SHASHIDHAR PURANDHAR HEGDE AND ANR.versusSTATE OF KARNATAKA

A               SHASHIDHAR PURANDHAR HEGDE AND ANR.
                                 v.
                        STATEOFKARNATAKA

                                OCTOBER 15, 2004

B                  [ARIJIT PASAYAT AND C.K. THAKKER, JJ.]


        Penal Code, 1860-Sections 263, 506 and 507-Kidnapping-Manner
  of kidnapping and his rescue clearly narrated by kidnapped child-Demand
C of ransom and threat to father of child-Version of child and father
  corroborated by other witnesses-Accused apprehended by some· witnesses-
  Case reported to police after apprehension of accused-Seizure of small
  ropes and knife from one of the accused-Acquittal by trial Court doubting
  the roles played by witnesses who apprehended the accused and in view of
  certain discrepancies in the evidence of some witnesses-Conviction by High
D Court relying on evidence of kidnapped child and his father-On appeal,
  held: High Court rightly convicted the accused.

          Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973-Section 378-Criminal appeal-
    Against order of acquittal-Power of Appellate Court to reappreciate
    evidence-Held, generally the order of acquittal should not be interfered
E   with-But where admissible evidence is ignored, it is duty of appellate Court
    to reappreciate evidence-If two views are pos~ible on the evidence, view
    favourable to the accused should be adopted.

          Criminal Trial:

F         Discrepancies-In evidence of witnesses-Evidentiary value of-Held:
    Minor discrepancies cannot be termed as contradictions unless such
    discrepancies affect credibility of evidence-Whether any omission in the
    evidence amounts to contradiction is a question of fact-Code of Criminal
    Procedure, 1973-Section 162.
G         Words and Phrases:

          "Contradiction"-Meaning of

          Appellants-accused were prosecuted for having kidnapped PW-3.

H                                       536
             SHASHIDHARPURANDHARHEGDEv.STATEOFKARNATAKA                   537
According to prosecution Accused persons kidnapped PW-3 from his school          A
and held him in forest and threatened him. They had also made telephone calls
to PW-I father of PW-3 telling him that they had kidnapped his son, demanding
ransom of Rs. 3 lakh and further threatening him if the matter was reported
to Police his son would be killed. PW-20 had seen PW-1 talking over phone
and was looking scared. PW-1 told him about the kidnapping and demand of         B
ransom to be kept at a certain place with particular identification. PW-I
informed it to his nephew who himself and alongwith his friends i.e. PWs
2,4,5 and 6 went to the school of PW-3 and made enquiry from his teacher
and friends. Thereafter they went to the indicated place with fake currency
notes in a bag and kept the same at the indicated place. When A-2 came to
take the bag they caught hold of him and he revealed that A-1 was holding        C
PW-3. They took A-2 to the place and apprehended A-1 and rescued PW-3.
Thereafter information was lodged with police and accused were handed over
to police. Accused were tried u/ss. 363, 368, 506 and 507 r/w Section 34
IPC. During trial PW-3 specifically and clearly narrated the manner of
kidnapping by the accused and manner of rescue. Prosecution version was
supported by evidence of PWs 7 and 11 who had seen A-1 calling on telephone      D
demanding Rs. 3 lakhs for returning the child, PW-13, teacher of PW-3 had
seen him talking to A-1, PWs 9 and IO stated that A-1 had purchased kumkum
and lemon from their respective shops, PW-8 had seen A-1 taking PW-3 on
his bike, A-1 had enquired about PW-3 from PWs 20 and 21, PW-24, police
official had seized hand bag containing small ropes and knife from the person    E
of A-1. Trial Court found some discrepancies in the evidence of PWs 8, 12
and 22, friends of PW-3 and doubted the roles played by PWs 2, 4, 5 and 6,
and hence directed acquittal on the ground that accusations had not been
established. On appeal, High Court reappreciated the evidence and relying
on the prosecution evidence held the appellants-accused guilty of offences
punishable u/s 363 r/w Section 34 IPC and additionally sentenced appellant       F
No.I u/s 506 and 507 IPC. Hence the present appeal.

      Dismissing the appeal, the Court

      HELD: 1.1. The evidence of the witnesses cannot be discarded merely
because they first made attempt to find out whether the place where the          G
kumkum and lemon were kept was the place where the accused persons had
hidden PW-3. The class mates of the victim have given proper identification
of the accused by their description. This clearly corroborates the evidence of
PW-3 and since his evidence is cogent and credible the trial Court had
erroneously directed acquittal of the accused persons and the High Court has     H
    538                     SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004) SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A rightly directed the conviction. [544-H; 545-A]
       . 1.2. It is of great relevance that the evidence of PW-3 has not been
    shaken. Added to that is the evidence of PW-1, the father. Merely because
    some of the witnesses are involved in criminal cases that may at the most
    warrant a close scrutiny of their evidence but not total rejection. [546-D)
B
          . 2.1. There is no embargo on the appellate Court reviewing the evidence
    upon which an order of acquittal is based. Generally, the order of acquittal
    shall not be interfered with because the presumption of innocence of the
    accused is further strengthened by acquittal. The golden thread which runs
C   through the web of administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two
    views are possible on the evidence adduc~d in the case, one pointing to the
    guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable
    to the accused should be adopted. The paramount consideration of the Court
    is to ensure that miscarriage of justice is prevented. A miscarriage of justice
    which may arise from acquittal of the guilty is no less than from the c:onviction
D   of an innocent. In a case where admissible evidence is ignored, a duty is cast
    upon the appellate Court to re-appreciate the evidence where the accused had
    been acquitted, for the purpose of ascertaining as to whether any of the accused
    really committed any offence or not. [545-B-D)

          Bhagwan Singh and Ors. v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2002) 2 Supreme
E   567, relied on.

          2.2. The principle to be followed by appellate Court considering the
    appeal against the judgment of acquittal is to interfere only when there are
    compelling and substantial reasons for doing so. If the impugned judgment is
    clearly unreasonable and relevant and convincing materials have been
F   unjustifiably eliminated in the process, it is a compelling reason for
    interference. [545-E)

         Shivaji Sahabrao·Bobade and Anr. v. State of Maharashtra, AIR (1973)
   SC 2622; Ramesh Babula! Doshi v. State of Gujarat, (1996) 4 Supreme 167;
G Jaswant Singh v. State of Haryana, (2000) 3 Supreme 320; Raj Kishore Jha
   v. State of BiharandOrs., (2003) 7Supreme152; State of Punjab v. Karnail
 · Singh, (2003) 5 Supreme 508 and State of Punjab v. Pohla Singh and Anr.,
   (2003) 7 Supreme 17, relied on.

         2.3. Interference is called for when instead of dealing with intrinsic
H   merits of the evidence the Court brushes aside the same on surmises and
       SHASHIDHARPURANDHARHEGDEv.STATEOFKARNATAKA[PASAYAT,J.]             539

conjectures and preponderance of improbabilities which in fact did not exist.    A
The intrinsic and probative value of the evidence was clearly over-looked by
the trial Court and, therefore, the High Court was justified in interfering
with the judgment of the trial Court. The analysis done by the High Court is
correct [546-E-F]

      3.1. In the instant case the discrepancies which were highlighted are      B
merely trivial in nature. Minor discrepancies cannot be termed as
contradictions unless it affects the credibility of the evidence tendered by a
witness. The word 'contradiction' is of a wide connotation which takes within
its ambit all material omissions and under the circumstances of a case a Court
can decide whether there is one such omission as to the amount to                C
contradiction. [545-G-H; 546-A)

    State of Maharashtra v. Bharat Chaganlal Raghani and Ors., [2001) 9
SCC 1 and Raj Kishore Jha v. State of Bihar, JT (2003) Supp. 2 354, relied
on.
                                                                                 D
       3.2. 'Contradiction' means the setting up of one statement against
another and not the setting up of a statement against nothing at all. All
omissions are not contradictions. As the Explanation to Section 162 Cr.P.C.
shows, an omission to state a fact or circumstance in the statement referred
to in sub-section (1) may amount to contradiction ifthe same appears to be       E
significant or otherwise relevant having regard to the context in which the
omission occurs. The provision itself makes it clear that whether any omission
amounts to contradiction in the particular context is a question of fact
                                                                    [546-B-C]

      Tahsildar Singh v. State of UP., AIR (1959) SC 1012, relied on.            F
     CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 748
of 1999.

      From the Judgment and Order dated 30.3.99 of the Karnataka High Court
in Crl. A. No. 530 of 1996.                                                 G

     Sushil Kumar, N.P.S. Panwar, D.P. Chaturvedi and S.N. Bhat with him for
the Appellant.

      Sar.jay R. Hegde for the Respondent.
                                                                                 H
      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
    540                     SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A         ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. The appellants faced trial for alleged commission
    ofoffences punishable under Sections 363, 368, 506 and 507 read with Section ,
    34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short the 'IPC'). The trial Court directed
    acquittal of the present appellants being of the view that the accusations
    have not been established. In appeal by the State, by the impugned judgment
    the High Court held that the appellants were guilty of offences punishable
B   under Section 363 read with Section 34 IPC and were also liable to pay a fine
    of Rs. l ,000. Appellant No. l additionally was sentenced to undergo
    imprisonment for three months on each count for the offences punishable
    under Sections 506 and 507 IPC. It was directed that in case the fine is paid,
    a sum ofRs.1,000 was to be paid to Niranjan (PW-3) the victim. The appellants
C   are described as A-1 and A-2 hereinafter.

           The background facts and the findings of the trial Court are as follows:

           Niranjan (PW-3) is the son ofSudhakar Kamat (PW-1) and was studying
    in St. Anthony's school. PW-3 was a minor then. On 16.2.1989 at about 4.00
D   p.m. when Niranjan (PW-3) was in his class, his friend Sachin informed him
    that somebody wants to see him. Accordingly, PW-3 went out of his class
    room and saw A-1 standing near a motor-bike. He told PW-3 that Dr. Prabhu
    who is PW-3's brother-in-law had asked him to take PW-3 whereupon PW-
    3 told him that he could not go out without the permission of his teacher. A-
     l told him that he had already taken permission from his class teacher.
E   Thereafter, he was taken in his motor-bike as a pillion rider. When they
    reached the 5th Main Road, A-2 was there. All the three of them went by
    motor-bike. Though PW-3 requested them that he would keep his school bag
    in his house, A-1 did not agree and he was taken away. Thereafter, they went
    into a forest for about 2 furlongs where A-1 collected his phone number.
p   When PW-3 enquired about his brother-in-law-Dr. Prabhu, A-1 told him that
    he would find out about his brother-in-law. At about 6.30 p.m. A-1 came back
    and discussed something privately with A-2. Then A-2 told him that he had
    lost his ring and so saying he went to search for the lost ring. However, PW-
    3 became suspicious and asked A-1 to take him to his house. But A-1 assured
    him that after A-2 returned, they would go. When PW-3 insisted he threatened
G   him saying that there was a ghost in that place which made him to cry. At
    that time A-1 threatened him by showing a knife saying that he would stab
    him.

        After some time one Nagapathy brought A-2 holding him. A-1 dragged
H   PW-3 inside the forest and hid him covering his mouth with his hands. PW-
       SHASHIDHARPURANDHARHEGDEv. STATEOFKARNATAKA[PASAYAT,J.]           541

3 had made some sound with his legs as he heard the voice of Narasimha           A
Barakura (PW-5) who is his brother's friend. Then they flashed a torch light
and saw that PW-3 was being held by A-1. Immediately they apprehended A-
 l. Thereafter, all the persons came to the house of PW-1 and subsequently
they produced him before police. (So the evidence of PW-3 gives a clear
picture as to how these accused persons kidnapped him and held him in the        B
forest.) In the meantime, PW-I had been informed over the phone by A-I that
he had kidnapped his child and he would be killed if he failed to pay Rs.3
lakhs. The fact that A-1 had telephoned at about 4.30 p.m. is spoken to by
Rajendra (PW-7) who is a rice mill owner and also P.V. Hegde (PW-11) who
is working as a manager in the shop. According to PW-11 at 6.00 p.m. A- I
telephoned to some one. It is no doubt true both PWs 7 and 11 could not          C
know what he had spoken or to whom he had telephoned. But the fact
remains that he had telephoned and those calls were received by PW-I who
is none other than the father of PW-3. He had clearly stated that the person
who had spoken over the telephone had demanded a lump sum of Rs.3 lakhs
for returning his child, lest he would be killed. PW-I was also informed that
he had to keep the money in a place where kumkum and lemon were placed           D
and he had also mentioned the place where exactly that rock was located. He
was also threatened that if he reported the matter to the police, he would be
done to death. Therefore, he could not immediately inform the matter to the
police. However, he mustered courage and telephoned his nephew Sri Prakash           ·~

who came to him with his friend Narasimha Barakura (PW-5). Thereafter, they      E
all went to the school and enquired from one teacher and also the friends of
PW-3. They learnt as to what had happened to PW-3. Therefore, this fact was
 informed to these witnesses and they went to the indicated place and verified
where they found the 'kumkum' and lemon kept near a rock. After verifying
this, they came back and collected some fake currency notes and put it in a
bag and returned to the same spot where this kumkum and lemon was kept,          F
they left the bag there and kept watch on the ground. At about 6.30 p.m. A-
2 came to the spot and he was attempting to take the bag kept by these
witnesses. In the meantime, these persons caught hold of him and on enquiry
he revealed that A- I was holding PW-3. Accordingly, all of them took A-2
to that place and apprehended A-1 who was holding PW-3 as stated above.          G
 Information was lodged with police and the apprehended accused persons
were handed over to police. After investigation was completed, charge sheet
was filed. Accused persons pleaded innocence. The above version was
 unfolded during trial.

      Learned Judge was satisfied that they have stated the true facts as to     H
    542                    3UPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A what had happened. However, he found fault with the manner in which they
    had dealt with the matter. According to the learned Magistrate, these
    petitioners should have taken police assistance before apprehending the
    accused. He therefore directed acquittal. State filed an appeal before the High
    Court. Stand of the State was that acting on surmises and ignoring vital
B   evidence, the trial Court had directed acquittal. Accused persons supported
    the trial Court's order.

           High Court held that PW-I was already threatened that if he informed
    the matter to the police, he would be done to death and that his _men were
    near his house, etc. Besides that they were interested to save the child and
C   if they ventured to. go to the police station, they could not visualize the
    consequences that would happen to the child. It held that the learned Magistrate
     instead of commending their good work found fault with PWs 2, 4, 5 and 6
    who saved the life of the child in their own way. Though in the evidence of
    these witnesses there were minor discrepancies here and there, duty of the
    Court is to find out whether their evidence in totality can be accepted. From
D   a careful scrutiny of the evidence, the High Court was fully satisfied that their
    evidence is most natural and they had absolutely no axe to grind against A-
     l and A-2 and they have no ill will against them. PW-3 who is a victim has
    given a clear picture as to how he was kidnapped and how he was confined
     in the forest and how they contacted his father PW-I. A-1 had used their
E   telephone between 4.30 and 6.00 p.m. which would indicate that he had
    contacted PW-I. In addition to that nothing could be elicited as to why their
    evidence cannot be accepted. Therefore, the learned Judge was of th~ .
    considered view that evidence of these witnesses is worthy of acceptance.
    The learned Magistrate had found some discrepancies in the evidence of
    PWs 8, 12 and 22 who were the classmates and friends of PW-3. They had
F   stated as to what they had seen on that particular day and also the manner
    in which A-1 came to meet PW-3. PW-9 had stated that A-I had purchased
    kumkum from his shop. PW-IO was examined to show that A-I had purchased
    lemon from his shop, but he turned hostile. This would not in any way
    demolish the case of the prosecution. The presence of 'kumkum' at the place
G   of incident and also the lemon were spoken to by the witnesses and it is not
    in dispute. A-I and A-2 are not strangers. PW-3 went on the motor bike of
    A-I without knowing his bad intention and believing his representation.
    Srinivasa Verneker (PW-8) knows A-1 by name as his father used to take
    petrol from his petrol bunk. He had even seen A-I taking PW-3 in his red
     motor-bike. Sumanth (PW-12) has stated that A-I had gone to his school on
H    that day in his red motor-bike. Fernandese (PW-13) the school teacher of PW-
        SHASHIDHARPURANDHARHEGDEv.STATEOFKARNATAKA[PASAYAT,J.]            543

3 stated that when he was in the class, someone wanted to meet PW-3 and A
therefore he asked PW-3 to talk to him. He also stated that he saw A-I talking
to PW-3. Ariyan (PW-17) is the Head Mistress of PW-3. She has stated that
no one had taken permission to take away PW-3 from the school. Therefore,
it is clear that PW-3 was removed from the school without the prior permission
of the Head Mistress (PW-17) or PW-13, the teacher of PW-3. Janardhan B
(PW-20) is working as the clerk in the shop of PW-I. He had seen PW-1
speaking over the phone on 16.2.1989 in Hindi and PW-I looked scared. PW-
 l told him that his son was kidnapped and the kidnapper was demanding Rs.3
Iakhs to release his son, which payment would have to be made near Kerki.
This evidence coupled with the fact that A-1 and A-2 were apprehended at
the place, corroborates the case of the prosecution. He also deposed that C
PW-I telephoned to Prakash Karnath. PW-21 is the owner of the motor bike
which was borrowed by A-I to kidnap PW-3 on 16.2.1989. An attempt was
made to show that he had borrowed the motor bike at about 7.00 p.m. but the
time factor is not very material when there was sufficient material to show that
the said motor bike was used for taking away the victim boy. Sachin {PW-
21) also speaks about A-I going to his school and enquiring about PW-3 and D
thereafter taking PW-3 along with him. He also says that A-I had come on
a red motor bike. PW-23 Seetharam had seen A- I with others near Kerki and
he learnt that PW-3 was kidnapped by A-I. PW-24 Mahadev, ASI has received
the complaint and registered the case on 16.2.1989 at about l l.45 p.m. and .
prepared the FIR. Narasimha Bakakura, Lateef and Govind produced before E
him the accused and also PW-3. He searched the person of A-I and found
one hand bag and a shirt. Inside that there was a bag which had small ropes
and a knife. He has identified all the M.Os. marked in this case which were
seized from the A-I as per Mahazar (Ex.P-3). He also produced Niranjan (PW-
3) to the Court and thereafter the Court had given the custody of the victim
boy to his parents. Therefore, this evidence also clearly discloses that there F
is sufficient material to show that NI and A-2 are responsible for kidnapping
PW-3 and also they demanded ransom from PW-I. They had also threatened
PWs l and 3. After having carefully scrutinized the evidence as indicated
above, the learned Judge was fully satisfied that the learned Magistrate had
committed an error in rejecting the evidence of these witnesses. These witnesses G
have given a true picture and there may be some discrepancies which would
not go to the root of the case. The learned Magistrate had also taken a
serious note of certain inconsistent statements made by the witnesses in
regard to approaching PW-3 and also PWs 2, 4, 5 and 6 apprehending these
accused. But PW-3's evidence is directly on the point.
                                                                                H
    544                    SUPREME COURT REPORTS {2004) SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A         The High Court held that the approach of the trial Court was clearly
    erroneous. The cogent and credible evidence of PW-3 and PW-1, the father
    was not considered in the proper perspective; there was nothing to doubt the
    roles played by PWs 2, 4, 5 and 6 which the trial Court erroneously came to
    hold to be suspicious and not in confonnity with law. Accordingly the judgment
B   of the trial Court was set aside and the appellants were convicted as afore-
    noted.

          In support of th~ appeal, Mr. Sushi! Kumar, learned senior counsel
    submitted that the trial iCourt had analysed the evidence in great detail and
    had come to the right conclusion about the fallacies in the prosecution
C   evidence. It has been clearly established that the witnesses were not speaking
    the truth. Though the criminal antecedents of a witness are not always
    sufficient to discard his evidence, yet the tr1al Court acted not only on the
    antecedents but also on the improbabilities highlighted by the defence. There
    are many suspicious circumstances as to when the FIR was lodged to the
    police. There are unexplained contradictions on that score. The class-mates
D   of the alleged victim (PW-3) were also not consistent as to the manner in
    which the victim was supposedly taken from the school. If in reality A-2 was
    caught by the these persons as claimed there was no reason as to why the
    police was not infonned thereafter and the witnesses took upon themselves
    the task of capturing A-1. The evidence shows as if A-2 was taken to the
E   police station first and the evidence of PWs. 2, 4, 5 and 6 contradicts each
    other. Since the trial Court recorded a view which is a possible view, the High
    Court without compelling reasons should not have upset it.

          In response, learned counsel for the State submitted that the scenario
    as projected by the prosecution has been clearly established by the evidence
p   of the witnesses. Most important is the testimony of PW-3, the victim. In spite
    of detailed and incisive cross examination nothing material has been brought
    out to discard his evidence. It has also been established that a telephonic call
    was made regarding demand to PW-1. Merely because the witnesses
    themselves went out to catch A-1 that does not affect the credibility of their
    evidence. Mere fact that they did not infonn ttie police, the reason for which
G   has also been indicated, the trial Court had erroneously directed acquittal
    discarding the credible prosecution version.

          The evidence of the witnesses cannot be discarded merely because
    they first made attempt to find out whether the place where the kumkum and
H   lemon were kept was the place where the accused persons had hidden PW-
       SHASHIDHARPURANDHARHEGDEv.STATEOFKARNATAKA[PASAYAT,J.]              545

3 The class mates of the victim have given proper identification of the            A
accused by their description. This clearly corroborates the evidence of PW-
3 and since his evidence is cogent and credible the trial Court had erroneously
directed acquittal of the accused persons and the High Court has rightly
directed the conviction.

       The respective stands need careful consideration. There is no embargo       B
on the appellate Court reviewing the evidence upon which an order of acquittal
is based. Generally, the order of acquittal shall not be interfered with because
the presumption of innocence of the accused is further strengthened by
acquittal. The golden thread which runs through the web of administration
of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence     C
adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other
to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be
adopted. The paramount consideration of the Court is to ensure that
miscarriage of justice is prevented. A miscarriage of justice which may arise
from acquittal of the guilty is no less than from the conviction of an innocent.
In a case where admissible evidence is ignored, a duty is cast upon the            D
appellate Court to re-appreciate the evidence where the accused has been
acquitted, for the purpose of ascertaining as to whether any of the accused
really committed any offence or not. See Bhagwan Singh and Ors. v. State
of Madhya Pradesh (2002) 2 Supreme 567. The principle to be followed by
appellate Court considering the appeal against the judgment of acquittal is to     E
interfere only when there are compelling and substantial reasons for doing so.
If the impugned judgment is clearly unreasonable and relevant and convincing
materials have been unjustifiably eliminated in the process, it is a compelling
reason for interference. These aspects were highlighted by this Court in
Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade and Anr. v. State of Maharashtra AIR (1973) SC
2622, Ramesh Babula/ Doshi v. State ofGujarat (1996) 4 Supreme I 67, Jaswant       F
Singh v. State of Haryana (2000) 3 Supreme 320, Raj Kishore Jha v. State of
Bihar and Ors. (2003) 7 Supreme 152, State ofPunjab v. Karnail Singh (2003)
5 Supreme 508 and State ofPunjab v. Pohla Singh and Anr. (2003) 7 Supreme
 17.

      In the instant case it is to be noted that the discrep?.ncies which were     G
highlighted by learned counsel for the appellants are merely trivial in nature.
Minor discrepancies cannot be termed as contradictions unless it affects the
credibility of the evidence tendered by a witness.

      The word 'contradiction' is of a wide connotation which takes within
                                                                                   H
    546                    SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A its ambit all material omissions and under the circumstances of a case a court
    can decide whether there is one such omission as to amount to contradiction.
    See State of Maharashtra v. Bharat Chaganlal Raghani and Ors., [2001] 9
    SCC 1 and Raj Kishore Jha v. State of Bihar, JT (2003) Supp 2 354. The
    Explanation to Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short
B   the 'Code') is relevant. 'Contradiction' means the setting of one statement
    against another and not the setting up of a statement against nothing at all.
    As noted in Tahsildar Singh v. State ofU.P., AIR (1959) SC 1012 all omissions
    are not contradictions. As the Explanation to Section 162 of the Code shows,
    an omission to state a fact or circumstance in the statement referred to in sub-
    section (I) may amount to contradiction if the same appear~ to be significant
C   or otherwise relevant having regard to the context in which the omission
    occurs. The provision itself makes it clear that whether any omission amounts
    to contradiction in the particular context is a question of fact.

          It is of great relevance that the evidence of PW-3 has not been shakened.
    Added to that is the evidence of PW-I the father. Merely because some of
D   the witnesses are involved in criminal cases that may at the most warrant a
    close scrutiny of their evidence but not total rejection. The High Court has .
    as noted above analysed the evidence in great detail and arrived at the correct
    conclusions. Unfortunately, the trial Court did not examine the evidence in
    proper perspective.

E          Interference is called for when instead of dealing with intrinsic merits
    of the evidence the Court brushes aside the same on surmises and conjectures
    and preponderance of improbabilities which in fact did not exist. The intrinsic
    and probative value of the evidence was clearly over-looked by the trial Court
    and, therefore, the High Court was justified in interfering with the judgment
F   of the trial Court. The analysis done by the High Court is correct. That being
    so, the impugned judgment does not suffer from any infirmity to warrant our
    interference. The appeal fails and is dismissed. The accused-appellants shall
    surrender to custody forthwith to serve the remainder of sentence.

    K.KT.                                                       Appeal dismissed.