Holding

Because the essential ingredient of a dowry demand was not proved beyond reasonable doubt, the presumption under Section 113‑B could not be raised and the appellants were acquitted of offences under Sections 304‑B and 498‑A IPC.

Summary

The deceased, Neelam, died from extensive burn injuries within seven years of her marriage to the son of the appellants, who were her father‑in‑law and mother‑in‑law. The prosecution alleged that the accused demanded a motorcycle and Rs 50,000 as dowry and threatened her, invoking the presumption of dowry death under Section 113‑B of the Evidence Act. The trial court convicted the appellants under Sections 304‑B and 498‑A IPC, a decision affirmed in part by the High Court. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined whether the essential ingredients of a dowry death—particularly a proven demand for dowry and cruelty—were established beyond reasonable doubt. It found no reliable evidence of any dowry demand or harassment, and the presence of the accused at the time of death was not proved, rendering the presumption inapplicable. Consequently, the Court set aside the convictions and acquitted the appellants. The appeal was allowed and the bail bonds discharged.

Issues considered

Whether the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt the essential ingredients of a dowry death, especially a demand for dowry and cruelty, to invoke the presumption under Section 113‑B of the Evidence Act.
Whether the presumption under Section 113‑B applies when the essential ingredients of dowry death are not established.
Whether the evidence of alleged dowry demand is admissible and reliable for the purpose of conviction under Sections 304‑B and 498‑A IPC.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961s. 3, s. 4
Evidence Act, 1872s. 113-B
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 304-B, s. 498-A

Subjects

dowry deathpresumption under section 113-Bevidence admissibilityevidence reliabilitysuicidesection 304-B IPCsection 498-A IPCburden of proofcriminal law

Judgment

[2024] 9 S.C.R. 818 : 2024 INSC 713

Shoor Singh & Anr.
v.
State of Uttarakhand
(Criminal Appeal No. 249 of 2013)
20 September 2024
[J.B. Pardiwala and Manoj Misra,* JJ.]

Issue for Consideration
High Court, if justified in acquitting the parents-in-laws and the
husband of the victim-daughter-in-law of the offences punishable
u/ss.304-B and 498-A IPC.

Headnotes†
Penal Code, 1860 – ss.304-B and 498-A – Evidence Act, 1872 –
s.113-B – Dowry death – Presumption as to dowry death
u/s.113-B – Victim-daughter-in-law died of burn injuries at her
matrimonial home within one year of marriage – FIR by the
father that his daughter was harassed by the appellants-parent-
in-laws and husband soon before her death in connection
with dowry demand – Order of conviction and sentence of the
appellants u/ss.304-B and 498-A – However, the High Court
upholding the order of conviction, reduced the sentence from
10 years to 7 years R.I. u/s.304-B IPC while maintained the
sentence of 1 year R.I. u/s.498-A – Justification:
Held: Distinction must be drawn between admissibility and
acceptability/reliability of a piece of evidence – Merely because
a piece of evidence is admissible does not mean that it must be
accepted – Before accepting the evidence to hold that the fact in
issue stands proved beyond reasonable doubt, the Court must
evaluate the same against the weight of surrounding circumstances
and other facts proven on record – On facts, one of the essential
ingredients of dowry death, namely any demand for dowry, not
proved beyond reasonable doubt – Accused have not been convicted
for murder, and rightly so, because no worthwhile evidence to
show that except for the burn injuries, which could be self-inflicted,
the victim suffered any other antemortem injury – Moreover, the
presence of the accused in the house at the time of occurrence
not proved – In such circumstances, the death was most probably
* Author
[2024] 9 S.C.R. 819

Shoor Singh & Anr. v. State of Uttarakhand

suicidal though this would not make a difference for commission
of an offence punishable u/s.304-B if all the other ingredients of
dowry death stand proved – Harassment/ cruelty at the instance of
the appellants in connection with any demand for dowry not been
proved beyond reasonable doubt – Reason to commit suicide could
be that the deceased used to remain depressed for being unable
to join her husband at the place of his posting, and photograph of
hers’, showing her alone with a male stranger had shamed her –
Once all the necessary ingredients of dowry death not been proved
beyond reasonable doubt, the presumption u/s.113-B of the 1872
Act would not be available to the prosecution – Thus, the appellants
entitled to be acquitted of the charge of offences punishable u/
ss.304-B and 498-A – Conviction and sentence of the appellants
u/ss.304-B and 498-A set aside. [Paras 14 to 19]
Penal Code, 1860 - s.304 – Dowry death – Ingredients to be
satisfied to constitute a ‘dowry death’, punishable u/s.304-B –
Stated. [Para 12]

Evidence Act, 1872 – s.113-B – Presumption as to dowry
death – When:
Held: When all the ingredients of ‘dowry death’ punishable u/s.304-B
IPC, are proved, the presumption u/s.113-B is to be raised against
the accused that he has committed the offence of ‘dowry death’ –
Presumption u/s.113-B is not in respect of commission of an act of
cruelty, or harassment, in connection with any demand for dowry,
which is one of the essential ingredients of the offence of ‘dowry
death’ – Presumption, however, is in respect of commission of the
offence of ‘dowry death’ by the accused when all the essential
ingredients of ‘dowry death’ are proved beyond reasonable doubt
by ordinary rule of evidence, which means that to prove the
essential ingredients of an offence of ‘dowry death’ the burden is
on the prosecution. [Paras 12,13]

List of Acts
Penal Code, 1860; Evidence Act, 1872; Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973; Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961.

List of Keywords
Dowry death; Presumption as to dowry death; Death otherwise
than under normal circumstances; Within seven years of marriage;
820 [2024] 9 S.C.R.

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Demand for dowry; Unnatural death; Admissibility of evidence;
Acceptability/reliability of evidence; Proved beyond reasonable
doubt; Suicide; Harassment/cruelty; Necessary ingredients of dowry
death; Presumption u/s.113-B of the Evidence Act; Ingredients to
constitute ‘dowry death’ punishable u/s.304-B; Presumption as to
dowry death; Ordinary rule of evidence.

Case Arising From
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
249 of 2013
From the Judgment and Order dated 26.04.2012 of the High Court
of Uttarakhand at Nainital in CRLA No. 87 of 2010

Appearances for Parties
A.P. Mohanty, Adv. for the Appellants.
Akshat Kumar, Ajay Bahuguna, Advs. for the Respondent.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

Manoj Misra, J.
1. This appeal is against the judgment and order of the High Court1 dated
26.04.2012, whereby, while affirming the conviction of the appellants
under Sections 304-B and 498-A IPC,2 the appeal3 of the appellants
was partly allowed thereby reducing the sentence awarded by the
Trial Court4 from 10 years to 7 years R.I. under Section 304-B IPC
and maintaining the sentence of 1 year R.I. under Section 498-A IPC.

FACTUAL MATRIX
2. The appellants are father-in-law and mother-in-law, respectively, of
the deceased (Neelam), who was daughter of Shanker Singh (PW-1)
and Sarojini Devi (PW-2). The deceased was married to appellants’

1 The High Court of Uttarakhand at Nainital
2 Indian Penal Code, 1860
3 Criminal Appeal No.87 of 2010
4 Sessions Judge, Pauri Gharwal
[2024] 9 S.C.R. 821

Shoor Singh & Anr. v. State of Uttarakhand

son Jitendra Singh (co-accused) on 1.03.2006. On 30.12.2006,
deceased gave birth to a male child. Naming ceremony of the child
was performed on 11.01.2007. On 17.01.2007, deceased died at
her matrimonial home due to extensive burn injuries. Upon being
informed of her death, PW-1 lodged a first information report5 (Ex.
Ka-1) on the same day, inter alia, alleging that,-when he along
with PW-2 had visited deceased’s matrimonial home on 4.1.2007,
deceased’s father-in-law, mother-in-law, brother-in-law (i.e., husband’s
elder brother – not tried) and sister-in-law (husband’s elder brother’s
wife – not tried) had told PW-1 and PW-2 that on the day of naming
ceremony of the child they would have to give a motor-cycle and
cash of Rs.50,000/-. Besides that, it was alleged that when PW-1
and PW-2 visited deceased’s matrimonial home on 11.01.2007, the
deceased inquired from PW-1 and PW-2 whether they had brought
motorcycle and cash. However, when PW-1 expressed his inability
to meet the demand, the deceased told PW-1 that lot of pressure
was being put on her and if the demand is not met, she would be
killed. With these allegations, and by stating that accused had killed
his daughter on account of the demand being not met, PW-1 lodged
the FIR, which was registered as case crime No.1 of 2007 at P.S.
Langur Walla-2, district Pauri Garhwal, under Sections 304-B, 498-A
IPC and Sections 3/ 4 Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, against three
accused, namely, Jitendra Singh (husband of the deceased) and
the appellants, who were all tried together by the Court of Session,
Pauri Garhwal in Sessions Trial No.25 of 2007.
3. During trial, prosecution examined 7 witnesses. PW-1 (the first
informant – father of the deceased); PW-2 (mother of the deceased);
and PW-3 (uncle of the deceased) were family members of the
deceased who proved the date of marriage and alleged that the
deceased was depressed on account of the demand. PW-4 was
the doctor who conducted autopsy of the cadaver. He proved that
the deceased had suffered extensive ante-mortem burn injuries
which resulted in her death. PW-5 is cousin of the deceased who
had arrived at the spot along with PW-1 on receipt of information
regarding her death. He is also the inquest witness. PW-6 is the
Patwari who made GD entry of the FIR and took initial steps of
investigation such as preparation of inquest report and dispatch

5 FIR
822 [2024] 9 S.C.R.

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of the cadaver for autopsy. PW-7 completed the investigation and
submitted charge-sheet. PW-7, inter alia, stated that at the time of
inquest the body of the deceased was lying in the courtyard.
4. In their statement recorded under Section 313 CrPC6 the accused
admitted:
(a) the factum of marriage;
(b) the date of marriage;
(c) the date of childbirth;
(d) that parents of the deceased visited her matrimonial home
on 04.01.2007 to see their daughter and the child; and
(e) that on 11.01.2007 child naming ceremony was done.
The accused, however, denied demand of dowry/ motorcycle/ cash of
Rs.50,000/- as well as harassment of the deceased. Jitendra Singh
(i.e., husband of the deceased) stated that the deceased committed
suicide due to depression on account of staying separate from him
as no quarter was allotted to him, and also because a photograph
of her with a male stranger was found. He had also stated that at
the time of the incident he had gone to collect wood.
Accused Shoor Singh (appellant no.1 herein) added that he had gone
to Lansdowne at the time of incident. Similarly, accused Gangotri Devi
(appellant no.2 herein) stated that she had gone out to wash clothes.
5. The defense had examined 4 witnesses (DW-1 to DW-4) and
produced color photographs (Ex Kha-1 to Kha-6). DW-1 stated
that the deceased used to accompany her for collecting grass and
wood, but she never made any complaint about her harassment
on account of dowry demand. Rather, the deceased used to say
that if she is not taken by her husband to his workplace she would
die. DW-2 stated that in the morning of 17.01.2007 (i.e., date of
the incident) she had seen Shoor Singh (appellant no.1 herein)
going towards Lansdowne. DW-3 stated that between 12.30 and
1.00 p.m. he saw smoke bellowing from the house of Shoor Singh.
When he reached there, he noticed that none of the accused were
there, and the body of the deceased was lying outside the shutter

6 Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
[2024] 9 S.C.R. 823

Shoor Singh & Anr. v. State of Uttarakhand

in a burnt condition. Whereafter, he went to inform Gangotri Devi
who was washing clothes near a water well. DW-4 stated that he
was present at the time of inquest when he saw an empty can of
kerosene and matchsticks lying near the body of the deceased; and
smell of kerosene was all over.
6. The trial court primarily relied on the testimonies of PW-1, PW-2
and PW-3 to hold that the deceased was harassed soon before her
death in connection with demand for a motorcycle and cash and,
therefore, in view of the presumption under Section 113-B of the
Evidence Act, 1872, the accused were liable to be convicted for
dowry death, punishable under Section 304-B IPC, and for cruelty,
punishable under Section 498-A IPC.
7. Aggrieved therewith, two separate criminal appeals were filed before
the High Court. One appeal was by the husband of the deceased and
the other was by the appellants herein. Both appeals were decided
by the impugned order. In so far as the accused Jitendra Singh is
concerned, he has served out the sentence and has not filed any
appeal. This appeal is, therefore, by father-in-law and mother-in-law
of the deceased.
8. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and have perused
the record.

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT(S)
9. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted:
(i) The autopsy report indicated no mark of injury, other than burn
injuries, on the body of the deceased. Body of the deceased
was found in the courtyard of the house. Further, the evidence
indicated death during daytime. The defense evidence indicated
that when smoke was noticed, the witness reached the spot
to find a burnt body of the deceased lying in the courtyard
and, at that time, none of the accused persons were present.
Even prosecution witnesses do not state that at the time of
incident the accused were present in the house. All of this
would suggest that it is a case of suicide, which could be for
multiple reasons.
(ii) There is no direct evidence regarding demand of dowry by the
appellants. The testimonies of PW-1 and PW-2 do not support
824 [2024] 9 S.C.R.

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the FIR allegation that on 4.1.2007 appellants had demanded
a motorcycle and cash from PW-1 and PW-2.
(iii) There is no evidence that motorcycle or cash was demanded
in connection with marriage. Hence, a case of dowry death is
not made out.
(iv) The courts below failed to test the merit of the allegations against
the weight of surrounding circumstances and the deposition of
prosecution witnesses during cross-examination. Interestingly,
PW-1 and PW-2, who had been visiting the matrimonial home
of the deceased, admitted during cross-examination that they
did not confront the accused in respect of the alleged demand
as reported to them by their daughter (i.e., the deceased)
because they thought it to be a joke. If it was so, the question
of subjecting the deceased to cruelty does not arise.
(v) Admittedly, husband of the deceased in connection with service
was residing elsewhere. Accused in their statement under
Section 313 CrPC stated that the deceased was unhappy and
depressed because she was not able to live with her husband
as no residential quarter was allotted to him. A suggestion to
that effect was also given to the prosecution witnesses. Hence,
this was a material circumstance explaining the drastic step to
commit suicide.
(vi) PW-1 tried to implicate even the elder brother of the husband
of the deceased even though he resided in another town in
connection with service. This would suggest that there was
a malicious attempt to implicate the entire family without any
basis. In such circumstances, the Court ought to have been
circumspect. More so, when no witness of the locality was
produced in support of the prosecution case.
(vii) Presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act arises
only when the necessary ingredients of a dowry death are
proved beyond reasonable doubt. Here there was no direct and
reliable evidence that the deceased was subjected to cruelty
in connection with demand of dowry soon before her death.
Hence, there was no occasion to raise a presumption in respect
of a dowry death.
[2024] 9 S.C.R. 825

Shoor Singh & Anr. v. State of Uttarakhand

(viii) There were sufficient reasons for the deceased to commit
suicide, such as:
(a) She was depressed for not being able to reside with her
husband who had to be away from home in connection
with his service.
(b) She was shamed by discovery of a photograph (Ex. Kha- 1)
wherein she was noticed alone with a male stranger in
front of a waterbody.

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF STATE
10. On behalf of the prosecution (i.e., the State of Uttarakhand), it was
submitted:
(i) PW-1, PW-2 and PW-3 have all been consistent about the
deceased reporting to them that accused persons were
demanding a motorcycle and cash of Rs.50,000/- and
threatening her that if their demand is not met by the date of
child naming ceremony, she would be killed. Naming ceremony
was held on 11.01.2007 and soon thereafter the deceased died
on 17.01.2007. Thus, deceased’s statement was in respect of
circumstances of the transaction which resulted in her death
and, therefore, admissible in evidence under Section 32 (1) of
the Evidence Act.
(ii) The courts below justifiably raised a presumption of the offence
of dowry death; and that presumption was not dispelled by the
accused- appellants. Moreover, the appellants being father-in-
law and mother-in-law of the deceased, residing in the same
house where the deceased died an unnatural death, were liable
to be convicted.
(iii) The photograph (Ex. Kha-1) was not admissible in evidence as
neither the person who took the photograph nor its negative
was produced in evidence. Otherwise also, it did not reveal
any such compromising position of which the deceased will
be ashamed of.
(iv) The appeal is concluded by concurrent findings of fact, therefore
no case for interference is made out.
826 [2024] 9 S.C.R.

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ANALYSIS/DISCUSSION
11. Before we proceed to test the merit of the rival submissions, it would
be useful to cull out certain facts as regards which there is no serious
dispute. These are:
(a) the deceased was married to the son of the appellants within
seven years of her death;
(b) the deceased died an unnatural death on account of ante-
mortem burn injuries;
(c) place of death of the deceased was her matrimonial home;
(d) just 18 days before her death, the deceased had given birth
to a male child;
(e) prior to her death there was no police complaint or FIR in respect
of harassment of the deceased for any reason whatsoever;
(f) there is no evidence that any of the accused demanded dowry, or
a motorcycle, or cash from the family members of the deceased
either before the marriage or at the time of marriage; and
(g) there is no evidence that the deceased was physically assaulted
by any of the accused in connection with demand for dowry or
motorcycle or cash.
12. To constitute a ‘dowry death’, punishable under Section 304-B7 IPC,
following ingredients must be satisfied:
i. death of a woman must have been caused by any burns or
bodily injury or it must have occurred otherwise than under
normal circumstances;
ii. such death must have occurred within seven years of her
marriage;

7 Section 304-B. Dowry Death. – (1) Where the death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury
or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown
that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of
her husband for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, such death shall be called ‘dowry death’,
and such husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her death.
Explanation. -- For the purpose of this sub-section, ‘dowry’ shall have the same meaning as in section 2
of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 [28 of 1961].
(2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less
than seven years but which may extend to imprisonment for life
[2024] 9 S.C.R. 827

Shoor Singh & Anr. v. State of Uttarakhand

iii. soon before such death, she must have been subjected to
cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her
husband; and
iv. such cruelty or harassment must be in connection with any
demand for dowry.
The phrase ‘otherwise than under normal circumstances’ is wide
enough to encompass a suicidal death.
13. When all the above ingredients of ‘dowry death’ are proved, the
presumption under Section 113-B8 of the Evidence Act is to be
raised against the accused that he has committed the offence of
‘dowry death’. What is important is that the presumption under
Section 113-B is not in respect of commission of an act of cruelty,
or harassment, in connection with any demand for dowry, which is
one of the essential ingredients of the offence of ‘dowry death’. The
presumption, however, is in respect of commission of the offence of
‘dowry death’ by the accused when all the essential ingredients of
‘dowry death’ are proved beyond reasonable doubt by ordinary rule
of evidence, which means that to prove the essential ingredients of
an offence of ‘dowry death’ the burden is on the prosecution.
14. In the instant case, it is not in dispute that the deceased died otherwise
than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage.
However, the issue between the parties is about her being subjected
to cruelty or harassment by her husband or his relative, soon before
her death, in connection with any demand for dowry.
15. The testimonies of PW-1, PW-2 and PW-3 do not indicate that any
demand for dowry was made by the accused-appellants either
before or at the time of marriage of the deceased with their son.
Further, there is no evidence that the accused appellants directly
demanded a motorcycle or cash from any of the above witnesses.
In fact, evidence is to the effect that the deceased had informed
PW-1 and PW-2 on 4.1.2007 and 11.1.2007 about the demand for
a motorcycle and cash. Further, from the deposition of PW-1 and

8 Section 113-B. Presumption as to dowry death. When the question is whether a person has committed
the dowry death of a woman and it is shown that soon before her death such woman had been subjected
by such person to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, the court shall
presume that such person had caused the dowry death.
Explanation.- For the purposes of this section, dowry death shall have the same meaning as in section
304 capital B of the Indian Penal Code [45 of 1860]
828 [2024] 9 S.C.R.

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PW-2, it appears that the aforesaid demand was not in connection
with marriage but as a mark of celebration on birth of a male child.
16. No doubt testimonies of PW-1 and PW-2 would not be hit by the
rule against hearsay evidence because it related to one of the
circumstances of the transaction resulting in their daughter’s unnatural
death. However, a distinction must be drawn between admissibility
and acceptability/reliability of a piece of evidence. Merely because
a piece of evidence is admissible does not mean that it must be
accepted. Before accepting the evidence to hold that the fact in issue
stands proved beyond reasonable doubt, the Court must evaluate
the same against the weight of surrounding circumstances and other
facts proven on record.
17. In the instant case, the witnesses PW-1 and PW-2 were asked
whether they took up the issue of motorcycle /cash demand with
the accused. Their reply was that they did not, because they took
it as a joke. We fail to understand how parents could treat their
daughter’s multiple reporting of threat to her life, on account of
demand being not met, as a joke. This creates a serious doubt
about the truthfulness of the allegation more so when there is no
allegation that any such demand was ever raised either before or at
the time of marriage. This doubt gets fortified by change in stance
of PW-1 from what was taken in the FIR. Notably, in the FIR it was
alleged that the accused-appellants including their elder son, and
his wife, had directly raised demand for a motorcycle and cash. This
allegation was not supported by the deposition of both PW-1 and
PW-2 while admitting that appellant’s elder son was a doctor serving
in another district. Thus, there appears to be a knee-jerk reaction to
the unnatural death of their daughter to make out a case of dowry
death. Besides that, no independent witness of the vicinity was
examined. In our considered view, therefore, one of the essential
ingredients of dowry death, namely, any demand for dowry, was not
proved beyond reasonable doubt.
18. Indisputably, the accused have not been convicted for murder,
and rightly so, because there was no worthwhile evidence to show
that except for the burn injuries, which could be self- inflicted, the
accused suffered any other ante-mortem injury. Moreover, the
presence of the accused in the house at the time of occurrence is
not proved. In such circumstances, the death was most probably
[2024] 9 S.C.R. 829

Shoor Singh & Anr. v. State of Uttarakhand

suicidal though this would not make a difference for commission
of an offence punishable under Section 304-B IPC if all the other
ingredients of dowry death stand proved. But, as noted above, here
harassment/ cruelty at the instance of the appellants in connection
with any demand for dowry has not been proved beyond reasonable
doubt. As regards the reason to commit suicide, though it is not
necessary for us to dwell upon, suffice it to say that husband of
the deceased was in service and stayed away from the deceased.
Suggestion was given to the prosecution witnesses, and statement
was also made under Section 313 CrPC, that the deceased used
to remain depressed for being unable to join her husband at the
place of his posting due to lack of residential quarter. That apart, a
photograph of the deceased (Ex. Kha 1), regarding which no dispute
was raised by the prosecution witnesses, showing her alone with
a male stranger had surfaced. In the statement under Section 313
CrPC a stand was taken that this photograph had shamed her. Be
that as it may, once all the necessary ingredients of dowry death
have not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, the presumption
under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act would not be available to
the prosecution. Hence, in our considered view, the appellants are
entitled to be acquitted of the charge of offences punishable under
Section 304-B and 498-A IPC.
19. The appeal is accordingly allowed. The order convicting and
sentencing the appellants under Section 304-B and 498-A IPC is set
aside. The appellants are on bail. They need not surrender. Their
bail bond(s) stand discharged.
20. Pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of.

Result of the Case: Appeal allowed.

†
Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain