SHARDHAMMA & ANR.versusTHE DY. COMMISSIONER & ORS.
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 583
- Decided
- 29 April 2025
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- B V NAGARATHNA
Holding
An application under Section 5 of the Karnataka SC/ST (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978 filed after an unreasonable delay and without proper locus standi is barred, and the sale deed remains valid.
Summary
The appellants purchased four acres of land that had been granted to Shri Ranga in 1946-47 and was subject to a Saguvalli Chit confirming a non‑alienation clause. Shri Ranga sold the land in 1969, but in 1992 a third party, Dodda Hanumaiah, filed an application under Section 5 of the Karnataka Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978, seeking restoration of the land to the original grantee. The Assistant Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner allowed the application, holding that the sale violated the non‑alienation period, and the High Court upheld those orders. The Supreme Court examined the delay, noting that the application was filed more than 20 years after the sale and was therefore barred by laches and the principle of reasonable time. It also observed that the Saguvalli Chit expressly prohibited alienation for ten years, which had already elapsed, and that the respondents had no locus standi as they were not descendants of the original grantee. Consequently, the Court set aside all lower‑court orders and allowed the appeal, confirming the appellants' title to the land.
Issues considered
- Whether an application under Section 5 of the Karnataka SC/ST (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978 can be entertained after an unreasonable delay.
- Whether the non‑alienation clause in the Saguvalli Chit bars the sale made in 1969.
- Whether the respondents have locus standi to file the application under Section 5.
Legislation cited
Headnote
Issue for Consideration The present appellants being aggrieved by the order passed by the Assistant Commissioner as well as Deputy Commissioner preferred a writ petition before the High Court and vide order dated 18.12.2003, the writ petition was dismissed. The present appellants thereafter in the matter and the same was also dismissed by the High Court. Headnotes† Karnataka Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978 – s.5 – A land was sold to R, predecessor-in-title of the appellants in the year 1946-47 and a
Subjects
Judgment
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 2045 : 2025 INSC 583
Shardhamma & Anr.
v.
The Dy. Commissioner & Ors.
(Civil Appeal No. 5689 of 2025)
29 April 2025
[B.V. Nagarathna and Satish Chandra Sharma,* JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
The present appellants being aggrieved by the order passed by
the Assistant Commissioner as well as Deputy Commissioner
preferred a writ petition before the High Court and vide order dated
18.12.2003, the writ petition was dismissed. The present appellants
thereafter preferred a Writ Appeal in the matter and the same was
also dismissed by the High Court.
Headnotes†
Karnataka Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition
of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978 – s.5 – A land was
sold to R, predecessor-in-title of the appellants in the year
1946-47 and a Saguvalli Chit was confirmed on 12.05.1954 –
The land was sold by R on 20.06.1969 – The application
u/s.5 of the PTCL Act was filed on 06.06.1992 by one D (not
a legal representative of the original grantee) – The Assistant
Commissioner has allowed the application vide order dated
01.03.1999 and on appeal, the Deputy Commissioner has
affirmed the aforesaid order vide order dated 16.10.2003
holding that there was violation of alienation clause as under
the Mysore Land Revenue Rules which were in force on the
date of grant, particularly on account of the non-alienation
clause, the land could not have been alienated before the
expiry of period of 20 years – Writ petition and thereafter writ
appeal filed before the High Court was dismissed:
Held: The application preferred in the matter under the PTCL Act
was hopelessly barred by delay and latches – In the instant case,
the application was preferred only on 06.06.1992 and the land was
sold on 20.06.1969, it was certainly beyond reasonable period
and, therefore, the order passed by the Assistant Commissioner,
Deputy Commissioner, Single Judge and the impugned orders
are set aside – The appellants had purchased the land by virtue
* Author
2046 [2025] 4 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
of the sale deed, and, therefore, have all rights over the land in
question – The application u/s.5 of the PTCL Act was preferred
after expiry of more than 10 years period, the same should have
been dismissed on the ground of delay and latches – There is
one another important aspect with regard to Saguvalli Chit which
was confirmed on 12.05.1954 – The records reveal that there is
a non-alienation clause which provides that the land in question
shall not be transferred before expiry of period of 10 years and,
therefore, in the light of this categoric recital in the Saguvalli Chit,
the sale deed executed in the matter could not have been declared
as null and void as has been done by the authorities and affirmed
by the Courts below – The respondents before this Court were also
not having any locus in the matter as they are not descendants of
R, the original grantee and, therefore, they could not have preferred
an application u/s.5 of the PTCL Act – Thus, the impugned orders
are set aside. [Paras 6-10]
Case Law Cited
Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi v. State of Karnataka and Another (2020)
14 SCC 232; Vivek M. Hinduja and Others v. M. Ashwatha and
Others (2020) 14 SCC 228 – referred to.
List of Acts
Karnataka Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of
Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978; Mysore Land Revenue Rules.
List of Keywords
Section 5 of Karnataka Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes
(Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978; Delay and
laches; Non-alienation clause; Beyond reasonable period.
Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 5689 of 2025
From the Judgment and Order dated 27.07.2010 of the High Court
of Karnataka at Bengaluru in WA No. 1928 of 2004
Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellants:
Ms. Kiran Suri, Sr. Adv., S.j. Amith, Ms. Vidushi Garg, Dr. Mrs.
Vipin Gupta.
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 2047
Shardhamma & Anr. v. The Dy. Commissioner & Ors.
Advs. for the Respondents:
P. Vishwanatha Shetty, Sr. Adv., V. N. Raghupathy, Raghavendra
M. Kulkarni, Ms. Mythili S, M. Bangaraswamy, Venkata Raghu
Mannepalli, Dhanesh Ieshdhan, Shiv Kumar, Ms. Vaishnavi,
G. N. Reddy, Mahesh Thakur, Vibhav Chaturvedi.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
Satish Chandra Sharma, J.
Leave granted.
2. The present appeal is arising out of order dated 27.07.2010 passed
in Writ Appeal No. 1928 of 2004 (SC/ST) by the High Court of
Karnataka at Bangalore whereby the High Court has set aside the
order passed in Writ Petition No. 50446/2003 dated 18.12.2003.
3. The facts of the case reveal that four acres of land in old Survey No.
14/1 (New No. 150) of Hosahalli Village, Hulikunte, Hobli were granted
on lease through auction conducted by Tehsildar, Sira Taluk to one
Shri Ranga @ Rangappa during the year 1946-47 i.e. 01.04.1946
and a Saguvalli Chit was confirmed on 12.05.1954 in his favour.
The upset price was paid by Shri Ranga towards the land and Shri
Ranga continued to be in peaceful possession and enjoyment of the
land in question from 1946 to 1969, i.e., for a period of 23 years. His
name continued in existence in the revenue records. Shri Ranga, the
land holder (the Grantee), sold the land to the husband of the first
appellant, namely, Sri Basavarajappa by way of a registered sale
deed and the appellant No. 2 is son of Basavarajappa. Thus, the
land in question continued to be in possession of late Shri Ranga
and after his death in the name of his wife and son.
4. On 06.06.1992, one Dodda Hanumaiah preferred a petition under
Section 5 of the Karnataka Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes
(Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978 (hereinafter
referred to as, ‘the PTCL Act’), stating that the original grantee is the
elder brother of his late father and the land was sold on 20.06.1969
and as the land was sold on 20.06.1969, the possession of the same
has to be restored to the original grantee and as the original grantee
was not alive, to his relative. It is pertinent to note that respondent
2048 [2025] 4 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
No. 3 Doddahanumaiah is certainly not the legal representative of
the original grantee. The Assistant Commissioner has allowed the
application vide order dated 01.03.1999 and on appeal, the Deputy
Commissioner has affirmed the aforesaid order vide order dated
16.10.2003 holding that there was violation of alienation clause as
under the Mysore Land Revenue Rules which were in force on the
date of grant, particularly on account of the non-alienation clause, the
land could not have been alienated before the expiry of period of 20
years. The present appellants being aggrieved by the order passed
by the Assistant Commissioner as well as Deputy Commissioner
preferred a writ petition before the High Court of Karnataka and vide
order dated 18.12.2003, the writ petition was dismissed.
5. The present appellants thereafter preferred a Writ Appeal in the matter
and the same was also dismissed by the High Court of Karnataka
vide order dated 27.07.2010.
6. This Court has carefully gone through the orders passed by the
Assistant Commissioner, Deputy Commissioner, learned Single Judge
as well as Division Bench of the High Court of Karnataka. In the
present case, the land was sold to Shri Ranga, predecessor-in-title of
the appellants in the year 1946-47 and a Saguvalli Chit was confirmed
on 12.05.1954. The land was sold by Shri Ranga on 20.06.1969
and the application under Section 5 of the PTCL Act was filed on
06.06.1992. In the considered opinion of this Court, the application
preferred in the matter under the PTCL Act was hopelessly barred by
delay and latches, as has been held in the case of Nekkanti Rama
Lakshmi Vs. State of Karnataka and Another (2020) 14 Supreme
Court Cases 232, in paragraphs 7 and 8, as under:
“7. Shri R.S. Hedge appearing for the appellant urged
several grounds. It is contended by Shri Hegde that
proceedings are void for non-joinder of the first purchaser
of the land. It is further contended that the non-alienation
period i.e. period for which Kriyappa could not have
transferred the land was not 15 years but was 10 years
under the Rules of the land and, therefore, transfer
was legal having been made after 10 years. However,
the applicant had not produced the original grant, and,
therefore, it was not possible for the purpose to come
to a conclusion that the transfer was in breach of the
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 2049
Shardhamma & Anr. v. The Dy. Commissioner & Ors.
non-alienation period. We, however, find that one of
the points raised on behalf of the appellant deserves
acceptance. That point is that the application for
restoration of the land was made by the heir of Kriyappa
after unreasonably long period i.e. 25 years from when
the Act came into force. Section 4 of the Act itself has a
ubiquitous effect in it, annulling the transfer of granted
land “made either before or after the commencement
of the Act” as null and void. The Act does not specify
how much before the commencement of the Act. Thus,
on a plain and critical reading of the Act, it seems that
it covers proceedings made in time before the Act was
enacted. However, we are not called upon to deal with the
reasonableness of this provision and we do not propose
to say anything on this. The validity of the Act has been
upheld by a judgment of this Court in Manchegowda v.
State of Karnataka [Manchegowda v. State of Karnataka,
(1984) 3 SCC 301].”
“8. However, the question that arises is with regard to terms
of Section 5 of the Act which enables any interested person
to make an application for having the transfer annulled
as void under Section 4 of the Act. This section does not
prescribe any period within which such an application
can be made. Neither does it prescribe the period within
which suo motu action may be taken. This Court in Chhedi
Lal Yadav v. Hari Kishore Yadav [Chhedi Lal Yadav v.
Hari Kishore Yadav, (2018) 12 SCC 527:(2018) 5 SCC
(Civ) 427] and also in Ningappa v. Commr.[Ningappa v.
Commr.(2020)14 SCC 236] reiterated a settled position
in law that whether statute provided for a period of
limitation, provisions of the statute must be invoked within
a reasonable time. It is held that action whether on an
application of the parties, or suo motu, must be taken within
a reasonable time. That action arose under the provisions
of a similar Act which provided for restoration of certain
lands to farmers which were sold for arrears of rent or from
which they were ejected for arrears of land from 1-1-1939
to 31-12-1950. This relief was granted to the farmers due
to flood in Kosi River which make agricultural operations
2050 [2025] 4 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
impossible. An application for restoration was made
after 24 years and was allowed. It is in that background
that this Court upheld that it was unreasonable to do
so. We have no hesitation in upholding that the present
application for restoration of land made by respondent
Rajappa was made after an unreasonably long period and
was liable to be dismissed on that ground. Accordingly,
the judgments of the Karnataka High Court, namely, R.
Rudrappa v. Commr. [R.Rudrappa v. Commr., 1998 SCC
OnLine Kar 671:(2000) 1 Kant LJ 523], Maddurappa v.
State of Karnataka [Maddurappa v. State of Karnataka,
(2006) 4 Kant LJ 303] and G. Maregoudav. Commr.
[G. Maregouda v. Commr., (2000) 2 Kant LJ SN 4B]
holding that there is no limitation provided by Section 5
of the Act and, therefore, an application can be made at
any time, are overruled. Order accordingly.”
7. In the light of the aforesaid judgment, as in the present case, the
application was preferred only on 06.06.1992 and the land was
sold on 20.06.1969, it was certainly beyond reasonable period and,
therefore, the order passed by the Assistant Commissioner, Deputy
Commissioner, learned Single Judge and the impugned orders are
set aside. The appellants had purchased the land by virtue of the
sale deed, and, therefore, have all rights over the land in question.
This Court again in the case of Vivek M. Hinduja and Others Vs.
M. Ashwatha and Others (2020) 14 Supreme Court Cases 228
dealing with the similar Act, in paras 10 to 12, has held as under:
“10. In Pune Municipal Corpn. v. State of Maharashtra
[Pune Municipal Corpn. v. State of Maharashtra, (2007) 5
SCC 211] this Court reproduced the following observations
with regard to the declaration of orders beyond the period
of limitation as invalid: (SCC p. 226, para 39)
“39. Setting aside the decree passed by all
the courts and referring to several cases,
this Court held that if the party aggrieved by
invalidity of the order intends to approach the
court for declaration that the order against him
was inoperative, he must come before the court
within the period prescribed by limitation. ‘If the
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 2051
Shardhamma & Anr. v. The Dy. Commissioner & Ors.
statutory time of limitation expires, the court
cannot give the declaration sought for’.”
(emphasis supplied)
“11. We are in respectful agreement with the aforesaid
observations. It is, however, necessary to add that where
limitation is not prescribed, the party ought to approach
the competent court or authority within reasonable time,
beyond which no relief can be granted. As decided earlier,
this principle would apply even to suo motu actions.”
“12. We find from the impugned judgments [Vivek M.
Hinduja v. M. Ashwatha, 2006 SCC OnLine Kar 882] ,
[George Thomas v. K.P. Krishnappa, 2011 SCC OnLine
Kar 4496] that the High Court has not given due regard
to the period of time within which the action was taken in
the present cases. The competent authorities in all these
cases had declined relief to the respondents and had
refused to annul the transfers. In the circumstances, the
impugned judgment(s) and order(s) passed by the High
Court are set aside.”
8. In the light of the ratio laid down in the aforesaid judgments, it can
be safely gathered that as the application under Section 5 of the
PTCL Act was preferred after expiry of more than 10 years period,
the same should have been dismissed on the ground of delay and
latches.
9. There is one another important aspect with regard to Saguvalli Chit
which was confirmed on 12.05.1954. The vernacular version and
the English translation which are on record reveal that there is a
non-alienation clause which provides that the land in question shall
not be transferred before expiry of period of 10 years and, therefore,
in the light of this categoric recital in the Saguvalli Chit, the sale
deed executed in the matter could not have been declared as null
and void as has been done by the authorities and affirmed by the
learned Courts below.
10. Resultantly, the appeal deserves to be allowed and is accordingly
allowed. The respondents before this Court were also not having
any locus in the matter as they are not descendants of Shri Ranga,
2052 [2025] 4 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
the original grantee and, therefore, they could not have preferred an
application under Section 5 of the PTCL Act. On this count also, the
impugned orders deserve to be set aside and are hereby set aside.
11. The appeal is allowed. No orders as to costs.
Result of the case: Appeal allowed.
†
Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan
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