Court dated 06.01.2012 is
consequently set aside.
28. The appeals are accordingly allowed leaving the parties to
bear their own costs. C
Devika Gujral Appeals allowed.
D
E
F
G
H
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