SHIVAJI CHINTAPPA PATILversusSTATE OF MAHARASHTRA

                        [2021] 2 S.C.R. 617


                   SHIVAJI CHINTAPPA PATIL
                                  v.
                   STATE OF MAHARASHTRA
                 (Criminal Appeal No. 1348 of 2013)
                         MARCH 02, 2021
           [R. F. NARIMAN AND B. R. GAVAI, JJ.]
       Penal Code, 1860: s.302 – Conviction based on circumstantial
evidence – Prosecution case was that the appellant was addicted to
liquor and used to abuse and beat his wife forcing her to get money
from her mother – On the fateful night, the appellant and his wife
went to sleep in their house – Next day morning, when the brother
of the appellant went to call the appellant for going to field for
harvesting crop, appellant informed him that his wife committed
suicide by hanging – Trial court convicted appellant under s.302
and sentenced him to imprisonment for life – High Court upheld the
said order – On appeal, held: The medical expert who conducted
the autopsy admitted that the rope, which was found on the spot,
could have been used for suicidal hanging of the deceased – He
further stated that in case of homicidal strangulation, the bodily
resistance would be reflected – Admittedly, there were no marks on
the body to suggest violence or struggle – In any case, the medical
expert himself did not rule out the possibility of suicidal death – In
the light of this evidence, trial court as well as High Court erred in
holding that the prosecution proved that the death of the deceased
was homicidal – The motive relied on by prosecution was ill-treatment
by the appellant meted out to the deceased for not arranging money
from her mother – PW-3, mother of the deceased stated that appellant
and deceased had been to her house and stayed for four days few
days prior to the incident – This showed that the relations between
the deceased and appellant were cordial – Thus, it was not safe to
rely on the uncorroborated evidence of such a witness – Also,
prosecution sought to rely on the evidence of PW-1 – However, his
evidence was full of improvements and omissions – Even trial court
and High Court disbelieved his evidence – Thus, prosecution utterly
failed to prove motive beyond doubt – As such, an important link to
complete the chain of circumstances was totally absent – Prosecution
failed to prove a single incriminating circumstance beyond
                                 617
618            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                       [2021] 2 S.C.R.


A     reasonable doubt – Conviction and sentence passed by trial court
      as affirmed by High Court is set aside and appellant is acquitted of
      all the charges.
             Evidence Act, 1872: s.106 – Burden to prove – s.106 does
      not directly operate against either a husband or wife staying under
B     the same roof and being the last person seen with the deceased –
      s.106 does not absolve the prosecution of discharging its primary
      burden of proving the prosecution case beyond reasonable doubt –
      It is only when the prosecution has led evidence which, if believed,
      will sustain a conviction, or which makes out a prima facie case,
      that the question arises of considering facts of which the burden of
C     proof would lie upon the accused – In the instant case, the
      prosecution has even failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that
      the death was homicidal.
            Criminal law: Motive – Though in a case of direct evidence,
      motive would not be relevant, in a case of circumstantial evidence,
D     motive plays an important link to complete the chain of
      circumstances.
            Criminal law: False explanation or non-explanation can only
      be used as an additional circumstance, when the prosecution has
      proved the chain of circumstances leading to no other conclusion
E     than the guilt of the accused – However, it cannot be used as a link
      to complete the chain.
            Criminal law: Two views – If two views are possible, the benefit
      shall always go to the accused.

F           Allowing the appeal, the Court
            HELD: 1. In the instant case, PW-6 examined as a medical
      expert, conducted the autopsy along with his senior medical
      officer. In the advance death certificate issued on 24th March 2003,
      under his signature, the probable cause of death was ‘asphyxia
      due to strangulation’. However, in the Post-Mortem Report which
G
      was signed by PW-6 as well as his Senior Medical Officer on 19th
      June 2003, the cause of death was ‘cardio respiratory arrest due
      to asphyxia due to hanging’. PW-6 admitted, that in both the cases
      of suicidal or homicidal hanging, the ligature marks around the
      neck shall go upwards ears. He further admitted that after
H
  SHIVAJI CHINTAPPA PATIL v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA                      619


consulting his senior medical officer and going through the books,     A
he concluded that it was a case of hanging. He further admitted,
that rope, which was found on the spot, can be used for suicidal
hanging. He further admitted, that in case of homicidal
strangulation, the bodily resistance would be reflected.
Admittedly, there are no marks on the body which would suggest
                                                                       B
violence or struggle. In any case, the medical expert himself has
not ruled out the possibility of suicidal death. On the contrary,
the Post-Mortem Report shows, that the cause of death was
‘asphyxia due to hanging’. In the light of this evidence, the trial
court as well as the High Court erred in holding, that the
prosecution proved that the death of the deceased was homicidal.       C
[Paras 13, 15, 17, 18][625-A-C, E-F; 626-C-D]
      Eswarappa alias Doopada Eswarappa v. State of
      Karnataka (2019) 16 SCC 269 – relied on.
      Modi’s Medical Jurisprudence and Toxicology 23rd
      Edn. p.572 – referred to.                                        D

      2. It is well-settled that Section 106 of the Evidence Act
does not directly operate against either a husband or wife staying
under the same roof and being the last person seen with the
deceased. Section 106 of the Evidence Act does not absolve the
prosecution of discharging its primary burden of proving the           E
prosecution case beyond reasonable doubt. In the present case,
the prosecution has even failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt,
that the death was homicidal. [Paras 22, 23][628-A-C, C-D]
      Subramaniam v. State of Tamil Nadu and Another (2009)
      14 SCC 415 : [2009] 9 SCR 725; Gargi v. State of                 F
      Haryana (2019) 9 SCC 738; Trimukh Maroti Kirkan v.
      State of Maharashtra (2006) 10 SCC 681 : [2006] 7
      Suppl. SCR 156; Ponnusamy v. State of Tamil Nadu
      (2008) 5 SCC 587; [2008] 6 SCR 303 – relied on
      3. Another circumstance relied upon by the prosecution           G
was, that the appellant failed to give any explanation in his
statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. By now it is well-settled
principle of law, that false explanation or non-explanation can only
be used as an additional circumstance, when the prosecution has
                                                                       H
620           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2021] 2 S.C.R.


A     proved the chain of circumstances leading to no other conclusion
      than the guilt of the accused. However, it cannot be used as a
      link to complete the chain. [Para 24][628-D-E]
            4. Though in a case of direct evidence, motive would not
      be relevant, in a case of circumstantial evidence, motive plays an
B     important link to complete the chain of circumstances. The motive
      relied on by the prosecution is the ill-treatment by the appellant
      meted out to the deceased for not arranging the money from her
      mother. PW-3, mother of the deceased has stated, that the accused
      and deceased had been to her house and stayed for four days few
      days prior to the incident. This would show, that the relations
C     between the deceased and accused were cordial. The prosecution
      has utterly failed to prove motive beyond doubt. As such, an
      important link to complete the chain of circumstances is totally
      absent in the present case. [Paras 26, 27, 30][628-H; 629-A-C;
      630-F]
D           Anwar Ali and Another v. State of Himachal Pradesh
            (2020) 10 SCC 166 – relied on.
            State of Rajasthan v. Kashi Ram (2006) 12 SCC
            254:[2006] 8 Suppl. SCR 501 – held inapplicable.

E           5. It is more than settled principle of law that if two views
      are possible, the benefit shall always go to the accused. In the
      present case, let alone establishing chain of events which are so
      interwoven to each other leading to no other conclusion than the
      guilt of the accused, the prosecution has failed even to prove a
      single incriminating circumstance beyond reasonable doubt. The
F     conviction and sentence passed by the trial court as affirmed by
      the High Court is set aside. The appellant is acquitted of all the
      charges. [Paras 32, 34][631-A, G-H; 632-A]
            Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra
            (1984) 4 SCC 116 : [1985] 1 SCR 88; Devi Lal v. State
G           of Rajasthan (2019) 19 SCC 447 – relied on.
            G. Parshwanath v. State of Karnataka (2010) 8 SCC
            593: [2010] 10 SCR 377; Babu v. State of Kerala (2010)
            9 SCC 189:[ 2010] 9 SCR 1039 – referred to.

H
     SHIVAJI CHINTAPPA PATIL v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA                        621


                        Case Law Reference                                  A
     [2010] 10 SCR 377                referred to          Para 5
     [2010] 9 SCR 1039                referred to          Para 8
     (2019) 19 SCC 447                relied on            Para 9
     (2019) 16 SCC 269                relied on            Para 16          B
     [2009] 9 SCR 725                 relied on            Para 19, 20
     (2019) 9 SCC 738                 relied on            Para 21
     [1985] 1 SCR 88                  relied on            Para 24
                                                                            C
     [2006] 7 Suppl. SCR 156          relied on            Para 20
     [2008] 6 SCR 303                 relied on            Para 20
     (2020) 10 SCC 166                relied on            Para 29
     [2006] 8 Suppl. SCR 501          held inapplicable Para 31
                                                                            D
       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
1348 of 2013
       From the Judgment and Order dated 01.10.2008 of the High Court
of Judicature at Bombay in Criminal Appeal No. 46 of 2005
       S. Mahendran, Sachin Patil, Rahul Chitnis, Aaditya A. Pande, Geo
                                                                            E
Joseph, Advs. for the appearing parties.
       The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
       B. R. GAVAI, J.
       1. This appeal assails the judgment and order delivered by the
Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in Criminal        F
Appeal No. 46 of 2005, thereby dismissing the appeal of the appellant
and maintaining the conviction and sentence of the appellant as passed
by the Additional Sessions Judge, Islampur in Sessions Case No. 39 of
2003 for offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code
(For short ‘IPC’).
       2. The prosecution case in brief as could be gathered from the       G
material placed on record is as under:-
       Deceased Jayashree was married to the accused prior to about 8
or 9 years from the date of the incident. They were blessed with two
issues. PW-3-Anandibai is the mother of deceased. PW-5-Ramchandra
Chintappa is the brother of the appellant, who was residing separately in   H
622                SUPREME COURT REPORTS                       [2021] 2 S.C.R.


A     different part of the same house. It is the case of the prosecution, that
      the appellant was addicted to liquor and used to abuse and beat the
      deceased forcing her to get money from her mother. On the fateful night
      of 23rd March 2003, the accused and deceased went to sleep in their
      house. At the dawn of 24th March 2003, PW-5 gave a call to the appellant,
      so that they could go to their field for harvesting jawar crop. The accused
B
      opened the door and expressed his inability to accompany him to the
      field stating, that Jayashree had committed suicide by hanging. PW-4-
      Ramchandra Shankar resides near the house of the appellant as well as
      PW-5. PW-5 informed PW-4 about the incident. PW-5 went to the village
      Panumbre to inform the mother of deceased and other relatives about
C     the incident. PW-5 went to Kokrud Police Station and gave information
      about death of the deceased. On the basis of information received from
      PW-5, initially Ad No.13/2003 came to be registered. Subsequently, crime
      came to be registered for the offence punishable under Section 302
      IPC. As per the advance death certificate, the probable cause of death
      was asphyxia due to strangulation. The charge-sheet came to be filed
D
      before the jurisdictional Magistrate, First Class.
              3. The case was committed to the learned Sessions Judge. Charge
      was framed for the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC. The
      appellant pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. At the conclusion of
      the trial, the learned trial judge convicted the accused for the offence
E     punishable under Section 302 IPC and sentenced him to imprisonment
      for life. Being aggrieved thereby, the appellant preferred an appeal before
      the High Court, which came to be dismissed. Hence, the present appeal.
            4. We have heard Shri S. Mahendaran, learned amicus curiae
      appearing on behalf of the appellant and Shri Sachin Patil, learned counsel
F     appearing on behalf of the State.
             5. Shri Mahendaran, learned counsel for the appellant submitted,
      that the case rests entirely on the circumstantial evidence. He submitted,
      that unless and until the prosecution proves its case beyond all reasonable
      doubt, conviction in a case of circumstantial evidence would not be
G     warranted. The learned counsel submitted, that merely on the basis of
      suspicion, conviction would not be sustainable. He relies in this respect
      on the judgment of this Court in the case of G. Parshwanath v. State of
      Karnataka 1.

      1
H         (2010) 8 SCC 593
     SHIVAJI CHINTAPPA PATIL v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA                            623
                      [B. R. GAVAI, J.]

       6. The learned counsel submitted, that in the present case, the          A
prosecution has not been in a position to establish, that the death of the
deceased was homicidal. He submitted, that if the evidence of PW-6-
Dr. Kishor Patki is considered, it would reveal, that the evidence is
inconsistent with the theory of homicidal death. In this respect, the learned
counsel relies on the judgment of this Court in the case of Eswarappa
                                                                                B
alias Doopada Eswarappa v. State of Karnataka2.
       7. Insofar as the finding of the learned trial court and the High
Court with regard to the burden of the accused in view of Section 106 of
the Evidence Act is concerned, the learned counsel submitted, that unless
the initial burden is discharged by the prosecution, the burden would not
shift on the appellant. Reliance in this respect is placed on the judgments     C
of this Court in Subramaniam v. State of Tamil Nadu and Another3
and Gargi v. State of Haryana4.
       8. The learned counsel submitted, that in the case of circumstantial
evidence, motive plays an important role and the prosecution has utterly
failed to prove the case as to motive. Reliance in this respect is placed       D
on the judgment of this Court in the case of Babu v. State of Kerala5.
       9. Lastly, the learned counsel submitted, that when two views are
possible, one leaning towards acquittal and another towards conviction,
the benefit should be given to accused. Reliance in this respect placed
on the judgment of this Court in the case of Devi Lal v. State of               E
Rajasthan 6.
       10. Shri Sachin Patil, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
State submitted, that no interference is warranted in the concurrent
findings of the trial court and the High Court. He submitted, that the trial
court as well as the High Court have rightly relied on the judgment of
this Court in the case of State of Rajasthan v. Kashi Ram7 for convicting       F
the accused.
       11. The law with regard to conviction on the basis of circumstantial
evidence has been very well crystalised in the judgment of this Court in
the case of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra8 :-
                                                                                G
2
  (2019) 16 SCC 269
3
  (2009) 14 SCC 415
4
  (2019) 9 SCC 738
5
  (2010) 9 SCC 189
6
  (2019) 19 SCC 447
7
  (2006) 12 SCC 254
8
  (1984) 4 SCC 116                                                              H
624             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2021] 2 S.C.R.


A           “153. A close analysis of this decision would show that the
            following conditions must be fulfilled before a case against
            an accused can be said to be fully established:
                (1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is
                to be drawn should be fully established.
B           It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the
            circumstances concerned “must or should” and not “may be”
            established. There is not only a grammatical but a legal
            distinction between “may be proved” and “must be or should
            be proved” as was held by this Court in Shivaji Sahabrao
C           Bobade v. State of Maharashtra (1973) 2 SCC 793 where the
            observations were made : [SCC para 19, p. 807 : SCC (Cri)
            p. 1047]
                “19. …..Certainly, it is a primary principle that the
                accused must be and not merely may be guilty before a
D               court can convict and the mental distance between ‘may
                be’ and ‘must be’ is long and divides vague conjectures
                from sure conclusions.”
                (2) the facts so established should be consistent only with
                the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say,
                they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis
E
                except that the accused is guilty,
                (3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and
                tendency,
                (4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except
F               the one to be proved, and
                (5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to
                leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent
                with the innocence of the accused and must show that in
                all human probability the act must have been done by the
                accused.
G
             154. These five golden principles, if we may say so, constitute
             the panchsheel of the proof of a case based on circumstantial
             evidence.”
             12. In the light of these guiding principles, let us examine the facts
H     in the present case.
     SHIVAJI CHINTAPPA PATIL v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA                          625
                      [B. R. GAVAI, J.]

       13. In the present case, PW-6-Dr. Kishor Patki has been examined       A
as a medical expert. He has conducted the autopsy along with his senior
medical officer Dr. Tamboli. In the advance death certificate (Exh.-15),
issued on 24th March 2003, under the signature of PW-6, the probable
cause of death was ‘asphyxia due to strangulation’. However, in the
Post-Mortem Report (Exh.-16) which is signed by Dr. Kishor Patki as
                                                                              B
well as Dr. Tamboli on 19th June 2003, the cause of death was ‘cardio
respiratory arrest due to asphyxia due to hanging’. The only explanation
for inordinate delay of almost 3 months in signing the Post-Mortem Report
as given in his evidence by PW-6 is, that he was busy in some other
work.
      14. It will be relevant to refer to cross-examination of PW-6:-         C

      “It is correct that in both cases of suicidal or homicidal
      hanging the ligature mark around the neck shall go upwards
      ears. It is correct that while issuing advance death certificate
      it did not consult senior medical officer and after consulting
      of senior medical officer and going through the books I                 D
      concluded that it was a case of hanging. Article No. 1 can be
      used for suicidal hanging and in case of homicidal hanging
      or homidic strangulation the bodily resistance would have
      reflected other recorded in my presence wise.”
       15. It is thus clear, that the medical expert has admitted, that in    E
both the cases of suicidal or homicidal hanging, the ligature marks around
the neck shall go upwards ears. He has further admitted, that after
consulting his senior medical officer and going through the books, he
concluded that it was a case of hanging. He has further admitted, that
Article No. 1 which is a rope, which is found on the spot, can be used for    F
suicidal hanging. He has further admitted, that in case of homicidal
strangulation, the bodily resistance would have been reflected.
      16. It will be apposite to refer to the judgment of this Court in the
case of Eswarappa alias Doopada Eswarappa (supra), wherein this
Court relied on Modi’s Medical Jurisprudence and Toxicology and               G
observed thus:-
      “7. In Modi’s Medical Jurisprudence and Toxicology, 23rd
      Edn., p. 572 it is observed as follows:
          “Homicidal hanging, though rare, has been recorded.
          Usually, more than one person is involved in the act, unless        H
626             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                             [2021] 2 S.C.R.


A               the victim is a child or very weak and feeble, or is rendered
                unconscious by some intoxicating or narcotic drug. In a
                case, where resistance has been offered, marks of violence
                on the body and marks of a struggle or footprints of several
                persons at or near the place of the occurrence are likely
                to be found.”
B
                None of the well-known signs referred to by the learned
                author are present in this case.”
            17. In the present case also, admittedly, there are no marks on the
      body which would suggest violence or struggle. In any case, the medical
C     expert himself has not ruled out the possibility of suicidal death. On the
      contrary, the Post-Mortem Report shows, that the cause of death was
      ‘asphyxia due to hanging’.
             18. In the light of this evidence, we find, that the trial court as well
      as the High Court have erred in holding, that the prosecution has proved
D     that the death of the deceased was homicidal.
             19. That leads us to the reliance placed by the High Court as well
      as the trial court on the provisions of Section 106 of the Evidence Act. In
      the case of Subramaniam (supra), this Court had occasion to consider
      the similar case of the husband and wife remaining within the four walls
E
      of a house and death taking place. It will be relevant to refer to the
      following observations of this Court:-
             “23. So far as the circumstance that they had been living
             together is concerned, indisputably, the entirety of the
             situation should be taken into consideration. Ordinarily when
F
             the husband and wife remained within the four walls of a
             house and a death by homicide takes place it will be for the
             husband to explain the circumstances in which she might have
             died. However, we cannot lose sight of the fact that although
             the same may be considered to be a strong circumstance but
G            that by alone in the absence of any evidence of violence on
             the deceased cannot be held to be conclusive. It may be
             difficult to arrive at a conclusion that the husband and the
             husband alone was responsible therefor.”
            20. In the case of Subramaniam (supra), reliance was placed
H     on behalf of the State on the judgments of this Court in Trimukh Maroti
        SHIVAJI CHINTAPPA PATIL v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA                        627
                         [B. R. GAVAI, J.]

Kirkan v. State of Maharashtra9 and Ponnusamy v. State of Tamil                A
Nadu10. This Court observed thus:-
         “26. In both the aforementioned cases, the death occurred
         due to violence. In this case, there was no mark of violence.
         The appellant has been found to be wholly innocent. So far
         as the charges under Section 498-A or Section 4 of the Dowry          B
         Prohibition Act is concerned, the evidence of the parents of
         the deceased being PW 1 and PW 2 as also the mediators,
         PWs 4 and 5 have been disbelieved by both the courts below.
         That part of the prosecution story suggesting strong motive
         on the part of the appellant to commit the murder, thus, has
         been ruled out……”                                                     C

      21. It will also be relevant to refer to the following observations of
this Court in the case of Gargi (supra):-
         “33.1. Insofar as the “last seen theory” is concerned, there
         is no doubt that the appellant being none other than the wife         D
         of the deceased and staying under the same roof, was the last
         person the deceased was seen with. However, such
         companionship of the deceased and the appellant, by itself,
         does not mean that a presumption of guilt of the appellant is
         to be drawn. The trial court and the High Court have
         proceeded on the assumption that Section 106 of the Evidence          E
         Act directly operates against the appellant. In our view, such
         an approach has also not been free from error where it was
         omitted to be considered that Section 106 of the Evidence Act
         does not absolve the prosecution of its primary burden. This
         Court has explained the principle in Sawal Das v. State of            F
         Bihar, (1974) 4 SCC 193 in the following: (SCC p. 197, para
         10)
             “10. Neither an application of Section 103 nor of 106 of
             the Evidence Act could, however, absolve the prosecution
             from the duty of discharging its general or primary burden
                                                                               G
             of proving the prosecution case beyond reasonable doubt.
             It is only when the prosecution has led evidence which, if
             believed, will sustain a conviction, or which makes out a
             prima facie case, that the question arises of considering
9
    (2006) 10 SCC 681
10
     (2008) 5 SCC 587                                                          H
628             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2021] 2 S.C.R.


A               facts of which the burden of proof may lie upon the
                accused.””
             22. It could thus be seen, that it is well-settled that Section 106 of
      the Evidence Act does not directly operate against either a husband or
      wife staying under the same roof and being the last person seen with the
B     deceased. Section 106 of the Evidence Act does not absolve the
      prosecution of discharging its primary burden of proving the prosecution
      case beyond reasonable doubt. It is only when the prosecution has led
      evidence which, if believed, will sustain a conviction, or which makes
      out a prima facie case, that the question arises of considering facts of
      which the burden of proof would lie upon the accused.
C
            23. In the present case, as discussed hereinabove, the prosecution
      has even failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt, that the death was
      homicidal.
             24. Another circumstance relied upon by the prosecution is, that
D     the appellant failed to give any explanation in his statement under Section
      313 Cr.P.C. By now it is well-settled principle of law, that false explanation
      or non-explanation can only be used as an additional circumstance, when
      the prosecution has proved the chain of circumstances leading to no
      other conclusion than the guilt of the accused. However, it cannot be
      used as a link to complete the chain. Reference in this respect could be
E     made to the judgment of this Court in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda
      (supra).
              25. The High Court and the trial court have then relied on Section
      8 of the Evidence Act about the conduct of the accused. It will be relevant
      to note, that PW-5-Ramchandra Chintappa who was the first informant,
F     has stated in his evidence, that when he went to call the accused for
      going to the field for harvesting the crop of jawar, he informed him, that
      the deceased had committed suicide by hanging. Not only this, but on
      the basis of the report of the said witness, initially Ad No.13 of 2003
      came to be registered. The evidence of this witness is also duly
G     corroborated by the evidence of PW-4-Ramchandra Shankar. Both these
      witnesses are prosecution witnesses. We find, that the High Court and
      the trial court have failed to take into consideration the evidence of these
      witnesses.
            26. Though in a case of direct evidence, motive would not be
      relevant, in a case of circumstantial evidence, motive plays an important
H
        SHIVAJI CHINTAPPA PATIL v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA                        629
                         [B. R. GAVAI, J.]

link to complete the chain of circumstances. The motive relied on by the       A
prosecution is the ill-treatment by the appellant meted out to the deceased
for not arranging the money from her mother. In this respect, the
prosecution relies on the evidence of PW-3-Anandi, mother of the
deceased. It will be relevant to refer to the cross-examination of the
said witness:-
                                                                               B
         “….The accused and deceased had been to my house and
         stayed for four days few days prior to the incident…..”
       27. PW-3-Anandi, mother of the deceased has stated, that the
accused and deceased had been to her house and stayed for four days
few days prior to the incident. It would thus show, that the relations         C
between the deceased and accused were cordial. It will not be safe to
rely on the uncorroborated evidence of such a witness.
      28. The prosecution has sought to rely on the evidence of PW-1-
Nivrutti. However, his evidence is full of improvements and omissions.
Even the trial court and the High Court have disbelieved his evidence.
                                                                               D
      29. It will be relevant to refer to a recent judgment of this Court in
the case of Anwar Ali and Another v. State of Himachal Pradesh11:-
         “24. Now so far as the submission on behalf of the accused
         that in the present case the prosecution has failed to establish
         and prove the motive and therefore the accused deserves               E
         acquittal is concerned, it is true that the absence of proving
         the motive cannot be a ground to reject the prosecution case.
         It is also true and as held by this Court in Suresh Chandra
         Bahri v. State of Bihar 1995 Supp (1) SCC 80 that if motive is
         proved that would supply a link in the chain of circumstantial
         evidence but the absence thereof cannot be a ground to reject         F
         the prosecution case. However, at the same time, as observed
         by this Court in Babu [Babu v. State of Kerala, (2010) 9 SCC
         189, absence of motive in a case depending on circumstantial
         evidence is a factor that weighs in favour of the accused. In
         paras 25 and 26, it is observed and held as under:                    G
         [Babu v. State of Kerala, (2010) 9 SCC 189], SCC pp. 200-
         01)
             “25. In State of U.P. v. Kishanpal, (2008) 16 SCC 73, this
             Court examined the importance of motive in cases of
11
     (2020) 10 SCC 166                                                         H
630            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2021] 2 S.C.R.


A               circumstantial evidence and observed: (SCC pp. 87-88,
                paras 38-39)
                ‘38. … the motive is a thing which is primarily known to
                the accused themselves and it is not possible for the
                prosecution to explain what actually promoted or excited
B               them to commit the particular crime.
                39. The motive may be considered as a circumstance which
                is relevant for assessing the evidence but if the evidence is
                clear and unambiguous and the circumstances prove the
                guilt of the accused, the same is not weakened even if the
C               motive is not a very strong one. It is also settled law that
                the motive loses all its importance in a case where direct
                evidence of eyewitnesses is available, because even if there
                may be a very strong motive for the accused persons to
                commit a particular crime, they cannot be convicted if the
                evidence of eyewitnesses is not convincing. In the same
D               way, even if there may not be an apparent motive but if the
                evidence of the eyewitnesses is clear and reliable, the
                absence or inadequacy of motive cannot stand in the way
                of conviction.’
                26. This Court has also held that the absence of motive in
E               a case depending on circumstantial evidence is a factor
                that weighs in favour of the accused. (Vide Pannayar v. State
                of T.N., (2009) 9 SCC 152.””
            30. In the present case, we are of the considered view that the
      prosecution has utterly failed to prove motive beyond doubt. As such, an
F     important link to complete the chain of circumstances is totally absent in
      the present case.
             31. Insofar as the reliance placed by the learned counsel for the
      State on the judgment of Kashi Ram (supra) is concerned, it would
      reveal, that this Court had used the factor of non-explanation under
G     Section 313 Cr.P.C. only as an additional link to fortify the finding, that
      the prosecution had established chain of events unquestionably leading
      to the guilt of the accused and not as a link to complete the chain. As
      such, the said judgment would not be applicable to the facts of the present
      case.
H
     SHIVAJI CHINTAPPA PATIL v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA                            631
                      [B. R. GAVAI, J.]

       32. It is more than settled principle of law that if two views are       A
possible, the benefit shall always go to the accused. It will be apposite to
refer to the following observations of this Court in the case of Sharad
Birdhichand Sarda (supra):-
         “163. We then pass on to another important point which seems
         to have been completely missed by the High Court. It is well           B
         settled that where on the evidence two possibilities are
         available or open, one which goes in favour of the prosecution
         and the other which benefits an accused, the accused is
         undoubtedly entitled to the benefit of doubt. In Kali
         Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh (1973) 2 SCC 808, this
         Court made the following observations : [SCC para 25, p.               C
         820 : SCC (Cri) p. 1060]
            “Another golden thread which runs through the web of
            the administration of justice in criminal cases, is that if
            two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case,
            one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to           D
            his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused
            should be adopted. This principle has a special relevance
            in cases wherein the guilt of the accused is sought to be
            established by circumstantial evidence.””
         33. This Court, recently, in the case of Devi Lal (supra) observed     E
thus:-
         “19. That apart, in the case of circumstantial evidence, two
         views are possible on the case of record, one pointing to the
         guilt of the accused and the other his innocence. The accused
         is indeed entitled to have the benefit of one which is favourable      F
         to him. All the judicially laid parameters, defining the quality
         and content of the circumstantial evidence, bring home the
         guilt of the accused on a criminal charge, we find no difficulty
         to hold that the prosecution, in the case in hand, has failed to
         meet the same.”                                                        G
       34. In the present case, we are of the considered view that let
alone establishing chain of events which are so interwoven to each other
leading to no other conclusion than the guilt of the accused, the prosecution
has failed even to prove a single incriminating circumstance beyond
reasonable doubt. As such, the appeal is allowed and the conviction and
                                                                                H
632              SUPREME COURT REPORTS                        [2021] 2 S.C.R.


A     sentence passed by the trial court as affirmed by the High Court is set
      aside. The appellant is acquitted of all the charges and he is directed to
      be released forthwith if not required in any other case.


      Devika Gujral                                                Appeal allowed.
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