Supreme Court of India
SHANTI DEVI (SINCE DECEASED) THROUGH LRS. GORANversusJAGAN DEVI & ORS.
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 1105
- Decided
- 12 September 2025
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Bench
- B PARDIWALA
Holding
The suit is governed by Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and was filed within the prescribed 12‑year period, so it is not time‑barred.
Summary
The plaintiffs claimed a one‑third share in agricultural land and sought a permanent injunction and joint possession, alleging that a sale deed dated 14‑06‑1973 was fraudulent and void because they never executed it and received no consideration. The trial court dismissed the suit as time‑barred; the First Appellate Court reversed that decision, applying Article 65 of the Limitation Act and holding the suit within the 12‑year period. The High Court affirmed the appellate decree but incorrectly applied Article 59, treating the deed as a voidable instrument. The Supreme Court examined whether the fraud pertained to the character or contents of the deed, concluding that the deed was void ab initio, so Article 59 does not apply and the suit is governed by Article 65. It further held that the suit was filed within 12 years of the adverse possession, rendering it timely. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the lower courts' decree in favour of the plaintiffs.
Issues considered
- Whether the suit is barred by limitation under Article 59 or Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
- Whether the sale deed of 14‑06‑1973 is void on the basis of fraud concerning its character or merely voidable.
- Whether a plaintiff not a party to a deed must seek cancellation or can seek a declaration of non‑binding effect.
- Whether the absence of sale consideration renders the deed void under the Transfer of Property Act.
Legislation cited
- Limitation Act, 1963s. Article 59, s. Article 65
- Punjab Land Revenue Acts. Section 44
- Transfer of Property Act, 1882s. Section 54
Headnote
Issue for Consideration Whether the plaintiff’s suit was time-barred or not. Whether it is Article 65 or Article 59 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963, which would apply to the present facts in hand. Headnotes† Limitation Act, 1963 – Art.65 or Art.59 – The for permanent injunction restraining the defendant from interfering with their peaceful possession – In the alternative, the plaintiffs prayed that they be put in joint possession along with the defendant and the sale deed dated 14.06.1973 be declared as fraudulent, concocted and
Subjects
Article 65 of Limitation Act, 1963Article 59 of Limitation Act, 1963Permanent injunctionAbsence of the sale considerationSale deedPossession of property
Judgment
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 825 : 2025 INSC 1105
Shanti Devi (Since Deceased) Through LRs. Goran
v.
Jagan Devi & Ors.
(Civil Appeal No. 11795 of 2025)
12 September 2025
[J.B. Pardiwala* and R. Mahadevan, JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
Whether the plaintiff’s suit was time-barred or not. Whether it is
Article 65 or Article 59 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963,
which would apply to the present facts in hand.
Headnotes†
Limitation Act, 1963 – Art.65 or Art.59 – The plaintiffs
instituted civil suit for permanent injunction restraining the
defendant from interfering with their peaceful possession –
In the alternative, the plaintiffs prayed that they be put in
joint possession along with the defendant and the sale deed
dated 14.06.1973 be declared as fraudulent, concocted and
thereby, void – Suit was dismissed – In first appeal, the suit
of the plaintiffs came to be decreed – The High Court vide its
impugned judgment and order dismissed the appeal thereby
affirming the judgment and order passed by the First Appellate
court decreeing the suit in favour of the plaintiffs – However,
insofar as the issue of limitation was concerned, the High
Court differed with the First Appellate Court and came to the
conclusion that it is Art.59 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and not
Art.63 that would be applicable to the facts of the matter –
Correctness:
Held: 1. As per the dictum in Prem Singh, this Court, in order to
ascertain whether Art.65 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would apply
to the present factual scenario, has to first determine whether
the fraud was alleged as regards the contents of the sale deed
dated 14.06.1973 or the character of such sale deed – Both the
First Appellate Court as well as the High Court have arrived at
the finding that the plaintiff had never executed the said sale
* Author
826 [2025] 9 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
deed in the first place as it was proved that it was not her thumb
impression that was affixed therein – Therefore, this finding goes
to the character of the sale deed and thereby, renders it void/void
ab initio – Hence, as per this decision, there remained no reason
for the plaintiff to seek for its cancellation – The original sale deed
also was not produced before the Trial Court by the defendants
in order to rebut the doubt cast upon the veracity of the said sale
deed – Consequently, Art. 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would
find no application to the case in hand. [Para 31]
2. The averment of the plaintiff in the plaint, that she had not
received the sale consideration, had not been otherwise proven
as false – In such circumstances as well, i.e., in the absence of
the sale consideration being tendered, the sale deed would be
void and the plaintiff would not be required to seek its cancellation.
Therefore, Art.59 of the Limitation Act, 1963 could not be said to
be applicable to the present facts. [Para 38]
3. The High Court could be said to have committed an error insofar
as observing that it is Art.59 and not Art. 65 of the Schedule to
the Limitation Act, 1963, which would apply to the case in hand –
However, irrespective of the question of which Article of the
Limitation Act, 1963 would be applicable to the suit instituted by
the present plaintiff, the suit could be said to have been filed within
limitation – Therefore, apart from clarifying the correct position of
law, there is no infirmity in the ultimate conclusion that the High
Court arrived at as far as the maintainability of the suit on the
aspect of limitation is concerned. [Para 40]
Case Law Cited
Prem Singh v. Birbal [2006] Supp. 1 SCR 692 : (2006) 5 SCC
353; Hussain Ahmed Choudhury v. Habibur Rahman, 2025 SCC
OnLine SC 892 – relied on.
State of Maharashtra v. Pravin Jethalal Kamdar [2000] 2 SCR
134 : 2000 SCC OnLine SC 522; Bhim Singhji v. Union of India
[1985] Supp. 1 SCR 862 : (1981) 1 SCC 166; Kewal Krishnan v.
Rajesh Kumar and Others [2021] 11 SCR 588 : (2022) 18 SCC
489 – referred to.
List of Acts
Limitation Act, 1963.
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 827
Shanti Devi (Since Deceased) Through LRs. Goran v.
Jagan Devi & Ors.
List of Keywords
Article 65 of Limitation Act, 1963; Article 59 of the Limitation Act,
1963; Permanent injunction; Absence of the sale consideration;
Sale deed; Possession of property.
Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 11795 of 2025
From the Judgment and Order dated 22.02.2018 of the High Court
of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in RSA No. 2930 of 1996
Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellant:
R. Bala Subarmanyam, Sr. Adv., Himanshu Sharma, Arun Kumar,
Varun Sharma, Ms. Kamlesh, Kunal Garg.
Advs. for the Respondents:
Arjun Singh Bhati, Tanmay Nagar, Shamli Verma, Mohit Yadav.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
J.B. Pardiwala, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. This appeal arises from the judgment and order passed by the High
Court of Punjab & Haryana dated 22.02.2018 in the Regular Second
Appeal No. 2930 of 1996 by which the second appeal filed by the
appellant-herein (original defendant) against the judgment and decree
dated 07.10.1996 arising from Civil Appeal No. 149 of 1991 passed
by the First Appellate court, came to be dismissed.
FACTUAL MATRIX
3. The facts giving rise to this appeal may be summarized as under.
4. For the sake of convenience, the appellant-herein shall be referred
to as the original defendant and the respondents-herein shall be
referred to as the original plaintiffs.
828 [2025] 9 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
5. The plaintiffs instituted Civil Suit No. 782 of 1984 in the court of
Senior Sub Judge, Gurgaon for permanent injunction restraining the
defendant from interfering with their peaceful possession to the extent
of one-third share in the agricultural land admeasuring 31 kanals 4
marlas situated within the revenue estate of village Bisar Akbarpur,
Tehsil Nuh, District Gurgaon. In the alternative, the plaintiffs prayed
that they be put in joint possession along with the defendant and the
sale deed dated 14.06.1973 purported to have been executed by
Ram Saran s/o Bhambar and the plaintiff in favor of the defendant
be declared as fraudulent, concocted and thereby, void insofar as
the share of the plaintiff is concerned.
6. The plaint of Civil Suit No. 782 of 1984 reads thus:
“1. That the plaintiff is the lawful owner and in possession
to the extent of 1/3rd share in agricultural land bearing
Rect. No.40 Killa No. 1/2 (2-0), 9/2 (2-12), 10 (8-0), 11
(8-0), 12/1 (2-12) 20 (8-0), total measuring 31 Kanals 4
marlas, besides other lands situated in the revenue estate
of Village Bisar Akbarpur Tehsil Nuh, Distt. Gurgaon. The
fard jamabandi for the years 1973-74 and 1978-79 are
attached herein.
2. That the defendant wrongly claims herself to be the
purchaser of the suit land referred to above from one
Ram Saran s/o Bhambar on the basis of a fraudulent and
concocted sale deed alleged to have been executed on
14.06.1973. The alleged sale deed dated 14.6.73 is total
fraudulent, illegal and void and cannot defeat the legal
rights and share of the plaintiff in the suit land on the
following grounds:-
(a) That the plaintiff never executed on registered
sale deed dated 14.6. 73 or of any other date in
favor of the defendant and she is still the co-owner
in possession to the extent of her share in the land.
(b) That it seems that the defendant must have got
executed and registered the alleged sale deed in her
favor by making some impersonation in collusion with
the other vendor and witnesses and must have played
a fraud on the Sub-Registrar to derive wrongful gain
for her personal benefit.
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 829
Shanti Devi (Since Deceased) Through LRs. Goran v.
Jagan Devi & Ors.
(c) That the plaintiff never got any sale consideration
of the alleged sale deed and she came to know about
this fraudulent transaction only when he came to the
village mourn the death of Ram Saran and heard
that her land is going to be sold by the defendant
without any right in it.
(d) That the alleged sale deed if made by any other
person by making impersonation or otherwise, the
same does not effect the rights of the plaintiff in the
land in suit.
3. That the plaintiff is owner in possession her 1/3rd share
in the land and is entitled to file suit for permanent injunction
against the defendant restraining her from interfering with
the possession and ownership of the plaintiff in the suit
land in any manner. In the alternative, if it is found and
held that that defendant is in possession of the whole land
then the plaintiff is entitled to a decree for joint possession
to the extent of 1/3rd share in the land in suit.
4. That the cause of action for the suit arose on or about
4.2.1984 when the plaintiff came to know about the
fraudulent transaction and the defendant attempted to sell
away to the property of the plaintiff and denied to admit
the claim of the plaintiff. Hence this suit.
5. That the suit property is situated within the territorial
jurisdiction of this Hon’ble Court, hence this Hon’ble Court
has got jurisdiction to try this suit.
6. That the value of the suit for the purpose of court fees
and jurisdiction is assessed at Rs.200/- and for relief of
possession is also Rs. 100/-. A court fees of Rs.25/- is paid.
7. That the plaintiff, therefore, prays that a decree for
permanent injunction be passed in favor of the plaintiff
and against the defendant to the effect that the plaintiff
is co-owner in possession to the extent of 1/2 share (sic)
(1/3 rd share) in the land in suit described in para no.1
of the plaint restraining the defendant from interfering or
dealing with it in any manner. In the alternative a decree
for joint possession be passed in favor of the plaintiff and
830 [2025] 9 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
against the defendant in respect of suit land mentioned in
para 1 of the plaint declaring the alleged sale deed dated
14.6.73 to be fraudulent and void qua the share of the
plaintiff. The costs of the suit be also awarded. Any such
other relief which the Ld. Court may deem just and proper
be also granted to the plaintiff.”
(Emphasis supplied)
7. The written statement filed on behalf of the defendant reads thus:
“Pre Objections
1. That the suit is not maintainable in the present form.
The plaintiff has got no right, interest or title in the land
in dispute or any part of it.
2. That the plaintiff has got no locus standi nor any cause
of action to file the present suit.
3. That the suit for permanent injunction in the alternative
for joint possession is not maintainable. It is mandatory
to seek declaration
4. That the plaintiff is estopped from filing the present
suit by acts, conduct, omission, acquiescence, latches
and admission.
5. That the suit is barred by time.
On Merits
1. That Para no.1 of the plaint is wrong and denied. It is
wrong and denied that the plaintiff is owner or in possession
of the suit land to the extent of 1/3rd share or she has
got any right, interest or title in the land in dispute or any
part of it.
2. That para no.2 of the plaint alongwith its sub-paras
2(a.) to (d) are wrong and denied. The plaintiff alongwith
the brother Ram Saran sold the land in dispute in favour
of the defendant vide sale deed dated 14.6.1973 for sale
consideration of Rs.15000/-. The contents of the sale
deed were read over and explained to the plaintiff. She
had appeared before the Sub Registrar and had admitted
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 831
Shanti Devi (Since Deceased) Through LRs. Goran v.
Jagan Devi & Ors.
and acknowledged the contents of the sale deed. She
was identified by Sehdev Sarpanch of village Kawari. It
is wrong and denied that the sale deed dated 14.6.1973
is totally fraudulent, illegal and ineffective, the rights of
the plaintiff in the suit land on the grounds mentioned in
sub-para 2(a) to 2(d) of the plaint or on another grounds.
2(a) Para 2(a) of the plaint is wrong and denied. It is
wrong and denied that the sale deed dated 14.6.1973 was
not executed by the plaintiff in favour of the defendant.
It is wrong and denied that she is still owner of the land
in dispute or any part of it. Mutation on the basis of sale
deed dated 14.6.1973 was also got sanctioned by the
plaintiff in favour of the defendant.
2(b) Para 2(b) of the plaint is wrong and denied. It is wrong
and denied that the sale deed was got registered by false
impersonation in collusion with Ram Saran, brother of the
plaintiff or any other person. It is wrong and denied that any
fraud was played on the Sub Registrar to derive wrongful
gain for personal benefit. All these allegations are false to
the positive knowledge of the plaintiff.
2(c) Para no.2(c) of the plaint is wrong and denied. It is
wrong and denied that the plaintiff did not execute the
sale deed or she did not receive the sale consideration.
It is further wrong and denied that the sale deed was
fraudulent transaction or she came to know about the
same on the death of Ram Saran. All these allegations
are false. It is unthinkable that her brother Ram Saran did
not know the plaintiff.
2(d) Para no.2(d) of the plaint is wrong and denied. It is
wrong and denied that the sale deed was not executed by
the plaintiff or somebody else falsely impersonated in her
place. It is wrong and denied that the plaintiff is owner or
in possession of the land in dispute as alleged.
3. That para no.3 of the plaint is wrong and denied. It is
wrong and denied that the plaintiff has got any right, interest
or title in the suit land or she is owner or in possession of
the same or any part of it. It is further wrong and denied
that she is entitled to sue for possession in the alternative.
832 [2025] 9 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
4. That para no.4 of the plaint is wrong and denied. No
cause of action ever accrued to the plaintiff. Cause of
action if any is bogus, fictitious and imaginary one.
5&6. Paras no.5 and 6 of the plaint are legal.
7. That para no.7 of the plaint is wrong and denied. It is,
therefore, humbly prayed that the suit of the plaintiff may
kindly be dismissed with costs. Since the suit of the plaint
is false, frivolous and vexatious, therefore, the plaintiff be
burdened with special costs U/s 35-A C.P.C.”
8. The Trial Court framed the following issues:
“1. Whether the sale deed dated 14.6.1973 is illegal,
fraudulent and ineffective on the grounds mentioned in
the para no.2 of the plaint? OPP
2. Whether the plaintiff is in joint possession of the suit
property? OPP.
3. Whether the suit is not maintainable? OPD
4. Whether the plaintiff has no locus standi and cause of
action to file the suit? OPD
5. Whether the plaintiff is estopped from filing the present
suit by her own act and conduct? OPD.
6. Whether the suit is time barred? OPD
7. Relief.”
9. All the above referred issues framed by the Trial Court came to
be answered against the plaintiffs. The suit ultimately came to be
dismissed vide the judgement and decree dated 14.10.1991.
10. The plaintiffs being dissatisfied with the judgment and decree passed
by the Trial Court preferred First Appeal before the district court. The
First Appeal came to be registered as Civil Appeal No. 149 of 1991.
The First Appeal came to be allowed. The suit of the plaintiffs came
to be decreed. On the question of limitation, the First Appellate Court
observed as thus:
“Lastly the question of limitation has been raised in the
present proceedings. As per the defendant the present suit
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 833
Shanti Devi (Since Deceased) Through LRs. Goran v.
Jagan Devi & Ors.
should have been filed within three years of the sanction
of mutation. He mainly reliance on 1996 (1) PLR 482 The
State of Punjab Vs. Babu Singh which lays down that illegal
or void order have to be got set aside from the court of
competent jurisdiction and limitation for the same is three
years from the date of passing of the order. On the other
hand, the counsel for plaintiff-appellant has relied upon
Article 65 in order to assert that the period of limitation
shall be 12 years for getting the relief of possession from
the date when the possession of the defendant would be
deemed to be adverse to that of the plaintiff. Accordingly
he argued that even if it is presumed that the defendant
came into adverse possession from the date of execution
of the present sale deed even then the plaintiff was entitled
to get the relief of possession within the period of 12 years
and the suit was filed within that period. Merely because it
was filed after about 11 years cannot deprive the plaintiff
of the relief. The said arguments of the plaintiff appellant
is convincing. She has claimed relief of joint possession.
It has already been held that the transaction in question
was void and Risali had never executed the sale deed
in question. So under these circumstances the plaintiff
could have maintained action to obtain possession of
the property within the period of 12 years from the date
of knowledge. So even if the knowledge party is ignored
still the suit has been filed within 12 years from the date
of sale and the same is maintainable.”
(Emphasis supplied)
11. The defendants being dissatisfied with the judgment and decree
passed by the First Appellate court preferred Second Appeal No.
2930 of 1996 in the High Court.
12. The High Court vide its impugned judgment and order dismissed the
appeal thereby affirming the judgment and order passed by the First
Appellate court decreeing the suit in favour of the plaintiffs. However,
insofar as the issue of limitation was concerned, the High Court
differed with the First Appellate Court and came to the conclusion
that it is Article 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and not Article 63 that
would be applicable to the facts of the matter.
834 [2025] 9 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
13. The High court while dismissing the Second Appeal held as under:
“I have heard the learned counsel for the parties, appraised
the judgments and decrees as well as record of both the
Courts below and of the view that there is no force and
merit in the submissions of Mr. Keshav Pratap Singh.
In my view, limitation would not come in the way of the
plaintiff-respondents, for, the suit can be filed from the
date of the knowledge as per the provisions of Article 59
of the Limitation Act, which reads thus:-
59. To cancel or Three When the facts
set aside an years entitling the
instrument or plaintiff to have
decree or for the the instrument or
rescission of a decree cancelled
contract or set aside or
the contract
rescinded first
becomes known
to him.
The defendant for the best known reasons has not examined
any expert in his evidence to counter and rebut the
testimony of PW4. Appellant-defendant Shanti Devi (since
deceased) represented through legal representatives made
a statement that she was present at the time of execution
and registration of the sale deed and one Rasali was also
present to whom she knew very well. Rasali had also put
her thumb impressions on the sale deed in her presence
but in cross-examination, she stated that she was not in a
position to identify Rasali Devi. If at all, Rasali was known
to Shanti Devi, she could have been very bold to identify
Rasali. Endorsement made by Sub-Registrar showed that
her husband Bagdawat had appeared on her behalf before
the Sub Registrar and the aforementioned document did
not carry the thumb impression/signatures of Shanti Devi.
The other witness to the sale deed, i.e., Budhu, an attesting
witness of the document was none else but the real brother
of Shanti Devi, obviously he was expected to make a
favourable deposition. He also admitted that sale deed
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 835
Shanti Devi (Since Deceased) Through LRs. Goran v.
Jagan Devi & Ors.
was thumb marked by Shanti Devi, whereas, as noticed
above, it was not Bagdawat, husband of Shanti Devi, for
the reasons best known had not stepped into witness box.
The second witness, Sahdev, Sarpanch had died before
the statement of Budhu could be recorded. Shanti Devi
admitted that Sahdev was well acquainted with his brother
Budhu. Thus, defendant failed to prove that there was any
impartial witness. Things do not end here. The plaintiffs
had moved an application for directing the defendant to
produce the original sale deed and answer was that the
original had been misplaced. Defendant had admitted
that prior to sale deed, there was an agreement to sell
but the same has also not seen the light of day. On the
contrary, expert compared the disputed thumb impressions
found on the Special Power of Attorney Ex.P2 and thumb
impressions put by Rasali on her statement recorded by
the Court on 20.03.1984. Special Power of Attorney Ex.P2
had been proved through the testimony of PW3, who
stated that executant had put her thumb impressions on
the said document after it was read over and explained.
The defendant failed to put any cross-examination to the
aforementioned witness. It is settled law that in case,
statement made in examination-in-chief is not subjected
to cross-examination, the same would be admitted.
The defendant in the evidence did not dispute that Rasali
had not appeared before the Court on 20.03.1984. The
handwriting expert also compared the thumb impressions
on two affidavits executed by Rasali, i.e., on 27.02.1984
and 28.02.1984. Both the affidavits were duly attested by
Oath Commissioner and identified by K.S. Jain, Advocate.
The expert also examined the thumb impressions on the
plaint and vakalantnama to form an opinion that they
were not of the same person, therefore, there was no
occasion for the Lower Appellate Court to discard the
report of expert. In my view, evidence brought on record
by the plaintiffs un-clinchly proved that Rasali had never
executed disputed sale deed.
There is another aspect of the matter, mutation Ex.DE was
affected on the basis of the sale deed which also carried
836 [2025] 9 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
a presumption of truth under Section 44 of Punjab Land
Revenue Act, unless the same is rebutted. No evidence has
been led to rebut the same. Even from perusal of Ex.D3,
it was not proved that Rasali at the time of attestation and
sanction was there. Defendant miserably failed to prove
that document actually executed by Rasali. There is no
force in the submission of Mr. Keshav Pratap Singh that
improvement made by the defendant was in the knowledge
of the plaintiffs, and therefore, suit was barred by law of
limitation but fact of the matter is that no such improvement
had been proved, therefore, the pleading was beyond
evidence. The suit could not be said to be barred by law
of limitation as relief of declaration qua joint possession
was sought as every owner is owner of each and every
inch of land until the same is partitioned.
As an upshot of my findings, I do not find any illegality
and perversity in the findings under challenge which are
based upon the appreciation of oral and documentary
evidence, much less no substantial question of law arises
for adjudication of the present appeal.
No other argument has been raised. Resultantly, the appeal
stands dismissed.”
(Emphasis supplied)
14. In such circumstances referred to above, the legal heirs of the original
defendant are here before us with the present appeal.
15. Upon a perusal of the facts of the case in hand, this Court vide
order dated 03.02.2025, confined itself to the question whether the
plaintiff’s suit was time-barred or not.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT/ ORIGINAL
DEFENDANT
16. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant vehemently submitted
that the High court committed a serious error in dismissing the second
appeal thereby affirming the judgment and decree passed by the
First Appellate court in favor of the plaintiffs. The counsel would
submit that the suit itself was barred by limitation as the same had
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 837
Shanti Devi (Since Deceased) Through LRs. Goran v.
Jagan Devi & Ors.
been filed on 28.02.1984 i.e., after a delay of more than 11 years
from the date of the execution of the sale deed dated 14.06.1973.
17. It was argued that the Trial Court rightly dismissed the suit being barred
by limitation. The First Appellate court wrongly invoked Article 65 of
the Limitation Act, 1963 to bring the suit within the period of limitation.
According to the learned counsel, it is Article 56 of the Limitation
Act, 1963 that governs the period of limitation in the present case.
It was also argued that the original plaintiff, namely, Rasali failed to
enter the witness box in the presence of the defendant. Moreover,
Sibba s/o Lal Singh, in whose favour the plaintiff had executed a
power of attorney to pursue the case, never entered the witness box.
18. In the last, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant submitted
that heavy burden of proof is cast upon a person impugning the
transaction to show that the same is sham or fraudulent one.
According to the learned counsel a distinction should be borne in
mind in regard to the nominal nature of the transaction which is no
transaction in the eye of law at all and the nature and character of
a transaction as reflected in a deed of conveyance. In other words,
according to the learned counsel appearing for the defendant, the
initial burden of proving the transaction as bogus or sham was on the
plaintiffs and they could be said to have miserably failed to lead any
evidence in that regard. In such circumstances, the onus could not
be said to have shifted upon the defendant to establish or prove the
valid execution of the sale deed. The registered document and the
registration of the sale deed reinforced the valid execution of the sale
deed. He would submit that a registered document carries with it a
presumption that it was validly executed. It is for the party challenging
the genuineness of the transaction to rebut such presumption.
19. In such circumstances referred to above, the learned counsel prayed
that there being merit in his appeal, the same may be allowed and
the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court be set
aside and the impugned judgment and order passed by the Trial
Court dismissing the suit, be affirmed.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS/ORIGINAL
PLAINTIFFS
20. On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents-
herein submitted that no error not to speak of any error of law could
838 [2025] 9 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
be said to have been committed by the High Court in passing the
impugned judgment and order. It was argued that there are concurrent
findings recorded by the First Appellate court and the High Court
respectively that the plaintiff was not a party to the sale deed of 1973
i.e., the sale deed in question. In other words, the plaintiff had not
put her thumb impression on the sale deed.
21. It was argued that it is settled law that when an instrument of
sale of an immovable property is not executed by the owner,
then such a sale deed is void ab initio and is considered a nullity
qua the owner. In such a case, the owner is not required to seek
cancellation of such an instrument or seek a declaration that such
an instrument is void. This is the reason why the plaintiff had not
sought the cancellation of the sale deed dated 14.06.1973 in the
present case and therefore, there arises no question of application
of Article 59 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963. The counsel
has placed reliance on several decisions to emphasize that when
the instrument is void/void ab initio and not voidable, it would be
Article 65 which would apply to a suit for possession based on title
filed by the plaintiffs.
22. In the last, it was argued that since the alleged possession of the
defendant over the suit property can at best be considered to have
been adverse to the plaintiff from the date of execution of the sale
deed dated 14.06.1973, the suit having been filed on 28.02.1984,
i.e., within 12 years of the execution of the impugned sale deed,
cannot be said to be barred by limitation as per Article 65.
23. In such circumstances referred to above, the learned counsel prayed
that there being no merit in this appeal the same may be dismissed.
ANALYSIS
24. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and
having gone through the materials on record, the only question that
falls for our consideration is whether the High Court committed any
error in passing the impugned judgment and order?
25. The crux of the issue seems to be whether it is Article 65 or Article
59 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963, which would apply
to the present facts in hand. The aforesaid Articles are reproduced
as under:
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 839
Shanti Devi (Since Deceased) Through LRs. Goran v.
Jagan Devi & Ors.
59. To cancel or Three When the facts
set aside an years entitling the
instrument or plaintiff to have
decree or for the the instrument or
recission of a decree cancelled
contract or set aside or the
contract rescinded
first become known
to him.
65. For possession Twelve When the
of immovable years possession of the
property or any defendant becomes
interest therein adverse to the
based on title plaintiff.
26. The counsel for the plaintiff would submit that it is Article 65 which
must be applied to the present suit for possession since the sale
deed dated 14.06.1973 was found to be fraudulent and therefore,
void. Insofar as the question whether the aforesaid sale deed was
void, the First Appellate Court observed as thus:
“[…] In my view, the evidence led by the plaintiff leaves
no room for doubt that Smt. Rasali never executed the
disputed sale deed. According the finding on issue no.
1 given by the trial court was incorrect and is reversed.
-xxx-
[…] But here, the said mutation was based on void
transaction, as Smt. Risali had never executed the sale
deed in question. So the question of estoppels against
the plaintiff does not arise in the present proceedings.”
27. The High Court has also expressed its agreement with the aforesaid
finding of the First Appellate Court and observed that:
“In my view, evidence brought on record by the plaintiffs
un-clinchly proved that Rasali had never executed the
disputed sale deed.”
28. In State of Maharashtra v. Pravin Jethalal Kamdar reported in
2000 SCC OnLine SC 522, this Court held that as far as void
and non-est documents are concerned, it would be enough for the
840 [2025] 9 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
plaintiff to file a simpliciter suit for possession to which Article 65 of
the Limitation Act, 1963 would apply. Therein, Section 27(1) of the
Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 which came into force
w.e.f. 17.02.1976 imposed a restriction on the transfer of any urban
or urbanisable land with a building or part of such building, which
was within the ceiling limit. In other words, Section 27(1) sought to
affect the right of a person to dispose of his urban property within
the ceiling limit. Under the Act, the competent authority of the State
of Maharashtra had to grant permission if such a person wanted to
sell the property to a prospective purchaser. However, when such a
permission was asked for in the facts of the aforesaid case, the same
was denied by the competent authority and it instead exercised the
option to buy the same on behalf of the State vide its order dated
26.05.1976. Pursuant to such order, a sale deed dated 23.08.1976
was executed between the plaintiff and the State for the same sale
consideration that would have been paid by the prospective purchaser.
Subsequently, the decision of this Court in Bhim Singhji v. Union
of India reported in (1981) 1 SCC 186 held Section 27(1), insofar
as the restriction it placed as mentioned above, to be invalid. In this
background, it was opined as follows:
i. First, the contention of the State that it is Article 58 of the
Limitation Act, 1963 that would apply, was rejected. It was held
that the suit is primarily one for possession of property based
upon title. It was observed that owing to the decision in Bhim
Singhji (supra), the order dated 26.05.1976 along with the
sale deed dated 23.08.1976 became void ab intio and without
jurisdiction. Therefore, it was not necessary for the plaintiff to
claim any separate declaration that they are void. The plea
about their invalidity could be raised in the course of any
proceedings. Therefore, it is Article 65, which deals with a suit
for possession based on title, that would apply from the date
on the which the possession of the defendant State became
adverse to the plaintiff.
ii. Secondly, though the plaintiff sought a declaration that the order
dated 26.05.1976 and the sale deed dated 23.08.1976 were
void, yet it was held that the same would be of no consequence
insofar as the question of limitation is concerned. The fact would
still remain that the possession of the property was taken by
the defendants via void documents. Therefore, such documents
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 841
Shanti Devi (Since Deceased) Through LRs. Goran v.
Jagan Devi & Ors.
could be ignored and a suit for possession simpliciter for which
the period of limitation prescribed under Article 65, i.e., 12 years,
could be filed. In the course of such proceedings, it could be
contended by the plaintiff that the documents are a nullity.
The relevant observations are reproduced hereinbelow:
“4. Article 58 of the Limitation Act, 1963, prescribes
limitation of three years from the date when the right to
sue first accrues to obtain a declaration. Under Article
65, the period of limitation prescribed for filing a suit for
possession of immovable property or any interest therein
based on title is 12 years from the date when possession
of the defendants becomes adverse to the plaintiff. The
contention urged on behalf of the State Government was
that Article 58 of the Limitation Act was applicable as
the plaintiff had sought declaration about the invalidity
of the order dated 26-5-1976 and sale deed dated 23-
8-1976 and that the period of limitation of three years
had to be computed from 26-5-1976 and, therefore, the
suit filed on 22-8-1988 was hopelessly barred by time.
This contention was rejected by the High Court as also
by the trial court. The contention urged on behalf of the
plaintiff and which has been accepted is that the suit is
basically for possession of the property based upon title
and the sale deed dated 23-8-1976 and the order dated
26-5-1976 being void ab initio and without jurisdiction, a
plea about its invalidity can be raised in any proceedings
and it is not necessary to claim any declaration and thus
Article 65 which deals with suit for possession based on
title would be applicable from the date, the possession of
the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff. The High
Court held that in view of the order and the sale deed
being null and void and without jurisdiction, the same
have no existence in the eye of the law and the plea
about invalidity of these documents can be raised in any
proceedings and no separate declaration is necessary to
be sought. It held that the suit for possession would be
governed by Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963. It was
further held that the suit is within time even from the date
842 [2025] 9 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
when the possession of the suit property was taken on
the execution of the sale deed on 23-8-1976.
5. As already noticed, in Bhim Singhji case [(1981) 1 SCC
166] Section 27(1) insofar as it imposes a restriction on
transfer of any urban or urbanisable land with a building
or a portion of such building, which is within the ceiling
area, has been held to be invalid. Thus, it has not been
and cannot be disputed that the order dated 26-5-1976,
was without jurisdiction and a nullity. Consequently, the
sale deed executed pursuant to the said order would also
be a nullity. It was not necessary to seek a declaration
about the invalidity of the said order and the sale deed.
The fact of the plaintiff having sought such a declaration
is of no consequence. When possession has been taken
by the appellants pursuant to void documents, Article 65
of the Limitation Act will apply and the limitation to file the
suit would be 12 years. When these documents are null
and void, ignoring them a suit for possession simpliciter
could be filed and in the course of the suit it could be
contended that these documents are a nullity. In Ajudh
Raj v. Moti [(1991) 3 SCC 136] this Court said that if the
order has been passed without jurisdiction, the same can
be ignored as a nullity, that is, non-existent in the eye of
the law and it is not necessary to set it aside; and such
a suit will be governed by Article 65 of the Limitation Act.
The contention that the suit was time-barred has no merit.
The suit has been rightly held to have been filed within
the period prescribed by the Limitation Act.”
(Emphasis supplied)
29. This Court in Prem Singh v. Birbal reported in (2006) 5 SCC 353,
discussed the position of law as to when Article 59 of the Limitation
Act, 1963 would apply and opined as follows:
i. First, that Article 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would only
encompass within its fold fraudulent transactions which are
‘voidable’ transactions and not those that are ‘void’. In other
words, Article 59 would apply only where an instrument is prima
facie valid and not to those instruments which are presumptively
invalid.
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 843
Shanti Devi (Since Deceased) Through LRs. Goran v.
Jagan Devi & Ors.
ii. Secondly, that when the document in question is void ab
initio/or void, a decree for setting aside the same would not
be necessary since such a transaction would be non-est in the
eyes of law, owing to it being a nullity.
iii. Thirdly, a fine distinction was drawn between fraudulent
misrepresentation as regards the ‘character of the document’
and fraudulent misrepresentation as regards the ‘contents of a
document’. It is only in the former situation that the instrument
would be void and, in the latter, it would remain voidable. To
put it simply, Article 59 would not govern the period of limitation
in respect of a void transaction.
iv. Lastly, that if a deed was executed by the plaintiff when he
was a minor and it was thereby void, he had two options to file
a suit to get the property conveyed thereunder i.e., he could
either file the suit within 12 years of the deed or within 3 years
of attaining majority.
The relevant observations are reproduced as under:
“13. Article 59 of the Limitation Act applies specially when
a relief is claimed on the ground of fraud or mistake. It
only encompasses within its fold fraudulent transactions
which are voidable transactions.
-xxx-
16. When a document is valid, no question arises of its
cancellation. When a document is void ab initio, a decree
for setting aside the same would not be necessary as the
same is non est in the eye of the law, as it would be a
nullity.
17. Once, however, a suit is filed by a plaintiff for
cancellation of a transaction, it would be governed by
Article 59. Even if Article 59 is not attracted, the residuary
article would be.
18. Article 59 would be attracted when coercion, undue
influence, misappropriation or fraud which the plaintiff
asserts is required to be proved. Article 59 would apply
to the case of such instruments. It would, therefore, apply
where a document is prima facie valid. It would not apply
844 [2025] 9 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
only to instruments which are presumptively invalid. (See
Unni v. Kunchi Amma [ILR (1891) 14 Mad 26] and Sheo
Shankar Gir v. Ram Shewak Chowdhri [ILR (1897) 24
Cal 77] .)
-xxx-
21. Respondent 1 has not alleged that fraudulent
misrepresentation was made to him as regards the
character of the document. According to him, there
had been a fraudulent misrepresentation as regards its
contents.
22. In Ningawwa v. Byrappa [(1968) 2 SCR 797 :
AIR 1968 SC 956] this Court held that the fraudulent
misrepresentation as regards character of a document is
void but fraudulent misrepresentation as regards contents
of a document is voidable stating: (SCR p. 801 C-D)
“The legal position will be different if there is a
fraudulent misrepresentation not merely as to the
contents of the document but as to its character.
The authorities make a clear distinction between
fraudulent misrepresentation as to the character of
the document and fraudulent misrepresentation as
to the contents thereof. With reference to the former,
it has been held that the transaction is void, while in
the case of the latter, it is merely voidable.”
In that case, a fraud was found to have been played and
it was held that as the suit was instituted within a few
days after the appellant therein came to know of the fraud
practised on her, the same was void. It was, however,
held: (SCR p. 803 B-E)
“Article 91 of the Limitation Act provides that a suit
to set aside an instrument not otherwise provided
for (and no other provision of the Act applies to the
circumstances of the case) shall be subject to a three
years’ limitation which begins to run when the facts
entitling the plaintiff to have the instrument cancelled
or set aside are known to him. In the present case,
the trial court has found, upon examination of the
evidence, that at the very time of the execution of
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 845
Shanti Devi (Since Deceased) Through LRs. Goran v.
Jagan Devi & Ors.
the gift deed, Ext. 45 the appellant knew that her
husband prevailed upon her to convey Surveys Plots
Nos. 407/1 and 409/1 of Tadavalga village to him by
undue influence. The finding of the trial court is based
upon the admission of the appellant herself in the
course of her evidence. In view of this finding of the
trial court it is manifest that the suit of the appellant
is barred under Article 91 of the Limitation Act so far
as Plots Nos. 407/1 and 409/1 of Tadavalga village
are concerned.”
-xxx-
28. If a deed was executed by the plaintiff when he was
a minor and it was void, he had two options to file a suit
to get the property purportedly conveyed thereunder. He
could either file the suit within 12 years of the deed or
within 3 years of attaining majority. Here, the plaintiff did
not either sue within 12 years of the deed or within 3 years
of attaining majority. Therefore, the suit was rightly held
to be barred by limitation by the trial court.”
(Emphasis supplied)
30. In the decision of this Court in Hussain Ahmed Choudhury v.
Habibur Rahman reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 892, where
one of us, J.B. Pardiwala J., was a member of the Bench, it was
reiterated that a person who is not a party to an instrument would
not be obliged in law to seek its cancellation. The reason being
that such an instrument would neither be likely to affect his title nor
be binding on him. However, such a plaintiff must at least seek a
declaration that the said instrument is not binding on him or that is
invalid insofar as he is concerned. The relevant observations are
reproduced hereinbelow:
“30. As observed aforesaid, a plaintiff who is not a party
to a decree or a document, is not obligated to sue for its
cancellation. This is because such an instrument would
neither be likely to affect the title of the plaintiff nor be
binding on him. We have to our advantage two very old
erudite judgments of the Madras High Court and one of
the Privy Council on the subject.
846 [2025] 9 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
31. In Unni v. Kunchi Amma reported in 1890 SCC OnLine
Mad 5, the legal position has been thus explained:
“If a person not having authority to execute a deed
or having such authority under certain circumstances
which did not exist, executes a deed, it is not
necessary for persons who are not bound by it, to
sue to set it aside for it cannot be used against them.
They may treat it as nonexistent and sue for their
right as if it did not exist.”
(Emphasis supplied in original)
32. The same principle has been distinctly laid down by
the Privy Council in Bijoy Gopal Mukerji v. Krishna Mahishi
Debi, reported in 1907 SCC OnLine PC 1, where the jural
basis underlying such transactions was pointed out. In
that case, the reversioner sued for a declaration that a
lease granted by the widow of the last male owner was
not binding on him and also for khas possession. It was
objected that the omission to set aside the lease by a suit
instituted within the time limit prescribed by Article 91 of
the Indian Limitation Act, 1877 was fatal to the suit. The
following observations which are equally applicable to the
case at hand, are apposite:
“A Hindu widow is not a tenant for life, but is owner of
her husband’s property subject to certain restrictions
on alienation and subject to its devolving upon her
husband’s heirs upon her death. But she may alienate
it subject to certain conditions being complied with.
Her alienation is not, therefore, absolutely void, but it is
prima facie voidable at the election of the reversionary
heir. He may think fit to affirm it, or he may at his
pleasure treat it as a nullity without the intervention of
any Court, and he shows his election to do the latter
by commencing an action to recover possession of
the property. There is, in fact, nothing for the Court
either to set aside or cancel as a condition precedent
to the right of action of the reversionary heir. It is
true that the appellants prayed by their plaint for a
declaration that the ijara was inoperative as against
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 847
Shanti Devi (Since Deceased) Through LRs. Goran v.
Jagan Devi & Ors.
them, as leading up to their prayer for delivery to
them of khas possession. But it was not necessary for
them to do so, and they might have merely claimed
possession, leaving it to the defendants to plead and
(if they could) prove the circumstances, which they
relied on, for showing that the ijara of any derivative
dealings with the property were not in fact voidable,
but were binding on the reversionary heirs.”
33. In fact, it is logically impossible for a person who is
not a party to a document or to a decree to ask for its
cancellation. This is clearly explained by Wadsworth,
J., in the decision rendered in Vellayya Konar (Died) v.
Ramaswami Konar, reported in 1939 SCC OnLine Mad
149, thus:
“When, the plaintiff seeks to establish a title in himself
and cannot establish that title without removing an
insuperable obstruction such as a decree to which
he has been a party or a deed to which he has been
a party, then quite clearly he must get that decree
or deed cancelled or declared void ‘in toto’, and his
suit is in substance a suit for the cancellation of the
decree or deed even though it be framed as a suit
for declaration. But when he is seeking to establish
a title and finds himself threatened by a decree or
a transaction between third parties, he Is not in a
position to get that decree or that deed cancelled
‘in toto’. That is a thing which can only be done by
parties to the decree or deed or their representatives.
His proper remedy therefore in order to clear the way
with a view to establish his title, is to get a declaration
that the decree or deed is invalid so far as he himself
is concerned and he must therefore sue for such a
declaration and not for the cancellation of the decree
or deed.”
(Emphasis supplied in original)
34. Therefore, filing a suit for cancellation of a sale deed
and seeking a declaration that a particular document is
848 [2025] 9 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
inoperative as against the plaintiff are two distinct, separate
suits. The plaintiff in the present case, not being the
executant of the sale deed dated 05.05.1997 executed
in favour of the respondent no. 1 (original defendant no.
14), was therefore, not obligated to sue for its cancellation
under Section 31 of the Act, 1963.”
(Emphasis supplied)
31. As per the dictum in Prem Singh (supra), this Court, in order to
ascertain whether Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would apply
to the present factual scenario, has to first determine whether the
fraud was alleged as regards the contents of the sale deed dated
14.06.1973 or the character of such sale deed. Both the First Appellate
Court as well as the High Court have arrived at the finding that the
plaintiff had never executed the said sale deed in the first place as
it was proved that it was not her thumb impression that was affixed
therein. Therefore, this finding goes to the character of the sale deed
and thereby, renders it void/void ab initio. Hence, as per this decision,
there remained no reason for the plaintiff to seek for its cancellation.
The original sale deed also was not produced before the Trial Court
by the defendants in order to rebut the doubt cast upon the veracity
of the said sale deed. Consequently, Article 59 of the Limitation Act,
1963 would find no application to the case in hand.
32. In Hussain Ahmed Choudhury (supra), it was clearly opined that
a plaintiff who is not a party to the instrument in question need
not seek its cancellation. We are not oblivious to the fact that in a
situation where the plaintiff was not a party to the instrument, the said
decision laid down a requirement that a declaration must be sought
to the effect that the said instrument was not binding on the plaintiff.
However, the said decision clarified that whether the plaintiff has
sought such a declaration or not could be culled out from a holistic
reading of the plaint along with the relief(s) sought. In cases where
the character of the sale deed is assailed as being fraudulent, this
requirement is implicitly satisfied since the very averment that the
sale deed was fraudulent or a sham and bogus transaction by itself
indicates that the plaintiff did not intend to be bound by it. Therefore,
this requirement too, could be said to have been satisfied by the
plaintiff in the present case.
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 849
Shanti Devi (Since Deceased) Through LRs. Goran v.
Jagan Devi & Ors.
33. Further, as per State of Maharashtra (supra), it would be of no
consequence even the plaintiff in one of his prayers, seeks a
declaration that the sale deed is a nullity or invalid insofar as he is
concerned, since such an instrument would anyway be void owing
to it being fraudulent. Therefore, the period of limitation for a suit for
possession based on title would continue to be governed by Article
65. In other words, the addition of such a prayer would not influence
the period of limitation within which such a suit must be filed.
34. We may look at the matter from one another angle. Apart from the
aspect of fraud, the decision of this Court in Kewal Krishnan v.
Rajesh Kumar and Others reported in (2022) 18 SCC 489, while
looking into whether the defendants had paid any sale consideration
to the plaintiff while purchasing the plaintiff’s share in the property,
held as follows:
i. First, that the sale of an immovable property would have to
be for a price and such a payment of price is essential, even
if it is payable in the future. If a sale deed is executed without
the payment of price, it is not a sale at all in the eyes of law,
specifically under Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act,
1882. Such a sale without consideration would be void and
would not affect the transfer of the immovable property.
ii. Secondly, that, in the said case, the defendants could not
rebut the allegation of the plaintiff that no sale consideration
was paid as no evidence was adduced to indicate - (a) the
actual payment of the price mentioned in the sale deeds and,
(b) that the defendants had any earning capacity at the time
of the transaction such that the sale consideration could have
been paid. As such the sale deed being void for want of valid
consideration, could not be said to have affected the one-half
share of the plaintiff in the suit properties nor have conferred
any right of title on the defendants. In fact, it was held that the
sale deeds were a sham and must be ignored.
iii. Lastly, it was reiterated that a document that is void need not
be challenged by seeking a declaration as the said pleas can
be set up and proved even in collateral proceedings.
The relevant observations are thus:
“18. Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (for
short “the TP Act”) reads thus:
850 [2025] 9 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
“54. “Sale” defined.—“Sale” is a transfer of
ownership in exchange for a price paid or promised
or part-paid and part-promised.
Sale how made.—Such transfer, in the case of
tangible immovable property of the value of one
hundred rupees and upwards, or in the case of a
reversion or other intangible thing, can be made only
by a registered instrument.
In the case of tangible immovable property of a value
less than one hundred rupees, such transfer may be
made either by a registered instrument or by delivery
of the property.
Delivery of tangible immovable property takes place
when the seller places the buyer, or such person as
he directs, in possession of the property.
Contract for sale.—A contract for the sale of
immovable property is a contract that a sale of such
property shall take place on terms settled between
the parties.
It does not, of itself, create any interest in or charge
on such property.”
Hence, a sale of an immovable property has to be for a
price. The price may be payable in future. It may be partly
paid and the remaining part can be made payable in future.
The payment of price is an essential part of a sale covered
by Section 54 of the TP Act. If a sale deed in respect of
an immovable property is executed without payment of
price and if it does not provide for the payment of price at
a future date, it is not a sale at all in the eye of the law. It
is of no legal effect. Therefore, such a sale will be void.
It will not effect the transfer of the immovable property.
19. Now, coming back to the case in hand, both the sale
deeds record that the consideration has been paid. That
is the specific case of the respondents. It is the specific
case made out in the plaints as originally filed that the sale
deeds are void as the same are without consideration. It
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 851
Shanti Devi (Since Deceased) Through LRs. Goran v.
Jagan Devi & Ors.
is pleaded that the same are sham as the purchasers who
were minor sons and wife of Sudarshan Kumar had no
earning capacity. No evidence was adduced by Sudarshan
Kumar about the payment of the price mentioned in the sale
deeds as well as the earning capacity at the relevant time,
of his wife and minor sons. Hence, the sale deeds will have
to be held as void being executed without consideration.
Hence, the sale deeds did not affect in any manner one
half-share of the appellant in the suit properties. In fact,
such a transaction made by Sudarshan Kumar of selling
the suit properties on the basis of the power of attorney
of the appellant to his own wife and minor sons is a sham
transaction. Thus, the sale deeds of 10-4-1981 will not
confer any right, title and interest on Sudarshan Kumar’s
wife and children as the sale deeds will have to be ignored
being void. It was not necessary for the appellant to
specifically claim a declaration as regards the sale deeds
by way of amendment to the plaint. The reason being that
there were specific pleadings in the plaints as originally
filed that the sale deeds were void. A document which is
void need not be challenged by claiming a declaration as
the said plea can be set up and proved even in collateral
proceedings.
20. Hence, the issue of bar of limitation of the prayers for
declaration incorporated by way of an amendment does
not arise at all. The additional submissions made by the
respondents on 16-11-2021 have no relevance at all.
21. As no title was transferred under the said sale deeds,
the appellant continues to have undivided half-share in
the suit properties. That is how the District Court passed
the decree holding that the appellant is entitled to joint
possession of the suit properties along with Sudarshan
Kumar. Therefore, for the reasons recorded above, by
setting aside the impugned judgment and order [Rajesh
Kumar v. Kewal Krishan, 2015 SCC OnLine P&H 20782]
of the High Court, the decree passed by the District Court
deserves to be restored.”
(Emphasis supplied)
852 [2025] 9 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
35. As far as the facts of the present matter are concerned, the plaintiff
specifically averred that she never obtained any sale consideration
from the defendant. On this aspect, the plaint reads as follows:
“(c) That the plaintiff never got any sale consideration of
the alleged sale deed and she came to know about this
fraudulent transaction only when she came to the village
mourn the death of Ram Saran and heard that her land is
going to be sold by the defendant without any right in it”
36. Admittedly, the sale consideration is Rs. 15,000/- as per the sale deed.
The sale deed indicated that, out of the total sale consideration, the
plaintiff and the other vendor i.e., Ram Saran, had already allegedly
received Rs. 9000/- from the defendant and that the remaining amount
of Rs. 6000/- would be received at the time of the execution of the
sale deed, in front of the Registrar. The relevant portion of the sale
deed reads thus:
“[…] now we with our own sweet will have sold the above
land measuring 31 kanal 4 marla, along with all the rights
to Smt. Shanti wife of Bagdawat son of Harnath, resident of
Akbarpur, for Rs. 15000/-. Possession has been delivered
to the vendee. Out of the total sale consideration, we
have already received Rs. 9000/- from the vendee and
remaining amount of Rs. 6000/- will be received in front
of the Sub Registrar. Expenses of the stamp papers have
been borne by the vendee itself […]”
37. The endorsement made by the Sub Registrar at the time of the
execution of the sale deed, reads thus:
“That the contents of the sale deed have been read over
and understood to Ram Saran 2/3rd share, Risali 1/3rd
share, and Bhadgawat husband of vendee. They have
verified the same and the vendors have received Rs.
6000/- from the husband of the vendee in the presence of
the sub-registrar. Both the parties have been identified by
Mahadev Singh Sarpanch, and witness no. 2 Budhu.[…]”
38. Concurrent findings of both the First Appellate Court and the
High Court indicated that the husband of the defendant i.e., one
Bagdawat, who had allegedly given the remaining sale consideration
of Rs. 6,000/- during the time of execution of the sale deed, had
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 853
Shanti Devi (Since Deceased) Through LRs. Goran v.
Jagan Devi & Ors.
not stepped into the witness box. Furthermore, one of the attesting
witnesses to the execution of the sale deed i.e., the Sarpanch had
also died before his deposition could be recorded. One Budhu, who
was the second attesting witness, was the brother of the defendant
and both the Courts had doubted his testimony as being partial to
the defendant. All in all, there was no witness who could substantiate
the case of the defendant that there was part-payment of the sale
consideration, i.e., Rs. 6,000/- during the time of execution of the sale
deed. Furthermore, no evidence was adduced by the defendant to
prove that even the initial amount of Rs. 9,000/- which was purportedly
paid before the execution of the sale deed was actually received by
the plaintiff. Therefore, the averment of the plaintiff in the plaint, that
she had not received the sale consideration, had not been otherwise
proven as false. In such circumstances as well, i.e., in the absence
of the sale consideration being tendered, the sale deed would be
void and the plaintiff would not be required to seek its cancellation.
Therefore, Article 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963 could not be said
to be applicable to the present facts.
39. The First Appellate Court had rightly observed that the plaintiff had
claimed the relief of joint possession. It had also arrived at the finding
that the transaction in question was void. To put it simply, in the
eyes of the law, the plaintiff could not be said to have executed the
sale deed. Therefore, the plaintiff could indeed have maintained an
action to obtain possession of the property on the basis of her title
and filed the same within the period of 12 years from the date of
knowledge that the possession of the defendant was adverse to that
of the plaintiff. Even if the date of execution of the sale deed, i.e.,
14.06.1973 is considered, the suit having been filed on 28.02.1984,
i.e., almost 11 years later, could be said to be well within limitation
as stipulated under Article 65.
40. In the overall view of the matter, we have reached the conclusion
that the High Court could be said to have committed an error insofar
as observing that it is Article 59 and not Article 65 of the Schedule
to the Limitation Act, 1963, which would apply to the case in hand.
However, irrespective of the question of which Article of the Limitation
Act, 1963 would be applicable to the suit instituted by the present
plaintiff, the suit could be said to have been filed within limitation.
Therefore, apart from clarifying the correct position of law, we find
854 [2025] 9 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
no infirmity in the ultimate conclusion that the High Court arrived at
as far as the maintainability of the suit on the aspect of limitation
is concerned.
41. Therefore, this appeal fails and is hereby, dismissed.
Result of the case: Appeal dismissed.
†
Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan
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