Holding

Delayed reporting of a seizure to the magistrate under Section 102(3) CrPC does not invalidate the seizure order; "forthwith" means reasonable promptness, and non‑compliance may attract departmental action but not vitiate the substantive power exercised under Section 102(1).

Summary

The appellant, a deliveryman, complained that gold bars received in exchange for gold chains were counterfeit, leading the police to freeze the accused's bank accounts. The police reported the seizure to the jurisdictional magistrate only after a delay, and the Madras High Court ordered de‑freezing on the ground that the seizure was not reported "forthwith" under Section 102(3) of the CrPC. The Supreme Court examined the legislative history of Section 102, the meaning of "forthwith", and held that the term requires reasonable promptness rather than an absolute deadline. It ruled that non‑reporting does not vitiate the substantive power to seize under Section 102(1); at most, it may invite departmental action against the officer. Consequently, the High Court's reasoning was set aside, the seizure order was upheld, and the appeals were partly allowed, with the accused required to execute a bond if convicted.

Issues considered

The requirement to report a seizure "forthwith" under Section 102(3) CrPC – whether it is mandatory or directory.
Whether delayed reporting of a seizure vitiates the seizure order under Section 102(1) CrPC.
Whether the validity of a seizure depends on compliance with the reporting obligation.
The proper construction of the word "forthwith" in statutory context.

Legislation cited

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1882s. 523
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898s. 550
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 102(1), s. 102(3), s. 105E, s. 157, s. 168, s. 457, s. 459
Code of Criminal Procedure, 2023s. 106(1), s. 106(2)
Gujarat Prevention of Anti‑Social Activities Act, 1985
Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971
Preventive Detention Act, 1950

Subjects

Section 102(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973Section 102(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973Implication of non‑reporting of the seizure forthwith to the jurisdictional MagistrateReasonable constructionSeizure of propertyReporting obligation

Judgment

[2024] 6 S.C.R. 409 : 2024 INSC 407

Shento Varghese
v.
Julfikar Husen & Ors.
(Criminal Appeal Nos. 2531-2532 of 2024)
13 May 2024
[Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha and Aravind Kumar,* JJ.]

Issue for Consideration
What is the implication of non-reporting of the seizure forthwith
to the jurisdictional Magistrate as provided under Section 102(3)
Cr.P.C.; does delayed reporting of the seizure to the Magistrate
vitiate the seizure order altogether.

Headnotes†
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.102(3) – Implication of
non-reporting of the seizure forthwith to the jurisdictional
Magistrate:
Held: The meaning of the word ‘forthwith’ as used in section
102(3) has not received judicial construction – The said
expression must receive a reasonable construction and in giving
such construction, regard must be had to the nature of the act
or thing to be performed and the prevailing circumstances of
the case – When it is not the mandate of the law that the act
should be done within a fixed time, it would mean that the act
must be done within a reasonable time – It all depends upon the
circumstances that may unfold in a given case and there cannot
be a straight-jacket formula prescribed in this regard – In that
sense, the interpretation of the word ‘forthwith’ would depend
upon the terrain in which it travels and would take its colour
depending upon the prevailing circumstances which can be
variable – Therefore, in deciding whether the police officer has
properly discharged his obligation under Section 102(3) Cr.P.C.,
the Magistrate would have to, firstly, examine whether the seizure
was reported forthwith – If it finds that the report was not sent
forthwith, then it must examine whether there is any explanation
offered in support of the delay – If the Magistrate finds that the
delay has been properly explained, it would leave the matter at
that – The non reporting of the seizure forthwith by the police

* Author
410 [2024] 6 S.C.R.

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officer to the jurisdictional court would not vitiate the seizure
order, it also would not mean that there would be no consequence
whatsoever as regards the police officer, upon whom the law has
enjoined a duty to act in a certain way – If it finds that there is
no reasonable explanation for the delay or that the official has
acted with deliberate disregard/ wanton negligence, then it may
direct for appropriate departmental action to be initiated against
such erring official. [Paras 18, 19, 20, 23, 24]
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.102(3) – Delay in reporting
the seizures to the Magistrates:
Held: The delay in reporting the seizure to the Magistrate may,
subject to proof of prejudice, at best, dent the veracity of the
prosecution case vis-à-vis the date, time and occasion for seizure
of the property – Since the proof of prejudice on part of the
accused and the explanation for delay on part of the prosecution
can only be demonstrated at trial, the effect of non-compliance
becomes an issue to be adjudicated at the time of appreciation
of evidence – Moreover, this Court has consistently held that
even illegalities in the investigation (including illegality in search
and seizures) is no ground for setting aside the investigation in
toto. [Para 16]
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.102(1) and s.102(3) –
Whether validity of the seizure order is contingent on
compliance with the reporting obligation:
Held: The validity of the power exercised under Section 102(1)
Cr.P.C. is not dependent on the compliance with the duty
prescribed on the police officer under Section 102(3) Cr.P.C. –
The validity of the exercise of power under Section 102(1) Cr.P.C.
can be questioned either on jurisdictional grounds or on the
merits of the matter – That is to say, the order of seizure can be
challenged on the ground that the seizing officer lacked jurisdiction
to act under Section 102(1) Cr.P.C. or that the seized item does
not satisfy the definition of ‘property’ or on the ground that the
property which was seized could not have given rise to suspicion
concerning the commission of a crime, in order for the authorities
to justify the seizure – The pre-requisite for exercising powers
under Section 102(1) is the existence of a direct link between
the tainted property and the alleged offence – It is essential that
the properties sought to be seized under Section 102(1) of the
[2024] 6 S.C.R. 411

Shento Varghese v. Julfikar Husen & Ors.

Cr.P.C. must have a direct or close link with the commission of
offence in question. [Para 13]
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.102(3) – Expression
“shall forthwith report” – Discussed. [Paras 18-22]

Case Law Cited
Tmt. T .Subbulakshmi v. The Commissioner of Police
(2013) 4 MLJ (Crl) 41; The Meridian Educational Society
v. The State of Telangana (2022) 1 ALT (Cri) 229; Dr
Shashikant D. Karnik v. State of Maharashtra (2008)
CRL.L.J. 148; Ruqaya Akhter v. Ut Through Crime
Branch (CRM(M) No.223/2022, Jammu & Kashmir and
Ladakh High Court). Operation Mobilization India v. State
of Telangana (2021) SCC OnLine TS 1529; Bharath
Overseas Bank v. Minu Publication (1988) MLJ (Crl.)
309; Ms Swaran Sabharwal v. Commissioner of Police
(1990) 68 Comp Cas 652 Delhi (DB) – referred to.
Anwar Ahmad v. State of UP [1976] 1 SCR 779 :
AIR (1976) SC 680; Nevada Properties (P) Ltd. v.
State of Maharashtra & Anr. [2019] 15 SCR 223 :
(2019) 20 SCC 119; State of Maharashtra v. Tapas
D. Neogy [1999] Supp. 2 SCR 609 : 1999 INSC 417;
Ravinder Kumar & Anr. v. State of Punjab [2001]
Supp. 2 SCR 463 : (2001) 7 SCC 690; Bhajan Singh
and Ors. v. State of Haryana [2011] 7 SCR 1 : 2011
INSC 422; HN Rishbud v. State of Delhi [1955] 1
SCR 1150 : (1954) 2 SCC 934; Sk. Salim v. State
of West Bengal [1975] 3 SCR 394 : (1975) 1 SCC
653; China Apparao and Others v. State of Andhra
Pradesh [2002] Supp. 3 SCR 175 : (2002) 8 SCC
440; Navalshankar Ishwarlal Dave v. State of Gujarat
[1993] 3 SCR 676 : 1993 Supp. 3 SCC 754; Rao
Mahmood Ahmad Khan v. Ranbir Singh [1995] 2 SCR
230 : (1995) Supp. 4 SCC 275; Bidya Deb Barma v.
District Magistrate [1969] 1 SCR 562 : (1968) SCC
OnLine SC 82 – referred to.

Books and Periodicals Cited
Black’s Law Dictionary, 10th Edition; Wharton’s Law
Lexicon, 17th Edition – referred to.
412 [2024] 6 S.C.R.

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List of Acts
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Code of Criminal Procedure,
1882; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898; Bharatiya Nagarik
Suraksha Sanhita, 2023; Maintenance of Internal Security Act,
1971; Preventive Detention Act, 1950; Gujarat Prevention of Anti-
Social Activities Act, 1985.

List of Keywords
Section 102(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section
102(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Implication
of non-reporting of the seizure forthwith to the jurisdictional
Magistrate; Reasonable construction; Seizure of property;
Reporting obligation.

Case Arising From
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal Nos.
2531-2532 of 2024
From the Judgment and Order dated 09.08.2023 of the High Court
of Judicature at Madras in CRLOP Nos. 14029 and 14031 of 2023
Appearances for Parties
Himinder Lal, Roy Abraham, Ms. Reena Roy, Adithya Koshy Roy,
Ms. Anju Kanodiya, Advs. for the Appellant.
S. Mahendran, Adv. for the Respondents.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
Aravind Kumar J.
1. Leave granted.
2. These appeals have been preferred at the instance of the first informant
in Crime No.318 of 2022. By the impugned order dated 09.08.2023,
passed in Crl. O.P. Nos.14029 & 14031 of 2023 and Crl. M.P.
Nos.8658 of 2023, the High Court of Madras has allowed the claim
of the Respondents-accused for de-freezing of their bank accounts.
The High Court has ordered for de-freezing on the specific ground
that there was delay on part of the police in reporting the seizure to
[2024] 6 S.C.R. 413

Shento Varghese v. Julfikar Husen & Ors.

the jurisdictional Magistrate. The facts in the instant case, which we
shall advert to later below, have given rise to following question of law:
What is the implication of non-reporting of the seizure
forthwith to the jurisdictional Magistrate as provided
under Section 102(3) Cr.P.C.?
more specifically;
Does delayed reporting of the seizure to the Magistrate
vitiate the seizure order altogether?
That is the question which needs to be answered in these appeals.
3. Our research indicates that there is no authoritative pronouncement
of this Court on this issue. If we turn to the pronouncements of the
High Courts, there are decisions1 which have directly confronted
this question. Having reviewed these decisions, we find that,
broadly, there are two prevailing strands of thought: one set of
cases holding that delayed reporting to the Magistrate would,
ipso facto, vitiate the seizure order; and the other view being that
delayed reporting would constitute a mere irregularity and would
not vitiate the seizure order.
4. The former view has been justified on the grounds that:
(a) the obligation [u/S 102(3) Cr.P.C.] to report the
seizure forthwith to the Magistrate is mandatory
and non-negotiable, breach of which would qualify
as an illegality in following the prescribed statutory
procedure2;
(b) the employment of the word ‘shall’ in Section 102(3)
makes it clear that non-compliance of the mandatory
requirement to report forthwith to the Magistrate goes
to the root of the matter3;
(c) the power to seize has been subjected to procedural
requirements prescribed under Section 102(3) –

1 See Table at Annexure A for a compilation of the 36 decisions on this issue.
2 Tmt. T .Subbulakshmi vs The Commissioner of Police 2013(4) MLJ (Crl) 41
3 The Meridian Educational Society Vs. The State of Telangana, 2022 1 ALT(Cri) 229
414 [2024] 6 S.C.R.

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and breach of complying with follow-up procedures
would render the exercise of the main power to be
without authority and jurisdiction – in that sense, the
requirement to report is in the nature of a condition
subsequent clause.4
5. The latter view has been sustained on the reasoning that:
a) The statutory provision provides no express
consequence(s) for non-compliance and therefore,
the procedural requirement is merely directory and
not mandatory5;
b) The power to seize property connected with a crime
is plenary and the obligation to intimate is a mere
incidental exercise of power – breach of the latter
cannot affect the former6;
c) the object of reporting is to facilitate disposal of
property seized – prejudice caused by delayed
reporting, if any, can always be demonstrated at
the trial7;
d) Neither is there any obligation to seek prior leave
before exercising the power to seize nor is there any
statutorily provided consequence for non-compliance
of the reporting obligation8;
e) No prejudice would be caused to the owner of a
property by non-reporting of seizure to the concerned
Magistrate during the investigation phase.
Therefore, it cannot be a case of illegality but such an
omission may only be an irregularity.9

4 Dr Shashikant D. Karnik Vs. State of Maharashtra, 2008 CRL.L.J. 148
5 Ruqaya Akhter Vs Ut Through Crime Branch, CRM(M) No.223/2022, Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh
High Court.
6 Operation Mobilization India Vs. State of Telangana 2021 SCC OnLine TS 1529
7 Bharath Overseas Bank Vs. Minu Publication [1988] MLJ (Crl.) 309
8 Supra, 7
9 Supra, 5
[2024] 6 S.C.R. 415

Shento Varghese v. Julfikar Husen & Ors.

6. In light of conflicting precedents operating across various High Courts,
we find it expedient and necessary to settle the conflict and bring in
uniformity in adjudication.
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY – A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

Criminal Relevant Provision
Procedure
Codes
188210 Section 523- Procedure by police upon seizure of
property taken under Section 51 or stolen
The seizure by any Police-officer of property taken
under Section 51, or alleged or suspected to have
been stolen, or found under circumstances which
create suspicion of the commission of any offence,
shall be forthwith reported to a magistrate, who
shall make such order as he thinks fit respecting the
delivery of such property to the person entitled to
the possession thereof, or, if such person cannot be
ascertained, respecting the custody and production
of such property.
189811 Section 550- Powers to police to seize property
suspected to be stolen: Any police-office may
seize any property which may be alleged or
suspected to have been stolen, or which may be
found under circumstances which create suspicion
of the commission of any offence. Such police-
officer, if subordinate to the office in charge of a
police station, shall forthwith report the seizure to
that officer.
197312 102. Power of police officer to seize certain
property.—(1) Any police officer may seize any
property which may be alleged or suspected to
have been stolen, or which may be found under
circumstances which create suspicion of the
commission of any offence.

10 Hereinafter referred to as “1882 Code”.
11 Hereinafter referred to as “1898 Code”.
12 Hereinafter referred to as “1973 Code”.
416 [2024] 6 S.C.R.

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(2) Such police officer, if subordinate to the officer in
charge of a police station, shall forthwith report the
seizure to that officer
(3) Every police officer acting under sub-section (1)
shall forthwith report the seizure to the Magistrate
having jurisdiction and where the property seized is
such that it cannot be conveniently transported to the
Court, [or where there is difficulty in securing proper
accommodation for the custody of such property, or
where the continued retention of the property in police
custody may not be considered necessary for the
purpose of investigation,] he may give custody thereof
to any person on his executing a bond undertaking to
produce the property before the Court as and when
required and to give effect to the further orders of
the Court as to the disposal of the same:
[Provided that where the property seized under sub-
section (1) is subject to speedy and natural decay
and if the person entitled to the possession of such
property is unknown or absent and the value of
such property is less than five hundred rupees, it
may forthwith be sold by auction under the orders
of the Superintendent of Police and the provisions
of Sections 457 and 458 shall, as nearly as may be
practicable, apply to the net proceeds of such sale.]
202313 106. (1) Any police officer may seize any property
which may be alleged or suspected to have been
stolen, or which may be found under circumstances
which create suspicion of the commission of any
offence.
(2) Such police officer, if subordinate to the officer in
charge of a police station, shall forthwith report the
seizure to that officer.

13 Hereinafter referred to as the “2023 Code”.
[2024] 6 S.C.R. 417

Shento Varghese v. Julfikar Husen & Ors.

(3) Every police officer acting under sub-section (1)
shall forthwith report the seizure to the Magistrate
having jurisdiction and where the property seized is
such that it cannot be conveniently transported to the
Court, or where there is difficulty in securing proper
accommodation for the custody of such property, or
where the continued retention of the property in police
custody may not be considered necessary for the
purpose of investigation, he may give custody thereof
to any person on his executing a bond undertaking to
produce the property before the Court as and when
required and to give effect to the further orders of
the Court as to the disposal of the same: Provided
that where the property seized under sub-section
(1) is subject to speedy and natural decay and if the
person entitled to the possession of such property is
unknown or absent and the value of such property is
less than five hundred rupees, it may forthwith be sold
by auction under the orders of the Superintendent of
Police and the provisions of Sections 505 and 506
shall, as nearly as may be practicable, apply to the
net proceeds of such sale.
7. The responsibility of the police officer to promptly inform the
Magistrate about the seizure can be historically traced to the 1882
Code. Oddly enough, this provision was absent in the 1898 Code.
In the 1898 Code, however, it was provided that if the seizing officer
was below the rank of an officer-in charge of a police station, then
such officer was under a duty to give information to his superior
regarding the seized property. It appears that the provision as it
existed in the 1898 Code was retained as is in the 1973 Code. Sub-
section (3) to Section 102 was inserted by way of an amendment
only in the year 1978. This amendment reintroduced the reporting
obligations of police officer to the Magistrate, as it originally existed
in the 1882 Code. It also empowered the seizing officer to give
custody of the seized property to any person, on such person
executing a bond undertaking to produce the property before the
Court as and when required. There was no provision in the 1973
Code nor the 1898 Code till the insertion of sub-section (3) by
an amendment in 1978, empowering the police to take a bond
from a person undertaking to produce the property entrusted to
418 [2024] 6 S.C.R.

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him by the police later on before the Court. The law as it existed
then was that the bond could be entered before the Court but not
in favour of the police. While setting aside the order of forfeiture
in regard to the bond in favour of the police, this Court in Anwar
Ahmad v State of UP14, pointed out the lacuna in the 1973 Code
and suggested the insertion of a suitable provision. That is why this
sub-section (3) empowering the police to execute the bond under
certain conditionalities came to be inserted by way of the 1978
Amendment. For the sake of completeness, it may be observed
that Section 102 Cr.P.C. in its present form has been retained as
is in the 2023 Code, which is scheduled to come into force on 1st
July 2024 and replace the 1973 Code.
8. The Notes on Clauses appended to the 1978 Bill had set out the
following reasons for inserting sub section (3) to Section 102 Cr.P.C.:
“Clause 10- Section 102 is being amended (1) to provide
that the police officer shall forthwith report the seizure
of any property under sub-section (1) to the Magistrate,
as there is a lacuna in the Law and (2) to give effect to
the observations of the Supreme Court made in Anwar
Ahmad vs. the State of U.P. (AIR 1976 SC 680) that the
police should be given the power to get a bond from
the person to whom the property seized is entrusted,
particularly in cases where a bulky property like elephant
or car, is seized and the Magistrate is living at a great
distance and it is difficult to produce the property seized
before the Magistrate.”
9. The reason cited for inserting the amendment was to overcome a
‘lacuna’ in the law. What could have been the lacuna in the law that
impelled the insertion of this amendment?
10. In our view, the answer to this question can be derived by referring
to the provisions in Chapter XXXIV of the 1973 Code which is titled
as ‘Disposal of Property’. Section 457 Cr.P.C. sets out the procedure
to be followed by police upon seizure of the property. Sub section (1)
begin with the words: ‘Whenever the seizure of property by any
police officer is reported to a Magistrate under the provisions of

14 [1976] 1 SCR 779 : AIR 1976 SC 680
[2024] 6 S.C.R. 419

Shento Varghese v. Julfikar Husen & Ors.

this Code, and such property is not produced before a Criminal Court
during an inquiry or trial…..”. Similarly, we may refer to Section 459
Cr.P.C. which empowers the Magistrate with the power to auction/
sell seized property in certain situations. It begins with the words: ‘If
the person entitled to the possession of such property is unknown
or absent and the property is subject to speedy and natural decay,
or if the Magistrate to whom its seizure is reported is of opinion
that……”.
11. Both, Section 457 Cr.P.C. and Section 459 Cr.P.C. contemplates
the act of seizure by police to be reported to the Magistrate so
that necessary steps could be taken for its custody and disposal.
However, the provision [Section 102(1) Cr.P.C.] which conferred
substantive power on the police to seize property linked to a crime,
did not impose on such officers a consequent duty to report the
seizures made to the Magistrate. Section 523 in the 1882 Code
had coupled the power to seize property linked to the crime and the
duty to report forthwith the seizure to the Magistrate in the same
provision. Since the relevant provisions in the 1898 Code and the
1973 Code provided only for the substantive power to seize and
did not impose any duty on such seizing officer to report to the
Magistrate, there arose a need for amendment. That appears to
us to be the lacuna in the law which was sought to be overcome.
In fact, there are several decisions which indicate that the purpose
of reporting to the Magistrate is to ensure an order of the disposal
of the seized property either on superdari, or otherwise, during the
pendency of the case/investigations under Section 457 Cr.P.C. This
further reinforces our view regarding the lacuna which was sought
to be fixed. Therefore, the main object underlying the amendment
appears to be a mere gap-filling exercise and an attempt to fix a
basic omission in legislative drafting.
12. It is in this background that we must consider whether ‘seizure orders’
can be set at naught for non-compliance with the procedural formality
of reporting such seizure forthwith to the Magistrate.
13. This requires us to consider whether validity of the seizure order is
contingent on compliance with the reporting obligation? In our view,
the validity of the power exercised under Section 102(1) Cr.P.C. is
not dependent on the compliance with the duty prescribed on the
police officer under Section 102(3) Cr.P.C. The validity of the exercise
420 [2024] 6 S.C.R.

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of power under Section 102(1) Cr.P.C. can be questioned either on
jurisdictional grounds or on the merits of the matter. That is to say,
the order of seizure can be challenged on the ground that the seizing
officer lacked jurisdiction15 to act under Section 102(1) Cr.P.C. or that
the seized item does not satisfy the definition of ‘property’16 or on the
ground that the property which was seized could not have given rise
to suspicion concerning the commission of a crime, in order for the
authorities to justify the seizure.17 The pre-requisite for exercising
powers under Section 102(1) is the existence of a direct link between
the tainted property and the alleged offence. It is essential that the
properties sought to be seized under Section 102(1) of the Cr.P.C.
must have a direct or close link with the commission of offence in
question.18
14. As stated hereinbefore, the obligation to report the seizure to the
Magistrate is neither a jurisdictional pre-requisite for exercising the
power to seize nor is the exercise of such power made subject to
compliance with the reporting obligation. Contrast this with Section
105E Cr.P.C., 1973 which provides for similar power of seizure
and attachment of property. While Section 105E(1) confers the
substantive power to make seizure under circumstances provided
in that section, sub-section (2) of Section 105E declares that the
order passed under Section 105E(1) ‘shall have no effect unless
the said order is confirmed by an order of the said Court, within a
period of thirty days of its being made’. In that sense, the order of
seizure, for it to take effect and have legal force, is subjected to a
further statutory requirement of the seizure order being confirmed
by an order of Court. It is only upon passing of the confirmation
order within the stipulated period does the order of seizure take
effect. Until then, it remains an order in form but without having
any legal force.
15. We find that there are certain other provisions19 in the 1973 Code which
place similar obligation(s) on the police officer to report their actions
to the jurisdictional Magistrate. For example, Section 157 Cr.P.C.

15 Nevada Properties (P) Ltd. Vs. State of Maharashtra & Anr. (2019) 20 SCC 119
16 Ms Swaran Sabharwal Vs. Commissioner of Police, 1990 (68) Comp Cas 652 Delhi (DB)
17 State of Maharashtra Vs. Tapas D. Neogy,1999/INSC/417
18 Supra, 17.
19 See, Section 168 Cr.P.C.
[2024] 6 S.C.R. 421

Shento Varghese v. Julfikar Husen & Ors.

provides that ‘if, from information received or otherwise, an officer
in charge of a police station has reason to suspect the commission
of an offence……he shall forthwith send a report of the same to a
Magistrate’. As in the case of Section 102(3) Cr.P.C., Section 157
Cr.P.C. does not provide for any consequence in the event there is
failure to promptly comply with the reporting obligation. It would be
helpful to understand how this Court has elucidated on the effect of
such non-compliance in the context of Section 157 Cr.P.C. since the
provision is nearly pari materia with Section 102(3).
16. It is now too well settled that delay in registration of FIR is no ground
for quashing of the FIR itself.20 It follows as a corollary that if delay
in registration of FIR is no ground to quash the FIR, then delay in
forwarding such FIR to the Magistrate can also afford no ground for
nullification of the FIR. In fact, this Court has gone to the extent of
holding that unless serious prejudice is demonstrated to have been
suffered as against the accused, mere delay in sending the FIR
to the Magistrate by itself will not have any deteriorating effect on
the case of the prosecution.21 If prejudice is demonstrated and the
prosecution fails to explain the delay, then, at best, the effect of such
delay would only be to render the date and time of lodging the FIR
suspect and nothing more.22 Drawing from this analogy, the delay
in reporting the seizure to the Magistrate may, subject to proof of
prejudice, at best, dent the veracity of the prosecution case vis-à-vis
the date, time and occasion for seizure of the property. Since the
proof of prejudice on part of the accused and the explanation for
delay on part of the prosecution can only be demonstrated at trial,
the effect of non-compliance becomes an issue to be adjudicated
at the time of appreciation of evidence. Moreover, this Court has
consistently held that even illegalities in the investigation (including
illegality in search and seizures) is no ground for setting aside the
investigation in toto23.
17. In the background of the aforesaid discussion, therefore, the line
of precedents which have taken the position that ‘seizure orders’

20 Ravinder Kumar & Anr. Vs. State of Punjab (2001) 7 SCC 690
21 Supra, 20.
22 Bhajan Singh and Ors. vs. State of Haryana, 2011/INSC/422
23 HN Rishbud v. State of Delhi (1954) 2 SCC 934
422 [2024] 6 S.C.R.

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are vitiated for delay in compliance with the reporting obligation are
declared to be manifestly erroneous and are accordingly, overruled.
The relevant question to be determined was not whether the duty
of the police to report the seizure to the Magistrate is mandatory or
directory. Instead, what ought to have been inquired into was whether
the exercise of the seizure power was subjected to compliance of
reporting obligation, as illustrated in Section 105E Cr.P.C.
18. Merely because we have held that non reporting of the seizure
forthwith by the police officer to the jurisdictional court would not
vitiate the seizure order, it would not mean that there would be no
consequence whatsoever as regards the police officer, upon whom
the law has enjoined a duty to act in a certain way. Since there is an
obligation cast on the officer to report the seizure forthwith, it becomes
necessary to understand the meaning of the expression forthwith
as used in Section 102(3) CrPC. For, without a clear understanding
of the said expression, the Magistrate would not be in a position to
determine whether the obligation cast on the police officer has been
properly complied with. In this background, the expression ‘shall
forthwith report the seizure to the Magistrate’ occurring in sub-
section (3) of the Section 102 requires to be examined.
19. The meaning of the word ‘forthwith’ as used in Section 102(3)
has not received judicial construction by this Court. However, this
Court has examined the scope and contours of this expression as
it was used under the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971;
Preventive Detention Act, 1950; Section 157(1) of the Cr.P.C.; and
Gujarat Prevention of Anti-Social Activities Act, 1985 in the case of
Sk. Salim v. State of West Bengal24, Alla China Apparao and Others
v. State of Andhra Pradesh25 and Navalshankar Ishwarlal Dave v.
State of Gujarat26.
20. This Court, in Rao Mahmood Ahmad Khan v. Ranbir Singh27, has held
that the word ‘forthwith’ is synonymous with the word immediately,
which means with all reasonable quickness. When a statute requires
something to be done ‘forthwith’ or ‘immediately’ or even ‘instantly’,

24 [1975] 3 SCR 394 : (1975) 1 SCC 653 (para 10 and 11)
25 [2002] Supp. 3 SCR 175 : (2002) 8 SCC 440 (para 9)
26 [1993] 3 SCR 676 : 1993 Supp (3) SCC 754 (para 9)
27 [1995] 2 SCR 230 : 1995 Supp (4) SCC 275
[2024] 6 S.C.R. 423

Shento Varghese v. Julfikar Husen & Ors.

it should probably be understood as allowing a reasonable time for
doing it28.
21. The expression ‘forthwith’ has been defined in Black’s Law Dictionary,
10th Edition as under:
“forthwith, adv. (14c) 1. Immediately; without delay. 2.
Directly; promptly; within a reasonable time under the
circumstances; with all convenient dispatch”
Wharton’s Law Lexicon, 17th Edition describes ‘forthwith’ as extracted:
Forthwith, When a defendant is ordered to plead forthwith,
he must plead within twenty four hours. When a statute
or rule of Court requires an act to be done ‘forthwith’,
it means that the act is to be done within a reasonable
time having regard to the object of the provision and the
circumstances of the case [Ex parte Lamb, (1881) 19 Ch
D 169; 2 Chit. Arch. Prac., 14th Edition]
22. From the discussion made above, it would emerge that the expression
‘forthwith’ means ‘as soon as may be’, ‘with reasonable speed and
expedition’, ‘with a sense of urgency’, and ‘without any unnecessary
delay’. In other words, it would mean as soon as possible, judged
in the context of the object sought to be achieved or accomplished.
23. We are of the considered view that the said expression must receive
a reasonable construction and in giving such construction, regard
must be had to the nature of the act or thing to be performed and the
prevailing circumstances of the case. When it is not the mandate of
the law that the act should be done within a fixed time, it would mean
that the act must be done within a reasonable time. It all depends
upon the circumstances that may unfold in a given case and there
cannot be a straight-jacket formula prescribed in this regard. In that
sense, the interpretation of the word ‘forthwith’ would depend upon
the terrain in which it travels and would take its colour depending
upon the prevailing circumstances which can be variable.
24. Therefore, in deciding whether the police officer has properly
discharged his obligation under Section 102(3) Cr.P.C., the
Magistrate would have to, firstly, examine whether the seizure

28 Bidya Deb Barma v. District Magistrate,1968 SCC OnLine SC 82
424 [2024] 6 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

was reported forthwith. In doing so, it ought to have regard to the
interpretation of the expression, ‘forthwith’ as discussed above. If
it finds that the report was not sent forthwith, then it must examine
whether there is any explanation offered in support of the delay. If
the Magistrate finds that the delay has been properly explained,
it would leave the matter at that. However, if it finds that there
is no reasonable explanation for the delay or that the official has
acted with deliberate disregard/ wanton negligence, then it may
direct for appropriate departmental action to be initiated against
such erring official. We once again reiterate that the act of seizure
would not get vitiated by virtue of such delay, as discussed in
detail herein above.
25. Having clarified the applicable legal position above, we now proceed
to consider the facts in instant case.
26. The Respondents-accused is said to have placed an order for
purchase of forty-seven Kerala Model Gold Chains from the
Appellant-first informant, who worked as a deliveryman in a company
called ‘PR Gold’. In consideration for the supply of gold chains,
the Respondents had agreed to provide gold bars of equivalent
value. The allegations in the complaint suggest that the exchange
took place on 20.12.2022. Shortly thereafter, the Appellant learns
that gold bars handed over to him were fake. On this basis, the
Appellant approached the police and lodged the first information
report. On registration of the first information report, the police
initiated investigation and during such investigation, it was noticed
that certain monies to the tune of Rs.19,83,036/- were deposited
in the bank accounts of Accused 1 and 3. On 09.01.2023, the
investigating officer wrote to the bank and ordered for freezing of their
bank accounts. The order of freezing was reported to the Magistrate
on 27.01.2023. The Respondents had unsuccessfully approached29
the jurisdictional Magistrate for taking custody of the seized bank
accounts. The Respondents then approached the High Court by
filing an original petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and sought for
de-freezing of the bank accounts. The High Court vide the impugned
order has allowed the application of the Respondents-accused for
de-freezing of the bank accounts, and therefore set at naught the

29 Application under Section 457 – Cr. M.C 2032 of 2023 was filed.
[2024] 6 S.C.R. 425

Shento Varghese v. Julfikar Husen & Ors.

seizure order on the sole ground that the order of seizure was not
forthwith reported to the Magistrate.
27. The reasoning adopted by the High Court cannot be sustained in the
light of aforestated discussion. This takes us to the consequential
question, namely, whether at this distance of time, we ought to direct
freezing of the bank accounts afresh? The answer has to be in the
negative, since undisputedly by virtue of the impugned order, the bank
accounts of the respondents has been defreezed and resultantly,
the Respondents would have operated the accounts and amount of
Rs.19,83,036/- which had been frozen would have been withdrawn.
The ends of justice would be met and the interest of prosecution would
be served if the Respondents are called upon, forthwith, to execute
a bond undertaking to deposit the amount (which has been thus far
withdrawn from the seized bank accounts) before the jurisdictional
Court in the event the Court were to return a finding of guilt against
the accused persons. The Respondents would have to undertake
to deposit the amount within four weeks from the date on which the
Court passes an order of conviction. It is needless to say that the
bond executed would stand discharged if the accused persons are
acquitted at the end of trial.
28. With these observations, appeals are allowed in part.
ANNEXURE ‘A’

CASES WHERE COURTS HAVE HELD THAT
BREACH OF REPORTING CONDITIONS IS ILLEGAL
S. CASE CITATION COURT
No
1. Manish Khandelwal And Ors 2019 SCC OnLine Bombay
vs The State of Maharashtra Bom 1412 High Court
And Ors
2. V Plus Technology Pvt Ltd 2022/DHC/001595 Delhi HC
vs The State (Nct Of Delhi)
& Anr
3. Muktaben M. Mashru vs 2019 SCC OnLine Delhi HC
State Of Nct Of Delhi & Anr Del 11509
4. Tmt.T.Subbulakshmi vs The 2013(4)MLJ(Crl)41 Madras
Commissioner of Police High Court
426 [2024] 6 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

5. Ms Swaran Sabharwal 1990 (68) Comp Delhi High
Versus Commissioner of Cas 652 Delhi (DB) Court
Police
6. Uma Maheshwari Vs. The 2013 SCC OnLine Madras
State Rep. By Inspector Mad 3829 HC
of Police, Central Crime
Branch, Egmore, Channai;
Criminal O.P. No.15467 of
2013
7. The Meridian Educational 2022 1 ALT(Cri) Telangana
Society Vs. The State of 229 HC
Telangana; Writ Petition
No.21106 of 2021

8. Padmini vs. Inspector of 2008(3) Crimes Madras
Police, Tirunelveli 716 (Mad.) HC

9. R. Chandrasekar vs. 2003 Criminal Law Madras
Inspector of Police, Salem Journal 294 HC
10. Lathifa Vs. State of 2012 Cri. L.J. 3487 Karnataka
Karnataka High Court
11. B. Ranganathan Vs. State 2003 Crl.L.J 2779 Madras
and Ors HC
12. Shashikant D. Karnik Vs. II(2007)BC337 Bombay
The State of Maharashtra HC
13. Karthika Agencies W.P.No.17953 of Madras
Export House vs The 2021 High Court
Commissioner of Police
14. S. Ganapathi Vs. State and Crl.O.P.No.800 of Madras
Ors. 2014 HC
15. R. Sivaraj Vs. State of Tamil Criminal Madras
Nadu O.P.Nos.576 and HC
577 of 2013
16. Shri. Vilas S/o. Prabhakar Criminal Writ Bombay
Dange Vs. State of Petition No. HC
Maharashtra 1033/2017
17. Purbanchal Road Service, 1991CRILJ2798 Gauhati
Gauhati VS State High Court
[2024] 6 S.C.R. 427

Shento Varghese v. Julfikar Husen & Ors.

18. S. T. Cleopatra VS W.P.No.17953 of Madras
Commissioner of Police, 2021 HC
Chennai City, Vepery,
Chennai
19. Kiruthika Vs. State rep. Crl.O.P.No.14733 Madras
by Inspector of Police and of 2021 HC
another
20. Dr.Shashikant D. Karnik Vs. 2008 CRL.L.J. 148 Bombay
State Of Maharashtra HC
21. Ali Trading and Anr v The WA 296/2019 Gauhati
State of Assam HC
22. B. Kavitha v. Inspector of Crl.OP. NO. Madras
Police & ors 14824/2019 HC
CASES WHERE THE COURT HAS HELD THE REPORTING
CONDITIONS ARE DIRECTORY AND NOT ILLEGAL
23. Dattasai (Kisan Seva 2022 6 ALD 702 Telangana
Kendra) VS State of HC
Telangana
24. M/S SJS Gold Pvt. Ltd. Criminal Misc. Writ Allahabad
Thru. Director Sunil Jaihind Petition No. - 3511 High Court
Salunkhe & Anr V. State of Of 2022
UP
25. Amit Singh vs State of U.P. Criminal Misc. Allahabad
And Anr. Writ Petition No. - High Court
11201 Of 202
26. Ruqaya Akhter Vs Ut CRM(M) The
Through Crime Branch No.223/2022 Jammu &
Kashmir
and
Ladakh
High Court
27. Narottam Singh Dhillon and Criminal Misc. Punjab-
another vs. State of Punjab No.43768 of 2004 Haryana
High Court
28. Vinoshkumar 2011(1) MWN (Cr) Bombay
Ramachandran Valluvar Vs. 497 HC
The State of Maharashtra
428 [2024] 6 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

29. C.Aranganayagam Vs. State 1999 SCC OnLine Madras
by the Director of Vigilance Mad 463 HC
and Anti-corruption, Erode
and another
30. M/S. Ap Product vs State Of AIR ONLINE 2020 Telangana
Telangana on 3 December, TEL 135 High Court
2020
31. Mohd. Maqbool Ahmed @ 1996(3) ALT215 Andhra
Mateen And Anr. vs The High Court
Deputy Commissioner Of
Police
32. State of Manipur v Canning 2021 SCC OnLine Manipur
Keishing Mani 272 HC
33. M.S. Jaggi vs 1977 CRILJ 1902 Orissa
Subaschandra Mohapatra High Court
34. Bharath Overseas Bank v. [1988] MLJ (Crl.) Madras
Minu Publication 309 HC
35. Dr. Shaik Haseena v State 2020 SCC OnLine Telangana
of Telangana TS 2851 HC
36. Operation Mobilization India 2021 SCC OnLine Telangana
v. State of Telangana TS 1529: (2021) 1 HC
HLT 81

Result of the case: Appeals partly allowed

†
Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan