SH. P.G.GUPTA ETC. ETC.versusSTATE OF GUJARAT AND ORS.

A                          SH. P.G.GUPTA ETC. ETC.
                                    v.
                        STATE OF GUJARAT AND ORS.

                              DECEMBER 14, 1994

B      [K. RAMASWAMY, S. MOHAN AND N. VENKATACHALA, JJ.]

         Constitution of India, 1950: Articles 19 (J)(e) and 21-Right to
    residence.

        Article 14-Equality--Cut off date-Housing Scheme-Resolution for
c   converting rental basis scheme into hire purchase-Criteria for allotment
    with reference to date fixed in resolution held not arbitrary.

        Housing-Government Housing Scheme-Allotment to Government
    employees-Conversion from rental scheme to hire purchase scheme-
    Government Resolution approving scheme-Eligibility Criteria-
D   Requirement ofcontinuous residence for fzve years-Challenge to allotment
    scheme-Quashing of only two eligible categories of employees by High
    Court-First those allotted better accommodation by Government and were
    consequently not in possession for five years on the date of reso/ution-
    Secondly, those transferred on permanent basis-Exclusion of these two
    categories held not arbitrary.
E
         In a Lower Income Group ~ousing Scheme 396 houses were
    constructed at Pahari at Ahmedabad and were allotted to Government
    employees on rental basis. Subsequently the State Government
    obtained sanction from the Central Government to convert the rental
    scheme into hire purchase scheme for allotment to the Govt. employees.
F   As per the criteria for allotment continuous residence for five years was
    necessary. Further retired Govt. servants were excluded from the
    scheme. Consequently, on April 17, 1971, the Govt. passed a resolution
    under which 200 houses were converted from rental basis scheme to
    hire purchase scheme. Thereafter, the Government re-considered the
    matter and by its resolution dated June 22, 1972 resolved to allot all the
G
    396 houses to the Government employees on hire purchase basis. Under
    the Resolution Category III and VI of employees were inter alia entitled
    to the benefit of said scheme. Category III was of those employees who
    were working in secretariat and were originally allotted the house at
    Pahari but later allotted better accommodation at Gandhinager. In
H   Category VI there were employees who were transferred outside
                                    628
                               P.G.GUPTA v. STATE                        629
    Ahmedabad on permanent basis. The said scheme of allotment was A
    challenged before the Gujarat High Court which took into .account the
i   criteria of June 22, 1972 as last date for fixing the entitlement for the
    priorities mentioned in the resolution and upheld the validity of the
    scheme save and except priority categories III and VI.

         In appeal to this Court, it was contended on behalf of the appellant B
    that (i) in view of the compulsion by the State Government Category
    III employees had shifted from Pahari to Gandhinager, therefore, they
    cannot be deprived of their entitlement to allotment on hire purchase
    basis; and (ii) the denial of benefit of the scheme to Category VJ
    employees violates Articles 14, 19 and 21; the High Court committed
    manifest error of law in denying the benefit to the said Category C
    inasmuch as none had challenged the entitlement of allotment to that
    category.

        Dismissing the appeals, this Court

        HELD: 1. There is no illegality in excluding employees of cate- D
    gories (iii) and (vi) for allotment under hire purchase scheme. (636 DJ

        2. It is true that initially when the Government of India had given
    sanction for converting 396 lower income group houses from rental
    scheme to hire purchase scheme, category III employees were in
    occupation of the respective allotted houses. It is seen that they had E
    vacated the respective premises as they were allotted government
    houses having better accommodation at Gandhinagar with concessional
    rates. But on the date of the resolution passed by the government,
    admittedly, they were not in possession of the houses at Pahari or some
    of them were in illegal occupation. In these circumstances, the
    conclusion reached by the High Court that the category III employees F
    are not entitled to the allotment, is just and reasonable. It is not vitiated
    by any error of law. [632 F, G)

         3. It is true, that a date has to be fixed with reference to a
    particular case and fixation of any date always may appear to be
    arbitrary. But some connection has to be established for fixation of the G
    date of allotment of the houses. In this case, since the government had
    taken decision on June 22, 1972, to convert the rental basis scheme into
    hire purchase scheme that date bears rational relation to the object of
    allotment. Therefore, it cannot be said to be arbitrary or irrational
    offending Article 14 of the Constitution. (635 H, 636 A)                 H
     630                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS           [1994] SUPP. 6 S.C.R

A        4. From the judgment of the High Court it is clear that category III
     persons who had vacated the houses were treated on par with category
     VI employees transferred from the capital to the districts. From the
     material on record it would appear that the eligibility of category VI
     employees was also questioned. Though some of them managed to
     remain in possession, they cannot cltlim right to allotment under hire
B    purchase scheme. Therefore, the High Court has rightly considered
     that when category III employees were excluded on the ground that
     they shifted their residence from Pahari to Gandhinagar, the same
     parity should be applied to category VI employees who have been
     transferred from the capital to the districts. [636 C to DJ

c       5. The right .to residence and settlement is a fundamentai right
   under Article 19(l)(e) and it is a facet of inseparable meaningful right
 · to life under Article 21. Food, shelter and clothing are minimal human
   rights. The State has undertaken as its economic policy of planned
   development of the country and has undertaken massive housing
  ·schemes. As its part, allotment of houses as adopted, as is enjoined by
D Articles 38, 39 and 46, Preamble and Art 19(1) (e) facilities and
   opportunities to the weaker sections of the society of the right to
   residence make the life meaningful and liveable in equal status with
   dignity of person. It is, therefore, imperative for the State to provide
   permanent housing accommodation to the poor in the housing schemes
   undertaken by it or its instrumentalities within their economic means
E so tha~ they could make the payment of the price in easy installments
   and have permanent settlement and residence assured under Article
   19(1)(e) and 21 of the Constitution. [635 C to E]

        Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation, [1985] 3 SCC 545 and
    Shantistar Builders v. Narayan Khimalal Totame, AIR (1990) SC 630;
F   referred to.

         CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1529of1988
    etc. etc.

           From the Judgment and Order dared 7.11.87 of the Gujarat High Court
G   in S.C.A. No. 980of1980.

        N. Dushyant Dave for Ms. Meenak:shi Arora and Harish J. Jhaveri for
    the Appellants.

        B.K. Mehta, Krishna Mahajan, P.H. Parekh and E.R. Kumar, for the
H   Respondents.
                            P.G.GUPTA v. STATE                          631

    The following Order of the Court was delivered:                            A
     Since common question of law has been raised, these appeals are being
disposed of together. The Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in its
judgment dated November 7, 1987, decided Civil Application No.980/80
and batch. One of the questions therein raised was, whether the persons
falling in categories (iii) and (vi) in the Government Resolution dated B
February 18, 1975 are entitled to priority in allotment of government
quarters under hire purchase scheme? The High Court, after elaborate
consideration, had concluded that "In view of the aforesaid discussion, it
must be held that the impugned resolutions dated 18.2.75 and 10.3.80 are
legal and valid save and except priority categories (iii) and (vi) contained
therein which are quashed and set aside. Rest of the resolutions shall be C
operated upon and implemented by the respondent authorities.•·

      In these appeals, we are concerned only with regard to category Nos.
(iii) and (vi) Admittedly, in the Lower Income Group Housing Scheme, 396
houses were constructed at Pahari at Ahmt:dabad and were allotted to the
government employees on rental basis. Subsequently, the State Government       D
had obtained sanction from the Central Government in May 1969 to
convert the scheme into hire purchase scheme and for allotment to the
government employees on the criteria indicated therein, namely, continuous
residence for five years and also the eligibility criteria excluding the
government servants who had already retired from service. Thereafter on
April 17, 1971, the government passed a resolution converting 200 out of       E
396 houses for allotment on hire purchase basis. On a further resolution
dated June 22, 1972, all the 396 houses Wf:re pooled for allotment on hire
purchase scheme. In the offending resolution the allotment was also sought
to be given to category (iii), such of those employees working in Sachivalay
(Secretariat) and originally allotted the house at Pahari at Ahmedabad but     F
later they shifted their residence and they voluntarily vacated the houses
and shifted to the houses allotted at Gandhi Nagar with better
accommodation on concessional basis. It was also sought to be given to
such of those employees in Category (vi) who had been transferred outside
Ahmedabad on a permanent basis. The entitlement under the scheme came
to be challenged by some of the .employef:s in the High Court. As stated       G
earlier, the High Court while upholding other criteria for other categories,
quashed the entitlement to the allotment to category (iii) and (vi). Thus,
these appeals by special leave.

   Shri Dave, learned counsel for the appellants, contends that initially
when the Government of India had given permission for converting these H
    632                    SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [1994] SUPP. 6 S.C.R

A    houses for allotment from rental scheme to hire purchase basis, the requisite
     qualification of five years' stay therein was applicable. In view of the
     compulsion by the State Government, the category III employees had
     shifted from Pahari to Gandhinagar. Therefore, they cannot be deprived of
     their entitlement to allotment on hire purchase basis.

B         Shri Mehta, learned senior counsel appearing for category (vi), urges
     that the impugned government resolution militates against the statutory
     regulation of allotment made pursuant to s. 74 of the Gujarat Housing Board
     Act, 1961 (for short, 'the Act'). The government have, therefore, no power
     under s.82 of the Act to pass any resolution contrary to the statutory regula-
     tions. It is also contended that the lower income group housing scheme was
C    initiated to benefit the people of lower income group having an annual
     income of Rs. 6,000 to purchase the houses on hire purchase scheme. The
     initial scheme to give benefit to the poorer employees has been given a go-
     bye hitting hard the weaker segments among the employees and their rights
     and allotment on priority basis was, therefore, defeated. The criteria
     adopted by the government are, therefore, irrational and arbitrary and it has
D    no nexus between the object of allotment on hire purchase basis and the
     policy. The denial thereof to category (vi) employees violates articles 14,19
     and 21 of the Constitution. It is also contended that though none has
     challenged the entitlement to allotment of category (vi) employees, the
     High Court, after reserving the cases for consideration, had denied them the
     benefit in the judgment. Therefore, the High Court has committed manifest
E    error oflaw.

         Having given our anxious consideration to the contentions raised by
    the learned counsel for the appellants, we are of the considered view that
    there is no force in any of them. It is true that initially when the
    Government of India had given sanction for converting 396 lower income
F   group houses from rental scheme to hire purchase scheme, category (iii)
    employees were in occupation of the respective allotted houses. It is seen
    that they had vacated the respective premises as they were allotted
    government houses having better accommodation at Gandhinagar with
    concessional rates. As on the date of the resolution passed by the
    government, admittedly, they were not in possession of the houses at Pahari
G   or some of them were in illegal occupation. In these circumstances, the
    conclusion reached by the High Court that the category (iii) employees are
    not entitled to the allotment, is just and reasonable. It is not vitiated by any
    error oflaw.

          With regard to the exercise of power by the State under s. 82 of the act
H vis-a-vis the regulations made under s.74 of the Act,we need not go into
                            P.G.GUPTA v. STATE                           633

that question. The reasons are eloquent. Though the lower income group A
Houses were constructed for the allotment to the weaker sections, from the
funds allotted by the Government of India, after the bifurcation of the
Bombay State, Gujarat State was formed, the capital of the State of Gujarat
was shifted from Bombay to Ahmedabad in the year 1970. Thereafter at the
request of the State Government, the Government of India had given
permission for allotment of those houses to the government employees. The B
statutory exercise of power under s.82 and operation of the regulations
under s.74, under these circumstances, have no bearing in relation to the
allotment of these houses to the government employees in question. Thus, it
is unnecessary for us to go into the question of legality of the exercise of
the power by the government under s.82 vis-a-vis the statutory regulations
made under s.74 by the Board with previous consent of the State C
Government.

  . It is true that Gujarat Housing Board had constructed houses under low
income group scheme for allotment to the poorer segments of the society
within prescribed annual income. Article 19(1) (e) protects the right to
residence and settlement in any part of the territory of India. The protection D
of life assured under Article 21 has bezn given expanded meaning of right
to life. It is settled law that all the related provisions under the Constitution
must be read together and given meaning of widest amplitude to cover
variety of rights which go to constitute the meaningful right to life. The
preamble to the Constitution says that the people of India resolved to secure
to all our citizen social and economic justice also have made it subject to E
equality of status and of opportunity to promote the dignity of the
individtutl in the united and integrated Bharat. Article 37 declares the rights
in part IV or fundamental law in the governance of the country. Article
39(b) enjoins that the ownership and control of the material resources of the
community are to promote the welfare of the people by securing social and F
economic justice to the weaker sections so as to subserve the common good
to minimize the inequalities in income and endeavour to eliminate
inequalities in statues. The State, thereby, evolved the scheme to provide
facilities and opportunities to the individuals and also groups of people to
have no houses of their own. Article 46, in particular, enjoins that the State
shall promote with special care the economic interest of the weaker sections G
of the people and to protect them from social injustice.

     Article 11 (I) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights laid down that the States' parties to the Covenant recognize
the "right to everyone to an adequate standard of living for himself and for
his family including food, clothing and housing and to the continuous          H
    634                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [1994] SUPP. 6 S.C.R

A   improvement of living conditions". The State parties will take appropriate
    steps to ensure the realization of these rights. Recognizing these obligations
    of the State and to give effect to the essential importance of International
    co-operation, the directions contained in Arts section 38, 39 and 46, the
    Housing Scheme for allotment to lower income group of the people was
    made. Possession of real property is the basis for and the symbol of wealth
B   and influence in society. To the poor, settlement with a fixed abode and
    right to residence guaranteed by Art, 19( 1)(e) remain more a teasing
    illusion unless the State provides them the means to have food, clothing and
    shelter so as to make their life meaningful and worth-living with dignity.

          In Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation, [1985] 3 SCC 545 at
c   572 para 32, when the squatters and the pavement dwellers were sought to
    be ejected by the respondent, without due process of law, they invoked the
    jurisdiction of this Court under Article 32. A Constitution Bench held that
    their eviction from the dwellings would result in deprivation of their
    livelihood. Right to life under Article 21 includes right to livelihood and so
    if deprivation of livelihood is effected without reasonable procedure
D   established by law, it would be violative of Article 21. In that context, this
    Court held the sweep of the right to life conferred by Article 21, is wide and
    far reaching. Life means more than animal existence. It does not mean
    merely that life cannot be extinguished or taken away as, for example, by
    imposition of execution of death sentence, except according to procedure
    established by law. That is but one aspect of right to life. An equally
E
    important facet of that right to livelihood is no person can live with~ut the
    means of living, that is, the means of livelihood. If the right to livelihood is
    not treated as a part of the constitutional right to life, the easiest way of
    depriving a person of his right to life would be to deprive him of his means
    of livelihood to the point of abrogation. Such deprivation would not only
F   denude the life of its effective content and meaningfulness but it would
    make life impossible to live. There is, thus, a close nexus between life and
    the means of livelihood and as such that, which alone makes it possible to
     live, leave aside what makes life liveable, must be deemed to be an integral
    component of the right to life.

G       In Shantistar Builders v. Narayan Khimalal Totame, AIR (1990) SC               I
    630, a Bench of three Judges, to which one ofus (K. Ramaswamy, J.) was a
    Member, held that :-                                                ·

                  "The right to life would take within its sweep the right to
                  food, the right to clothing, the right to decent environment
H                 and a reasonable accommodation to live in. The difference
                             P.G.GUPTAv. STATE                            635

              between the need of an animal and a human being for shelter A
              has to be kept in view. For the animal it is the bare protection
              of the body, for a human being it has to be a suitable
              accommodation which would allow him to grow in every
              aspect - physical, mental and intellectual. The Constitution
              aims at ensuring fuller development of every child. That
              would be possible only if the child is in a proper home. It is B
              not necessary that every citizen must be ensured of Jiving in a
              well-built comfortable house but a reasonable home
              particularly for people in India can even be mud-built
              thatched house or a mud-built fire-proof accommodation."

     As stated earlier, the right to residence and settlement is a fundamental C
right under Article 19 (1). (e) and it is a facet of inseparable meaningful
right to life under Article 21. Food, shelter and clothing are minimal human
rights. The State has undertaken as its economic policy of planned ·
development of the country and has undertaken massive housing schemes.
As its part, allotment of houses was adopted, as is enjoined by Arts 3 8, 39
and 46, Preamble and 19(1) (e), facilities and opportunities to the weaker D
sections of the society of the right to residence, make the life meaningful
and liveable in equal status with dignity of person. It is, therefore,
imperative pf the State to provide permanent housing accommodation to the
poor in the housing schemes undertaken by it or its instrumentalities within
their economic means so that they could make the payment of the price in E
easy installments and have permanent settlement and residence assured
under Article 19( l) (e) and 21 of the Constitution. Thus for there is no
problem but the crucial question is whether that right is till available to the
appellants in category (vi).

     It is seen that after the capital was shifted to Ahmegehad, these houses    F
were allotted to Govt. employees. That came with the shifting of the capital.
Initially, on April 17, 1971, 200 houses were got converted from rental
basis scheme to the hire purchase scheme. Tl1ereafter the Govt. have re-
considered the matter and by resolution dated June 22, 1972, resolved to
allot all the 396 houses to the Government employees on hire purchase
scheme. Thus, the diversion became compulsive necessity. Therefore, the          G
High Court has taken the criteria of June 22, 1972 as last date for fixing the
entitlement for the priorities mentioned in the offending resolutions and
allotment of the houses to the Govt. employees. It is true, that a date has to
be fixed with reference to a particular case and fixation of any date always
may appear to be arbitrary. But some connection has to be established for
fixation of the date for allotment of the houses. In this case, since the        H
    636                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [1994] SUPP. 6 S.C.R

A   government had taken decision on June 22, 1972, to convert the rental basis
    scheme into hire purchase scheme that date bears rational relation to the
    obje::t of allotment. Therefore, it cannot be said to be arbitrary or irrational
    offending Article 14 of the Constitution.

         It i!i contended that appellants in category (vi) were taken by surprise
B   of the adverse order like a bolt from the blue from the decision of the High
    Court without arguments nor challenge made to it, has no substance. From
    the judgment it is clear that category (iii) persons who had vacated the
    houses were treated on par with category (vi) employees transferred from
    the capital to the districts. From the material on record it would appear that
    the eligibility of category of (vi) employees was also questioned. Though
C   some of them managed to remain in possession, they cannot claim right to
    allotment under hire purchase scheme. Therefore, the High Court has
    rightly considered that when category (iii) employees were excluded on the
    ground that they shifted their residence from Pahari to Gandhinagar, the
    same parity should be applied to category (vi) employees who have been
    transferred from the capital to the districts.
D
        In these circumstances, we do not find any Illegality in excluding
    employees of categories (iii) and (vi) for allotment under hire purchase
    scheme. The appeals are accordingly dismissed. No costs.

    T.N.A.                                                     Appeals dismi~sed.