Holding

The conviction under Section 302 IPC is untenable; the appropriate charge is under Section 304 Part I IPC.

Summary

Shakti Dan was convicted under Section 302 IPC for throttling his mother, who died as a result of the assault, and under Section 323 IPC for causing hurt. He appealed, contending that he had no intention to kill his mother and that the charge of murder was inappropriate. The Supreme Court examined the statutory distinctions between murder (Section 300) and culpable homicide not amounting to murder (Section 304) and the relevant clauses of Section 299. It held that the prosecution had not proved the requisite intention or knowledge that the injury inflicted was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, making Section 302 inapplicable. Accordingly, the Court reduced the conviction to Section 304 Part I IPC and imposed a ten‑year imprisonment, partially allowing the appeal.

Issues considered

Whether the facts constitute murder under Section 302 IPC or culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 Part I.
Whether the accused possessed the intention or knowledge required under the clauses of Sections 299 and 300 to sustain a conviction for murder.
Whether the injury inflicted was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, as required by clause (3) of Section 300.
Appropriate quantum of punishment for the offence proved.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 299, s. 300, s. 302, s. 304

Subjects

murderculpable homicideintentionSection 302 IPCSection 304 IPCcriminal appellate jurisdictionhomicide classification

Judgment

SHAKTIDAN A
v.
STATE OF RAJASTHAN

APRIL 26, 2007

[DR. ARIJITPASAYAT AND D.K. JAIN, JJ.] B

; Penal Code, 1860:

s. 304 Part I-Prosecution ulss 302 and 323 I.P.C.-For causing death
of mother-Conviction by courts below uls 302-In appeal to this Court C
absence of intention to kill pleaded-Held: Jn view of the facts of the case
and the principles of Law conviction uls 304 Part I would be appropriate.

· ss. 299 and 300- 'Culpable homicide' and 'Murder-Distinction
between-Meaning and nature of-Discussed.
D
Appellant accused was prosecuted for causing death of his mother.
Prosecution case was that PW-6 (brother of the accused) submitted a report
before a Police Official (PW-11) stating that when accused was beating his
wife, she ran away and reached the house of PW-6. His mother (deceased)
also came there. The deceased advised the accused not to quarrel with his E
wife. Therefore, the accused dragged her out of the house and throttled her
neck, which resulted in her death. PW-11 after conducting preliminary
enquiry, submitted the report of PW-6 to PW-13 (the Investigating Officer).
The accused was charged u/ss. 302 and 323 IPC. Trial Court acquitted the
accused of charges u/s 323 and found him guilty of the offence u/s 302. The
conviction was upheld by High Court. F
In appeal to this Court, appellant questioned the conviction. Alternatively
it was contended that even if the prosecution version was accepted, the case
was not covered u/s 302 IPC, as he had no intention to kill his mother.

Partly allowing the appeal, the Court G
HELD: 1.1. In the scheme of IPC culpable homicide is genus and
'murder' its specie. All 'murder' is 'culpable homicide' but not vice-versa.
Speaking generally, 'culpable homicide' sans special characteristics of

673 H
674 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2007] 5 S.C.R.

A murder is culpable homicide not amounting to murder. For the purpose of
fixing punishment, proportionate to the gravity of the generic offence, the IPC
practically recognizes three degrees of culpable homicide. The first is, what
may be called, 'culpable homicide of the first degree. This is the gravest form
of culpable homicide, which is defined in Section 300 as 'murder'. The second
may be termed as 'culpable homicide of the second degree'. This is punishable
B under the first part of Section 304. Then, there is 'culpable homicide of the
third degree'. This is the lowest type of culpable homicide and the punishment
provided for it is also the lowest among the punishments provided for the three
grades. Culpable homicide of this degree is punishable under the second part
of Section 304. [Para 13) (678-D, E, F, G)
c 1.2. The academic distinction between 'murder' and 'culpable homicide
not amounting to murder' has always vexed the Courts. The confusion is
caused, if Courts losing sight of the true scope and meaning of the terms
used by the legislature in these sections, allow themselves to be drawn into
minute abstractions. The safest way of approach to the interpretation and
D application of these provisions seems to be to keep in focus the keywords used
in the various clauses of Sections 299 and 300. [Para 14) (678-G; 679-A)

1.3. Clause (b) of Section 299 corresponds with clauses (2) and (3) of
Section 300. The distinguishing feature of the mens rea requisite under
clause (2) is he knowledge possessed by the offender regarding the particular
E victim being in such a peculiar condition or state of health that the internal
harm caused to him is likely to be fatal, notwithstanding the fact that such
harm would not in the ordinary way ofnature be sufficient to cause death of
a person in normal health or condition. The 'intention to cause death' is not
an essential requirement of clause (2). Only the intention of causing the bodily
F injury coupled with the offender's knowledge of the likelihood of such injury
causing the death of the jlarticular victim, is sufficient to bring the killing
within the ambit of this clause. This aspect of clause (2) is borne out by
illustration (b) appended to Section 300. [Para 15) (680-A, B, CJ

1.4. The difference between clause (b) of Section 299 and clause (3) of
G Section 300 is one of the degree of probability of death resulting from the
intended bodily injury. It is the degree of probability of death which determines )o.. •

whether a culpable homicide is of the gravest, medium or the lowest degree.
The word 'likely' in clause (b) of Section 299 conveys the sense of probable
as distinguished from a mere possibility. The words "bodily injury ....
H Sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death" mean that death
SHAKTI DAN v. STA TE OF RAJASTHAN 675
will be the "most probable" result of the injury, having regard to the ordinary A
course of nature. [Para 16) (680-F, G)

1.5. For cases to fall within clause (3), it is not necessary that the
offender intended to cause death, so long as the death ensues from the
intentional bodily injury or injuries sufficient to cause death in the ordinary
course of nature. (Para 17) (680-H; 681-A) B
Rajwant and Anr. v. State of Kera/a, AIR (1966) SC 1874 and Virsa
' Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR (1958) SC 465, relied on.

1.6. Under clause thirdly of Section 300 IPC, culpable homicide is
murder, if both the following conditions are satisfied. i.e. (a) that the act whichc
causes death is done with the intention of causing death or is done with the
intention of causing a bodily injury; and (b) that the injury intended to be
inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. It must
be proved that there was an intention to intact that particular bodily injury
which, in the ordinary course of nature, was sufficient to cause death, viz.,
D
that the injury found to be present was the injury that was intended to be
4"
' inflicted. [Para 21) [682-D, E, F)

1. 7. Even if the intention of accused was limited to the infliction of a
bodily injury sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature, and
did not extend to the intention of causing death, the offence would be murder. E
Illustration (c) appended to Section 300 clearly brings out this point.
[Para 22) [682-F, G)

1.8. Clause (4) of Section 300 would be applicable where the knowledge
~
of the offender as to the probability of death of a person or persons in general
as distinguished from a particular person or persons - being caused from F
~ his imminently dangerous act, approximates to a practical certainty. Such
knowledge on the part of the offender must be of the highest degree of
probability, the act having been committed by the offender without any excuse
for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as aforesaid.
(Para 23( [682-H; 683-A, BJ
. "' State of Andhra Pradesh v. Rayavarapu Punnayya and Anr., [1976( 4
G

SCC 382; Abdul Waheed Khan@ Waheed and Ors. v. State ofAndhra Pradesh,
JT (2002) 6 SC 274; Augustine Saldanha v. State of Karna/aka, [2003) 10
SCC 472 and Thangaiya v. State a/Tamil Nadu, [2005) 9 SCC 650, referred
to. H
676 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2007] 5 S.C.R.
l
A 2. In view of the background facts and the principles of law, this is a
case where the conviction would be approximate in terms of Section 304 Part
I, IPC and custodial sentence of 10 years would meet the ends of justice.
(Para 26] (683-D, E]

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 630 of
B 2001.
From the Final Judgment and Order dated 11.02.2005 of the High Court
of Rajasthan at Jodhpur in D.B. Crl. Jail Appeal No. 127 of 2002. '

Rana Ranjit Singh, (A.C.) for the Appellant.
c
Dr. N.M. Ghatate, K.P. Dubey and Jatinder Kumar Bhatia for the
Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

D DR.ARIJITPASAYAT,J. l.Leavegranted.

2. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment rendered by a Division ~ •
Bench of the Rajasthan High Court upholding the conviction of the appellant
for an offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860
(in short the 'IPC'). The appellant was convicted by learned Addi. Sessions
E Judge, Parbatsar who sentenced him to undergo life imprisonment and to pay
a fine of Rs.200/- with default stipulation.

3. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:

A written report (Ex.P/18) was submitted before Sattar Khan, Sub-
F Inspector of Police, PS Nawa (PW-11) by Idan (PW-6) on 9.6.1999 with the
averments that in the morning i.e. at about 7a.m. accused Shakti Dan started
beating his wife at his house so she ran away from there and reached to the
house ofldan (PW-6), the younger brother of the accused. The mother of the
accused, namely, Smt. Ugam Kanwar also followed her and she also reached
G the house of Idan which was near the house of the accused. Smt. Ugam
Kanwar (hereinafter referred to as the 'deceased'), advised his son accused
Shaktidan that he should not quarrel with his wife. On hearing this, accused
caught hold of his mother and dragged her out from the house and took her
in front of the temple of deity Kami Mata, where he throttled her neck, on
account of which she died.
H
SHAKTI DAN v. STATEOFRAJASTHAN [PASAYAT,J.] 677
'I
4. On this report, which was received by Sattar Khan (PW-1 ), he thought A
it proper to conduct preliminary investigation. He called the photographer and
then prepared Fard Ex.P/3. He also inspected the site and prepared an Inspection
Note (Ex.P/l ). On the back of Ex.P/1 Fard Surat Hall Lass was prepared and
that is Ex.P/19. Fard Panchayatnama was also prepared, which is Ex.P/2. The
dead body was taken to Govt. Hospital, Nawa, where postmortem of the dead
body was conducted by Dr. Satyendracharya Swami (PW-14). The postmortem B
report is Ex.P/5. After postmortem, the dead body was handed over vide Ex.Pl
,4 20 through Fard Supadaginama of the dead body of deceased Ex.P/22 to Idan
(PW-6). Thereafter, he reached to Police Station Nawa and submitted a written
report (Ex.P/18) given to him by Idan before the SHO, Police Station, Nawa
Ishwar Singh (PW-13), who registered case No.61/99 under Section 302 IPC. c
5. A regular FIR was chalked on the basis of above report (Ex.P/21 ).
Thereafter, the investigation was conducted by Ishwar Singh (PW-13). He
recorded statements of the witness of the case. The accused was arrested
through Arrest Memo Ex.P/4 in presence of the witnesses. After investigation,
a charge sheet was presented in the Court of Judicial Magistrate, Nawa under D
4
Sections 302 and 323 !PC on 19. 7.1999. Thereafter, the case was committed to
' the Court of Sessions for trial. The learned Addi. Sessions Judge, Parbatsar,
after hearing both the sides on charge, framed charges under Section 302 and
323 oflPC on 16.12.1999. Accused denied the charges framed against him and
claimed trial.
E
6. In support of the case, prosecution examined Hamir Singh (PW- I),
Kishorilal (PW-2), Pushpa Kanwar (PW-3) {the wife of the accused), Shambhoo
Singh (PW-4), Saroj Kanwar (PW-5Xwife of PW6 Idan), ldan (PW-6), Kishore
Singh (PW-7), Madho Ram (PW-8), Jogendra Singh (PW-9), Girdharilal (PW-
10), Sattar Khan (PW-11), Santosh (PW-12), Ishwar Singh (PW-13) and Dr. F
Satyendracharya Swami (PW-14). After completion of the trial, statement of
the accused was recorded on 01.12.2001. In his statement under Sec. 313 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short the 'Code') accused has denied
the charges against him and stated that there was enmity of the accused with
Shambho Singh (PW-4).
.. .4
G
7. The learned trial Judge, after hearing both sides, while acquitting the
accused of the charge under Sec. 323 of the !PC, found the accused guilty
of the offence under Sec. 302 of the !PC and sentenced him as stated
hereinabove. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the judgment and order
of conviction and sentence dated 17.01.2002 in Sessions Case No. 31/99, the
H
678 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 5 S.C.R.
f
A accused has preferred before the High Court, which was dismissed. '

8. The High Court found that the evidence of witnesses is credible and
cogent and therefore there was no merit in the appeal before it.

9. In support of the appeal, learned counsel for the appellant submitted
B that there was absolutely no motive for killing the mother. It was submitted
that the evidence of PW-4 on which reliance has been placed is not a reliable
witness.
~

10. It is submitted that even if the prosecution version is accepted, the '
appellant throttled his mother which resulted in her death. There was no
c intention to murder her. Therefore, it was submitted that the case is not
covered under Section 302 IPC.

11. Learned counsel for the respondent on the other hand supported the
judgment and conviction as done by the trial Court and upheld by the High
Court.
D
12. The evidence of PW-4 though questioned to be unreliable, is credible.
... 1

13. This brings us to the crucial question as to which was the appropriate
prov~ion to be applied. In the scheme of the IPC culpable homicide is genus
and 'murder' its specie. All 'murder' is 'culpable homicide' but not vice-versa.
E Speaking generally,.'culpable homicide' sans 'special characteristics of murder
is culpable homicide not amounting to murder'. For the purpose of fixing
punishment, proportionate to the gravity of the generic offence, the IPC
practically recognizes three degrees of culpable homicide. The first is, what
may be called, 'culpable homicide of the first degree'. This is the gravest form
F of culpable homicide, which is defined in Section 300 as 'murder'. The second
may be termed as 'culpable homicide of the second degree'. This is punishable
under the first part of Section 304. Then, there is 'culpable homicide of the
third degree'. This is the lowest type of culpable homicide and the punishment
provided for it is also the lowest among the punishments provided for the
three grades. Culpable homicide of this degree is punishable under the second
G part of Section 304.
_.._ .
14. The academic distinction between 'murder' and 'culpable homicide
not amounting to murder' has always vexed the Courts. The confusion is
caused, if Courts losing sight of the true scope and meaning of the terms used
by the legislature in these sections, allow themselves to be drawn into minute
H
SHAKTI DANv. STATEOFRAJASTHAN [PASAYAT, J.] 679
abstractions. The safest way of approach to the interpretation and application A
of these provisions seems to be to keep in focus the keywords used in the
various clauses of Sections 299 and 300. The following comparative table will
be helpful in appreciating the points of distinction between the two offences.

Section 299 Section 300
B
A person commits culpable homicide Subject to certain exceptions

,_; . -l
if the if the act by which the death is culpable homicide is murder caused
done - if the act by which the
death is cause is done-

INTENTION c
(a) with the intention of causing (1) with the intention of causing
death; or death; or

(b) with the intention of causing (2) with the intention of
such bodily injury as is likely causing such bodily injury to D
to cause death; or as the offender knows to be likely
• .i. to cause the death of the person to
whom the harm is caused; or

(3) With the intention of causing
bodily injury to any person and the E
bodily injury intended to be inflicted
is sufficient in the ordinary course
of nature to cause death; or

KNOWLEOOE F
****
(c) with the knowledge that (4) with the knowledge that the act
the act is likely to cause is so imminently dangerous that it
death. must in all probability cause death
or such bodily injury as is likely to G
•. ....&. cause death, and without any
excuse for incurring the risk of
causing death or such injury as is
mentioned above."
H
680 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2007] 5 S.C.R.
!
A 15. Clause (b) of Section 299 corresponds with clauses (2) and (3) of
Section 300. The distinguishing feature of the mens rea requisite under clause
(2) is the knowledge possessed by the offender regarding the particular victim
being in such a peculiar condition or state of health that the internal harm
caused to him is likely to be fatal, notwithstanding the fact that such harm
B would not in the ordinary way of nature be sufficient to cause death of~a
person in normal health or condition. It is noteworthy that the 'intentioll1'to
cause death' is not an essential requirement of clause (2). Only the intention
of causing the bodily injury coupled with the offender's knowledge of the
likelihood of such injury causing the death of the particular victim, is sufficient
to bring the killing within the ambit of this clause. This aspect of clause (2)
C is borne out by illustration (b) appended to Section 300.
16. Clause (b) of Section 299 does not postulate any such knowledge
on the part of the offender. Instances of cases falling under clause (2) of
Section 300 can be where the assailant causes death by a fist blow intentionally
given knowing that the victim is suffering from an enlarged liver, or enlarged
D spleen or diseased heart and such blow is likely to cause death of that
particular person as a result of the rupture of the liver, or spleen or the failure
of the heart, as the case may be. If the assailant had no such knowledge about
the disease or special frailty of the victim, nor an intention to cause death or
bodily injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the
E offence will not be murder, even if the injury which caused the death, was
intentionally given. In clause (3) of Section 300, instead of the words 'likely
to cause death' occurring in the corresponding clause (b) of Section 299, the
words "sufficient in the ordinary course of nature" have been used. Obviously,
the distinction lies between a bodily injury likely to cause death and a bodily
injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The distinction
F is fine but real and if overlooked, may result in miscarriage of justice. The
difference between clause (b) of Section 299 and clause (3) of Section 300 is
one of the degree of probability of death resulting from the intended bodily
injury. To put it more broadly, it is the degree of probability of death which
determines whether a culpable homicide is of the gravest, medium or the
G lowest degree. The word 'likely' in clause (b) of Section 299 conveys the
sense of probable as distinguished from a mere possibility. The words "bodily
injury ....... sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death" mean that
death will be the "most probable" result of the injury, having regard to the
ordinary course of nature.

H 17. For cases to fall within clause (3), it is not necessary that the
SHAKTIDANv. STATE OF RAJASTHAN [PASAYAT, J.] 681
' offender intended to cause death, so long as the death ensues from the A
intentional bodily injury or injuries sufficient to cause death in the ordinary
course of nature. Rajwani and Anr. v. State of Kera/a, AIR (1966) SC 1874
is an apt illustration of this point.

18. In Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR (1958) SC 465, Vivian Bose,
J. speaking for the Court, explained the meaning and scope of clause (3). It B

v. 1
was observed that the prosecution must prove the following facts before it
can bring a case under Section 300, "thirdly". First, it must establish quite
objectively, that a bodily injury is present; secondly the nature of the injury
must be proved. These are purely objective investigations. Thirdly, it must be
proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular injury, that is to
c
- say, that it was not accidental or unintentional or that some other kind of
injury was intended. Once these three elements are proved to be present, the
enquiry proceeds further, and fourthly it must be proved that the injury of the
type just described made up of the three elements set out above was sufficient
to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. This part of the enquiry is
purely objective and inferential and has nothing to do with the intention of D
-l the offender.
'
19. The ingredients of clause "Thirdly" of Section 300, IPC were brought
out by the illustrious Judge in his terse language as follows:

"To put it shortly, the prosecution must prove the following facts E
before it can bring a case under Section 300, "thirdly".

First, it must establish, quite objectively, that a bodily injury is present.

Secondly, the nature of the injury must be proved. These are purely
objective investigations.
F
Thirdly, it must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that
particular bodily injury, that is to say that it was not accidental or
unintentional, or that some other kind of injury was intended. Once
....__ these three elements are proved to be present, the enquiry proceeds
further and, G
•. .4
Fourthly, it must be proved that the injury of the type just described
made up of the three elements set out above is sufficient to cause
death in the ordinary course of nature. This part of the enquiry is
purely objective and inferential and has nothing to do with the
intention of the offender." H
682 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007) 5 S.C.R.
1
A 20. The learned Judge explained the third ingredient in the following
words (at page 468):

"The question is not whether the prisoner intended to inflict a serious
injury or a trivial one but whether he intended to inflict the injury that
is proved to be present. If he can show that he did not, or if the
B totality of the circumstances justify such an inference, then of course,
the intent that the section requires is not proved. But if there is
nothing beyond the injury and the fact that the appellant inflicted it,
the only possible inference is that he intended to inflict it. Whether
he knew of its seriousness or intended serious consequences, is
neither here or there. The question, so far as the intention is concerned,
c is not whether he intended to kill, or to inflict an injury of a particular
degree of seriousness but whether he intended to inflict the injury in
question and once the existence of the injury is proved the intention
to cause it will be presumed unless the evidence or the circumstances
warrant an opposite conclusion."
D
21. These observations of Vivian Bose, J. have become locus classicus.
The test laid down by Virsa Singh 's case (supra) for the applicability of clause
"Thirdly" is now ingrained in our legal system and has become part of the
rule of law. Under clause thirdly of Section 300 IPC, culpable homicide is
murder, if both the following conditions are satisfied: i.e. (a) that the act which
E causes death is done with the intention of causing death or is done with the
intention of causing a bodily injury; and (b) that the injury intended to be
inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. It must
be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular bodily injury
which, in the ordinary course of nature, was sufficient to cause death, viz.,
F that the injury found to be present was the injury that was intended to be
inflicted.

22. Thus, according to the rule laid down in Virsa Singh's case, even
if the intention of accused was limited to the infliction of a bodily injury
sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature, and did not extend
G to the intention of causing death, the offence would be murder. Illustration
(c) appended to Section 300 clearly brings out this point.

23. Clause (c) of Section 299 and clause (4) of Section 300 both require
knowledge of the probability of the act causing death. It is not necessary for
the purpose of this case to dilate much on the distinction between these
H corresponding clauses. It will be sufficient to say that clause (4) of Section
.. SHAKTIDANv. STATE OF RAJASTHAN [PASAYAT,J.] 683
~ 300 would be applicable where the knowledge of the offender as to the A
probability of death of a person or persons in general as distinguished from
a particular person or persons being caused from his imminently dangerous
act, approximates to a practical certainty. Such knowledge on the part of the
offender must be of the highest degree of probability, the act having been
committed by the offender without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing B
death or such injury as aforesaid.

24. The above are only broad guidelines and not cast iron imperatives.
In most cases, their observance will facilitate the task of the Court. But
sometimes the facts are so intertwined and the second and the third stages
so telescoped into each other that it may not be convenient to give a separate C
treatment to the matters involved in the second and third stages.

25. The position was illuminatingly highlighted by this Court in State
of Andhra Pradesh v. Rayavarapu Punnayya and Anr., [1976] 4 SCC 382,
Abdul Waheed Khan@ Waheed and Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh, JT
(2002) 6 SC 274, Augustine Saldanha v. State of Karnataka, [2003] I0 SCC D
472 and Thangaiya v. State of Tamil Nadu, [2005] 9 SCC 650.

26. Considering the backgrounds facts and applying the principles set
out above we are of the view that this is case where the conviction would
be appropriate in terms of Section 304 Part I, JPC and custodial sentence of
IO years would meet the ends of justice. The appeal is allowed to the aforesaid E
extent. We appreciate the able assistance which learned Amicus Curiae rendered
to the Court.

KKT. Appeal partly allowed.