Holding

The convictions and death sentences were upheld as the identification of the bodies and the corroborated approver testimony satisfied the evidentiary requirements, and the death penalty was appropriate.

Summary

The Supreme Court upheld the convictions and death sentences of Sevaka Perumal and Isakkimuthu for the pre‑meditated murder of four young boys, committed for cash and jewellery. The Court held that the dead bodies were positively identified by the victims' mother and forensic evidence, so corpus delicti was established despite the bodies being recovered from a well. The testimony of the approver was deemed reliable and sufficiently corroborated by independent eyewitness and material evidence, satisfying the requirement of Section 133 of the Evidence Act. The Court rejected the appellants' claim that the benefit of doubt should affect sentencing and affirmed that the death penalty was appropriate given the organized, profit‑driven nature of the crimes. It also ruled that the procedural right to be heard on sentencing under CrPC s.235(2) does not mandate an adjournment when no further grounds are raised. Consequently, the appeals were dismissed.

Issues considered

Whether positive identification of the dead body is essential for a murder conviction.
Whether the approver's testimony requires corroboration and if such corroboration was present.
Whether the death sentence is justified in the circumstances of the offences.
Whether the doctrine of benefit of doubt extends to the determination of sentence.
Whether the accused's right to be heard on sentencing under CrPC s.235(2) necessitates adjournment of the hearing.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 235(2), s. 309
Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 114, s. 133
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 120B, s. 302, s. 34, s. 364, s. 392, s. 397

Subjects

murderdeath penaltycorpus delictiapprover testimonycorroborationbenefit of doubtsentencingCrPCIPCevidence law

Judgment

SEYAKA PERUMAL, ETC.
A
v.
STATE OF TAMIL NADU

MAY 7, 1991

[B.C. RAY AND K. RAMASWAMY, JJ.] B

Indian Penal Code, 1860: Section 302 read with section 34 and
sections 120-B, 364 and 392 read with section 397-Enticing young boys
to bring cash and jewellery-Murdering them for gain and throwing into
wells etc.-Recovery of dead body-Whether absolutely necessary to
convict accused-Benefit of doubt-Whether a relevant factor in impos-
ing sentence. c

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973: Sections 309 and 235(2)-Right
to be heard on 1h~ question of sentence-Necessity of-Adjournment on
that ground-Whether and when necessary.
D
Evidence Act, 1872: Sections I 14 and 133-Evidence of approver
-Nature of corroboration required.

Penology: Award of sentence-Showing undue sympathy harm-
ful to justice system~Would undermine public confidence-Hence
courts to award proper sentence having regard to the nature of the E.
offence and the manner in which it was exec!<ted.

According to the Prosecution, appellants 1 and 2 have been
friends and were in the habit of selling ganja and spending money
lavishly. They attempted to commit theft in their locality, but were not
successful. Therefore, they hatched a conspiracy to entice boys from F
affiuent families to bring cash and jewellery and murder them after
taking away the cash and jewellery. Likewise, they killed 4 boys, in a
span of about 5 years.

Both of them were charged with offences under sections 120B
read with section 34 IPC, sections 364 and 392 read with section 397 G
,. IPC in all the fonr cases filed against them, and were convicted by the
Sessions Conrt. However, in one case, on appeal, they were acquitted
by the High Court. In another case, the death sentence imposed by the
Sessions Conrt is pending conf'irmation by the High Court.

In the other two cases, both the appellants were sentenced to H

711
712 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1991) 2 S.C.R.

death by the Sessions Court and on appeal the High Court confirmed
A
the sentence in one case and in the other, the High Court confirmed the
death sentence passed against appellant No. I and acquitted appellant
No. 2 of all the charges.

The appellants preferred the present appeals challenging the said
l3 orders of the High Court confirming the sentence against them by con-
tending that there was no proper identification of the dead body and
that the approver was not a reliable witness and since his evidence did
not receive corroboration, it cannot form the basis for convicting the
appellants. It was also contended that the extreme penalty of death
sentence imposed was not justified.
c Dismissing the appeals, this Court,

HELD: 1.1 In a trial for murder it is not an absolute necessity or
an essential ingredient to establish corpus delicti. The fact of death of
the deceased must be established like any other fact. Corpus delicti in
D some cases may not be possible to be traced or recovered. If a murder
was committed and the dead body was thrown into flowing tidal river or
stream or burnt out, it is unlikely that the dead body may be recovered.
If recovery of the dead body, therefore, is an absolute necessity to
convict an accused, in many a case the accused would manage to see
that the dead body is destroyed etc. and that would afford a complete
E immunity to the guilty from being punished and the accused would
escape even when the offence of murder is proved. What, therefore, is
required to base a conviction for an offence of murder is that there
should be reliable and acceptable evidence that the offence of murder,
like any other factum, of death was committed and it must be proved by
direct or circumstantial evidence, although the dead body may not be
f: traced. [717 A-DI

1.2. In the instant case, the evidence of PWs. 7 to 10 would
establish that they have seen the dead body of the deceased in the well
and brought it out and the photograph was taken at the time of inquest.
It was identified to be that of the deceased by no other than the mother
G of the deceased. Thus there is no doubt as regards the identity of the
dead body. Also the medical evidence establishes that the deceased died
due to stabbing with sharp edged weapon like knife. [717E]

2. Law is settled that an approver is a competent witness against
the accused person. But the court, to satisfy its conscience, insists as
H caution and prudence to seek, as a rule, corroboration to the evidence
SEVAKA PERUMAL v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU 713

of the approver, a particips criminis from independent evidence occular
or circum,1antial, of general particulars regarding the story spoken of
.>.
... by the approver of the commission of the crime and the part played by
the accused therein to find whether it is true and worthy of acceptance.
The reliability of the evidence of an approver should be considered from
totality of the facts and circumstances. In one of the two trials there is
no dispnte that such a corroborative evidence connecting both the B
appellants is available which was minutely considered by the trial court
and the High Court and was accepted. There is infirmity in that regard.
In the other trial appellant No. 2 was acquitted on the ground that his
extra-judicial confession made to PW23, the only corroborative evi-
dence, was disbelieved by the High Court. Both the courts below gave
categorical finding that PW I is a reliable witness. The evidence of the
approver received corroboration from independent evidence. The c
canopy of the material evidence from independent sources sufficiently
corroborates the approver's evidence. He is a reliable witness. No
infirmity has been pointed out to disbelieve his evidence. [7190-H; 720A I

Rameshwar v. The State of Rajasthan, [1952] SCR 377; S. D
Swaminathan v. State of Madras, AIR 1957 SC 340; Sarwan Singh v.
The State of Punjab,, [1957] SCR 953; B. D. Patil v. State of
Maharashtra, [1963] 3 SCR 830; Md. Hussain Umar Kochra etc. v.
K.S. Dalipsinghji & Anr., [1970] I SCR I30; Ram Narain v. State of
Rajasthan, [l.,973] 3 SCC 805 and Abdul Sattar v. Union Territory,
Chandigarh, [1985] (Suppl.) SCC 599, relied on. E

King v. Baskervilli, [1916] 2 K.B. 658 (C.A.) and Mahadeo v. The
; King, AIR 1936 P.C. 242, referred to.

3. In the instant case, it is clear from the evidence that the
accnsed indnlged in illegal business of purchase and sale of ganja. They F
conspired to entice innocent boys from affiuent families, took them to
far flung places where the dead body could not be identified. The letters
were written to the parents purporting to be by the deceased to delude
the parents that the missing boy would one day come home alive and
·'" that they would not give any report to. the police and the crime would go
underected. Four murders in a span of five years were committed for G
gain in cold blooded, premeditated and planned way. In this case the
trial of the murder relating to the two deceased practically took place
simultaneously by which date the appellants were convicted for the
murder of two other boys. Therefore, the reference of conviction and
sentence by the Sessions Court to those two cases also are relevant facts.
One of the deceased is no other than the nephew of appellant No. I. This H
714 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1991] 2 S.C.R.

A would establish his depravity and hardened criminality. No regard for
precious lives of innocent young boys was shown. They adopted the
crime of murder for gain as a means to living. As such there is no
infirmity in the sentence awarded by the Sessions Court and confirmed ,.·'-
by the High Court. [7210-G]
B
4. The doctrine of benefit of doubt only would operate in proof of
the commission of the offence. If there is any reasonable doubt, not the
doubt of vacillating mind of a Judge, the accused is entitled to that
benefit and he acquitted. The benefit of doubt again does not enter in
the area of consideration of imposing sentence. [720C]

c 5.1. Undue sympathy to impose inadequate sentence would do
harm to the justice system to undermine the public confidence in the
efficacy of law and society could not long endure under serious threats.
If the courts did not protect the injured the injured would then resort to
private vengeance. It is, therefore, the duty of every court to award
proper sentence having regard to the nature of the offence and the
D manner in which it was executed or committed etc. [721C]

5.2. The compassionate greunds such as the accused being young
bread-winners of the family etc. would always he present in most cases
and are not relevant for interference with the sentence. [722D]
E 6. Under section 235(2) when the accused has been given right to
he heard on the question of sentence it is a valuable right. To make that
right meaningful the procedure adopted would he suitably moulded and
the 11ccused given an opportunity to adduce evidence on the nature of
the sentence. The bearing may he on the same day if the parties are
ready or to a next date but once the court after giving opportunity,
F proposes to impose appropriate sentence again there is no need to
adjourn the case under section 235(2) to next date. In the present mat-
ters, the counsel was directed by the High Court to show any additional
grounds on the question of sent_ence, but the counsel was unable to give
any additional ground. [7228-C]

G CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
Nos. 345-346 of 1991.

From the Judgment and Order dated 14.6.1990 of the Madras
High Court in Referred Trial Nos. 4/89 and 5/89 and Crl. Appeal Nos.
593/89 and 594 of 1989. ·
H
SEVAKA PERUMAL v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU [RAMASWAMY, J.] 715

Raju Ramachandran, Jaga Rao, Alok Agarwal, Ms. Malini
Bhat and S. Ravindra Bhatt for the appellants.
A

'.., V.R. Karthikeyan and V. Krishnamurthy for the respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
B
K. RAMASWAMY, J. Special leave to appeals granted.

Heard the learned counsel, Sri Raju Ramachandran amicus
.. curiae for the appellants and Sri V. Krishnamurthy, the learned Stand-
ing Counsel for the State. The appellants Sevaka Perumal and Isak-
kimuthu for short 'A-1' and 'A-2' in Appeal arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.)
No. 1842/90 are accused in Sessions Case No. 283 of 1986 on the file of c
the Addl. Sessions Judge, Tirunelveli Sessions Division and appellants
in Criminal Appeal No. 594 of 1989 and R.T. No. 4 of 1989 by judg-
men!, dated June 14, 1990 of the High Court of Madras. Criminal
Appeal arise out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 1841/90; Sessions Case No. 284
of 1986 of the same Sessions Division and Criminal Appeal No. 593 D
.lt and R.T. No. 5 of 1989 dated June 14, 1990 of the Madras High Court
respectively, A-1 is the appellant. In each case the Sessions Court
convicted them under ss. 120B, 364, 392 read withs. 397; s. 302 read
with s. 34 l.P.C. and sentenced to death. In Crl. Appeal No. 594 of
1989 and R.T. No. 4 of 1989, the High Court confirmed the conviction
and sentence of death of both the appellants. In Crl. Appeal No. 593 E
of 1989 and R.T. No. 5 of 1989, the High Court confirmed the convic-
tion and sentence of death of the A-1 and acquitted A-2 of all the
charges.
' The case of the prosecution in brief is that the appellants and
PW-1, the approver belonged to kidarakulam village and became F
friends. A-1 used to bring money from the timber shop of his brother-
in-law (PW-4) in Sessions Case No. 284/86 in whose shop A-1 had
worked. They used to go to various places. A-1 used to purchase ganja
from Chenglpatai and other places and A-1 and A-2 used to sell them.
Yet they did not have enough money to spend lavishly. They attemp-
}:
ted to commit theft in the localities but became impracticable. There- G
fore, they conspired to entice boys from affluent families to bring cash
and jewellery from their houses; take them to far away places; take
their money or jewellery and to murder them for gain. Pursuant
thereto in 1978 they murdered one Athiappan; in 1981 one Chella-
durai; in March, 1982 one Hariramachandran and in 1983 one Chris-
todas. In Sessions Case No. 283/86, the deceased boy is Athiappan. In H
716 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1991] 2 S.C.R.

A Sessions Case No. 284/86, the deceased boy is Hariramachandran.
Sessions Case No. 282/86 on the file of the Sessions Court. Madurai
Division relates to deceased Chelladurai. Therein also we are
informed that the appellants were convicted but on appeal they were
acquitted. In Sessions Case relating to the death of Christodas, it also
ended in conviction and sentence of death was imposed on the appel-
B lants and is pending confirmation in the High Court.

It is sufficient to set out the material fact leaving out the minor
details in Sessions Case No. 284/86 to meet the points raised by the
counsel for the appellants. A-1 enticed the deceased, Hariramachan-
dran, his nephew (elder sister PW-2' son) to bring jewellery from the
house of PW-2 and PW-4. The appellants and PW-1 took him to
c Madurai. On the way the deceased went to the house of PW-3 and
handed over one chain to be delivered to his mother and took M.O. 1
chain with him. A-1 had taken a room in the lodge at Madurai run by
PW-16. On coming to know that they were staying in Madurai, PW-2,
PW-4. her husband and PW-3 went to the lodge and the deceased was
D found threat. He informed them that the chain was with A-1 and he
would come in the evening at 8.00 p.m. After waiting for some time
and when it was getting dark, the ladies went away asking PW-4 to get
the chain and the deceased after A- l's arrival. While PW-4 was wait-
ing the deceased went down stairs and after A-l's arrival told him of
his mother's coming etc. and from there they went away to Madras,
E and having come to know that they left the place PW-4 left to his
village. On the next day they returned to Madurai. From there they
went to Usilampatti and A-1 then purchased a knife at the Bus Stand
without the knowledge of the deceased and proceeded to Peraiyar
Road. They sat near a jungle stream. While A-1 and the deceased
Hariramachandran were sitting near a stone on the southern side of
F the road, A-2 and PW-1 were standing at a distance, A-1 stabbed
Hariramachandran in his stomac'1. with a knife and the deceased col-
lapsed on the stone. A-1 threw away the knife in the river. He threw
the deceased in the nearby well and washed his hands and legs in the
stream. They returned to Usilampatti Bus Stand. From there they
came to Madurai. A-1 sold M.O. l chain to PW-24 and gave one
G hundred rupees each to PW-1 and A-2. This evidence of PW- I
received sufficient corroboration from the evidence of prosecution
witnesses.

Sri Raju Ramachandran contended that the dead body was
admittedly found in a highly decomposed condition. There is no
H proper identification of the dead body to be of the deceased. The
SEVAKA PERUMAL v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU [RAMASWAMY, J.] 717

mother PW-2 identified only with reference to the photograph taken of
A
the dead body. There is evidence that the deceased wrote a letter of
leaving to unknown destination. Unless there is proof that the dead
body belongs to Hariramachandran, it is not safe to convict to A-1 to a
capital punishment of death sentence. We find no force in the conten-
tion. In a trial for murder it is not an absolute necessity or an essential
ingredient to establish corpus delicti. The fact of death of the deceased B
must be established like any other fact. Corpus delicti in some cases
may not be' possible to be traced or recovered. Take for instance that a
murder was committed and the dead body was thrown into flowing
tidal river or stream or burnt out. It is unlikely that the dead body may
be recovered. If recovery of the dead body, therefore, is an absolute
necessity to convict an accused, in many a case the. accused would
manage to see that the dead body is destroyed etc. and would afford a c
complete immunity to the guilty from being punished and would
escape even when the offence of murder is proved. What, therefore, is
required to base a conviction for an offence of murder is that there
should be reliable and acceptable evidence that the offence of murder,
like any other factum, of death was committed and it must be proved D
by direct or circumstantial evidence, although the dead body may not
be traced. In this case the evidence of PWs.-7 to 10 would estbalish that
they have seen the dead body of the deceased Hariramachandran in
the well and brought it out and the photograph was taken at the time of
inquest. It was identified to be that of the deceased by no other than
his mother, PW-2. Thus we have no hesitation to hold that there is no E

, doubt as regards the identity of the dead body and that the medical
evidence establishes that the deceased died due to stabbing with sharp
edged weapon like knife.

It is next contended that PW-1 being an approver, his evidence
must be reliable and must receive corroboration on all material paticu- F
Jars from independent evidence. PW-1 is neither a reliable witness nor
did his evidence receive such corroboration. Therefore, his evidence
cannot form the basis to convict the appellants. It is his contention that
in Hariramachandran's death case the evidence of PW-1 was not
accepted as regards the complicity of A-2 and he was acquitted. There-
fore, PW-1 is not a reliable witness. This contention too is devoid of G
any force. PW-1 had given wealth of details of commission of the
crimes. Under s. 133 of the Evidence Act 1 of 1872, an accomplice
shall be a competent witness against an accused person; and a convic-
tion is not illegal merely because it proceeds upon the uncorroborated
testimony of an accomplice. Section 114 illustration (b) postulates that
an accomplice is unworthy of credit, unless he is corroborated in mate- H
718 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1991] 2 S.C.R.

A rial particulars. In King v. Baskervilli, [1916] 2 K.B .. 658 (C.A.) Lord
Reading, CJ, laid the test that the corroboration need not be direct
evidence that the accused committed the crime. It is merely circum-
stantial evidence of his connection with the crime. The nature of the ,,.,~
corroboration will depend and vary according to the particular cir-
cumstances of each case. What is required is some additional evidence
B rendering it probable that the story of the accomplice is true and that it
is reasonably safe to act upon. In Mahadeo v. The King AIR 1936 P.C.
242 the judicial committee held that the evidence of an accesory must
be corroborated in some material particulars not only bearing upon
the facts of the crime but upon the accused's implication in it. This
Court in Rameshwar v. The State ofp.ajasthan, [1952] S.C.R. 377 held
C that it is not neccessary that there should be independent confirmation
of every material circumstance in the sense that the independent evi-
dence of the case, apart from the testimony of the complainant or its
accomplice should in itself be sufficient to sustain conviction. All that
is necessary is that there should be independent evidence which will
make it reasonably safe to believe that the witness's story that the
D accused was the one .that committed the offence could be acceptable.
The corroboration need not be direct evidence that the accused com-
mitted the crime. It is sufficient if it is merely circumstantial evidence
of his connection with the crime. In S. Swaminathan v. State of
Madras, AIR 1957 SC 340 this Court held that corroboration of
approver's evidence need not be of a kind which prove the offence
E against the accused. It is sufficient if it connects the accused with the
crime when the accused had been charged for the offences of conspi-
racy and of cheating, a specific instance of cheating proved beyond
doubt against one of the accused would furnish the best corroboration
of the offence of the conspiracy. In Sarwan Singh v. The State of
Punjab, [1957] S.C.R. 953 relied by Shri Raju Ramachandran, this
F Court held that the approver must be a reliable witness and the evi-
dence must receive sufficient corroboration. In that case the corro-
boration of minor particulars was accepted to be sufficient to hold the
approver to be reliable witness. In B.D. Patil v. State of Maharashtra,
[1963] 3 S.C.R. 830 this Court held that the conviction of an accused
on the testimony of an accomplice cannot be said to be illegal, yet the
G courts will, as a matter of practice do not accept the evidence of such a
witness without corroboration in material particulars. There should be
corroboration of the approver in material particulars and must be qua
each accused. In Md. Hussain Umar Kochra etc. v. K.S. Dalipsinghji
& Anr., [1970] 1 S.C.R. 130 it was held that the combined effect of
ss. 133 and 114(b) is that though a conviction based upon accomplice
H evidence is legal the court will not accept such evidence unless it is
SEVAKA PERUMAL v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU [RAMASWAMY, J.] 719

corroborated in material particulars. The corroboration must be from
an independent source. If several accomplices simultaneously and
A
without previous concert giving consistent account of the crime
·-.. implicating accused, the court may accept the several statements as
corroborating each other. In Ram Narain v. State of Rajasthan, [1973]
3 S.C.C. 805 this Court held thats. l14(b) strikes a note of warning,
cautioning the.court that an accomplice does not generally deserve to B
be believed unless corroborated in material particulars. In other
words, the rule is that the necessity of corroboration is as a matter of
prudence except when it is safe to dispense with such corroboration
must be clearly present to the mind of the Judge. In Abdul Sattar v.
Union Territory, Chandigarh, [1985] (Suppl.) S.C.C. 599 this Court
further held that it is not safe to convict an accused on the charges like
murder upon the evidence of uncorroborated testimony of the C
approver.

Thus the settled law is that an approver is a competent witness
against the accused person. But the court, to satisfy its conscience,
insists as caution and prudence to seek, as a rule, corroboration to the o
evidence of the approver, a particips criminis from independent evi-
dence occular or circumstantial, of general particulars regarding the
story spoken off by the approver of the commission of the crime and
the part played by the accused therein to find whether it is true and
worthy of acceptance. The reliability of the evidence of an approver
should be considered from totality of the facts and circumstances. In E

, the trial of Athiappan murder there is no dispute that such a cor-
roborative evidence connecting both the appellants is available which
was minutely considered by the trial court and the High Court and was
accepted. We find no infirmity in that regard. In the trial of the death of
Hariramachandran, A. 2 was acquitted on the ground that his extra-
judicial confession made to P.W. 23, the only corroborative evidence, F
was disbelieved by the High Court. Both the courts below gave
categorical finding that P .W. 1 is a reliable witness. The evidence of
the approver received corroboration from independent evidence on
general prosecution case, namely, P. W. 16 spoke that the deceased
was brought by the accused and stayed in the lodge. P.Ws 2 to 4 spoke
of A-1 working in their shop, previous thefts by A-1 and M.O. 1 being G
missing, their attempt to take back the deceased and M.O. 1, the dead
body was found in the well and was taken out as spoke to by P .Ws. 7 to
10. The medical evidence establishes the stabbing with the knife and
death was due to it. P,W. 24 corroborates A. 1 of selling M.O. lchain
and taking the money. The canopy of the material evidence from
independent sources sufficiently corroborates the approver's evidence. H
720 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1991) 2 S.C.R.

PW-1 is a reliable witness. No infirmity has been pointed out to
A disbelieve his evidence.

It is next contended that the courts below were not justified in
imposing the extreme penalty of death sentence under s. 302, I.P.C.
and strongly relied upon the judgment of Bachan Singh's case. It is
B contended that the acquittal of A. 2 giving the benefit of doubt in
Hariramachandran's death trial introduces an element of doubt which
should be extended to convert the death sentence of A. 1 to life impris-
onment. We find no substance in the contention. The doctrine of
benefit of doubt only would operate in proof of the commission of the
offence. If there is any reasonable doubt, not the doubt of vacillating
mind of a Judge, the accused is entitled to that benefit and be acquit-
c ted. The benefit of doubt again does not enter in the area of considera-
tion of imposing sentence.

The law regulates social interests, arbitrates conflicting claims
and demands. Security of persons and property of the people is an
D essential function of the State. It could be achieved through instru-
mentality of criminal law. Undoubtedly, there is a cross cultural
conflict where living law must find answer to the new challenges and
the courts are required to mould the sentencing system to meet the
challenges. The contagion of lawlessness would undermine social
order and lay it in ruins. Protection of society and stamping out crimi-
E nal proclivity must be the object of law which must be achieved by
imposing appropriate sentence. Therefore, law as a corner-stone of the
edifice of order should meet the challenges confronting the society.
Friedman iu his "Law in Changing Society" stated that, "State of
criminal law continues to be-as it should be-a decisive reflection of
social consciousness of society". Therefore, in operating the sentenc-
F ing system, law should adopt the corrective machinery or the deter-
rence based on factual matrix. By deft modulation of sentencing pro-
cess be stern where it should be, and tempered with mercy where it
warrants to be. The facts and given circumstances in each case, the
nature of the crime, the manner in which it was planned and commit-
ted, the motive for commission of the crime, the conduct of the
G accused and all other attending circumstances are relevant facts which
would enter into the area of consideration. For instance a murder
committed due to deep seated personal rivalry may not call for penalty
of death. But an organised crime or mass murders of innocent people
would call for imposition of death sentence as deterrence. In Mahesh
v. State of M.P., [1987) 2 S.C.R. 710 this Court while refusing to
H reduce the death sentence observed thus:
SEVAKA PERUMAL v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU [RAMASWAMY, J.l 721

"It will be a mockery of justice to permit the accused to
A
escape the extreme penalty of law when faced with such
evidence and such cruel acts. To give the lesser punishment
for the accused would be to render the justicing system of
the country suspect. The common man will lose faith in
courts. In such cases, he understands and appreciates the
language of deterrence more than the reformative jargon". B

Therefore, undue sympathy to impose inadequate sentence
would do more harm to the justice system to undermine to public
confidence in the efficacy of law and society could not long endure
under serious threats. If the courts did not protect the injured, the
injured would then resort to private vengeance. It is, therefore, the
duty of every court to award proper sentence having regard to the
c
nature of the offence and the manner in which it was executed or
committed etc.

It is clear from the evidence that the accused indulged in illegal
business of purchase and sale of ganja. They conspired to entice inno- D
cent boys from affluent families took them to far flung places where
the dead body could not be identified. The letters were written to the
parents purporting _to be by the deceased to delude the parents that the
missing boy would one day come home alive and that they would not
give any report to the police and the crime would go undetected. Four
murders in a span of five years were committed for gain in cold E
blooded, pre-meditated and planned way. It is undoubted that if the
trial relating to Athiappan murder had taken place and concluded
earlier to the trial and conviction of other three murders, the subse-
quent murders are not relevant facts to be considered. But in this case
the trial of the murder relating to Athiappan and Hariramachandran
practically took place simultaneously by which date the appellants were F
convicted for the murder of Chelladurai and Christodas. Therefore,
the reference of convicti()n and sentence by the Sessions Court to those
two cases also are relevant facts. The deceased Hariramachandran is
no other than the nephew (elder sister's son) of A-1. This would
establish his depravity and hardened criminality. No regard for preci-
ous lives of innocent young boys was shown. They adopted the crime G
of murder for gain as a means to living.

Undoubtedly under section 235(2) of Code of Criminal Proce-
dure, the accused is entitled to an opportunity to adduce evidene and if
need be the case is to be adjourned to another date. It is illegal to
convict, an accused and to impose sentence on the same day. It is true H
722 SUPREME COURT REPORTS I 1991) 2 S.C.R.
A as contended for the State that under s. 309, third proviso brought by
Amendment Act, 1978 that no adjournment should be granted for the
purpose only of enabling the accused person to show cause against
sentence to be imposed upon him. Under s. 235(2) when the accused
has been given right to be heard on the question of sentence it is a
valuable right. To make that right meaningful the procedure adopted
8 should be suitably moulded and the accused given an opportunity to
adduce evidence on the nature of the sentence. The hearing may be on
the same day ifthe parties are ready or be adjourned to a next date but
once the court after giving opportunity propose to impose appropriate
sentence again there is no need to adjourn the case any further
thereon. No doubt the Sessions Judge needed to adjourn the case
c under s. 235(2) to next date but in the High Court the counsel was
directed to show any additional grounds on the question of sentence.
The High Court observed that the counsel was unable to give any
additional ground. It is Further contended that the appellants are
young men. They are the bread winners of their family each consisting
of a young wife, minor child and aged parents and that, therefore, the
D death sentence may be converted into life. We find no force. These
compassionate grounds would always be present in most cases and are
not relevant for interference. Thus we find no infirmity in the sentence
awarded by the· Sessions Court and confirmed by the High Court \Var-
ranting interference. The appeals are accordingly dismissed.

G.N. Appeals dismissed.