SHIVA SHANKAR PANDEY & ORS.versusSTATE OF BIHAR

A                     SHIVA SHANKAR PANDEY & ORS.
                                         v.
                                STATE OF BIHAR

                               SEPTEMBER 9, 2002

B        [S. RAJENDRA BABU AND P. VENKATARAMA REDDI, JJ.]


         ·'fena/ Code, 1860:

         Sections 302, 149 and 34:
c
          Murder-Conviction-Common Object-Prosecution case that accused
    allegedly commilting murder-Some of the accused sharing common intention
    to commit murder-Proseculion witnesses not giving any account of role of
    other' accused except alleging that accused seen chasing other party with
D   weapons-Trial Court convicting the accused under section 302 read with
    section 149-High Court upholding the same-On appeal held, section 149
    inapplicable since no constructive liability can be fastened on accused
    persons-Accused sharing common intention convicled under Sec/ion 302 read·
    with 34 and other accused acqui1ted.

E          Conviction under section 302 read with 34 though there was no specific
    charge under section 34-Bul accused were aware of the constructive criminal
    liability fastened on them-Thus no prejudice caused to them.

         Sec/ion 149-Vicarious liability of members of unla11ful assembly--
    Ingredients and scope of-Explained.
F
          Criminal Trial :

         Appreciation of evidence-Eye-witnesses were enimical to the accused
    and closely related to deceased-Evidence should be scrutinized with greater
    care and circumspection.
G
          According to the prosecution A-1 injured one M due to enmity
    between two factions. He fired at M causing him injury from the rifle given
    to him by A-4; an hour later each of the appellant-accused armed ,with
    weapons went to the scene of occurrence. At that juncture A-1 fired a shot
    from his rifle at M. A 4 and two appellants including A-4 exhorted A-1 to
H                                        166
                SHIVA SHANKARPANDEY ''·STATE OF BIHAR                   167

fire again. He fired two three more shots and M died instantaneously and       A
accused persons dispersed. A-1 was convicted under Sections 302 and 341
IPC and Section 27 of the Arms Act and his SLP was dismissed by this
Court. Appellants are the other accused who were convicted under Section
302 read with Sections 149 and 341 IPC by trial court and their conviction
was upheld by High Court. Hence these appeals. Disposing of tlie appeals,      B
the Court

      HELD: 1.1. Finding of th.e High Court that in the second part of the
occurrence all the appellants had common object to commit murder of
the deceased is not sustainable. The version of prosecution witnesses that
they had seen each of the accused with weapons in their hands is highly        C
improbable and is not consistent with the admitted course of conduct. It
does not inspire confidence and it only reflects an anxiety on their part to
implicate as many accused as possible. 1174-F; 175-8, G, HI

      1.2. Having regard to the fact that the witnesses are closely related
persons and there is a history of bitter enmity between the deceased and       D
the accused party, the evidence of PWs 10 and 3 should have been
scrutinized with greater care and circumspection as there was every
possibility of exaggeration and embellishment. Viewed in this background
                                                 a
and going by the state of evidence on record, reasonable doubt arises
on the veracity of prosecution version that each of the appellants armed       E
with weapons went to the scene of occurrence with a view of kill or.injure
the victim already injured in the course of first incident. (175-C, DJ

      1.3. The evidence of the deceased's son reveals that as soon as they
noticed the accused party chasing them, they ran for safety leaving the
cot on which the deceased was being carried at the spot. It is most unlikely   p
that at that moment he could have noticed meticulousl) who were all
following him and which weapon each of them carried. At best, he could
have seen at a quick glance some of the accused but not all of them. The
son of the deceased (PW 10) assigns the active role only to A-4 and
appellant-R apart from the actual assailant A-1. The first two of them are
said to have exhorted A-1 to fire. With regard to other appellants, none       G
of the prosecution witnesses gave any account of the role played by any
of them. The prosecution evidence is absolutely silent in this regard. No
injuries other than those inflicted by fire-arm were found on the deceased.
Thus, a serious doubt arises as to the correctness of the prosecution case
that each of the accused (excluding A-4 and appellant-R) accompanied A-        H
      168                      SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2002] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

 A 1 in prosecution of their common object to injure or kill the deceased. The
      possibility of some of the accused persons being present cannot be ruled
      out; but on the question as to who were present, it is difficult to eliminate
      chaff from the grain on an analysis of the evidence. 1175-G, H; 176-A-C-GI

            1.4. It is not safe to convict the accused-appellants by taking recourse
 B    to Section 149 I.P.C. However, the presence and active participation of
      A-4 and appellant-R cannot be doubted. They shared common intention
      with the main assailant to kill the deceased. Therefore, A·4 and appellant-
      R are liable to be convicted under Section 302 read with Section 34 I.P.C.
      Appellants 1,3,4,5 and 6 are acquitted of charges and conviction of A 4
 C    and appellant-R is altered into one under Section 302 read with 34 IPC
      from Section 302 read with 149 IPC. (177-G; 178-8, D, E)

            Umesh Singh v. State of Bihar, AIR (2000) SC 2111, referred to.

         3. The absence of a specific charge under Section 34 I.P.C. cannot
 D be said to have caused any prejudice to the other two appellants as the
   facts giving rise to constructive criminal liability were well known to them
   from the beginning and the case which they had to meet under Section 34
   is substantially the same as the.prosecution put forward. (178-C)

            Bhoor Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR (1974) SC 125(i, relied on,
  E
           CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No.
      871-872 of 2000.

            From the Judgment and Order dated 3.11.1999 of the Patna High Court
      in Crl. A. No. 109 of 120/96.
  F
            K.B. Sinha and Ashok Kumar Sharma, for the Appellants.

            Saket Singh and B.B. Singh for the Respondent.

            The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
  G       P. VEN KAT ARAMA REDDI, J. These appeals are by special leave
   against the judgment of Patna High Court in two criminal appeals, which
   were dismissed by the High Court, thereby upholding the conviction by the
   trial Court. Eight persons including the seven appellants herein, were charged
   of murdering one Mangalanand Pandey on J 8.10.1993. Accused Nos. 2, 3,
'H 5 to 8 are the appellants in Criminal Appeal No. 871 of 2000. Accused No.4
      SHIVASHANKARPANDEY1·. STATEOFBIHAR[P VENKATARAMA REDDl,J.]          J69

 is the appellant in the other appeal. The Special Leave Petition in so far as A
 the accused No. I Dinesh Pandey, who actually killed the deceased with the
 shots fired by him, was dismissed by this Court. The said accused was
 convicted under Sections 302 and 341 1.P.C. and Section 27 of the Arms Act.
 The remaining seven accused, who are appellants herein, were convicted
 under Section 302 read with Sections 149 and 341 l.P.C. and sentenced
                                                                    ,_.     to B
 undergo life imprisonment

           The prosecution case is that on 18.10.1993 at about 5.45 a.m. the
  deceased Mangalanand Pandey and his brother Ranganath Pandey (PW 2)
  were putting up a 'machan' (a bamboo platform for holding vegetable creepers)
  at a place adjacent to the 'dalan' of their house towards the West. The 'dalan' C
  and the cow shed of the appellant Ram Pravesh Pandey was adjacent to the
  !arid where ihe 'machan' was being erected. The eight accused came there
  and started abusing the deceased and PW 2. At that juncture, the son of the
  deceased by name Ram Bachan Pandey PW I 0 together with his grand father
  went to the place and advised the accused • appellants not to pick up quarrel.
  The accused were in the posture of assaulting them. All the three went running D
  to the house of deceased and closed the doors. The accused followed them
  to the doorway of the house and continued abusing them. Then PW I0 and
  the deceased shifted to the roof of the house for safety. Thereafter, the accused
. excepting Mithilesh Pandey and Ramkeshwar Pandey also got into the roof
  of the house ofSriniwas Pandey (A-4) and started pelting stones and brickbats E
  to hit the deceased and his companions. Mithilesh and Ramkeshwar remained
  in the lane nearby and continued abusing. While so the appellant Srinivas
  Pandey fetched a rifle from his house and gave it to Dinesh Pandey who fired
  at the deceased causing injury on the upper portion of his left arm. Then, the
  deceased together with others came down. The injured person (deceased) was
  put on a cot and he was being taken by PW I 0, PW 2, PW 9 and one F
  Ranganath Tiwari (not examined) for treatment. At about 7.15 a.m., when
  they came past the 'dalan' of Ram Narayan Pandey (PW 7), the accused,
  armed with lathis, gandasas and rifles, were rushing towards them uttering
  the words -'Maro salon ko'. Seeing them PW 10 and his party fled, keeping
  the cot on which the injured victim lay, in front of the house of PW 7. PW G
  JO ran inside a room located near the 'dalan' of Ram Narayan Pandey and
  started watching the incident through the window. The uncle PW 2 ran towards
  the village. However, Ranganath Tiwari (not examined) and PW 9 remained
  there at some distance. Dinesh Pandey (whose SLP was dismissed) fired at
  the deceased who was lying unconscious on the cot. The appellants Srinivas
  Pandey and Ram Pravesh Pandey exhorted the accused Dinesh to fire again H
    170                       SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002]SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A saying that the victim was still alive. Dineshthen fired two or three more
    shots before the accused dispersed. The victim died instantaneously. At about
    9.30 a.m. the Sub-Inspector of Police - PW 11 reached the place and recorded
    the 'Fard Bayan' of PW 10 which is treated as F.1.R. (Exhibit 3). PW 11
    inspected the two places of occurrence, seized blood stained earth, brick bats,
B   remains of cartridges etc. and prepared the inquest report. The dead body was
    sent for post-mortem. The autopsy was conducted by the Medical Officer of
    Sadar Hospital PW 4 on the same day evening. PW 12 filed the charge sheet.
    The Additional Sessions Judge Rohtas held the trial after committal and
    found the accused guilty of the offence with which they were charged.

C        The post-mortem report coupled with the deposition of PW 4 reveals
  that there were lacerated wounds at four spots, namely, posterior lateral aspecl
  of left upper arm resulting in fracture of left humerus, lacerated wound over
  the right side of 8th inter costal space resulting in the fracture of three ribs
  and manubrium stema, lacerated wound on the upper arm right side causing
  fracture of mid part of humerus and lacerated wound on the left leg mid -
D part causing fracture of tibia and fibula. The first and second wounds had
  corresponding circular wounds. Doctor opined that the deceased must have
  died on account of shock and haemorrhage produced by the above injuries
  caused by fire arm. In the face of the medical evidence, it is contended that
  the version of the prosecution cannot be true for two reasons, firstly, the
E Doctor noticed blackening around the upper left arm where the first injury
  was caused and the blackening would not have occurred unless the shot was
  fired from a close range, whereas, according to the prosecution, the accused
   Dinesh Pandey fired the first shot from the roof of the adjacent house.
  Secondly, according to the Doctor, the first injury on the upper left arm
   would have resulted in profuse bleeding at the place where the deceased was
F shot. However, the 1.0., P. W. 11, did not state that he found any blood stains
   on the roof of the house or the steps of the staircase. Moreover, no blood was
   found on the cot on which the deceased was alleged to have been laid after
   coming down from the roof. It is then commented, based on the statement of·
   the Doctor in cross-examination, that the deceased might have gone into
G shock and fell down at the very spot where he sustained the first injury and
   therefore, the theory of the deceased getting down the steps cannot be true.
   The High Court and trial Court examined all these aspects and negatived
   these contentions. The High Court observed that the distance between the
   two houses was very short i.e. 3 cubits and, therefore, the possibility of
   blackening cannot be ruled out. The High Court referred to the statement of
H the I.Q, that he found blood at the stairs as well as 'Osara' (front portion of
                                                                         .. ,

     SHIVASHANKARPANDEYv. STATEOFBIHAR[P. VENKATARAMAREDDl,J.)                  171
the house) and observed that the mere fact that he did not find blood marks           A
on the roof or steps does not go against the prosecution case. As far as victim
walking down the staircase after receiving the injuries, the trial Court adverted
to that aspect and observed, relying on the text books on medical jurisprudence,
that the injured managing to walk some distance cannot be ruled out. We do
not think that the factum of 1.0. not recording the presence of bood stains on        B
the roof and the cot is very material. They could as well be attributed to the
omissions in the investigation which do not belie the prosecution evidence
substantially. None of the above contentions advanced by the learned counsel
for the appeliant, therefore, merit acceptance.

       Coming to the eye witnesses, the trial Court believed the evidence of          C
PW 3 wife of the deceased, as far as the first part of the incident is concerned
but was not inclined to place reliance on her evidence vis·a·vis the final
attack on the deceased. The trial Court disbelieved the evidence of PW 2.
The evidence of PW I 0, the informant and PW I was accepted by the trial
Court as well as the High Court. The High Court believed the evidence of all
these eye witnesses in toto. It is contended before us that the eye witnesses         D
whose evidence was accepted are closely related to the deceased and
independent witnesses whose presence at the spot has been established were
either not examined or they were tendered. This, according to the learned
counsel for the appellants, makes it unsafe to act on the testimony of these
interested witnesses, especially in the background of enmity between the              E
deceased and the accused party. This contention on deeper ·scrutiny does not
hold good. Amongst independent witnesses, only Ranganath Tiwari was not
examined. However, PW 9 Satyendra Pandey, who allegedly carried the cot
of the victim, was examined; but, the prosecution tendered him for cross-
examination by the accused. So also, PW 7 Ram Narain Pandey, at whose
house the cot was left out after seeing the accused and in whose house PW.            F
10 had hidden, was examined, but he turned hostile. At the same time, he
gave certain details of attack. As commented by the trial court after referring
to various aspects, the possible witnesses were apparently won over by the
accused. In these circumstances, the kith and kin of the deceased have become
the main witnesses. Their presence at the time and place is quite natural and         G
cannot be doubted. True, their evidence has to be scrutinized with greater
caution especially in the background of enmity that gripped the two factions.
Viewed in this light, it cannot be said that the trial Court and the appellate
Court have committed any error in coming to the conclusion, based on the
evidence of PW I 0 (son of the deceased) and PW 3 (wife of the deceased)
that the deceased was fired at by Dinesh Pandey in the company of some of             H
    172                       SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A the accused. It appears to us that the prosecution case is broadly true, though
    in regard to implication of many of the appellants as members of unlawful
    assembly. the said prosecution witnesses have come forward with a version
    which gives room for cjoubt. That aspect will be discussed later.

          As far as PW I is concerned, there is considerable force in the comment
B   of the learned counsel for the appellant that his presence was highly
    improbable. PW I who was returning from his field was supposed to have
    halted at the place of occurrence (in front of Ram Narain Pandey's house)
    and observed the details of occurrence at close quarters, undeterred by the
    commotion and the risk of being assaulted by the accused party. PWI 's
C   evidence ought to have been doubted for that reason. Even eschewing the
    evidence of PW I, the evidence of PWs I0 and 3 is still there to support the
    main part of the prosecution case.

         Whether the conviction of all or any of the appellants for the offence
  of murder can be sustained by invoking Section 149 IPC is the next question
D which has been vehemently argued before us. The anatomy and ingredients
  of Section 149 have been laid bare and its functional parameters set down in
  a series of pronouncements of this Court. Vicarious liability of the members
  of unlawful assembly arises where the offence is committed by another member
  or members of unlawful assembly if the commission of such offence is the
  common object of that assembly OR ifthe members of the unlawful assembly
E knew that the offence of the nature committed was likely to be committed
  though the common object may be something different. It is worth
  recapitulating the exposition of law in a recent decision of this Court in
  Umesh Singh v. State of Bihar, AIR (2000) SC 2111. One of us (Rajendra
  Babu, J.) speaking for the Court summarized the scope and implications of
F the provision as under:
            "Vacarious liability, we may state, as rightly contended for the State
            by Shri B.B. Singh relying upon the decisions of this Court in Shamshul
            Kanwar v. State of U.P., [1995] 4 sec 430 and Bhajan Singh V.
            Slate of U.P., [1974] 3 sec. 89 extends to members of unlawful
G           assembly only in respect of acts done in pursuance of the common
            object of the unlawful assembly or such offences as the members of
            the unlawful assembly are likely to commit in the execution of that
            common object. An accused whose case falls within the terms of
            Section 149, l.P.C. as aforesaid cannoi put forward the defence that
            he did not with his own hand cormnit'the offence in prosecution of
H           the common object of the unlawful assembly or such as the members
     SHIVA SHANKAR PANDEY"· STATE OF BIHAR [P. VENKATARAMA REDD!,.!.]        173
        of the assembly knew to be likely to be committed in prosecution of         A
        that object. Everyone must be taken to have intended the probable
        and natural results of the combination of the acts in which he had
        joined. It is not necessary in all cases that all the persons forming an
        unlawful assembly must do some overt act. Where the accused had
        assembled together, armed with guns and lathis, and were parties to
        the assault on the deceased and others, the prosecution is not obliged      B
        to prove which specific overt act was done by which of the accused.
        Indeed the provisions of Section 149, l.P.C. if properly analysed will
        make it clear that it takes an accused out of the region of abetment
        and makes him responsible as a principal for the acts of each and all
        merely because he is a member of an unlawful assembly. We may               C
        also notice that under this provision, the liability of the other members
        for the offence committed during the continuance of the occurrence
        rests upon the fact whether the other members knew before hand that
        the offence actually committed was likely to be committed in
        prosecution of the common object. Such knowledge can reasonably
        be intended (sic, inferred) from the nature of the assembly, arms or        D
        behaviour, at or before the scene of action. If such knowledge may
        not reasonably be attributed to the other members of the assembly
        then their liability for the offence committed during the occurrence
        does not arise. "

Though the legal position is well settled, in its actual application to the facts
                                                                                    E
of a given case, difficulties do arise. It is not an easy task to draw a parallel
between two cases. The presence or absence of even a single material fact or
circumstance may make a world-of difference in reaching the ultimate
conclusion ..
                                                                                    F
       We shall now proceed to consider whether on the facts established in
this case, Section 149 !PC should be made applicable to the accused-appellants.
As seen from the factual narration above, broadly, two incidents took place
within a time gap of about an hour or so: the first one was at the open terrace
of the house of the deceased. The appellants except Mithilesh Pandey and
Ram Keshwar Pandey gathered on the roof of the adjacent house of Sriniwas G
Pandey (appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 872/2000) and started pelting stones
at the deceased and his companions. After sometime, Sriniwas Pandey suddenly
brought a fire-arm from his house and handed over to Dinesh Pandey who
fired at the deceased causing injury to him on the right scapula. The second
part of the incident took place about an hour later i.e. at 7.15 a.m. near the H
     174                                 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A court-yard of Ram Narayan Pandey (PW 7) when PW 10 with the help of PW
     2. PW 9 and another person was carrying his injured father laid on a cot. to
     the hospital. On noticing the accused running towards them with offensive
     cries. they left the cot near the 'dalan' of Ram Narayan Pandey and ran to
     save themselves. PW I 0, the informant, hid himself in the house of Ram
B    Narayan Pandey and he was watching the incident from there. The accused,
     according to the prosecution witnesses, were armed with lathis, gandasas and
     ,:ifles/pisfol. At' that juncture Dinesh Pandey (whose SLP was dismissed)
     t1red ·a ·si-/6t froin his rifle. On ~xliortation by appellants Ram Parvesh Pandey
     ~nd Sri\i'ii;as"Pandey,: Dinesh Pandey ·fired some more shots. After ensuring
     ihar the'1 ~ictim was dead, the accused. party retreated:
·c          . '1   ~ . / . '.11;                                              ,,
       ". •· ',Jn ·the ·sequence of events that had happened the question is whether
     al11the·appellants proceeded to the: spot of occurrence to.attain the common
     -0bjective of putting an end·to the life of Manglanand Pandey and the act of
     oDiriesh·Pandey in killing the deceased with the fire-arm was only a culmination
     of· that robjective. On the point of sharing common object the High Court
:D   quite rightly recorded a categorical finding that the appellants did not have
     the common object to kill the deceased when the ·incident at the roof of the
     house took place, The High Court observed that when Sriniwas Pandey (one
     of the appellants) brqught a rifle and handed it over to Dinesh Pandey, who
      immediately fired at the deceased, it could be said that none other than
E    Sriniwas Pandey and Dinesh Pandey shared the common intention to commit
     th'e m~~der.' If SO, did the coininon object to do away with the. deceased
     d~v~lopdiereafter? On this aspect:, this is what the High Court had to say:-
     ..     ;~       ' .. ,         d!                                                ~~J'

                       .is the second part of the occurrence which clearly suggests that 1111
          ' • . '' J "It

                    the appellants had common object to commit murder of the deceased
·p                  because when after receiving injury inflicted on the left shoulder of
    :.. ,.,,r iffhe deceased by ap.pellant Diitesh' Pandey he was being carried on a
     ,.,,, . ;ci:ot fortr'eatrnent, all the'appellants variously amied with rifle, garasa
                  0
        ''"'·       and lathi chased him and coinpelled the informant and his companions
    ''"'' '' nto 'leave the cot carrying his father near the dalan of Ram ·Narayan
    ' ' ·,b'l>ande)' and to run away from that place ·and thereafter appellant
1
  G ;, · ' ·2 Dinesh Pandey fired one shot'from his rifle at the deceased. Appellants
      ~ 1 ,,,'., 11siiNiwas Paridey :and Rarn Pravesh Pandey then said to the appellant
     ' r>~r,:.. 11 lDine5h Pandey 'that the deceased was still alive oil whit:h appellant -
      1



    '"1" ''.lbbine'sh·Pandey 'again fired' !Wo-three· shots on •the deceased causing
    '·"'· 1:.- '.>his death arid thereafter all the"appellants fled away.-This subsequei1t
                1                                              1

Ii-I·..      "Jll con<l~ct         of
                                  the appellants in chasing th~ informant·party when· the
      SHIVASllANKAR PANDEY..STATEOFBIHAR[P VENKATARAMAREDDLJ.]            J 75

       deceased was being carried on cot for treatment variously armed with      A
       rifle, garasa and lathi and thereafter commission of murder of deceased
       by appellant Dinesh Pandey by firing from his rifle, causing death of
       deceased, clearly suggests that all the appellmits had common object
       to commit the murder of the deceased.''

The above finding of the High Court, in our considered view, is not sustainable. B
Having regard to the fact that the witnesses are closely related persons and
there is a history of bitter enmity between the deceased and the accused
party, as revealed from the FIR coupled with the evidence of PW IO, we feel
that the evidence of PWs I 0 and 3 should have been scrutinized with greater
care and circumspection as there was every possibility of exaggeration and C
embellishment. Viewed in this background and going by the state of evidence
on record, a reasonable doubt arises on the veracity of prosecution version
that each of the appellants armed with weapons went to the scene of occurrence
with a view to kill or injure the victim already injured in the course of first
incident. The prosecution evidence is to the effect that Ram Parvesh Pandey,
Vijoy Shankar Pandey, Ram Keshwar Pandey aiid Awadesh Pandey were D
having lathis, Mithlesh Pandey and Srinivas Pandey were armed with
Gandasas, Shiv Shankar Pandey was having a country made pistol and Dinesh
pandey, the actual assailant, was armed with a rifle. Though such account
was given with an apparent precision by PWs I 0 and 3 (apart from PW I -
whose presence is doubtful), their evidence does not inspire confidence and E
it only reflects an anxiety on their part to implicate as many accused as
possible. PW I0 is supposed to have observed the accused with the weapons
while they were advancing towards the prosecution party carrying the victim
on the cot. According to PW 10, when they reached the spot near the 'dalan'
of Ram Naryana Pandey, they heard the noise 'maro maro' from behind.
Then, he looked back and noticed the accused with the weapons in their F
hands. However, his evidence also reveals that as soon as they noticed the
accused party chasing them, they ran for safety leaving the cot at the spot.
PW 10 further states that he hid himself in a room adjacent to the 'dalan' of
Ram Naryan Pandey. Going by this version it is most unlikely that he would
have noticed at that moment each of the accused with weapons in their hands. G
Scch a leisurely observation was highly improbable and would not be
consistent with the admitted course of conduct. PW 10 himself stated that
"due to fear we put the cot on the ground and I entered into a room and my
uncle ran away towards the village". Such a person stricken with fear anxious
to run for safety could not have noticed meticulously who were all following
him ?',J which weapon each of chem carried. At best, he could have seen at H
    176                        SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A a quick glance some of the accused, but not all of them. It was even more
    difficult to identify each one of the weapons being carried by the chasing
    party. At that juncture and distance, PW 10 could have only made a random
    observation and noticed some of the accused and others advancing towards
    them with some weapons which were patently visible. When that is the
B   probable scenario, PW IO comes forward with a highly artificial version of
    having seen each of the accused carrying a particular weapon in his hand. In
    this state of things, we must find some assurance from other facts and
    circumstances appearing from the evidence on record in order to fasten
    constructive liability on the appellants under Section 149. But, there is none.
    When we take stock of the happenings at the scene of occurrence as revealed
C   by the evidence of PW IO who was watching from a window of adjacent
    house, the active role is assigned only to Srinivas Pandey and Ram Pravesh
    Pandey apart from the actual assailant Dinesh Pandey. The first two of them
    are said to have exhorted Dinesh Pandey to fire. With regard to others, it is
    significant to note that PW I 0, or for that matter any other prosecution
    witness, did not give any account of the role played by any of them. The
D   prosecution evidence is absolutely silent in this regard. No injuries other than
    those inflicted by fire-arm were found on the deceased. May be, overt acts
    need not be there. But, the fact remains that nothing was said about the
    conduct or utterances of any of the accused other than the three. If they had
    seen any other accused at the scene of offence at the time of actual attack,
E   they could have pinpointed the same instead of being content with an omnibus
    allegation that the accused were seen chasing them with weapons. Only the
    role played by actual assailant and his two companions who exhorted him to
    fire are brought out in the evidence of PW I0 and PW3. On a cumulative
    consideration of all these factors, a serious doubt arises as to the correctness
    of the prosecution case that each of the accused (excluding Srinivas Pandey
F   and Ram Pravesh Pandey) accompanied Dinesh Pandey in prosecution of
    their common object to injure or kill the deceased. The possibility of some
     being present cannot be ruled out; but, who they are is the question. On this
    aspect, it is difficult to eliminate chaff from the grain on an analysis of the
    evidence. The anxiety on the part of the prosecution to implicate as many
G   members of the opposite faction as possible is quite apparent. Unfortunately,
    the evidence of material witnesses especially that of PWIO, had not been
    critically and carefully examined by both the Courts despite the fact that the
    witnesses were prone to exaggerate or distort the facts in view of enmity and
    close relationship. The crucial aspects, as discussed above, escaped the attention
    of the High Court.
H
     SHIVASHANKAR PAND~Yr. STATE OF BIHAR (P. VENKATARAMA REDDl,J.]         J77
       If the facts as stated by the High Court are correct, perhaps, the inference A
drawn by the High Court may be right and the conviction under Section 302
read with Section 149 IPC might not have been faulted. Even if the appellants
have not done any overt acts or otherwise taken active pa1i, knowledge under
the second part of Section 149 could possibly be attributed to them. But,
there is a difficulty in accepting the factual account given by PW 10 and
others insofar as jt relates to the accused other than the actual assailant and B
his two active companions. There is any amount of doubt in regard to the
presence and participation of the accused other than the three referred to
above.

        Before closing the discussion on this aspect, we must also advert to C
the evidence of PW 3, who is the wife of the deceased. In this regard PW 3's
evidence too does not inspire confidence. She too would not have been in a
position to observe each. of the accused carrying a particular weapon, even
assuming that the actual act of killing by Dinesh Pandey with his fire arm
could have been noticed by her from the place where she was remaining.
According to the version of PW3 she was at a culvert about "10 full steps" D
behind those carrying the cot when she heard the cries of the accused. On
noticing the accused coming from behind, she states she hid herself and Came
to the spot where the cot lay only after the accused left the scene. ln that
panicky state of mind, her impulsive reaction was only to seek a place of
hiding rather than standing at the spot and observing the movements of the E
accused and the weapons they carried. Her evidence that she had seen each
of the accused carrying particular weapon is, therefore, highly doubtful. Her
evidence in this regard is no better than that of PW 10-th informant. In fact,
the trial Court was not inclined to believe the evidence in regard to the
second and final incident on the ground that she made certain improvements .
and embellishments. But, the High Court omitted to discus~ them.               F
       In the light of the above discussion it is not safe to convict the accused-
appellants by taking recourse to Section 149 l.P.C. However, the presence
and active participation of Srinivas Pandey and Ram Pravesh Pandey cannot
be doubted. As far as Srinivas Pandey is concerned it is he who went and G
fetched the fire-arm and gave it to Dinesh Pandey when they were on the
roof of his house thereby leading to the first shoot-out of the deceased. It is
a clear pointer that he shared the common intention with Dinesh Pandey to
kill the deceased. Again, at the time of second incident, he played active role
in exhorting Dinesh Pandey to fire at the deceased. Ram Pravesh Pandey is
another accused who exhorted Dinesh Pandey to open fire at the deceased H
    178                       SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2002] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A saying that h~ was still alive. His presence in the immediate company of the
    assailant and the role played by him could be watched by PW I0 just as he
    had seen Dinesh Pandey using his rifle to hit the deceased. He too can be said
    to have shared common intention with the main assailant and Srinivas Pandey
    to kill the deceased. Therefore, we are of the view that Srinivas Pandey and
    Ram Pravesh Pandey are liable to be convicted under Section 302 read with
B   Section 34 I.P .C .. The absence of a specific charge under Section 34 I.P .C.·
    cannot be said to have caused any prejudice to the two appellants as the facts
    giving rise to constructive criminal liability were well known to them from
    the beginning and the case which they have to meet under S. 34 is substantially
    the same as the prosecution put forward. The ruling of this Court in Bhoor
C   Singh v. .State of Punjab, AIR (1974) SC 1256 is quite relevant in this
    context.

          Accordingly, the Criminal Appeal No. 871 of2000 is allowed in so far
    as Appellant Nos. I, 3, 4, 5 and 6 are concerned. The said appellants are
    acquitted of the charges. The appeal in regard to Ram Pravesh Pandey stands
D   dismissed. The Criminal Appeal No. 872 of 2000 filed by Srinivas Pandey
    is also dismissed. However, we alter the conviction of these two accused,
    namely, Ram Pravesh Pandey and Srinivas Pandey, into one under Section ..·
    302 read with 34 IPC instead of Section 302 read with 149 IPC.

    NJ.                                                     Appeals disposed of.