Supreme Court of India
SHAH NAWAJversusSTATE OF U.P. & ANR.
- Citation
- 2011 INSC 548
- Decided
- 5 August 2011
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- P SATHASIVAM
Holding
Under Rule 12, a school mark sheet and school leaving certificate are valid conclusive proof of age, making the appellant a juvenile, and the orders of the Additional Sessions Judge and High Court are set aside.
Summary
An FIR was lodged under Sections 302 and 307 IPC against Shah Nawaj. His mother applied to the Juvenile Justice Board claiming he was a minor, relying on his school mark sheet and school leaving certificate showing a birth date of 18‑06‑1989. The Board declared him a juvenile, but the Additional Sessions Judge and the High Court set aside that finding, holding that in the absence of a matriculation certificate the Board should have sought a medical opinion. The Supreme Court examined Rule 12 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007, which prioritises school certificates and mark sheets over medical reports, and held that such documents are valid proof of age. It found the appellant was indeed a juvenile on the date of the alleged offence and set aside the lower courts' orders, allowing the appeal.
Issues considered
- The proper method of determining the age of an accused under the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000, particularly the hierarchy of evidence under Rule 12 of the 2007 Rules.
- Whether a school mark sheet and school leaving certificate constitute conclusive proof of age in the absence of a matriculation certificate.
- Whether a medical board opinion was required in this case.
Legislation cited
Subjects
Juvenile JusticeAge determinationSchool mark sheet as evidenceSchool leaving certificateRule 12Criminal lawIPC 302IPC 307Appeal
Judgment
[2011] 9 S.C.R. 859
·•.
SHAH NAWAJ A
v.
STATE OF U.P. & ANR.
(Criminal Appeal No. 1531 of 2011)
J AUGUST 05, 2011
B
[P. SATHASIVAM AND DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, JJ.]
Juvenile Justice/Care and Protection of Children) Rules,
2007 - Claim of juvenility - FIR lodged against appellant for
commission of offence u/ss. 302 and 307 /PC - Application c
filed by appellant's mother before the Juvenile Justice Board
that he was a minor at the time of the alleged occurrence on
. basis of her son's school leaving certificate - Application
,> allowed - Session Judge set aside the order passed by the
Board - Said 'order upheld by the High Court on the ground D
of absence of any matriculation or equivalent certificate - On
,appeal held: Documents furnished-mark sheet of High
School Examination issued by the School Authority and the
School Leaving Certificate issued by the Preparatory School
clearly show that the date of birth of the appellant was noted E
as 18.06.1989 - Entry relating to date of birth entered in the
mark sheet as also school leaving certificate are valid proof
.• of evidence for determination of age of an accused person -
Date of birth mentioned in the High School mark sheet
produced by the appellant has duly been coffoborated by the F
School Leaving Certificate of the appellant of Class X and has
also been proved by the statement of the clerk and the
principal of the School - Mother of the appellant corroborated
his academic records which clearly depose his date of birth
as 18. 06. 1989 and the appellant was a juvenile on the date
"" G
of occurrence as alleged in the FIR - Thus, the Additional
Sessions Judge and the High Court erred in determining the
age of the appellant ignoring the date of birth mentioned in
those documents which is illegal, erroneous and contrary to
859 H
860 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 9 S.C.R.
A the Rules - Decision of the Board is upheld and that of the
Additional Sessions Judge and the High Court are set aside
- Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act,
2000.
8 An FIR was lodged against the appellant and others
for commission of offence under Sections 302 and 307
IPC. The mother of the appellant filed an application
before the Juvenile Justice Board that the minor was a
juvenile on the alleged date of occurrence. The witnesses
C were cross-examined and the Board declared the
appellant juvenile under the provisions of the Juvenile
Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000. The
complainant-wife of deceased filed an appeal and the
order passed by the Board was set aside. The appellant
filed criminal revision. The High Court dismissed the
D revision on the ground that in the absence of any
matriculation or equivalent certificate and the language
used in Rule 12 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and
Protection of Children) Rules, 2007 was with reference to
only certificate and not the mark sheet. Therefore, the
E appellant filed the instant appeal.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1.1 Rule 12 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and
F Protection of Children) Rules, 2007 which was brought
in pursuance of the Act describes four categories of
evidence which have been provided in which preference
has been given to school certificate over the medical
report. Rule 12 of the Rules categorically envisages that
the medical opinion from the medical board should be·
G sought only when the matriculation certificate or school
certificate or any birth certificate issued by a corporation
or by any Panchayat or municipality is not available.
[Paras 19 and 21] [873-B-C; 874-B]
H
SHAH NAWAJ v. STATE OF U.P. & ANR. 861
1.2 The documents furnished mark sheet of High A
School Examination issued by the School Authority and
the School leaving certificate dated 11.07.2007 issued by
the Preparatory School clearly show that the date of birth
of the appellant was noted as 18.06.1989. The entry
relating to date of birth entered in the mark sheet is one B
of the valid proof of evidence for determination of age of
an accused person. The School Leaving Certificate is
also a valid proof in determining the age of the accused
person. Further, the date of birth mentioned in the High
School mark sheet produced by the appellant has duly c
been corroborated by the School Leaving Certificate of
the appellant of Class X and has also been proved by the
statement of the clerk of the School and recorded by the
Board. The date of birth of the appellant has also been
recorded as 18.06.1989 in School Leaving Certificate 0
issued by the Principal of the School as well as the said
date of birth mentioned in the school register of the said
school which was proved by the statement of the
Principal of that school recorded before the Board. Apart
from the clerk and the Principal of the school, the mother E
of the appellant categorically stated on oath that the
appellant was born on 18.06.1989 and his date of birth in
his academic records from preparatory to Class X is the
same, namely, 18.06.1989, thus, her statement
corroborated his academic records which clearly depose F
his date of birth as 18.06.1989. Thus, the appellant was a
juvenile on the date of occurrence as alleged in the FIR.
[Para 20] [873-D-H; 874-A-B]
1.3 From the acceptable records, it is held that the
date of birth of the appellant is 18.06.1989. Though the G
Board correctly accepted the entry relating to the date of
birth in the mark sheet and school certificate, the
Additional Sessions Judge and the High Court committed
a grave error in determining the age of the appellant
ignoring the date of birth mentioned in those documents H
862 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 9 S.C.R.
..
A which is illegal, erroneous and contrary to the Rules.
While upholding the decision of the Board, the orders of
the Additional Sessions Judge and the High Court are set
aside. The appellant is declared to be a juvenile on the
date of commission of offence and may be proceeded in
B accordance with law. [Paras 19 and 22] [873-B-C; 874-C-
D]
Raju and Anr. vs. State of Haryana 2010 (3) SCC 235:
2010 (2) SCR 57 4; Hari Ram vs. State of Rajasthan and Anr.
C 2009 (13) SCC 211: 2009 (7) SCR 623; Bhoop Ram vs. State
of U.P. 1989 (3) SCC 1: Rajinder Chandra vs. State of
Chhatisgarh and Anr. 2002 (2) SCC 287; Amit Das vs.State
of Bihar (2000) 5 SCC 488: 2000 (1) Suppl. SCR 69;
Ravinder Singh Gorkhi vs. State of U.P. 2006 (5) SCC 584:
2006 (2) Suppl. SCR 615; Pradeep Kumar vs. State of U.P.
0 1995 Supp. (4) SCC 419 - referred to.
Case Law Reference:
2010 (2) SCR 574 Referred to Para 7
E 2009 (7) SCR 623 Referred to Para 7
1989 (3) sec 1 Referred to Para 8
2002 (2) sec 287 Referred to Para 9 •
F 2000 (1) Suppl. SCR 69 Referred to Para 10
2006 (2) Suppl. SCR 615 Referred to Para 11
1995 Supp. (4) SCC 419 Referred to Para 12
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
G No. 1531 of 2011.
From the Judgment & Order dated 10.12.2010 of the High
Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Criminal Revision No. 716
of 2009.
H
SHAH NAWAJ v. STATE OF U.P. & ANR. 863
.. Dinesh Kumar Garg, B.S. Billowria, Abhishek Garg, A
Dhananjay Garg for the Appellant.
R.K. Gupta, Rajeev Dubey, Kamlendra Mishra for the
Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by B
P. SATHASIVAM, J. 1. Leave granted.
2. This appeal is directed against the final judgment and
order dated 10.12.2010 passed by the High Court of c
Judicature at Allahabad in Criminal Revision No. 716 of 2009
whereby the High Court dismissed the criminal revision filed
by the appellant herein.
' 3. Brief facts:
,,.. D
(a) The appellant claims to have born on 18.06.1989 in
Village and Post Dadheru Kala, Police Station Charthawal,
District Muzaffamagar, U.P. He was admitted in Class I in Nehru
Preparatory School, Khurd, Muzaffarnagar on 05.07.1994 and
studied there till 20.05.1998. Thereafter, on 04.07.1998, he got E
admission in Class VI in the National High School Dadheru,
Khurd-0-Kalan, Muzaffarnagar and studied there till Class X.
The date of birth in the mark sheet is mentioned as 18.06.1989.
.;
(b) On 04.06.2007, a First Information Report (in short "the
FIR") was lodged by Khatizan, wife of Nawab-the deceased, F
against the appellant herein and three others for the alleged
occurrence which culminated into Crime Case No. 215 of 2007
at Police Station Charthawal, District Muzaffarnagar, U.P. under
Sections 302 and 307 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short
"the IPC") . G
....
(c) On 12.06.2007, the mother of the appellant submitted
an application before the Juvenile Justice Board (in short "the
Board"), Muzaffarnagar. U.P. stating that the appellant was a
minor at the time of the alleged occurrence. After examining H
864 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2011J 9 S.C.R.
A the witnesses, the Board, vide judgment and order dated
..
24.01.2008, declared the appellant juvenile under the provisions
of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act,
2000 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act").
8 (d) Against the judgment of the Board, Khatizan - the wife
of the deceased filed Criminal Appeal No. 11 of 2008 before
the Additional Sessions Judge, Muzaffarnagar, U.P. under
Section 52 of the Act. The State - respondent No.1 did not file
any appeal. Vide judgment dated 13.01.2009, the Additional
C Sessions Judge allowed the appeal and set aside the order
dated 24.01.2008 passed by the Board.
(e) Challenging the judgment dated 13.01.2009 passed by
the Additional Sessions Judge, the appellant filed Criminal
Revision No. 716 of 2009 before the High Court of Allahabad.
D The High Court, by the impugned judgment dated 10.12.2010,
dismissed the criminal revision. Hence this appeal by way of
special leave.
4. Heard Mr. Dinesh Kumar Garg, learned counsel for the
-
E appellant and Mr. R.K. Gupta, learned counsel for the State.
Despite notice, no one has entered appearance on behalf of
respondent No.2.
5. Before considering the merits of the claim of the
appellant and the stand of the State, let us consider Rule 12 of
F the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules,
2007 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Rules') which reads as
under:-
"12. Procedure to be followed in determination of
G Age.- (1) In every case concerning a child or a juvenile
in conflict with law, the court or the Board or as the case
may be the Committee referred to in rule 19 of these rules
shall determine the age of such juvenile or child or a
juvenile in conflict with law within a period of thirty days from
H the date of making of the application for that purpose.
SHAH NAWAJ v. STATE OF U.P. & ANR. 865
[P. SATHASIVAM, J.]
(2) The court or the Board or as the case may be the A
Committee shall decide the juvenility or otherwise of the
juvenile or the child or as the case may be the juvenile in
conflict with law, prima facie on the basis of physical
appearance or documents, if available, and send him to
f .. the observation home or in jail. B
(3) In every case concerning a child or juvenile in conflict
with law, the age determination inquiry shall be conducted
.. by the court or the Board or, as the case may be, the
Committee by seeking evidence by obtaining -
c
(a) (i) the matriculation or equivalent certificates, if
available; and in the absence whereof;
•I ' (ii) the date of birth certificate from the school (other
than a play school) first attended; and in the D
absence whereof;
(iii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a
municipal authority or a panchayat;
(b) and only in the absence of either (i), (ii) or (iii) of E
clause (a) above, the medical opinion will be
sought from a duly constituted Medical Board, which
.:; will declare the age of the juvenile or child. In case
exact assessment of the age cannot be done, the
Court or the Board or, as the case may be, the F
Committee, for the reasons to be recorded by them,
may, if considered necessary, give benefit to the
child or juvenile by considering his/her age on lower
side within the margin of one year.
G
.... and, while passing orders in such case shall, after taking
into consideration such evidence as may be available, or
-
I
the medical opinion, as the case may be, record a finding
in respect of his age and either of the evidence specified
in any of the clauses (a)(i), (ii), (iii) or in the absence
H
866 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 9 S.C.R.
A whereof, clause (b) shall be the conclusive proof of the age +·
as regards such child or the juvenile in conflict with law.
(4) If the age of a juvenile or child or the juvenile in conflict
with law is found to be below 18 years on the date of
offence, on the basis of any of the conclusive proof
B
specified in sub-rule (3), the court or the Board or as the
case may be the Committee shall in writing pass an order
stating the age and declaring the status of juvenility or
otherwise, for the purpose of the Act and these rules and
a copy of the order shall be given to such juvenile or the
c person concerned.
(5) Save and except where, further inquiry or otherwise is
required, inter alia, in terms of section 7A, section 64 of
the Act and these rules, no further inquiry shall be
D conducted by the court or the Board after examining and
obtaining the certificate or any other documentary proof
referred to in sub-rule (3) of this rule.
(6) The provisions contained in this rule shall also apply
to those disposed off cases, where the status of juvenility
E
has not been determined in accordance with the
provisions contained in sub-rule (3) and the Act, requiring
dispensation of the sentence under the Act for passing
appropriate order in the interest of the juvenile in conflict
with law."
F
6. In the light of the above procedure to be followed in
determining the age of the child or juvenile, let us consider
various decisions of this Court.
G 7. In Raju and Anr. vs. State of Haryana (2010) 3 SCC
235, this Court had admitted "mark sheet" as one of the proof
in determining the age of the accused person. In that case, the
appellants therein Raju and Mangli along with Anil alias Balli
and Sucha Singh were sent up for trial for allegedly having
H committed an offence punishable under Section 302 read with
SHAH NAWAJ v. STATE OF U.P. & ANR. 867
[P. SATHASIVAM, J.]
"-f
Section 34 of the IPC. Accused Sucha Sil']gh was found to be A
a juvenile and his case was separated for separate trial under
the Act. Others were convicted under Section 302 read with
Section 34 of the !PC and were sentenced to imprisonment for
life and to pay a fine of Rs. 5,000/-. Apart from contending on
•• the merits of the prosecution case, insofar as appellant No. 1, B
Raju, is concerned, the counsel appearing for him submitted
that on the date of the incident that is on (31.03.1994), he was
a juvenile and as per his mark sheet, wherein his date of birth
was recorded as 1977, he was less than 17 years of age on
the date of the incident. Learned counsel submitted that having c
regard to the recent decision of this Court in Hari Ram vs.
State of Rajasthan & Anr., (2009) 13 SCC 211, appellant No.
1 must be held to have been a minor on the date of the incident
and the provisions of the Act would apply in his case. Learned
counsel furthercontended that the ap~ellant No. 1 would have
D
to be dealt with under the provisions of the said Act in keeping
with the decision in the aforesaid case. On merits, while
accepting the claim of the learned counsel for accused-
appellant, this Court altered the conviction and sentence and
convicted under Section 304 Part I read with Section 34 IPC
instead of Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC. As far as E
appellant No. 1, namely, Raju was concerned, while accepting
the entry relating to date of birth in the mark sheet referred his
• case to the Board in terms of Section 20 of the Act to be dealt
under the provisions of the said Act in keeping with the
provision of Section 15 thereof. It is clear from the said decision F
that this Court has accepted mark sheet as one of the proof
for determining the age of an accused person.
8. Similarly, this Court has treated the date of birth in
School Leaving Certificate as valid proof in determining the age G
of an accused person. In Bhoop Ram vs. State of U.P. (1989)
3 sec 1, this Court considered whether the appellant therein
is entitled lesser imprisonment than imprisonment for life and
. should have been treated as a "child" within the meaning of
Section 2(4) of the U.P. Children Act, 1951 (1 of 1952). The H
868 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011) 9 S.C.R.
A following conclusion in para 7 is relevant which reads as under:-
"7 ..... The first is that the appellant has produced a school
certificate which carries the date 24-6-1960 against the
column "date of birth". There is no material before us to
8 hold that the school certificate does not relate to the
appellant or that the entries therein are not correct in their
particulars ...."
It is clear from the above decision that this Court relied on the
entry made in the column "date of birth" in the School Leaving
C Certificate.
9. In Rajinder Chandra vs. State of Chhattisgarh and Anr.
(2002) 2 sec 287, this Court once again considered the entry
relating to date of birth in the mark sheet and concluded as
o under:
"5. It is true that the age of the accused is just on the border
of sixteen years and on the date of the offence and his
arrest he was less than 16 years oy a few months only. In
Amit Das v. State of Bihar this Court has, on a review of
E judicial opinion, held that while dealing with the question
of determination of the age of the accused for the purpose
of finding out whether he is a juvenile or not, a
hypertechnical approach should not be adopted while
appreciating the evidence adduced on behalf of the
F accused in support of the plea that he was a juvenile and
if two views may be possible on the said evidence, the
court should lean in favour of holding the accused to be a
juvenile in borderline cases. The law, so laid down by this
Court, squarely applies to the facts of the present case.
G
10. In Amit Das vs. State of Bihar, (2000) 5 SCC 488, this
Court held that while dealing with a question of determination
of the age of an accused, for the purpose of finding out whether
he is a juvenile or not, a hyper-technical approach should not
H be adopted while appreciating the evidence adduced on behalf
870 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011) 9 S.C.R.
A U.P. Children Act, 1951 and as such on conviction under r
Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC should have been sent
to an approved school for detention till the age of 18 years. At
the time of granting special leave, appellant, by name, Jagdish
produced High School Certificate, according to which he was
B about 15 years of age at the time of occurrence. Appellant -
Krishan Kant produced horoscope which showed that he was
13 years of age at the time of occurrence. So far as appellant
- Pradeep was concerned, a medical report was called for by
this Court which disclosed that his date of birth as 07 .01.1959
c was acceptable on the basis of various tests conducted by the
medical authorities. In the above factual scenario/details, this
Court concluded as under:-
"3. It is thus proved to the satisfaction of this Court that on
the date of occurrence, the appellants had not completed '
D 16 years of age and as such they should have been dealt
with under the U.P. Children Act instead of being
sentenced to imprisonment on conviction under Section
302/34 of the Act"
E After saying so and after finding that the appellants were aged
more than 30 years, this Court directed not to send them to an
approved school under the U.P. Children Act for detention, while
sustaining the conviction of the appellants under all the charges
framed against them, quashed the sentences awarded to them ..
F and ordered their release forthwith.
13. The applicability of the Act and the Rules in respect
of "Juvenile" and "Juvenile in conflict with law" have been
elaborately considered by this Court in Hari Ram (supra}. After
analyzing the Scheme of the Act and various Rules including
G Rule 12 and earlier decisions of this Court laid down various
principles to be followed. After applying those principles and
finding that the appellant therein was 16 years of age on the
date of the commission of the alleged offence and had not
been completed 18 years of age, remitted the matter to the
H Board for disposal in accordance with law.
SHAH NAWAJ v. STATE OF U.P. & ANR. 871
[P. SATHASIVAM, J.]
·-i
Discussion on merits: A
14. In the light of the above principles, now let us consider
the claim of the appellant. According to him, on 18.06.1989,
he was born in Village and Post Dadheru Kala, Police Station
/.
·< Charthawal, District Muzaffarnagar, U.P. On 05.07.1994, he
B
was admitted in Class I in Nehru Preparatory School, Khurd,
Muzaffarnagar. The appellant left the said school on
20.05.1998. On 04.07.1998, he was admitted in Class VI in the
National High School Dadheru, Khurd-0-Kalan, Muzaffarnagar,
U.P. On 21.05.2004, he left the said school, namely, National
High School as he failed in High School. From Class VI till
c
Class X the appellant remained and studied continuously in the
aforesaid school. The date of birth in the mark sheet is
~ mentioned as 18.06.1989. The alleged occurrence took place
on 04.06.2007. The FIR was lodged on 04.06.2007 which
" culminated into Crime Case No. 215 of 2007 at Police Station D
Charthawal, District Muzaffarnagar, U.P. under Sections 302
and 307 ofthe4PC. On 12.06.2007, the mother of the appellant
submitted an application before the Board at Muzaffarnagar
stating that the appellant was a minor at the time of alleged
occurrence. The appellant was provided a School Leaving E
Certificate dated 11.07.2007 from Nehru Preparatory School,
Khurd, Muzaffarnagar. The mother of the appellant made a
• statement dated 26.07.2007 regarding the age of her son. She
was cross-examined at length. On 16.10.2007, the statement
of clerk of Nehru Preparatory School was recorded by the F
Board. The said clerk brought the entire records maintained by
the School. The said clerk was also cross-examined at length.
15. The Board, vide judgment and order dated 24.01.2008,
declared the appellant juvenile under the Act. Against the
G
judgment of the Board, the complainant Smt. Khatizan, wife of
deceased Nawab filed Criminal Appeal No. 11 of 2008 under
Section 52 of the Act before the learned Additional Sessions
· Judge, Muzaffarnagar. It is relevant to point out that the State,
who is the prosecuting agency did not file any appeal. The
H
872, SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011) 9 S.C.R.
A Additional Sessions Judge, Muzaffarnagar recorded the
statement of Guljar Hussain, Principal of Nehru Preparatory
School, Dadheru, Khurd-0-Kalan, Muzaffarnagar on
07 .08.2008. By order dated 13.01.2009, the Additional
Sessions Judge allowed the said appeal filed by the
B complainant and set aside the order dated 24.01.2008 passed
by the Board.
16. Aggrieved by the order of the Additional Sessions
Judge, the appellant filed Criminal Revision No. 716 of 2009
C before the High Court. The High Court dismissed the said
Revision mainly on the ground that in the absence of any
matriculation or equivalent certificate and considering the
language used in Rule 12 with reference to only "Certificate"
and not "mark sheet", dismissed the Revision petition.
D 17. We have already referred to the decision of this Court
about the entry relating to the date of birth made in the mark
sheet of High School examination. The appellant has produced
mark sheet of High School examination issued by the school
authority, namely, National High School, Dadheru, Khurd-0-
E Kalan, Muzaffarnagar. A perusal of the above said certificate
makes reference to appellant's Roll No., his name, Date of Birth,
name of the school, details regarding various subjects,
maximum marks, marks obtained and ultimate result in the
examination. The certificate contained signature of the Clerk
F Salim Ahmed, who prepared the same, the signature of the
examiner and signature and seal of the Head Master. It is dated
21.05.2004.
18. Another document relied on by the appellant is School
Leaving Certificate dated 11.07.2007 issued by Nehru
G Preparatory School, Khu rd, Muzaffarnagar wherein it noted the
registration no., name of the school, student's name, date of
birth (18.06.1989) written in words also, Father's name,
occupation, caste, residential address, date of admission in
school, date of leaving of school. The certificate contained the
H
SHAH NAWAJ v. STATE OF U.P. & ANR. 873
[P. SATHASIVAM, J.]
,_, signature and seal of the Head Master and the same is dated. A
11.07.2007.
19. The documents furnished above clearly show that the
date of birth of the appellant had been noted as 18.06.1989.
Rule 12 of the Rules categorically envisages that the medical
~ -· opinion from the medical board should be sought only when the
B
matriculation certificate or school certificate or any birth
certificate issued by a corporation or :by any Panchayat or
municipality is not available. We are of the view that though the
Board has correctly accepted the entry relating to the date of
birth in the mark sheet and school certificate, the Additional c
Sessions Judge and the High Court committed a grave error
in determining the age of the appellant ignoring the date of birth
mentioned in those documents which is illegal, erroneous and
" contrary to the Rules.
,j•
D
20. We are satisfied that the entry relating to date of birth
entered in the mark sheet is one of the valid proof of evidence
for determination of age of an accused person. ·The School
Leaving Certificate is also a valid proof in determin'ing the age
of the accused person. Further, the date of birth mentioned in E
the High School mark sheet produced by the appellant has duly
been corroborated by the School Leaving Certificate of the
.. appellant of Class X and has also been proved by the statement
• of the clerk of Nehru High School, Dadheru, Khurd-0-Kalan and
recorded by the Board. The date of birth of the appellant has F
also been recorded as 18.06.1989 in School Leaving
Certificate issued by the Principal of Nehru Preparatory School,
Dadheru, Khurd-0-Kalan, Muzaffarnagar as well as the said
date of birth mentioned in the school register of the said school
at S. No. 1382 which have been proved by the statement of G
the Principal of that school recorded before the Board. Apart
from the clerk and the Principal of the school, the mother of the
appellant has categorically stated on oath that the appellant
was born on 18.06.1989 and his date of birth in his academic
records from preparatory to Class X is the same, namely, H
874 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 9 S.C.R.
A 18.06.1989, hence her statement corroborated his academic
records which clearly depose his date of birth as 18.06.1989.
Accordingly, the appellant was a juvenile on the date of
occurrence that is 04.06.2007 as alleged in the FIR dated
04.06.2007.
B
21. We are also satisfied that Rule 12 of the Rules which
was brought in pursuance of the Act describes four categories
of evidence which have been provided in which preference has
been given to school certificate over the medical report.
c 22. In the light of the above discussion, we hold that from
the acceptable records, the date of birth of the appellant is
18.06.1989, the Additional Sessions Judge and the High Court
committed an error in taking contrary view. While upholding the
decision of the Board, we set aside the orders of the Additional
0 Sessions Judge dated 13.01.2009 and the High Court dated
10.12.2010. Accordingly, the appellant is declared to be a
juvenile on the date of commission of offence and may be
proceeded in accordance with law. The appeal is allowed.
E N.J. Appeal allowed.
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