Holding

The third dying declaration is not trustworthy and cannot sustain the conviction; the conviction under Section 302 IPC is set aside.

Summary

The deceased Sarla suffered severe burns on 16 August 1999 and died on 19 August 1999. Three dying declarations were recorded: the first two (Ex D‑3 and Ex P‑3) were taken on the day of the incident by police in the presence of doctors, wherein she stated the fire was accidental and no one was responsible; the third (Ex P‑18) was recorded three days later by an executive magistrate, alleging that her mother‑in‑law Sharda poured kerosene on her. The trial court and the Rajasthan High Court convicted Sharda under Section 302 IPC based solely on the third declaration, imposing life imprisonment. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined the reliability of the three statements, finding the first two consistent and credible, while the third was marred by overwritings, altered dates, and lack of corroboration, rendering it untrustworthy. Consequently, the Court held that the conviction could not be sustained and set aside the judgment, ordering Sharda’s release.

Issues considered

Whether the third dying declaration (Ex P‑18) can be relied upon to sustain a conviction under Section 302 IPC.
Whether a dying declaration must be corroborated and what degree of reliability is required for conviction.
Whether the earlier dying declarations, being consistent and recorded in the presence of medical officers, outweigh the later, doubtful declaration.

Legislation cited

Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 302

Subjects

dying declarationcredibilitycorroborationSection 302 IPCmurderevidencecross‑examinationconviction quashed

Judgment

(2009] 16 (ADDL.) S.C.R. 441

SHARDA A
v.
STATE OF RAJASTHAN
(Criminal Appeal No. 699 of 2008)
DECEMBER 15, 2009
B
[AFTAB ALAM AND DEEPAK VERMA, JJ.]

Dying declaration: Three dying declarations - First and
second dying declarations recorded by police in the presence
of doctors in quick succession - Consistent statements made C
by deceased that she received bum injuries accidentally and
she held no one responsible for the incident - Third dying
declaration in question-answer form recorded by magistrate
after three days - Deceased stating that appellant-mother-in-
/aw poured kerosene on her - There were overwritings in the D
> 1 third dying declaration and some dates were scored out to put
new dates - This create doubt with regard to its co"ectness
and veracity - The first and second dying declarations were
more reliable and credible - Third dying declaration neither
inspired confidence nor wholly trustworthy to sustain conviction E
of appellant - Penal Code, 1860 - s.302.

Prosecution case was that .on 16.8.1999 deceased
was set on fire by appellant who was her mother-in-law
,, , which resulted"in her death on 19.8.1999. Three dying
declarations were recorded. The first was Ex.D-3 F
recorded by PW-22, ASI in the presence of PW-31, doctor.
The second dying declaration was Exh.P .3 recorded by
PW-20, SI in the presence of doctor. In the first and
second dying declaration, deceased stated that she
received burn injuries accidentally. The third dying G
declaration Exh.P.18 was recorded by magistrate, in
~
> which she stated that kerosene was poured on her by
appellant.

441 H
442 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 16 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A Trial court convicted the appellant under s.302 IPC
on the basis of third dying declaration. High Court
affirmed the same. Hence the present appeal .

• Allowing the appeal, the Court
B HELD: 1.1 ..PW-31 deposed that on 16.8.1999, he was
posted as Surgeon in Deen Dayal Upadhyay Hospital.
That day deceased was admitted in the hospital on
account of burn injuries sustained by her. She had given
her statement which was recorded in his presence,
c marked as D-3. The same bore his signature and thumb
impression of deceased. In the cross-examination of PW-
31, he categorically deposed that during the time her
statement was recorded, she was mentally alert and was
in a condition to get her statement recorded. He further
D admitted that the said statement was not recorded under
pressure from anyone and was given on her own free will
and accord. He further clarified that in Exh. D-3, her first
. "
dying declaration, she had stated that while cooking food,
on Primus stove, she pumped air which inflamed the
E same, her clothes accordingly caught fire and she
sustained burn injuries. She further stated that no one
had set her on fire. Thus, his cross-examination fully
established that deceased sustained burn injuries on her
own while cooking food and did not fast~ liability on
F anyone else much less on the appellant. PW-22
categorically deposed the manner in which statement of
' .
deceased was recorded in Exh. D-3. He also deposed
that at that time P.W.31 was also present who certified her
to be in mentally fit and proper condition to get the same
recorded. From the evidence, it is crystal clear that the
G
first dying declaration of deceased Ex.D-3 stood fully
corroborated from the evidence of P.W-22 and P.W-31.
[Paras 21 and 24] [450-B-H; 451-A] ~

~

1.2. Critical examination of the second dying
H
SHARDA v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN 443

declaration also shows that deceased had stated that A
after cooking meals in the evening she was trying to
extinguish the stove, but it got inflamed and her nylon
saree caught fire. No one had put her to fire and no one
should be blamed for it. Perusal of the same would show
that these two statements were consistent and were B
made by her, before being tutored by anyone. [Para 25]
[451-B-C]

1.3. The third dying declaration was in question-
answer form but perusal of the original record clearly C
showed that it had many over-writings and some dates
were scored out to put new dates. This itself created a
doubt in mind with regard to correctness and veracity
thereof. This was recorded on 19.8.1999 whereas two
earlier statements Exh.D-3 and Exh. P-3 were recorded
on 16.8.1999 in quick succession, soon after the incident. o·
Exh. P-3 has been signed by P.W-19, father of the
deceased. While putting his signatures on the dying
declaration of the deceased, his daughter, he did not raise
any objection that it was not the statement given by
deceased. He kept quiet. However, when he was E
confronted with his signatures on it at the time of his
cross-examination, he gave an explanation that since
many papers were being signed at the time of discharge,
he signed it without knowing the contents thereof.
Apparently, this appears to be a false and baseless F
explanation, which at this point of time is certainly not
acceptable and would amount to an after-thought. No
prudent man would put his signatures on. any document
without going through the same. Thus, it is clear that if
the complainant had any grievance with regard to foul- G
play having been played by the accused then ob'liously,
he would have brought it to the notice of the police
immediately. Not having done so, speaks volumes on the
conduct of the complainant party. [Paras 26 and 28] [451-
D-F, H; 452'-A-D] H
444 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 16 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A 2. There is yet another factor which would completely
discredit the last dying declaration Exh. P-18. For the first
time, a written complaint was sent by the cousin of
deceased to the Deputy Superintendent of Police only on.
19.8.1999. This would go to show that between 16.8.1999
B to 19.8.1999, until her third and last dying declaration was
recorded, they never suspected that she has been burnt
by appellant. Their silence during this period is indicative
of the fact that they were also under the impression that
deceased had caught fire only by accident and it was not
c her mother-in-law who was perpetrator of the crime.
Cumulative effect of this would lead to an irresistible
conclusion that Exh. P-18 is not sufficient to hold the
appellant guilty of commission of offence under Section
302 IPC. It neither inspires confidence nor is wholly
trustworthy to sustain the conviction of the appellant. It
D
was an after-thought and was got prepared after the
deceased appeared to have been tutored to say so by her • •
parents. In the light of this, it has to be completely ignored.
[Paras 29 and 30) [452-D-H]

E 3. Though a dying declaration is entitled and is still
recognized by law to be given greater weightage but it
is relevant to note that accused has no chance of cross-
examination. Such a right of cross-examination is
essential for eliciting the truth as an obligation of oath.
F This is the reason, generally, the court insists that the
dying declaration should be such which inspires full
. '

confidence of the court of its correctness. The court has
to be on guard that such statement of deceased was not
as a result of either tutoring, prompting or product of
G imagination. The court must be further satisfied that
deceased was in a fit state of mind after a clear
opportunity to observe and identify the assailants. Once
the court is satisfied that the aforesaid requirement and
. .r
also to the fact that declaration was true and voluntary,
H
SHARDA v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN 445

undoubtedly, it can base its conviction without any A
further corroboration. It is not an absolute rule of law that
the dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of
conviction unless it is corroborated. The rule requiring
,.. corroboration is merely a rule of prudence. [Para 34] [453-
E-H; 454-A] B
State (Delhi Administration) v. Laxman Kumar & Ors
(1985) 4 sec 476, relied on.

4. Exh. P-18 cannot be treated as wholly trustworthy
as it is shrouded by many doubts. On the other hand, c
Exh. D-3 and P-3 are more reliable and credible. Going by
the same would fully establish that the deceased had not
implicated in the same anyone much less the appellant.
[Para 35] [454-G]
D
Case Law Reference:
,. j

(1985) 4 sec 476 relied on Para 34
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
No. 699 of 2008. E
I . ' .
From the Judgment & Order dated 25.7.2007 of the High
Court of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jodhpur in DB Criminal
Appeal No. 1071 of 2003.
.> •
R.D. Upadhyay, Harishnakar Saran, Asha Upadhyay for the F
Appellant.

Dr. Manish Singhvi, AAG, Devanshu Kumar Dewedi, Milind
Kumar for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by G

... ;
DEEPAK VERMA, J. 1. The solitary question that arises
for consideration in this appeal is whether any one of the three
dying declarations of deceased Sarla, inspires confidence, to
sustain conviction of appellant Sharda, her mother-in-law for H
446 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009) 16 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A commission of offence under Section 302 of the l.P.C and
sentence of life imprisonment.

2. Appellant has been found guilty of. commission of
offence under Section 302 of the IPC and has been awarded
B life imprisonment by learned Additional District and Sessions
Judge, Dungarpur. On D.B. Criminal Appeal No. 1071/2003
being filed by her in the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan
at Jodhpur, the same has been dismissed vide order dated
25.7.2007. Thus Judgment of conviction and sentence awarded
c by the Trial court has been affirmed. Hence, this appeal after
grant of leave to the appellant.

3. Thumb-nail sketch of the facts of the case is as
mentioned herein below:-

D Vinod Vyas was married to Sarla on 21.1.1991, almost 8
years prior to the date of occurrence, which :-1ad taken place
~
on 16.8.1999 at the matrimonial home of the deceased.
4. According to the prosecution story, for past two-three
years, relations between deceased Sarla, her husband-Vined
E and appellant-Sharda were strained. They used to demand
dowry from her which she was not able to accede to. On
16.8.1999, deceased Sarla was alleged to have been set on
fire by her mother-in-law while she was cooking food on a
kerQsene stove as a result of which she had sustained 90%
F burn injuries. She was immediately rushed to General Hospital, ' .
Sagwara.

5. On getting the aforementioned information on
16.8.1999, P.W-22 Kishore Singh posted as ASI at the Police
G Station Sagwara rushed to the General Hospital. He reached
there at about 9 O'clock at night. In the presence of PW-31 Dr.
Gokul Prajapati, her first statement Exh. D-3 was recorded.

6. As per this first statement, Sarla disclosed that while
cooking meals for the family, she pumped in air in the kerosene
H
SHARDA v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN 447
. [DEEPAK VERMA, J.]
stove, which got inflamed thereby pallu of her saree caught fire. A
Thus she sustained burn injuries on her person. She further
stated that no one had deliberately or intentionally put her on
fire. Exh: D.3 is her first statement recorded at the hospital, in
presence of P.W-31 Dr. Gokul Prajapati, who had put his
signatures on the same along with P.W-22 Kishore Singh. 8
Thumb impression of deceased was also taken on it.

7. P.W-20 -Ranjit Singh was posted as S.I at the Police
Station, Varda on the date of incident i.e. 16.8.1999. On
receiving the information that Sarla has sustained burn injuries
in her matrimonial home, he went to the hospital where Sarla · C
was admitted. However, before going to the hospital, he
contacted SOM in his house, so that he could also be taken
there for the purpose of recording her statement but was
informed by SOM that he was not well, thus would not be in a
position to go with him. D

8. P.W-20 Ranjit Singh, after reaching hospital recorded
another statement of deceased Sarla on the said date marked
as Exh P-3. In the said statement, she reiterated that she had
sustained burn injuries, while she was trying to extinguish · E
burning stove, after cooking meals, which got inflamed and her
Saree caught fire. Exh. P-3 bears signatures of Dr. Ravindra
Mehta (not examined by prosecution), P.W-2 Ganesh Lal and
P .W-20 Ranjit Singh besides the thumb impression of
... • deceased Sarla. This was her second statement in point of time F
recorded in the Hospital.

9. Since the condition of Sarla had deteriorated, she was
referred to Civil Hospital, Ahmadabad. She was accordingly
taken there for better treatment. However, she died at
Ahmedabad on 19.08.1999. G

10. P.W-3 Purushottam, cousin of the deceased had
submitted an application on 19.8.1999, on behalf of her grand-
father PW-2 Ganeshlal to the Dy. Superintendent of Police,
H
448 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 16 (ADDL.) S.C.R

A Sagwara stating that on the night of Monday, 16.8.1999 Sarla
had been set on fire by her husband Vinod and mother-in-law
Sharda. This set the investigating agency into motion in
registering a case against them initially under Section 498-A
and 307/34 of the IPC.
B 11. As per prosecution, before her death, one more dying
declaration was recorded by P.W-23 Suresh Chandra Dixit,
Executive Magistrate, Ahmadabad, marked as Exh. P-18. This
is in question - answer form. In the said last statement, for the
first time, she alleged that kerosene was poured on her by her
c mother-in-law, the present appellant Sharda and she was set
on fire by lighting a match-stick. She suffered burn injuries on
account of her mother-in-law. When she cried for help, her
father-in-law came downstairs and along with other neig:;bours,
tried to extinguish the fire. She was carried to hospital by her
D father-in-law for treatment. Thus, this would be her third
./
statement at the Hospital at Ahmadabad.
12. As mentioned hereinabove, initially on the report being
filed at the instance of P.W-2 Ganesh Lal, offence was
registered against Sharda under Section 498-A, 307/34 IPC
E and against her husband Vinod and four other relatives only
under Section 498-A of the IPC. However, after her death,
charge sheet was filed against appellant under Section 302 of
the IPC and against others under Section 498-A/34 of the IPC.
Obviously, after her death, all the three statements of the • •
F deceased Sarla, Exh. D-3, Ex. P-3 and Exh. P-18 would be
treated as her dying declarations.
13. To bring home the charges levelled against the
~

accused, prosecution has examined, in all, 31 witnesses. In
G defence, no witness was examined by the appellant. On
appreciation of evidence available on record, as mentioned
hereinabove, the trial court recorded the finding of 'not guilty'
~
against other accused including husband of the deceased and
they were acquitted but appellant was found guilty of
H
SHARDA v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN 449
[DEEPAK VERMA, J.]
commission of offence under Section 302 of the IPC and was A
awarded life imprisonment. The appeal preferred by her in the
High Court was dismissed by Division Bench. Hence, this
appeal.

14. It has neither been disputed before us nor was disputed
8
in appeal in the High Court that deceased had met with her
death on account of 90% burn injuries sustained in matrimonial
home. This even otherwise stands proved from her post-
mortem Report Exh. P-22 and evidence of P.W-30 Dr. Ashwini
Sanghvi, who had performed post-mortem on her body and has
opined that her death was due to Septecimia and shock on C
account of extensive external burn injuries sustained by her.

15. Now, the question that arises for consideration is
whether the present appellant Sharda, mother-in-law of
deceased Sarla was the perpetrator of the crime or it was an D
accidental death.
16. We have already mentioned hereinabove that there
are, in all, three dying declarations - Exh.D-3, is first in point of
time, Exh P.3, is second in point of time and Exh. P.18, is the
third and last in point of time recorded by Executive Magistrate, E
Ahmedabad.
17. Since the case revolves around the three dying
declarations of deceased Sarla, it is really not necessary to
critically examine other evidence as no charge was levelled F
against this appellant under Section 498-A IPC and the said
charge was not found proved against other co-accused.
-
18. In the light of this, we are not dealing with other
prosecution witnesses who have deposed either with regard
to demand of dowry or harassment of the deceased by the G
appellant for the same as the same is not germane to the facts
of this case.
19. However, we would start with the first dying declaration
of deceased Sarla recorded at 9.00 p.m on 16.8.1999 by P.W- H
450 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 16 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A 22 Kishore Singh. It was recorded in presence of P.W-31 Dr.
Prajapati.
20. Even though PW-31 was examined by the prosecution
to prove Exh. D-3, but surprisingly neither the trial court nor the
-~
High Court cared to go through his evidence and to discuss
B
the same at all. Thus, it is necessary for us to discuss the same
in detail.
21. Dr. Prajapati has deposed that on 16.8.1999, he was
posted as Surgeon in Deen Dayal Upadhyay Hospital. That day
c Sarla w/o Vinod .Vyas resident of Tamtiya, P.S. Varda, was
admitted in the hospital on account of burn injuries sustained
by her. She had give~ her statement which was recorded in his
presence, marked as D-3. The same bears his sigriature and
thumb impression of Sarla.
D 22. In his cross-examination, he has categorically deposed
that during the time her statement was recorded, she was
...
mentally alert and was in a condition to get her statement
recorded. He has further admitted that the said statement was
not recorded under pressure from anyone and was given on
E her own free will and accord. He has further clarified that in Exh.
D-3, her first dying declaration, she had stated that while
cooking food, on Primus stove, she pumped air which inflamed
the same, her clothes accordingly caught fire and she sustained
burn injuries. She further stated that no one had set her on fire. ...
F
23. Thus, his cross-examination fully establishes that she
had sustained burn injuries on her own while cooking food and
has not fastened liability on anyone else much less on the
present appellant.
G 24. To further corroborate Exh. D-3, the evidence of PW-
22 Kishore Singh is on record. He has categorically deposed
the manner in which statement of deceased was recorded in
Exh. D-3. He has also deposed that at that time P.W.31 Dr.
Gokul Prajapati was also present who certified her to be in
H
SHARDA v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN 451
[DEEPAK VERMA, J.]
mentally fit and proper condition to get the same recorded. A
From the aforesaid evidence, it is crystal clear that the first dying

. declaration of deceased Ex.D-3 stood fully corroborated from
the evidence of P.W-22 and P.W-31 .
25. Now, we shall take up her second dying declaration
recorded by P.W-20 Ranjit Singh marked P-3 on 16.8.1999." B
Critical examination of the same also shows that deceased had
-( ~
stated that after cooking• meals in the evening she was trying
to extinguish the stove, but it got inflamed and her nyloo saree
caught fire. No one had put her to fire and no one should be
blamed for it. Perusal of the same would show that these two c
statements are consistent and have been made by tier, before
being tutored by anyone.
26. Now, we shall deal with Exh. P-18, her last statement
recorded at Ahmedabad in presence of P.W-23 Suresh Chand
D
Jll ~ •
Dixit, Executive Magistrate. We have critically gone through the
same. We have also examined th~ reasons assigned by Trial
Court and High Court while treating this dying declaration, Exh
P-18, as wholly trustworthy. No doubt, it is true that the same
is in question - answer form but perusal of the original record
clearly shows that it has many over-writings and some dates E
have been scored out to put new dates. This itself creates a
doubt in mind with regard to correctness and veracity thereof.
It is also to be noted that this was recorded on 19.8.1999
,.. • whereas two earlier statements Exh. D-3 and Exh. P-3 were
recorded on 16.8.1999 in quick succession, soon after the F
incident.
27. Thus, the question still arises whether any weightage
"""" can be given to Exh.P-18 which was recorded in presence of
the Executive Magistrate or it has to be completely given a go- G
by so as to give more credence to Exh. D-3 and P-3 her earlier
statements recorded by the police in presence of doctors.
28. It is pertinent to mention here that Exh. P-3 has also
been signed by P.W-19 Raman Lal, father of the deceased.
H
452 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 16 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A Surprisingly, while putting his signatures on the dying
declaration of the deceased, his daughter, he had not raised
any objection that it was not the statement given by deceased.
He kept quiet. When he was confronted with his signatures on
it at the time of his cross-examination, he gave an explanation
'-
B that since many papers were being signed at the time of
discharge, he signed it without knowing the contents thereof.
Apparently, this appears to be a false and baseless
explanation, which at this point of time is certainly not
acceptable and would amount to an after-thought. No prudent
man would put his signatures on any document without going
c through the same. Thus, it is clear that if the complainant had
any grievance with regard to foul-play having been played by
the accused then obviously, he would have brought it to the
notice of the police immediately. Not having done so, speaks
volumes on the conduct of the complainant party.
D
29. There is yet another factor which would completely
discredit the last dying declaration Exh. P-18. For the first time,
a written complaint was sent by the cousin of deceased to the
Deputy Superintendent of Police only on 19.8.1999. This would
E go to show that between 16.8.1999 to 19.8.1999, until herthird
and last dying declaration was recorded, they never suspected
that she has been burnt by her mother-in-law, the present
appellant. Their silence during this period is indicative of the
fact that they were also under the impression that deceased
F had caught fire only by accident and it was not her mother-in-
.. <
'
law who was perpetrator of the crime.
30. Cumulative effect of the aforesaid leads to an
~
irresistible conclusion that Exh. P-18 is not sufficient to hold the
appellant guilty of commission of offence under Section 302 of
G the IPC. It neither inspires confidence nor is wholly trustworthy
to sustain the conviction of the appellant. It was an after-thought
and has been got prepared after the deceased appears to /

have been tutored to say so by her parents. In the light of this,
it has to be completely ignored which we accordingly do so.
H
SHARDA v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN 453
[DEEPAK VERMA, J.]
31. In other words, we place greater relian~e on Exh. D-3, A
and Exh. P-3, her two earlier dying declarations which are not
only consistent but also inspire confidence.
32. In the case in hand, the conviction of the appellant is
based on the last dying declaration Exh.P-18, said to have been
B
recorded in presence of Executive Magistrate. The principle on
which dying declarations are admitted in evidence is indicated
in legal maxim:
"Nemo moriturus proesumitur mentiri - a man will not
meet his Maker with a lie in his mouth." c
33. It is indicative of the fact that a man who is on a death
bed would not tell a lie to falsely implicate an innocent person.
This is the reason in law to accept the veracity of her statement.
It is for this reason, the requirements of oath and cross-
D
.. examination are dispensed with. Besides, if the dying
declaration is to be completely excluded in a given case, it may
even amount to miscarriage of justice as the victim alone being
the eye-witness in a serious crime, the exclusion of the
statement would leave the court without a scrap of evidence.
E
34. Though a dying declaration is entitled and is still
recognized by law to be given greater weightage but it has also
to be kept in mind that accused had no chance of cross-
,.. • examination. Such a right of cross-examination is essential for
eliciting the truth as an obligation of oath. This is the reason, F
generally, the court insists that the dying declaration should be
such which inspires full confidence of the court of its
correctness. The court has to be on guard that such statement
of deceased was not as a result of either tutoring, prompting
or product of imagination. The court must be further satisfied
G
that deceased was in a fit state of mind after a clear opportunity
to observe and identify the assailants. Once the court is
satisfied that the aforesaid requirement and also to the fact that
declaration was true and voluntary, undoubtedly, it can base its
conviction without any further corroboration. It is not an absolute
H
454 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 16 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A rule of law that the dying declaration cannot form the sole basis
of conviction unless it is corroborated. The rule requiring
corroboration is merely a rule of prudence.
In this regard, we may profitably quote the following para
from (1985) 4 SCC 476 titled State (Delhi Administration) Vs
B Laxman Kumar & Ors :

"40. We have also come to the conclusion that the High
Court failed to take into account one material aspect while
appreciating the evidence of the prosecution witnesses. It
c is a fact that Sudha had been burnt and according to the
medical opinion that was to the extent of 70%. As the
evidence shows, Sudha was in her senses and was
capable of talking at the time when she was being
removed to the hospital or even after she had been
D admitted as an indoor patient. The two sisters or their
respective husbands had no apprehension that Sudha
would not live. In case Sudha came round, she was to have
..
lived in the family of her husband. No one interested in the
welfare of Sudha was, therefore, prepared to make a
statement which might prejudice the accused persons and
E
lead to the straining of relationship in an irreparable way.
Therefore, the silence or avoidance to make a true
disclosure about the cause of fire particularly so long as
Sudha was alive, cannot be over-emphasised an adverse
inference drawn by the High Court from the conduct of the
F • "'
sisters was indeed not warranted in the facts of the case.
35. In the light of the aforesaid discussion, we are of the
considered opinion that Exh. P-18 cannot be treated as wholly
trustworthy as it is shrouded by many doubts. On the other hand,
G for the reasons recorded herein above, Exh. D-3 and P-3 are
more reliable and credible. Going by the same would fully
establish that the deceased had not implicated in the same
anyone much less the appellant.
36. Thus, we have no doubt in our mind that the impugned
H
(
, · SHARDA v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN 455
[DEEPAK VERMA, J.]
judgment and order of conviction passed by the learned A
Sessions Judge and confirmed in appeal by the High Court
cannot be sustained in law. The same are hereby set aside
and quashed. The appeal is allowed accordingly. The appellant
is in jail, she would be released forthwith, if not required in any
other case. B
D.G . Appeal allowed.

..

.... !