Holding

The conviction was unsustainable because the prosecution failed to prove the appellant's presence in the house at the time of the discovery, and the circumstantial evidence did not exclude other reasonable hypotheses.

Summary

The appellant, Shankarlal Gyarasilal Dixit, was convicted of rape and murder of a five‑year‑old girl based solely on circumstantial evidence, including the discovery of the child's body in his house, alleged presence of the appellant at the scene, and forensic traces such as a semen stain on his under‑pant. The Supreme Court examined whether the prosecution's circumstances were established by clear and cogent evidence and whether they excluded every other reasonable hypothesis, particularly the crucial link that the appellant was present in the house when the body was found. The Court found that the testimony of the neighbour who entered the house did not reliably establish the appellant's presence, that the forensic evidence was too weak, and that the prosecution failed to prove the essential link, making the chain of circumstantial evidence incomplete. Consequently, the Court held that the conviction could not stand, set aside the death sentence and the seven‑year imprisonment, and acquitted the appellant. The judgment reiterated the stringent test for conviction on circumstantial evidence, emphasizing the need to exclude alternative hypotheses beyond a reasonable doubt.

Issues considered

Whether the circumstantial evidence presented was sufficient to prove the appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Whether the prosecution successfully established the appellant's presence in the house at the material time.
Whether the forensic findings (semen stain, blood stain, bruises) constitute conclusive proof of rape and murder.
Whether a false denial by the accused can be treated as a substantive circumstance of guilt.
Whether the death sentence was justified in the absence of conclusive evidence.

Legislation cited

Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 302, s. 376

Subjects

circumstantial evidencereasonable doubtrapemurderdeath penaltyforensic evidenceIndian Penal Codeacquittal

Judgment

384 •
A SHANKARLAL GYARASILAL DIXIT
v. '
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA
December 17, 1980
B [Y. V. CHANDRACHUD, C.J., A. P. SEN AND BAHARUL ISLAM, JJ.]
Evidence-CircumstanJi'al evidence-Tests to be applied while evaluating
circumstantial evidence-Falsity of defence-If could take the place of proof of
facts--"Shadow of doubt" meaning of.
The prosecution alleged that when the deceased girl did :.iot ictu1n home
C for quite some time from play her mother, alongwith two neighbouring women •
went in search of her. Believing that .she might be in the ~ppellant's house.
they repeatedly knocked at the door whict> wns locked from inside, but tl1ere
was no response from within. At that moment P .W. 5 who lived next to the
appellant's house, arrived on the scene. P.W. 5 climbed over the roof of his
house, entered the appellant's house through the open court-yard and opened the
front door. On entering the house, according to the prosecution, the three
D laiies saw the appellant lying on a cot in the court-yard with a co\,..er pulled
upto his face and the dead body of the child in the bath room, wrapped in a
blanket. The mother lifted her dead child threw the blanket and ran home
"'-"th the dead body. The girl's underpant wa11 missing.

The dead child had injuries on her person and her private parts were
swollen. Postmortem examination of the dead body showed that the vagina of
E the child was lacerated and her hymen ruptured and that death occurred as a
result of asphyxia. Examination of the appellant showed that there was a mark
of dry semen on his underpant and marks of bruises over his left thigh. There
was no smegma around the corona glandis and there was a small abra111ioo over
the base of his glans-penis which had a bluish discolouration on it.
The appellant pleaded that he knew nothing of the crime and that he was
falsely implicated in the murder.
F
The appellant was convicted and sentenced for offences under sections 376
and 302 l.P.C. by the trial conrt and the conviction and sentence hon been con-
firmed by the High Court.

G
Allowing the appeal,

HELD : In a case of circumstantial evidence it is necessary for the Court
-
to find whether the circumstances on which the prosecution reties are established
by satisfactory evidence, often described as clear and cogent and whether the •
circumstances are of such a nature as to exclude every other hypothesis save
the one that the appellant is guilty of the offences of which he is charged. In
other words, the circumstances have to be of such a nature as to be consistent
with the sole hypothesis that the accused is guilty of the crime impaled to
H him. [390 B-Cl
It is not necessary that in every case depending on circumstantial evidence,
the whole of the law governing cases of circumstantial evidence shonld be set
• SHANKER LAL V. MAHARASHTRA 385

out in the judgment. Legal principles are not magic incantations. 'fheir im- A
portance lies more in their application to a given set of facts than in their
• recital in the judgment The simple expectation is that the judgment must
show that the finding of guilt if any has been reached after a proper and care-
ful evaluation of circumstances in order to determine whether they are com-
patible with any other reasonable hypothesis. [395D-EJ

In the instant case the prosecution story that the appellant was not on good B
terms with his mother, brothers and wife, that he was living alone in the bonse
lllld that on the day of occurrence the young school boys who were his tenants
were not in the house and that, therefore, he was all alone is proved. That
P.W. 5 climbed over the roof of his house, entered the appellanfs house and
opened the front door is also proved. [390H]

• But it is impossible to say that the appellant was in the house when P.W. 5 C
and the three ladies entered the house. None of the four persons made any
attempt to elicit any information from the appellant about the presence of the
dead body in the bath room though it was alleged that everyone saw him ly-
ing on a cot in the court yard. Even if the ladies would not exchange a single
word with him, P.W. 5 would have instinctively enquired from him as to how
the dead body of the child was lying in the bath room. P.W. 5 categorically
stated that he had no talk with the appellant at all. His claim that he caJled D
out to the appellant to open the door but that he declined to do so was a clear
improvement over what he narrated to the police immediately after the
incident. [392A-HJ
Secondly the girl's father did not inform the police, either when he went to
the police station for the first time or when he went there a second time to
record the first information report, that the appellant was present in the house
when the ladies entered it. In the statement made to the police immediateily E
after the incident all that he stated was that the girl had died a mysterious death.
The disclosure made by him to police in his complaint leaves no manner of
doubt that the appellant was not present in his house at the time Df the recovery
of the dead body. In his cross-examination he admitted that his wife did not
tell him that it was the appellant who killed their daughter and that the particu-
lar portion in the F.I.R. in which it was stated that his wife had told him that
their daughter was killed by the appellant was not correctly recorded. [393A-BJ F
-{"' Once the crucial link in the chain of circumstances that the appellant was
in the house at the time when the dead body was discovered snaps the entire
case would have to rest on slender tit bits. [394BJ
' The course of contemporaneous and subsequent events strengthens the
inference that the appellant was not in the house when the dead 'Jody was G
discovered. The police inspector who visited the house for making the panch-
nama of the scene of the offence did not state whether the house was open or
locked when he and the punchas entered it. If the appellant's compt:city in
the crime was suspected, attempts would have been made to arrest him imme-
diately. It is not known as to who arrested him and from where and in what
circumstances. All that was stated was that the appellant was produced before
• him in the course of the day. [3930-F] H
It is imp,obable that the appellant would have kept the nnderp•'l! of the
child under his pillow while escaping from the house. The discovery of a blood
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981] 2 S.C.'R. t
386

A stain on the appellant's pant and of ~ dry stain of semen on his underpant arel
circumstances far too feeble to establish that the appellant raped or murdered •
the girl. Absence of smegma around the appellant's corona glandis would not
necessarily establish that he had had a recent intercourse nor do the other cir-
cumstances like bruises on the thigh establish his involvement in the crime. If
the girl was raped she was raped without resistance. [394E-F]

B The argument of the prosecution that the total ignorance uf the incident
pleaded by the appellant is false and \\'Ould itself furnish a link in the chain of
causation is without substance because falsity of dcfcnc.;: c<innot take the phl·~o
of proof of facts which the prosecution has to establish in order to succeed. A
false plea can at best be considered as an additional circumstance if other cir-
cumstances point unfailingly to the. guilt of the accused. [395A-B]
•
c The High Court was in error in saying that what the Court has to consider
is whether the cumulative effect of the circumstances establishes the guilt of
the accused beyond the "shadow of doubt". "Shadow of doubt" even in cases
which depend on direct evidence is shadow of "reasonable" doubt. In its pr<1c-
tical application the test which requires the exclusion of other alternative hypo-
theses is far more rigorous than the test of proof beyond r~asonable doubt.
Secondly, the High Court's view that such a p.;rson as the appellant could not
D be an asset to his wife and children and for that reason should be awarded the
sentence of death is not correct because unfaithful husbands, un~hastc wives
and unruly children are not for that reason to be sentenced to death if they
commit murders unconnected with the state of their equation with their family
and friends. The passing of the sentence of death must elicit the greatest con-
cern and solicitude of the Judge because, that is one sentence which cannot he
recalled. [395F-G, 396H]
E
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 766
of 1980.

Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 27 I
28-2-80 of the Bombay High Court (Nagpur Bench) in Criminal
Appeal No. 331/79 and confirmation case No. 3 of 1979. '
~.··

M. R. Daga, R. A. Gupta and N. P. Paliwal for the Appellant.
H. R. Khanna and M. N. Shroff, for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
G
CHANDRACHUD, c. J. The appellant Shankar!al Gyarasilal Dixit
who is 30 years of age, was convicted by the learned Additional Ses-
sions Judge, Alcala, for offences under sections 376 and 302 of the
Indian Penal Code on the charge that on December 1O. 1978 he raped
a five year old girl called Sunita and thereafter committed her murder. •
·H He was sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for 7 years for the offence
of rape and to death for the offence of murder. The order of convic-
tion and sentence havfog been confirmed by a Division Bench of the ,
SHANKAR LAL v. MAHARASHTRA (Chandrachud, C.J.) 387
'
Bombay High Court by its judgment dated February 27-28, 1980, he A
• has filed this appeal by special leave.
The appellant lives in a locality called Marwadipura in the town of
Karanja, District Akola. His house is situated near a temple called
Gopal Mandir, and a little beyond the temple is a public well. Ramrao
Wagh, the father of the deceased Sunita, used to reside in a house near B
about the well.
On December 10, 1978 at about 10-30 a.m., Sunita's mother
Renukabai, went to the well for fetching water. Sunita accompanied
her. Renukabai returned after a little while but Sunita, who was play-
ing with some children, stayed back. She did not come home for quite
• some time and feeling concerned, Renukabai went in search of her.
c
Unable to find the girl, she went back to her house and told her neigh-
bours, Shilabai Deo and Shobhabai Waghode, that Sunita was missing.
The three ladies thereafter went in search of Sunita. Believing that
she might be in the appellant's house, they knocked at his door re-
peatedly. The door was bolted from inside but there was no response D
from within. As the ladies were running out of their guesses and
patience, a teacher called Shrinarayan Sharma, who lived in a house
next to the appellant's, arrived on the scene. Sharma climbed over the
- roof of his house, entered the appellant's house through an open court-
yard and opened the front door. The three ladies thereafter entered
the house when, it is alleged, they saw the appellant sleeping on a cot E
in the court-yard, with a cover pulled upto his face. Sunita was lying
still and motionless in the bath-room, wrapped in a blanket. Renuka-
bai lifted her dead child, threw the blanket and ran home. Sunita's
underpant was missing.
Soon thereafter, Renukabai's husband Ramrao Wagh returned from
the bazar at about 12-45 p.m., and learned from her that Sunita's F
dead body was found in the appellant's house. Sunita had injuries
on her person and her private parts were swollen. Rarnrao went to
the police station and infom1ed the police of the mysterious death of his
• ·daughter. He returned to his house with the police and after about half
an hour, he went again to the police station and lodged the First Infor-
mation Report (E;xhibit 11), on the basis of which offences were G
• registered against the appellant under sections 376 and :ioz of the
Penal Code.
P.S.I. Ramdas Katke gave directions for the arrest of the appel-
lant, held an inquest on the dead body of Sunita, sent the dead body
for post-mortem examination and went to the appellant's house. From H
there, he seized a blood-stained tile of the flooring of a room afid a
blood-stained blanket which was lying in the bath-room. There was a
388 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1981] 2 S.C.R.

A cot in the court-yard of the house and under a pillow, which was lying
on that cot, was found a child's underpant. That too was seized.
The appellant was thereafter arrested and on being produced before
•
the investigating officer, he was sent for medical examination.
Dr. S. J. Santani, Assistant Surgeon of the Karanja Municipal
B Hospital, who performed the post-mortem examilllation on the dead
body of Sunita found six external injuries on her person. Her vagina
was lacerated and her hymen was ruptured. From these symptoms Dr.
Santani concluded that the girl was raped. From the other injuries, he
concluded that she died of asphyxia, probably due to tracheal com-
c pression.
Dr. Santani examined the appellant on the same day at 9-00 p.m.
i •'
The appellant had put on two full-pants, one on top of the other. His
underpant was suspected to bear the mark of dried semen. There were
marks of bruises over his left thigh, there was no smegma around the
corona glandis and there was a small abrasion over the base of his
D glans-penis which had a bluish discolouration on it.
The defence of the appellant was one of simple denial. He stated
that he was falsely implicated in the case at the instance of his brother.
mother and his neighbour Shrinarayan Sharma.

There can be no doubt that the deceased Sunita died a homicidal
E
death. The post-mortem report prepared by Dr. Santani shows that
she had a contusion over the left cheek, a contusion with soft red brufae
and abrasions over the whole of the anterior aspect of the neck, small
bruises and abrasions over the lips and mouth, an abrasion over the
chest, an abrasion over the right shoulder and an incised wound behind
the right ear, below the mastoid process. These injuries, according to
Dr. Santani, were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause
death.
There is also no reason to doubt that Sunita was raped or at least
attempted to be raped before being murdered. The evidence of Dr. •
Santani shows that her vagina was lacerated and her hymen was rup-
G tured. These are strong indications of her being subjected to a sexual
assault. The inquest panchanama shows that her vagina was swollen
and a whitish fluid and blood were coming out of it. The evidence of
•
Renukabai and Shilabai that Sunita's underpant was missing points in
the same direction.
11 The important question for determination is whether the appellant •
can be held guilty for either or both of these offences. There is no
direct evidence, in the sense of an eye-witness account, to connect the
SHANKAR LAL v. MAHARASHTRA (Chandrtlt1ud, C.J.) 389

appellant with the crime. The prosecution, however, relies on the A
following circumstances in order to establish the charges of rape and
mnrder levelled against him :
( 1 ) The dead body of Sunita was found in the house of Lhe
appellant;
(2) The appellant was residing in the house all alone at the B
relevant time;
(3) Renukabai (PW 2), Shilabai (PW 3) and Shobhabai
knocked at the door of the appellant several times and
though the door was bolted from inside, there was no res-
• ponse from within; C
( 4) Shrinarayan Sharma (PW 5), a next-door neighbonr,
climbed over the roof of his house and seeing that the
appellant was sleeping on a cot in the court-yard, he called
out for him. On hearing the call, the appellant turned
his side and said that he would not open the door; D
( 5) Shrinarayan Shanna entered the appellant's house and
opened the door whereupon Renukabai, Shilabai and
Shobhabai went in. They saw the dead body of Sunita
lying in a bath-room and the appellant sleeping on a cot
in the court-yard of the house;
E
( 6) At the time wheu Sharma and the three ladies entered the
house, no other person apart from the appellant was in the
house;
(7) In spite of the all-round commotion and the discovery of
a dead body from his house, the appellant continued to lie
unconcerned on the cot. He expressed no surprise, indeed F
-!" no reaction at all; nor did he challenge or ask any of the
four "intruders" as to why one of them entered his house
• ~
from the roof and the others rushed in to look out for
gomething;
(8) Sunita's underpant was later found under a pillow which
• was lying on the cot on which the appellant was sleeping; G
(9) A human blood-stain of B Group was found on the appel-
!ant's pant. Sunita's blood belonged to B Group;

• (10) A stain of semen was found on the underpa nt of the
appellant;
R
(11) There was no smegma around the appellant's corona
• glandis; there was a small abrasion over the base of his
9-57 SCI/81
390 SUPRbME COURT REPORTS [1981] 2 S.C.R.

A glans penis which had a bluish discolouration; and there
were bruises over bis right thigh; and '
(12) The plea of the appellant that he knew nothing of the·
crime and that he was involved falsely at the instance of
his mother, brother and the neighbour Sharma is patently
B false.
Since this is a case of circumstantial evidence, it is necessary to find
whether the circumstances on which the prosecution relies are esta-
blished by satisfactory evidence, often described as 'clear and cogent'
and secondly, whether the circumstances are of such a nature as to

c
exclude every other hypotl1esis save the one that the appellant is guilty
of the offences of which he is charged. In other words, the circum-
•
stances have to be of such a nature as to be consistent with the sole
hypothesis that the 11ccused is guilty of the crime imputed to him.

There is credible evidence in support of the first circumstance
out of th•o 12 circumstances enumerated above. The evidence of
D Renukabai (PW 2), Shilabai (PW 3) and Shrinarnyan Sharma (PW
5) proves that when they entered the appellant's house they saw the
dead body of Sunita lying in a bath-room of the house. The dead
body was wrapped in a blanket which Renukabai, the mother of
Suuita, discarded while removing Sunita to her awn house. The
blanket, which bore a few stains of human blood vias seized by the
E police from the appellant's house when they made a panchanarna of
the scene oi offence.
As regards the second circumstance, the evidcn.;;: of Navalkisbore
Dixit (PW 8), who is !be yonnger brother of the appellaht, shows
that after the death of their father on May 1, 1978, the appellant
F started picking up quarrels with the family members, trying to screw
money from them for his vices. He beat Navalkishore on November
30 and on December 7 he assaulted their mother. On December 8,
N avalkishore left fue house wifu the mother and they went to live with
a person called. Balkisan Banga. Thus, the only two other members
of the family who used to live in the house along with the appellant
G had ldt the house two days before the ~ncident. The appellant's
wife and their children had already started residing separately from
him in the house of the wife's father in the same town of Karanja.
A few young village boys who were residing at Karanja for their
schooling were occupying a part of the appellant's house as his tenants. •
H But the evidence of Shilahai (PW 3) who was a tenant of the appel-
lant in another part of fue house, shows that fue boys had gone to
their vilia~, Dapura, over the week-end. The incident happened ..
SHANKAR LAL v. MAHARASHTRA (Challdrachud, C.J.) 391

, on December 10, 1978 which was a Sunday. Thus, there is enough A
evidenrn lo show that the appellant was living by himself in bis
house on the date of the incident. The other members of hls family
had virtually deserted him and his school-boy tenants bad gone to
their villag.:: which was a short distanee away from Karanja.
The evidence as regards the third circumstance may also safely B
be accepted. Rcnukabai (PW 2) and Shilabai (PW 3) knocked at
the appcllani's door repeatedly but the door was bolted from inside
and there was no response to their request that the door be opened.
Plai1tly, the reason why Shrinarayan Sharma (PW 5) had to climb
• over the roof of his house for the purpose of entering the court-yard
of the appellant's house was that the ladies were unable to make any c
headway.
A part of the fourth circumstance is easy to accept as proved be-
cause there can be no doubt that Shrinarayan Shorma climbed over
the roof oi his adjoining house and entered the appellant's house.
Shrinarayan Sharma is a cousin of the appellant and his testimony
D
on this part of the case accords with the broad probabilities of
human affairs.
But though it is true that Shrinarayan Sharma climbed over the roof
of his house for the pul,'pOse of entering the appellant's house, it seems
to us impossible to accept his claim that he saw the appellant sleeping
on a cot in the court-yard, that he called out for him and that·on hear- E
ing the C'all, the appellant merely turned his side and said that he will
not open the door. That takes us to the consideration of what we con-
sider to be the most important link in the chain of circumstances impli-
cating the appellant. The focal point of the case is that the appellant
was present in his house while the dead body of Sunita was lying in the
_;jr bath-room. A part of circumstance ( 4) and the 5th circumstance relate F
1 to the question as to whether the appellant was sleeping on a cot in the
conrt-yard of his house whilst the dead body of Sunita was lying in
~ the bath-room.
There are several reasons which make it impossible to believe that
the appellant was in the house when Shrinarayan Sharma and the three G
• ladies found the dead body of Sunita after entering the house. It is
incredible that if Shrinarayan Sharma and the ladies saw the appellant
in the house, they would not exchange a single word with him. The
dead body was lying close-by in a bath-room and any normal human
being would have instinctively inquired of the appellant as to how rt
was that the dead body was lying in his house. None of the four H
persons who entered the appellant's house made any attempt what-
soever to elicit any information from him as to how Sunita came to
392 SUPJUlME COURT REPORTS [1981] 2 S.C.R.

A be lying dead in the bath-room. It is alleged that everyone saw the
appellant sleeping on a cot in the court-yard, but it is strahge that '
n0l1e talked to him at all.

One can understand the ladies not having the courage to talk to
the appellrult. But it is difficult to believe that Shrinarayan Sharma,
B a forty-five-Year old school teacher, could also not dare so mnch as
to ask tl1e appellant, without making any accusation against him, as
to how the dead body of the girl came to be in the bath-room. Shri-
nara yan Sharma has made a categorical admission in his evidence
that he had no talk with the appellant at all. In fact, as stated
earlier, the claim of Shrinarayan Sharma that he called out to the
1•-
c appellant and that the appellant said that he would not open the door,
seems to us a clear improvement over what he narrated to the police
immediately after the incident. He did not tell the police anything of
the kind. When his attention was drawn to this significant omission,
his explanation was that he could not say why the police did not
D record that part_ of his statement We have no doubt that Shrinarayan
Sharma did not tell the police during the course of bis statement, which
was recorded immediately after the incident, that he called out for
the appellant and that the appellant stated that he would not open
the door. This was far too important a happening which the witness
would have failecl to disclose to the police.
E
Another reason for rejecting the case of the prosecution that the
appellant was present in the house when the dead body of Sunita was
discovered is that when Ramrao Wagh, the father of Sunita, returned
to his house from the bazzar at about 12.30 p.m., he was neither in-
formed by his wife Renukabai oar by any other person that the appel-
F !ant was present in the house when Renukabai brought back the dead
body of Sunita from the appellant's house. The admitted sequence of
events in this behalf has an impartant bearing on this central theme of
the case. Ramrao Wagh went to his house from the bazzar and in
pursuance of a disclosure made to him by his wife Renukabai, he
straightaway went to the police station. The only statement which he
G made at the police station was that his daughter Sunita had died a
mysterious death. Nothing at all was said by him regarding the pre-
•
sence of the appellant in the house at the time when the dead body of
Sunita was discovered. The statement made by Ramrao Wagh to the
police was evidently not reduced to writing, but it is clear that Ramrao •
H went back to the house along with the police officers. He went airain
to the police station, when the First Information Report, Exhibit 1t,
was recorded. It is surprising that even in the FIR, Ramrao Wa~h did
not say that the appellant was present in the house when Renukabai
SHANKAR LAL v. MAHARASHTRA (Chandrachud, C.J.) 393

and the other persons entered the house and when the dead body of A
Sunita was discovered. All that Ramrao stated in the FIR was that
' the appellant had killed his daughter in orde( that she should not cry
while she was being raped. Surely, the FIR was recorded after Ram-
rao had learnt of the incident from his wife and a few others including
Shrinarayan Sharma, Shilabai and Shobhabai. The disclosure made by
Ramrao to the police in his complaint leaves no manner of doubt that B
the appellant was not present in his house at the time when Sunita's
dead body was discovered.
The FIR contains a statement that Reuukaban had told Ramrao
that the appellant bad killed Sunita. Ramrao admitted in bis cross-
examination that Reuukabai did not tell him an,ything of the sort and c
• that the particular portion of the FIR in which it is stated that
Renukabai had told him that Sunita was killed by Shankarlal was
not correctly recorded. The up-shot of the matter is that when the
FIR was recorded, no one thonght that the appellant was responsible
for the violence which was done to Sunita.
D
The course of contemporaneous and subsequent events streng-
thens the inference that the appellant was not in the house when the
dead body of Sunita was discovered. Ramrao went to the police sta-

- tion not once but "twice, and it is reasonable to expect that if the
appellant's complicity in the crime was stated or suspected, attempts
would have been made immediately to arrest him. When PSI Katke
went to the appellant's house for making the pancbanama of the scene
E

of offence, the appellant was evidently not in the honse. According
to PSI Katke, instructions were given by him for the arrest of the
appellant. But surprisingly, there is not one word on the record to
show as to who arrested the appellant and from where. All that the
Investigating Officer has stated in his evidence is that during the F
course of the day the appellant was produced before him" This
passive-voice statement does not inspire confidence.
The up-shot of the matter is that Shrinarayan Sharma did not tell
the police that he called out the appellant or that the appellant replied
that be will not open the door. Secondly, Renukabai did not tell her G
husband Ramrao that when she entered the house of the appellant
and found the dead bods of Sunita in the bath-room, the appellant
• was present in the house. Thirdly, none of the large group of persons
who were present in the house of Ramrao disclosed, what was cer-
tainly the most significant circumstance, that the appellant was sleep-
ing in the court-yard while the dead body was lying in the bath-room n
of his house. Finally, no attempt was made immediately after the
FIR was lodge9 to have the appellant arrested and there is no
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981) 2 S.C.R.
•
A evidence on the point as to who arrested him, from where, and in
what circnmstances.
As- we have stated earlier, the crucial link in the chain of cir-
cumstances is the presence of the appellant in his house at the time
when the dead body of Sunita was discovered. Once that link snaps,
B the entire case would have to rest on slender tit-bits here and there.
This discussion disposes of the second part of the 4th circumstance,
part of the 5th circumstance and circumstances (_6) and (7).
The discovery of Sunita's under-pant, which is the 8th circums-
tance, is also enveloped in suspicion. At the time when the under-
pant was discoverd, the appellant was not in the house. PSI Katke ~
c has not stated in his evidence as to whether the appellant's house was (
open or locked when he and the panchas entered it. It is also diffi- •
cnlt to believe that the appellant wonld keep the under-pant under
his pillow while making good his escape from the house after the dead
body of Sunita was taken away. We are inclined to the view that
Sunita's under-pant was placed under the pillow as a part of the
D scheme to involve the appellant, first by fixing that he was sleeping
on the cot at the crucial time and then by showing that the under-pant
of the girl was found under the very pillow which was lying on the

-
cot on which the appellant was sleeping.
The discovery of a blood stain of the 'B' Group measuring 0.5 cm.
E in diameter on the appellant's pant and of a dried stain of semen on
his under-pant are circumstances far too feeble to establish that the
appellant raped or murdered Sunita. 'B' Group is not an uncommon
group of blood and no effort was made to exclude the possibility that
the blood of the appellant belonged to the same group. As regards
the dried stain of semen on the appellant's under-pant, he was a
F grown up man of 30 years and no compelling inference can arise
that the stain was caused during the course of the sexual assault
committed by him on the girl. '-:_..,.
It is then said that there was no smegma around the appellant's
corona glandis. That cannot by itself prove that he had sexual inter-
G course. The presence of smegma may perhaps exclude the possibility
of recent sexual intercourse but its absence will not necessarily esta-
blish that the person bas had a recent intercourse. A small abrasion
over the base of the glans-penis and its bluish discolouration are also
inconclusive circumstances. Nor indeed can the bruises on the appel-
lant's thigh establish his involvement in the crime. If the girl was
H raped, she was raped without resistance. She was five years of age.
The last circumstance relied on by the prosecution is that the
total ignorance of the incident pleaded by the appellant is false, and

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SHANKAR LAL v. MAHARASHTRA (Chandrachud, C.J.) 395
•
would itself furnish a link in the chain of causation. We have come A
to the conclusion that the appellant was not present in the house at
• the time when Snnita's dead body was discovered. That makes it
impossible to hold that the appellant's plea is false.. Besides, falsity
of defence cannot take th·~ place of proof of facts which the prosecu-
tion has to establish in order to succeed. A false plea can at best be
considered as an additional circumstance, if other circumstances point B
unfailingly to the guilt of the accused.
It causes us some surprise that the learned Additional Sessions
Judge, Akola, 'Yho tried the case, has not shown any awareness of the
fundamental principle which governs cases dep~ndent solely on cir-
cumstantial evidence. Nowhere in his judgment has the learned Judge c
alluded, directly or indirectly, to the principle that in a case of cir-
cumstantial evidence, the circumstances on which the prosecution
relies must be consistent with the sole hypothesis of the guilt of the
• accused. It is not to be expected that in every case depending on
circumstantial evidence the whole of the law governing cases of
J)
circumstantial evidence shonld be set ont in the judgment. Legal
principles are not .magic incantations and their importance lies more
in their application to a given set of facts than in their recital in the
judgment. The simple expectation is that the jndgment must show that
the finding of guilt, if any, has been reached after a proper and care-
ful evaluation of circumstances in order to determine whether they
E
are compatible with any other reasonable hypothesis.
The High Court, it must be said, has referred to the recent deci-
sions of this Court in Mahmood v. State of Uttar Pradesh(') and
Chandmal v. State of Rajasthan(') in which the rule governing
cases of circumstantial evidence is reiterated. Bnt, while formula-
ting its own view the High Court, with respect, fell into an error in F
stating the true legal position by saying that what the Court has to
consitler is wh.ether the cumulative effect of the circumstances esta-
blishes the guilt of the accused beyond the "shadow of doubt". In
the first place, 'shadow of doubt', even in cases which depend on
direct evidence is shadow of "reasonable" doubt. Secondly, in its
practical application, the test which requires the exclusion of other G
alternative hypothesis ffi far more rigorous than the test of proof be-
• yond reasonable doubt.
Our judgment will raise a legitimate query : lf the appellant was
not present in his house at the material time, why then did so many
people conspire to involve him falsely ? The answer to such questions H
(!) AIR 1976 SC 69.
(2) AIR 1976 SC 917.
396 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981] 2 S.C.R.

A is not always easy to give in criminal cases. Different motives operate
on the minds of different persons in the making of unfounded accusa-
tions. Besides, human nature is too willing, when faced with brutal
crimes, to spin stories out of strong suspicions. In the !nstant case.
the dead body of a tender girl, raped and throttled, was found in the
appellant's house and, instinctively, everyone drew the infereace that
B the appellant must have committed the crime. No one would pause
to consider why the appellant would throw the dead body in his own
house, why would he continue to sleep a few feet away from it and
whether his house was not easily accessible to all and sundry, as shown
by the resourceful Shrinarayan Sharma. No one would even care to
consider why the appellant's name was not mentioned to the police
c until quite late. These are questions for the Court to consider. •
The folks of Karanja had a grouse against lhe appell~nt. He had
made a nuisance of himself to his family and friends, neighbours and
tenants. The small world of Karanja was up in arms against him. •
He had assaulted his mother and brother a few days before the inci-
D dent. He had a quarrel with Shilabai, his tenant, on the very day of
the incident. He was an idler and had no means .of livelihood. The
descripticn of his clothes at the time of his arrest is an eloquent com-
mentary on the way of his life. He was wearing two full pants, one on
top of another, not because he had one too many to wear but because,
one of the two pants was tom at awkward places and he had to hide
E his shame. It was tom on both the hips as well ~s the centre. The
left leg of the pant was tom over two feet and the right leg over half
a foot. The shirt on his person was tom all over. The right arm of
the shirt was hanging precariously by the rest of the torn portion of
his shirt. The Karanja community must have heaved a sigh of relief
that a person who was so good-for-nothing was ultimately in the hands
of law. Such people have no partisans. But that does not mean that
justice can he denied to them.
·~·

We may mention in passing, though in the view which we are
taking it is not relevant, that while confirming the sentence of death
imposed on the appellant by the Sessions Court, the High Court even
G took into consideration the appellant's relations with the members of
his family. After mentionihg that he had beaten his mother and
brother and that his wife was living separately from him, the High •
Court concluded :
"In our opinion, such a person could neither be an asset
H to his "'ife and children nor entitled to live in the society."
Unfaithful husbands, unchaste wives and unruly children are not for
that reason to be sentenced to death if they commit murders uncon-
SHANKAR LAL v. MAHARASHTRA (Chandrachud, C.J.) 397

neoted with the state of their equation with their family and friends. A
The passing of the sentence of death must elicit the greatest concern
and solicitude of the Judge because, that is one sehtence which cannot
he recalled.
For reasons aforesaid, we allow the appeal and set aside the judg-
ments of the High Conrt and the Sessions Conrt. The sentence of B
death as also the sentence of seven years' imprisonment imposed upon
the appellant is set aside. We acquit the appellant and direct that he
shall be released.

P.B.R. Appeal allowed.

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