Holding

The FIR and charge sheet do not disclose a prima facie case under Section 498A IPC and are therefore quashed under the inherent powers of Section 482 CrPC.

Summary

Shakson Belthisor appealed against the Kerala High Court’s order refusing to quash the FIR and charge sheet filed under Section 498A IPC for alleged cruelty by the husband. The Supreme Court examined whether the FIR and charge sheet disclosed any of the essential ingredients of cruelty as defined in explanations (a) or (b) of Section 498A. It found that the FIR and charge sheet contained no allegation of conduct likely to drive the wife to suicide, cause grave injury, or constitute harassment to coerce unlawful demands. Consequently, no prima facie case under Section 498A existed. The Court held that Section 482 CrPC may be exercised to quash proceedings when the complaint does not disclose an offence, and ordered the FIR and charge sheet to be quashed, allowing the appeal.

Issues considered

Whether the FIR and charge sheet disclose a prima facie offence under Section 498A IPC.
Whether explanations (a) or (b) of Section 498A IPC are attracted in the present facts.
Whether the High Court erred in refusing to quash the FIR and charge sheet under Section 482 CrPC.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 482
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 498A

Subjects

Section 482Section 498Acrueltydowryquashing FIRcriminal proceduremarital disputeabuse of processIndian Penal CodeCriminal Procedure Code

Judgment

[2009) 9 S.C.R. 1187

\
SHAKSON BELTHISSOR A
V.
STATE OF KERALA & ANR.
(Criminal Appeal No. 249 of 2004)

JULY 6, 2009
B
[DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA AND DR. B. S.
CHAUHAN, JJ.]

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - s.482 - Petition
under- Quashing of- FIR and charge sheet against husband c
alleging commission of offence u/s. 498A /PC - Application
uls.482 - Dismissal of, by High Court - Held: Not correct -
No ingredient of s.498A /PC in FIR or charge sheet to prima
facie constitute a case of cruelty as defined uls. 498A -
Neither explanation (a) or (b) of s. 498A attracted - Thus, FIR D
and charge sheet against husband qua__shed - Order of High
Court aside - Penal Code, 1860 - s.498A.

The question which arose for consideration in this
appeal was whether High Court was justified in dismissfng
E
the petition u/s. 482 Cr.P .C. for quashing the FIR and the

-
' ~
charge sheet against appellant-husband for the alleged
commission of offence u/s. 498A IPC.

Allowing the appeal, the Court
F
HELD: 1 The scope a·nd power of quashing a first
information report and charge sheet under section 482 of
the CrPC is well settled. The said power is exercised by
the court to prevent abuse of the process of law and court
but such a power could be exercised only when the G
complaint filed by the complainant or the charge sheet
filed by the police did not disclose any offence or when
the said complaint is found to be frivolous, vexatious or
oppressive. [Para 9) [1195-C-D]
1187 H
1188 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 9 S.C.R.

i
A Nagawwa v. Veeranna Shivalingappa Konjalgi (1976) 3
SCC 736, Drugs Inspector v. Dr. B.K. Krishna 1981 (2) SCC
454; Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Ram Kishan Rohtagi
1983 (1) SCC 1; State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal 1992 Supp.
(1) SCC 335; pepsi Foods Ltd. and Anr. Vs. Special Judicial
B Magistrate and Others 1998 (5) SCC 749; S. W Palanikar v.
State of Bihar 2002 (1) SCC 241; Indian Oil Corpn. v. NEPC,
lndiaLtd. (2006)6 SCC736; Kalyani v. Janak C. M_ehtaand
Others (2009) t SCC 516 - referred to.

2.1. In the light of the language used in the section
C 498AIPC, the provision would be applicable only to such
a case where the husband or the relative of the husband
of a w~man subjects the said woman to cruelty. When the
ingredients of the said section are present in a particular
case, in that event the person concerned against whom
,.D the offence is alleged would be tried in accordance wjth
law·in a trial instituted against him and if found guilty the
accused would be punished with imprisonment for.a term
which may extend to three years and shall also be liable
to fine. The said section contains an explanation, which
E defines "cruelty" as understood under section 498A IPC.
In order to understand the meaning of the expression
'cruelty' as envisaged under section 498A, there must be
suc-h ·a -eond'LTtf"on the part of the husband or relatives
of the husband of woman which is of such a -nature as
F to cause the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave
injury or danger to life, limb or health whether mental or
physical of the woman. [Para 21] [1206-C-F]

2.2. On examination of the facts of the present case,
G particularly the FIR and the charge sheet it is found that
there is no such allegation either in the FIR or in the
charge sheet making out-a prima facie case as narrated
under explanation (a). There is. no allegation that there is
any such conduct ori the part of the appellant which could
H be said to be amounting to cruelty of such a nature as is
SHAKSON BELTHISSOR v. STATE OF KERALA & 1189
ANR.
\
likely to cause the respondent no. 2 to commit suicide or A
to cause any injury to her life. The ingredient to
cons.titute an offence under explanation (a) of section
· 498A IPC are not at all mentioned either in FIR or in charge
sheet- and in absence thereof, no case is made out.
Therefore, explanationja) as found in section 498A IPC B
is clearly not attracted, in the instant case. [Para 22] [1206-
F-H; 1207-A-B]

2.3: In order to constitute cruelty under the said
provision there has to_. be harassment of the woman with · C
a view to .coercing her or any person related to her to
meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable
~ecurity or a case is to be made out to the effect that there
is a failure by her or any. person related to her to meet
such demand. When the allegation made in the FIR and ·.
charge sheet is examined in the instant case in the light -0
of the said provision, no prima facie case even under the
aforesaid provision is made out to attract a case of
cruelty. [Para 23] [1207-B-D]
-
2.4. The marriage between the appellant and E
respondent No. 2 was performed on 23.10.1997 when it
is -alleged that Rs. 5 lakhs was given by the parents of
respondent No. 2 to the family of appellant as dowry. The
FIR was filed in the month of April, 2002 and in the said
FIR there is no allegation that subsequent thereto any F
harassment was made by the appellant with a view to
coercing her or any person related to respondent No. 2
to meet any unlawful demand or any property. [Para 24]
[1207-E-F]

2.4. Neither explanation (a) nor explanation (b) of G
secth:>n 498 A IPC is attraited in the instant case. It is
crystal clear that neither in the FIR nor in the charge sheet
there is any ingredient of fection 498A IPC, which could
prima facie constitute a case of cruelty as defined in that
section. Thus,·it is established that on a reading of the H
1190 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009l 9 S.C.R.

'i
A FIR as also the charge sheet filed against t~~ appel~nt
no case under section 498A is made out on the fac~ of
the record, and therefore, both the FIR as also, the charge
sheet are liable to be quashed in exercise cj,f the powers
under section 482 of the Cr.P.C. High Court failed to
B appreciate th_e facts in proper perspective~and therefore,
committed an error on the face of th record. The
proceedings initiated against the appellant ~u,nder section
498A IPC are quashed. [Paras 25, 26 an<t 27] [1207-F-H;
1208-A-C]
c Case Law Reference:
1976 (3) sec 736 Referred to. Para 110
1981 (2) sec 454• Referred to. Para· 11

D 1983 (1) sec 1 Referred to Parai 12 ·
1992 Supp. (1) sec 335 Referred fo~ Para 13
1998 (5) sec 149 Referred
,. ·tp. Para 15
2002 (1) sec 241 Referred to. Para 16
E
2006 (6) sec 736 Referred to. Para 11·
2009 (1) sec 516 Referred t<>. Para 18 j-

"' )om
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal·
F No. 249 of 2004.

From the Judgment & Order dated 28:.10 2002 of the Hig~
Court of Kerala at Ernakulam in CRMC. No. 9376 of 2002. ·

M.K. Michael for the Appellant.
G ;..
Dushyant Parashar, C.N. Sreekumar, G. Prakash al)ld,
Ramesh Babu M.R. for the Respond~nts.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
H
SHAKSON BELTHISSOR v. STATE OF KERALA & 1191
ANR.
\ DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J. 1. This appeal is A
directed against the judgment and order dated 28.10.2002
passed by the Kerala High Court rejecting the petition filed by
the appellant herein praying for quashing of the first Information
report (for short 'the FIR') and the charge sh~et filed against
him. B
2. The Respondent No. 2 (Valsa) got married with the
-\ appellant on 23.10.1997. Even otherwise they are related to
each other, the Respondent No. 2 being the daughter of the
appellant's maternal uncle and paternal aunt. Incidentally, the
aforesaid marriage was the second marriage of Respondent
c
No. 2 as she was earlier married to one Mr. Varghese, who
died in the year 1995. Through the said marriage the
Respondent No. 2 has two sons. However, it was the first
marriage of the appellant. Out of the wedlock between the
appellant and Respondent No. 2, there is no issue. D

3. The appellant was working at the relevant time at Saudi
Arabia. The appellant got married·to Respondent No. 2 when
he came on leave for four months. However, after the marriage
there appears to be some dispute between the parties. On E
21.04.2002, Respondent No. 2 filed an FIR in the Kottayam
Police Station, District Kallam, Kerala alleging that the appellant
married her when he came on leave for 4 months and that after
the marriage he stayed in the house of the complainant - wife
and that after expiry of the period of leave, her husband - the F
appellant returned to the Gulf. It was also alleged by Respondent
No. 2 in the said FIR that thereafter, for 2-3 months, the
appellant used to send money for the expenses in the house,
talked to her over phone and also sent letters from Saudi Arabia
and also behaved with her very affectionately. It was also alleged
G
that the parents of Respondent No. 2 at the time of marriage
had given Rs. 5 lakhs and that the said money was utilized by
the family of the appellant for purchasing a house at
Nediyazhikam and also a property at Mukkam where they are
residing. It was also alleged that thereafter they started
H
I 1192 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009) 9 S.C.R.

A spreading wrong information regarding the conduct of the
Respondent No. 2 in the locality and also misled the appellant
about her. On believing his family members, the appellant also
stopped sending money from Saudi Arabia .for her expenses
and also stopped sending letters to her. It was also alleged by
B the Respondent No. 2 in the said FIR that when she called him
on telephone, the appellant behaved without affection towards
her and disconnected the phone due to which she became
mentally weak. It was also alleged that subsequently whenever
the appellant came on leave, he never used to come to the
c house of Respondent No. 2 and stayed in the house of his
younger brother and when Respondent No. 2 herself went to
that house, she was tur!led out from that house. It was also
alleged that due to such treatment meted out to her, she has
been suffering both mentally and physically.

D 4. On the basis of the said FIR a criminal case was
registered and on completion of the investigation made by the
police, a charge sheet was submitted by the police alleging,
inter alia, that in the investigation it is established that it is only
the appellant, who has committed the offence. It was also stated
E in the said charge sheet that investigation as per Section 498A
of the Indian Penal Code (in short "the IPC") is being continued
after dropping the provision of Section 34 IPC since it was
revealed that no offence was .committed by any of the family
members of the appellant under Section 34 IPC. It was also
F stated in the charge sheet that since the appellant has been in
Gulf, arrest could not be made and therefore police requested
the court to issue a warrant of· arrest for production of the
accused-appellant.

5. Both the FIR and the charge sheet, which were
G submitted by the police, became the bone of contention so far
as the appellant is concerned, and therefore, he filed a Criminal
Miscellaneous Case No. 9376 of 2002 under Section·482 of
the Criminal Procedure Code (in short "the CrPC) before the
High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam praying for quashing of both
H
SHAKSON BELTHISSOR v. STATE OF KERALA & 1193
ANR. [DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.]
\ the FIR as also the charge sheet on the ground that no case A
for prosecution under Section 498 A IPC is made out against
him. The High Court, however, without issuing any notice on the
said petition rejected the petition holding that by no stretch of
imagination it can be said that the FIR and the charge sheet
do not disclose the commission of the offence alleged against B
the appellant.

6. Being aggrieved by the said order passed by the
learned Single Judge of the High Court, the present appeal was
filed on which notice was issued and further proceedings before
the trial court were stayed by this Court.
c
7. Now, the appeal is listed before us for hearing and we
heard the learned counsels appearing for the parties. In order
to fairly appreciate the contents of the submissions made by
the counsel appearing for the parties, it is necessary to extract D
relevant portion of the FIR and the charge sheet.
8. The relevant part of the· FIR is as under:
"...... On last 23rd October, 1997, Shakson Belthissor of
Nediyazhikam House, Mukkam, Mayyanad married me at E
the lyyathu Church at Kallam in accordance with the
religious rites and custom. Husband is called by the name

.... Raju. Husband has been working in Saudi Arabia as
Business Executive. He married me at the time when he
came on leave for 4 months. After the marriage, after F
wedded life had been in my house. On expiry of the period
of leave, husband returned to Gulf. Thereafter, for 2-3
months, it was used to send money for the expenses in
the house, to talk over phone, to send letters and to behave
with very affection towards me. At the time of the marriage, G

- -* my parents had given Rs. 5 lakhs as dowry. Using that
amount with the consent of husband, Jose Major (younger
brother of husband), wife Jessilet Manoj, their mother Jain
Franco purchased Nediyazhikam house and property at
Mukkam and resided therein. Thereafter, they spread in H
1194 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009) 9 S.C.R.

-(
A the locality unnecessary matters regarding me and
informed husband and misled him. Husband, who believed
their words, later stopped sending money for my expenses
or sending letters. When I called him over phone, he would
behave Without affection towards me and cut off the phohe.
B Due to· this behaviour from the part of husband and .the.
aforesaid relatives, I was mentally weakened. While being
so, husband came back on leave. Without coming td my
house, went to the house of the younger brother. Learning
about it, I went to there. Then, the younger brother, wife' and
c wife's mother closed the door of the house after ser)ding
me out. From that event and onwards, I had been suffering
from physical and mental torturing ... "
......
Relevant part of the charge sheet is as under:
D " ... While leading family life in Vivek Bhawan having
~.
number 11 in Ward VII along the west side bf the
Panchayath Road going from Cheriyil Pullichira Pos{ Office
Junction towards Devalaku.zhi and other plac~s. the
accused spent off sor.ne amount from the Rs 5 lakhs which
E had been given as dowry at the time of marriage and after
buying property with the balance amount he left for Gulf,
and thereafter without giving for the maintenanc~ of the

F
witness No. 1 or looking after the family affairs, ~e. witness.
No. 1 was tortured through letters and over phone a.nd when·
he came on leave, he spread unnecessary matter about
the witness No. 1 and tortured mentally and thu~ committed
-
the offence under the above provision - regar;ding."

Re~ort

G ..... On getting it revealed during the investigafton. of the ,_
case that only the accused No. 1 has com'!'itted the
offence, report has been submitted before t~e Court .for
reducing the number from 2 to 4 regarding the
-
identification of the full name and address of ~~e accused
H No. 1.
SHAKSON BELTHISSOR v. STATE OF KERALA & 1195
-f
ANR. [DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.]
\
Report has been submitted before the Court A
..._ regarding continuation of the investigation as per Section
498A IPC after reducing Section 34 IPC, since it was
revealed that no offence was committed under Section 34
IPC.
B
Since the accused in this case has been in Gulf,
arrest could not be made and the Hon'ble Court may be
~ pleased to issue warrant to arrest and produce the
accused."
,,.'
9. The scope and power of quashing a first information c
I

report and charge sheet under Section 482 of the CrPC is well
I
....__ settled. The said power is exercised by the court to prevent
abuse of the process of law and court but such a power could ·
be exercised only when the complaint filed by the complainant
or the charge sheet filed by the police did not disclose any D
offence or when the said complaint is found to be frivolous,
vexatious or oppressive. A number of decisions have been
rendered by this Court on the aforesaid issue wherein the law
relating to quashing of a complaint has been succinctly laid
down. E
10. In Nagawwa v. Veeranna Shivalingappa Konjalgi,

... .. (1976) 3 SCC 736, it was held that the Magistrate while issuing
process against the accused should satisfy himself as to
whether the allegations made in the complaint, if proved, would
F
ultimately end in the conviction of the accused. It was held that
the order of Magistrate for issuing process against the accused
could be quashed under the following circumstances: (SCC p.
741, para 5)

"(1) Where the allegations made in the complaint or the G
'* statements of the witnesses recorded in support of the
........
same taken at their face value make out absolutely no case
against the accused or the complaint does not diselose

- the essential ingredients of an offence which is alleged
against the accused; H
1196 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009) 9 S.C.R.
t-

i
A (2) Where the allegations made in the complaint are
patently absurd and inherently improbable so that no
prudent person can ever reach a conclusion that there is ·--
sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused;

(3) Where the discretion exercised by the Magistrate in
B
issuing process is capricious and arbitrary having been
based either on no evidence or on materials which are
wholly irrelevant or inadmissible; and

(4) Where the complaint suffers from fundamental legal
c defects, such as, want of sanction, or absence of a
complaint by legally competent authority and the like."

11. In the case of Drugs Inspector v. Dr. B.K. Krishna
[1981 (2) SCC 454] it was held by this Court that in a quashing
D proceeding, the High Court has to see whether the allegations
made in the complaint petition, if proved, make out a prima
facie offence and that the accused has prima facie committed "
the offence. In the said decision this Court refused the prayer
for quashing of the complaint on the ground that there were
sufficient allegations in the complaint to make out a case that
E
the accused persons were responsible for the management and
conduct of the firm and, therefore, the extent of their liability
could be and should be established during trial. .
.12. In Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Ram Kishan Ji-
F Rohtagi [1983 ( 1) SCC 1] it was held that when on the allegation
made in the complaint, a clear case was made out against all
the respondents (accused persons), the High Court ought not
to have quashed the proceedings on the ground that the
complaint did not disclose any offence. In Municipal
G Corporation of Delhi (supra), this Court observed as follows· ,_
in para 8: .,.
"8. Another important consideration which is to be kept in
mind is as to when the High Court acting under the
provisions of Section 482 should exercise the inherent
H
SHAKSON BELTHISSOR v. STATE OF KERALA & 1197
..,..." ANR. [DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.]
\
power insofar as quashing of criminal proceedings are A
concerned. This matter was gone into in great~r detail in
Smt Nagawwa v. Veeranna Shivalingappa Konjalgi,
(1976) 3 sec 736 where the scope.of Sections 202 and
204 of the present Code was considered and while laying
down the guid~lines and the grounds on which proceedings 8
could be quashed this Court observed as follows: [SCC
para 5, p. 741 : SCC (Cri) pp. 511-12]

Thus it may be safely held that in the following cases an
order of the Magistrate issuing process against the
accused can be quashed or set aside:
c
(1) where the allegations made in the complaint or the
statements of the witnesses recorded in support of the
same taken at their face value make out absolutely no case
against the accused or the complaint does not disclose D
the essential ingredients of an offence, which is alleged
against the accused;

. (2) where the allegations made in the complaint are
patently absurd and inherently improbable so that no
E
prudent: person can ever reach a conclusion that there is
sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused;
~

_. (3) where the discretion exercised by the Magistrate in
' issuing process is capricious and arbitrary having been
based either on no evidence or on materials which are F
wholly irrelevant or inadmissible; and

(4) where the complaint suffers from fundamental legal
defects, such as, want of sanction, or absence of a
complaint by legally competent authority and the like. G
~

The cases mentioned by us are purely illustrative and
provide sufficient guidelines to indicate contingencies
where the High Court can quash proceedings."

H
1198 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 9 S.C.R.
..,..
,.

f
A 13. In State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp. (1)
sec 335, a question came up for consideration as to whether
--I
quashing of the FIR filed against the respondent Bhajan Lal for
the offences under Sections 161 and 165 IPC and Section 5(2)
of the Prevention of Cor~uption Act was proper and legal.
B Reversing the order passed by the High Court, this Court
explained the circumstances ~nder which such power could be
exercised. Apart from reiterating the earlier norms laid down
by ·this Court, it was further explained that such power could be
exercised where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint
c are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which
no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there
is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. It
observed as follows in para 102:

"102.. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various
D relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of
the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series
of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary
power und_er Article 226 or the inherent powers under
Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and
E reproduced above, we give the following ca_tegories of -~

cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be
exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any
court-or otherwise to secure the end~ of justice, though it

-
-4

may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly i
F defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible
guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list
of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be
exercised.

(1) Where the allegations made in the first information
G
report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face
value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie *
constitute any offence or make out a case against the
accused.

H (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and -r
SHAKSON BELTHISSOR v. STATE OF KERALA & 1199
ANR. [DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.]
\
other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not A
disclose a cognizable offence, justifyir.g an investigation
by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except
under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of
Section 155(2) of the Code.
B
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR
or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the
same do not disclose the commission of any offence and
make out a case against the accused.

(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a c
cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable
offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer
without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under
Section 155(2) of the Code.
~
D
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are
so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which
no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that
there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the
accused.
E
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any
l> of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under
which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution
and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is
a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, F
providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the
aggrieved party.

(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended
with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously G
+ instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance
on the accused and with a 'Jiew to spite him due to private
and personal grudge."

14. However, in paragraph 108 of the said judgment, this
H
1200 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 9 S.C.R.

.,
A Court referred to and relied upon it earlier judgment in
Sheonandan Paswan vs. State of Bihar; AIR SC 877 wherein
it has been held as under:

"It is a well established proposition of law that a criminal
prosecution, it otherwise justifiable and based upon
B
adequate evi,dence does not become vitiated on account
of mala tides or political vendetta of the first informant or
the complainant."

Thus, in such circumstances, the issue of malafice
c becomes irrelevant.
15. The above decision was followed by this Court in Pepsi
Foods Ltd.. and Anr. · Vs. Special Judicial Magistrate and "h

Others [1998 (5) SCC 749]. Jn paragraph 28 of the said
D judgment this Court held thus :
-f
"28. Summoning of an accused in a criminal case .is a
serious matter. Criminal law cannot be set into motion as
a matter of course. It is not that the complainant has to
bring only two witnesses to support his allegations in the
E complaint to have the criminal law set into motion. The
order of the Magistrate summoning the accused must
reflect that he has applied his mind to the facts of the case ,.
and the law appUcable thereto. He has to examine the
nature of allegations made in the complaint and the _,.
F evidence both oral and documentary in support thereof and
would that be sufficient for the complainant to succeed in
bringing charge home to the accused. It is not that the
Magistrate is a silent spectator at the time of recording of
preliminary evidence before summoning of the accused.
G The Magistrate has to carefully scrutinise the evidence
k
brought on record and may even himself put questions to
~.

the complainant and his witnesses to elicit answers to find
out the truthfulness of the allegations or otherwise and then
examine if any offence is prima facie committed by all or
H any of the accused." ~
SHAKSON BELTHISSOR v. STATE OF KERALA & 1201
ANR. [DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.]
\
16. Further, this Court observed in S. W. Palanikar v. A
State of Bihar [2002 (1) SCC 241] that every breach of trust
may not result in a penal offence of criminal breach of trust
unless there is evidence of a mental act of fraudulent
misappropriation. It observed as follows:
B
Before examining respective contentions on their
relative merits, we think it is appropriate to notice the legal
- position. Every breach of trust may not result in a penal
offence of criminal breach of trust unless there is evidence
of a mental act of fraudulent misappropriation. An act of
breach of trust involves a civil wrong in respect of which c
the person wronged may seek his redress for damages
in a civil court but a breach of trust with mens rea gives
rise to a criminal prosecution as well.
9. The ingredients in order to constitute a criminal breach D
' of trust are: (i) entrusting a person with property or with any
dominion over property, (ii) that person entrusted (a)
dishonestly misappropriating or converting that property to
his own use; or (b) dishonestly using or disposing of that
property or wilfully suffering any other person so to do in· E
violation (i) of any direction of law prescribing the mode
in which such trust is to be discharged, (ii) of· any legal
' contract made, touching the discharge of such trust.
llJ
10. The ingredients of an offence of cheating are: (i) there
should be fraudulent or dishonest inducement of a person F
by deceiving him, (ii)(a) the person so deceived should be
induced to deliver any property to.any person, or to ~onsent
-4 that any person shall retain any property; or (b) the person
so deceived should be intentionally induced to do or omit
+ to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were G
not so deceived; and (iii) in cases covered by (li)(b), the
act of omission should be one which causes or is likely to
cause damage or harm to the person induced in body,
mind, reputation or property.
H
1202 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 9 S.C.R. .

A 11. One of us (D.P. Mahapatra, J.), speaking for the
Bench, in Hridaya Ranjan Prasad Verma v. State of
Bihar; (2000) 4 sec ·168 on facts of that case, has
expressed thus: (SCC p. 177, para 15)
15. In determining the question it has to be kept in mind
B
that the distinction between mere breach of contract and
the offence of cheating is a fine one. It depends upon the
intention of the accused at the time of inducement which
may be judged by his subsequent conduct but for this
subsequent conduct is not the sole test. Mere breach of
c contract cannot give rise to criminal prosecution for
cheating unless fraudulent or dishonest intention is shown
right at the beginning of the transaction, that is the time
when the offence is said to have been committed.
Therefore it is the intention Which is the gist of the· offence.
D To:h'Jld a person guilty of cheating it is necessary to show f
thatI he had fraudulent or .dishonest intention at the time of
ma~ing the promi~e. From his mere failure to keep up
. promise subsequently such a ailpable intention right at the
beginning, that is,-when he made the pr.omise.cannot be
E . pre~umed."

(emphasis suppJied)
I •

17. This Court in the case of Indian Oil Corpn. v. NEPC
. India Ltd., (~006) 6 SCC 736, at page 747 has observed as
F under: ·

"1.2. The principles relating to exercise of jurisdiction Llld~r
Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to quash j

complaints and criminal proceedings have been stated \-
G and reiterated by this ·Court _in several decisions. To
merl.tion . a few~Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia v.
Sa.mbhajirao Chandrojirao Angre, State· of Haryana v.
Bhajan Lal; Ri!pan D_eol Bajaj v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill,

.•
Central Bureau of Investigation v. ·Duncans Agro
H · ·. {ndustrie$ Ltd., State of Bihar v. Rajendra Agrawal/a,
SHAKSON BELTHISSOR v. STATE OF KERALA & 1203
ANR. [DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.]

Rajesh Bajaj v. State NCT of Delhi, Medchl Chemicals A
& Pharma (P) Ltd. v. Biological E. Ltd., Hridaya Ranjan
Prasad Verma v. State of Bihar, M. Krishnan v. Vijay
Singh and Zan,du Pharmaceutical Worl<s Ltd. v. Mohd.
Sharaful Haque .. The principles, relevant to our purpose
are: B
(i) A complaint can be quashed where the allegations
made in the complaint, even if they are taken at their face
value and' accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie
constitute any oftence ·or make out the case alleged
against the accused.
c
For this purpose, the complaint has to be examined as a·
whole, but without examining the merits of the allegations.
Neither a detailed inquiry nor a meticulous analysis of the
material nor an assessment of the reliability or genuineness D
of the allegations in the complaint, is warranted while
examining prayer for quashing of a complaint.
.(ii) A complaint may also be quashed where it is a clear
abuse of the process of the court, as when the criminal E
proceeding is found to have been initiated with mala fides/
malice for Wf'eaking vengeance or to cause harm, or where
the allegations are absurd and inherently improbable..

(iii) The power to quash shall not, however, be used to stifle
or scuttle a legitimate prosecution. The power should be F
used sparingly and with abundant caution.

(iv) The complaint is not required to verbatim reproduce
the.legal ingredients of the offence alleged. If the necessary
factu~I foundation is laid in the complaint, merely on the' G
¥
ground that a few ingredients have not been stated in detail,
the proceedings should not be q4ashed. Quashing ·of the
complaint is warranted only where the complaint is so
bereft of even the basic facts wh,ich are absolutely
necessary for making out the offence. H
1204 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 9 S.C.R.

A 1
(v) A given set of facts may make out: (a) purely a civil
wrong; or (b) purely a criminal offence; or (c) a civil wrong
as also a criminal offence. A commercial transaction or a
contractual dispute, apart from furnishing a caqse of action
for seeking remedy in civil law, may also involve a criminal
8 offence. As the nature and scope of a civil proceeding are
different from a criminal proceeding, the mere fact that the
complaint relates to a commercial transaction or breach
of contract, for which a civil remedy is available ·or has
been availed, is not by itself a ground to quash the criminal
c proceedings. The test is whether the allegations in the
complaint disclose a criminal offence or not,"

18. This Court has recently in R. Kalyani v. Janak C.
Mehta and Others, (2009) 1 SCC 516, observed as follows:
'
D "15. Propositions of law which emerge from the said
decisions are:

(1) The High Court ordinarily would not exercise its inherent
jurisdiction to quash a criminal proceeding and, in
E particular, a First Information Report unless the allegations
contained therein, even if given face value and taken to be
correct in their entirety, disclosed no cognizable offence.
(2) For the saic;t purpose, the Court, save and except in
·very exceptional circumstances, would not look to any
F document relied upon by the defence. ·
(3) Such a power should be exercised very sparingly. If the
allegations made in the FIR disclose cc;>mmission of.an
offence, the court shall not go beyond the same and pass
G . an order in favour of the accused to hold absence of any
mens rea or actus reus. +
(4) If the allegation discloses· a civil dispute, the same by
'Itself may not be a ground to hold that the criminal
proceedings should not be allowed to continue.
H
SHAKSON BELTHISSOR v. STATE OF KERALA & 1205
ANR. [DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.]

16. It is furthermore well known that no hard and fast rule A
can be laid down. Each case has .to be considered on its
own merits. The Court, while exercising its inherent
jurisdiction, although would not interfere with a genuine
complaint keeping in view the purport and object for which
the provisions of Sections 482 and 483 of the Code of B
Criminal Procedure had been introduced by Parliament but
would not hesitate to exercise its jurisdiction in appropriate
_cases. One of the paramount duties of the superior courts
is to see that a person who is apparently innocent is not
subjected to persecution and humiliation on the basis of c
a false and wholly untenable complaint."
19. The same view has been taken by this Court in
Chunduru Siva Ram Krishna & Anr. v. Peddi Ravindra Babu
& Anr., SLP (Crl.) No. 2991 of 2007; and V. V. S. Rama
Sharma &.Ors. v. State of U.P. & Ors., SLP (Crl.) No. 1529 of D
2007. .

20. It was fairly agreed at bar that the aforesaid FIR was
filed by Respondent No. 2 with the intention of making out a
prima facie case of offence under Section 498A of the Indian E
Penal Code. The charge sheet, which was filed by the police
w~s under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code. As to
whether or not in the FIR filed and in the charge sheet a case
of Section 498A IPC is made out or not is an issue, which is
required to be answered in this appeal. Section 498A of the F
IPC reads as follows:

"498A. Husband or-relative of husband of e woman
subjecting her to cruelty. ,

whoever, being the husband or th~ relative of the husband G
of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be ·
punished with imprisonment for..a term· which may extend
le> three years and shall also be ·riable to fin~.
Explanation-For the purpose of this section, "cruelty" H
1206 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 9 S.C.R.

A means'"
(a) Any willful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely
to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave
injury or danger to life, limb or health whether mental or
B
physical) of the woman; or
(b) Harassment of the woman where such harassment is
with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to
meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable
security or is on account of failure by her or any person
c related to. her meet such demand".
'
21. In the light of the aforesaid language used in the
Section, ·1ne provision would be applicable only to such a case
where the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman
D subjects the said woman to cruelty. When, the ingredients of the
aforesaid Section are present in a particular case, in that event i
the person concerned against whom the offence is alleged
would be tried in accordance with law in a trial instituted against
him and if found guilty the accused would·. be punished with
E imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and
shall also be liable to fine. The said section contains an
explanation, which defines "cruelty" as understood under
Section 498A IPC. In order to understand the meaning of. the
expression· 'cruelty' as envisaged under Section 498A, there
must be such a conduct on the part of the husband or relatives
F of the husband of woman which is of such a nature as to cause
the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger
to life, limb or health whether mental or physical of the woman.
22. When we examine the facts of the present case
G particularly the FIR and the charge sheet we find that there is _..
no such allegation either in the FIR or in the charge sheet ~

making out a prima facie case as narrated under explanation
(a). There is no allegation t~at there is any such condu~t on the
part of the appellant which could be said to be amounting to
H cruelty of such a nature as is likely to cause the Respondent
SHAKSON BELTHISSOR v. STATE OF KERALA & 1207
ANR. [DR.. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.]
~
No. 2 to commit suicide or to cause any injury to her life. The A
ingredient to constitute an offence under explanation (a) of
Section 498A IPC are not at all mentioned either in FIR or in
charge sheet and in absence thereof, no case is made out.
Therefore, explanation (a) as found in Section 498A IPC is
clearly not attracted in the present case. B
23. We, therefore, now proceed to examine as to whether
the case would fall under explanation (b) of Section 498A of
IPC constituting cruelty of the nature as mentioned in
explanation (b). In order to constitute cruelty under the said
provision there has to be harassment of the woman with a view c
to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any
unlawful demand for aay property or valuable security or a case
is to be made out to the effect that there is a failure by her or
any person related to her to meet such demand. When the
allegation made in the FIR and charge sheet is examined in D
the present case in the light of the aforesaid provision, we find
that no prima facie case even under the aforesaid provision is
made out to attract a case of cruelty.
24. The marriage between the appellant and Respondent E
No. 2 was perfe>rmed on 23.10.1997 when it is alleged that Rs.
5 lakhs was given by the parents of Respondent No. 2 to the
family of appellant as dowry. The FIR was filed in the month of
April, 2002 and in the said FIR there is no allegation that
subsequent thereto any harassment was made by the appellant F
with a view to coercing her or any person related to Respondent
No. 2 to meet any unlawful demand or any property.

25. In that view of.the matter neither explanation (a) nor
explanation (b) of Section 498 A of IPC is attracted in the
present case. It is crystal clear that neither in the FIR nor in the G
charge sheet there is any ingredient o.f Section 498A IPC, ·
which could prima facie constitute a case of cruelty as defined
in that Section.
26. It is thus established that on a reading of the FIR as H
1208 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009) 9 S.C.R.

A also the charge. sheet filed against the appellant no case under
Section 498A is made out on the face of the record, and
therefore, both the flR as also the charge sheet are liable to
be quashed in exercise of the po"Wers under Section 482 of the
CrPC. Clearly, the High Court failed to appreciate the facts in
e proper perspective, and therefore, committed an error on the
face of th~ re~rd.
27. We, therefore, allow this appeal and quash the · (
proceedings initiated against the appellant under Section 498A
C of the IPC.
28. The appeal is allowed to the aforesaid_ extent.
N.J. Appeal· allowed.