Holding

The Supreme Court upheld the conviction, commuted the death sentence to life imprisonment, and held that life imprisonment means incarceration for the convict’s natural life, with release permissible only after a minimum of twenty years.

Summary

Shri Bhagwan, a 20‑year‑old apprentice goldsmith, was convicted of murdering five members of Shiv Pratap's family and committing robbery and dacoity. The conviction was based on circumstantial evidence: he was seen with one of the deceased, sustained injuries, possessed blood‑stained clothing and stolen jewellery, and could not explain their possession. The Supreme Court held the circumstantial evidence sufficient, rejected the claim that the statement of the victim was unreliable, and affirmed the presumption of guilt under Section 114 of the Evidence Act. While upholding the conviction, the Court commuted the death sentence to life imprisonment, directing that the appellant not be released before serving at least twenty years. It clarified that a sentence of life imprisonment under Sections 433(b) and 433A of the CrPC means imprisonment for the remainder of the convict’s natural life and cannot be automatically reduced after fourteen years.

Issues considered

The adequacy of circumstantial evidence to sustain conviction for murder, robbery and dacoity.
The reliability of the victim's statement and its impact on the case.
Whether the nature of injuries indicated the presence of multiple assailants.
The effect of possession of stolen articles on the presumption of guilt under Section 114, Evidence Act.
The appropriateness of the death penalty and whether it should be commuted to life imprisonment.
The interpretation of life imprisonment under Sections 433(b) and 433A of the Criminal Procedure Code, especially regarding release after fourteen years.
The calculation of term of imprisonment under Section 57 of the IPC (life = twenty years for remission).

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 401, s. 433A, s. 433(b)
Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 114
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 302, s. 392, s. 397, s. 57

Subjects

circumstantial evidencemurderrobberydeath penaltycommutationlife imprisonmentSection 114 Evidence Actpresumption of guiltSection 433 CrPCSection 57 IPCremission

Judgment

A SHRI BHAGWAN
v.
STATE OF RAJASTHAN

MAY 10, 2001

B (M.B. SHAH AND K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, JJ.]

Penal Code, 1860-Sections 392, 397, 302 and 57-Robbeiy-Murder
of.five persons of a .family-Conviction based on circumstantial evidence-
lmposition of'death sentence by Trial Co11rt-Confir111ed by High Court-On
C appeal, conviction upheld-Sentence commuted to life imprisonment in view
of young age of accused and his mental suflering due to confinement under
death sentence-Nature of crime held cruel and sadistic-Hence accused not
to be released before completion of 20 years-Sentencing-life imprisonment.

D Criminal Procedure Code, 1973-Section 433(b) rlw 433A-
Applicability of-life imprisonment-Meaning of-Prima facie it means for
the whole of the remaining period of convict 's natural life-Death sentence-
Commutation qf-Release of the accused held not permissible on completion
of 14 years, in view of the nature of the offence. \:._

E Evidence Act, 1872-Section 114 //lustration (a)-Presumption-
Artic!es connected with crime-Recovery of immediately after commission of
crime-No account given for such possession-Held, affords presumption of
guilt-However, presumption weakens if goods change hands.

Appellant-accused was convicted under Sections 302, 392 and 397 IPC
F for having caused death of five family members of PW-17 and for having
committed ,robbery in their house. The conviction was based on circumstantial r
evidence that the accused was last seen together with the one of the deceased;
and that injury was found on the person of the accused; and that an axe, a
blood-stained shirt and articles taken away from the house of deceased were
recovered at the instance of the accused immediately after the incident. It
G was proved that the accused had an acquaintance with the family members
of PW-17. Death sentence was imposed for the offence under section 302
IPC and sentence imposed for·offences under section 392 and 397 IPC. The
High Court confirmed the conviction and sentence.

In appeal to this Court, the appellant contended that the chain of
H
656
SHRI BllAGWAN v. STATE OF RA.IASTHAN 657

circumstances were not complete and the same were insufficient to draw' A
inference of guilt of the accused; and that the statement of PW-17, one of
the relatives of the deceased was not reliable as he did not mention the name
of appellant in his statement before investigating officer (PW-23); and that
,,
the appellant was entitled to benefit of doubt since there was possibility that
there must have been more assailants, as series of injuries allegedly had B
been caused to the deceased persons with various weapons; and that various
recvoveries effected at the instance of the appellant were doubtful. On the
question of sentence he contended that the sentence might be commuted t.o
life imprisonment in view of mitigating factors like appellant's young age
and his mental suffering due to his confinement under sentence of death.

Disposing of the appeal, the Court
c
HELD : 1. Courts below have rightly held the appellant guilty of the
offences charged against him. In view of the facts of the case, there is nQ
reason to suspect the guilt of the appellant as it is proved that the appellant
, was seen with one of the deceased before the incident and the appellant had D
an acquaintance with the family members of the deceased.(664-B; 662-D-EI

2. The statement of PW,..17 cannot be held to be unreliable. He would
not have mentioned the name of the appellan~ to PW-23 who recorded his.
statement, since he must have been under severe psychic trauma at the time
of giving the statement (Exh. P-8) before the police. PW-23 himself recorded E
the statement of PW-2 immediately thereafter and in that statement the
name of the appellant was mentioned as the person last seen with one of the
deceased. (661-E-Fl

3. The fact that household items were used as weapons of offence, rules
out the possibility of the presence of any outsider. It is also not possible to F
infer anything from the nature o3f injuries as to how many assailants were
involved. It is quite reasonable and probable that one assailant alone can
cause so much of injuries especially during the night when the victims
might have been in deep slumber. (662-BI

4. There is no reason to disbelieve the evidence adduced by the G
prosecution as regards recoveries, as there is further corroborative evidence
to support the recoveries. (662-CI

5.1. The possession of the fruits of the crime recently after it has been
. committed, affords a strong and reasonable ground for the presumption that
\the party in whose possession they are found was the real offender, unless H
658 SUPREME COURT REPORTS 1200 I I 3 S.C.R.

A - he can account for such possession in some way consistent with his innocence.
His unwillingness or inability to affo.rd any reasonable explanation is regarded
as amounting to strong, self inculpatory evidence. If the party gives a
reasonable explanation as to how he obtained it, the courts will be justified
in not drawing the presumption of guilt. The force of this rule of presumption ..
B depends upon the recency of the possession as related to the crime and that
if the interval of time be considerable, the presumption is weakened and
more especially .if the goods are of such kind as in the ordinary course of
such things frequently change hands. It is not possible to fix any precise
period. 1662-G-H; 663-A-BI

C Earabherppa @ Krishnappa v. Sate of Karnataka, 119831 2 SCC 330;
Mukund v. State of M.P., IJ 9971 10 SCC 130 and Guiab Chand v. State of
M.P., 1199513 SCC 574, referred to.

5.2. In the instant case, the appellant could not give an explanation as
to how he came into po~session of various gold ornaments and other articles
belonging to PW-17 and the members of his family. The appellant also could
D not give any reasonable explanation how he sustained injuries on his body
and how his shirt became blood-stained. In the facts and circumstances, it
is a fit case where the presumption under illustration (a) to Section 114 of
the Evidence Act could be drawn that the appellant committed the murders
and the robbery. 1663-H; 664-A-Bl
E 6.1. Death sentence imposed upon the appellant is commuted to life
imprisonment. As regards offences under sections 392 and 397 IPC, the
conviction of the appt:llant is confirmed and no separate sentence is awarded.
1668-F-GI

6.2. Section 57 IPC provides that in calculating fractions of terms of
F punishment, imprisonment for life is to be reckoned as equivalent to the
imprisonment for twenty years. Considering the heinous, barbaric offence
committed by the accused, in no set of circumstances accused should be
released before completion of 20 years of imprisonment. 1665-D-EI

A. Devendran v. State of Tamil Nadu, 11997111 SCC 720, distinguished.
G
Dalbir Singh and Ors. v. State of Punjab, 119791 3 SCC 745 and
Subhash Chander v. Krishan Lal and Ors., (2001) 3 Scale 130, referred to.

6.3. Though provided for under Section 433(b) read with Section 433-
A Cr. P.C. appellant cannot be released on completion of 14 years of
1-J imprisonment. A sentence of imprisonment for life imposed primafacie be
I
SHRI BHAGW/\N v. STATE OF R/\.IASTH/\N [K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, .1.J 659

treated as imprisonment for the whole of the remaining period of the convicted A
person's natural life. Rules framed under the Prisons Act do not substitute
a lesser sentence for a sentence of transportation for life. f667-B-Df.

- State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ratan Singh and others, (19761 3 SCC
470; Meru Ram v. Union of India, 11981) 1 SCC 107; Laxman Naskar (Life
Convict) v. State of W.B. and another, 1200017 SCC 626 and Gopal Vinayak B
Godse v. State of Maharashtra, 119611 3 SCR 440, referred to.
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
242 of2000.
From the Judgment and Order dated 15.12.99 of the Rajasthan High
Court in D.B. Crl. M.R. No. 3/98 and D.B. Crl. J.A. No. 20 of 1999. C
Dr. Shyamla Pappu, R. Krishnamorthi, A.K. Sinha and Shakeel Ahmed

- (A.C.) for the Appellant.
Sushi! Kumar Jain, A. Mishra and Anjali Doshi for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by D
K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, J. The facts in this criminal appeal disclose
acts of unparalleled evil and barbarity as five persons of a family were
battered to death without mercy by a young culprit aged about 20 years.
PW-17 Shiv Pratap, his wife, three daughters and aged parents were
residing in a house at Bidasar. The marriage of the eldest daughter of Shiv E
Pratap was fixed to be held on 20.2.1994. In order to purchase some articles
for the marriage, Shiv Pratap and his wife Bhanwari had left for Jaipur on 14th
December, 1993. They came back to Bidasar from Jaipur on 17th December,
1993 at about 9.30 PM. On reaching the house, they found the outer door of
the house open and the inside room was found bolted from within. PW-17
knocked at the door in vain and after sometime he scaled over the wall and F
gained entry into the room. He found his parents lying dead with multiple
injuries. PW-17 and his wife then went to thP- room of their daughters. That
room was found locked from outside. PW-17 broke open the lock and found
dead bodies of his three daughters. Various blood-stained articles were found
G

..
strewn in the room. PW-17 used to peg the bag containing gold and silver
jewellery of the shop. That bag was also found missing. Shocked at the
incident, they made a hue and cry. The brother of PW-17 who was staying
nearby came to the house. Some neighbours also came there in the meanwhile
and saw the ghastly incident. By about 9.45 P.M., PW-17 gave the P-8
statement before the Station House Officer of Police Station Chhapar (PW-
23). PW-23 registered a case and immediately visited the place of occurrence. H
660 SlJPREMI-: COURT REPORTS 12001 I 3 S.C.R.

A He recorded the statement of Bhanwari (PW-I); Murlidhar (PW-2) and also _
the further state.ment of Shiv Pratap (PW-17). On the next day, he took various
photographs and conducted inquest of the dead bodies of all the five deceased
persons. The various articles, including clothes found lying in the house,
were recovered. Many of these articles were found blood-stained.
....
B In his statement, PW-2, Murlidhar mentioned that on the evening of
14th December, 1993, he had seen the deceased Jora Ram, the father o_f Shiv
Pratap, at about 6.00 PM going to his house after closing the shop and the
appellant, Shri Bhagwan was also accompanying him. PW-2 further stated
that Shri Bhagwan was known to him previously as he had worked in the
shop of Shiv Pratap for about 8 to 10 months. He also stated that he saw the
C appellafit and Jora Ram entering the house of Shiv Pratap. Based on this
infonfiation, appellant Shri Bhagwan was arrested on the night of 18th
December, 1993 and the investigation of the case was taken over by PW-24.
He too visited the place of occurrence and collected various articles from
there. A broken iron 'Kunta', a wooden Pestle and an iron scissors were also
D recovered from the scene of occurrenc~ and all these articles were stained
with blood. The appellant was interrogated and based on his statement, an
axe was recovered from the water tank located on the terrace of the house
of Shiv Pratap. During the course of further investigation, the appellant gave
a statement regarding the place of concealment of golden jewellery and other ';.
articles taken away from the house of Shiv Pratap. Appellant's brother-in-law
E (Bahnoi) Ramu Ram was a resident of Sardar Shahar. The appellant led the
police party to the house of Ramu Ram and from his house a bag containing
jewellery and other articles were seized under Ex. P-83. These articles included
one gold finger-ring, gold ear tops and nose tops, white pearls, etc. All these
articles were later identified by Shiv Pratap as gold ornaments belonging to
F his mother and daughters. From the 110use of Ramu Ram, a small tobacco box
was recovered which .contained 12 copper pieces and an envelope of' Kumkurn
Patri' addressed to Shiv Pratap, Bidasar, and the sender's name was one
Manak Chand Soni (PW- I 0). Manak Chand was examined and he deposed
that this invitation had been sent by him to Shiv Pratap on the occasion of
the marriage of his daughter which was on IOth December, 1993.
G
Appellant, Shri Bhagwan also gave a statement to the effect that while
he was travelling in a bus, he had thrown away the shirt worn by him at the
time of occurrence, near a place three kilometers away from Sujangarh. The
appellant led the police party to that place and the said shirt was recovered
from the bushes near the place where the appellant had stated to have thrown
H the same. This shirt was blood-stained and it bore the label of786 J.K. Tailors,

_,
SllRI llll!\CiW/\N \". ST/\TI·: OF R/\.l/\STll/\N IK.G. 11/\L/\KRISllN/\N . .I.I 66)

Subzi Mandi, S.R.D.R. On the shirt, number 427 was found marked. The A
investigation officer later visited the said shop of J.K. Tailors and questioned
-< the owner of the shop, Zafar Hussain (PW-18). PW-18 stated that he had
stitched the shirt for the appellant and he had also recorded the name of th~
appellant and the measurements in the register. Exh. P-48 is the register
maintained. by him and as against serial number 427, the name of appellant,
Shri Bhagwan Soni was found written. B

The appellant was tried for offences under Section 302 and 392 rea9
wltli Section 397 IPC and was found guilty. For the offences under Section
392 afid 397 IPC. he was sentenced to undergo R.l. for seven years and to
pay a fine of Rs. 200. For the offence under Section 302 !PC, the appellant
was sentenced to death and to pay a fine of Rs.200 by the Sessions Judge.
c
This was challenged in appeal and the Division Bench of the Rajasthan Higl1
~
~
Court confirmed the conviction and sentence of the appellant.

On behalf of the appellant, Dr. Shyamla Pappu, learned Senior Advocate
(A.C.) very ably argued the case. It was pointed out by her that the evidence
D
adduced by the prosecution was not sufficient to find the guilt for the
offences he had been charged with. It was contended that various incriminating
circumstanees relied on by the court are not sufficient to draw an inference
~
-""., of guilt of the appellant and the chain of circumstances was not cogently and
firmly established and these circumstances have no definite tendency to
unerringly point the guilt of the accused. It was also contended that in a case E
of circumstantial evidence. the chain of circumstances should be so complete,
that there is no escape from the conclusion that in all probability the crime
was committed by the accused and none else.

...,.. The counsel for the appellant also argued that in the Exh. P-8 Statement
given by PW-17 Shiv Pratap, the name of the appellant was not mentioned,, F
~
though he was accompanied by PW-2 Murlidhar, who is alleged to have seen
the appellant along with one of the deceased prior to the incident. It may be,
noted that PW-17 must have been under severe psychic trauma at the time
of giving the Exh.P-8 Statement before the police and naturally he did not I

mention the name of the appellant to PW- 23 who recorded his statement.
PW-23 himself recorded the statement of PW-2 immediately thereafter and in
G
that statement the name of the appellant was mentioned as the person last ·
seen with one of the deceased. Another contention urged by appellant's
counsel is that in the instant case series of injuries had been caused to the '
deceased persons and sticks, wooden pestle. broken handle of axe, scissors
and 'kunta' were alleged to have been used and it was argued that from these H
662 SUl'REl'vtE COURT REPORTS [20011 3 S.C.R.

A facts, it is possibe that there must have been more than one assailant and
therefore, the prosecution suppressed the real facts and the appellant is
entitled to the benefit of doubt. All the articles allegedly used by appellant
as weapons of offence are things which might have been collected from the
house itself and according to the prosecution, the appellant was seen with
deceased Jora Ram in the evening and in all probability he must have spent
B the night in the house of Shiv Pratap. The incident might have happened in
the dead of the night and that being a winter season, it is quite possible that
attention of the neighbours might 'not have been attracted. The fact that
household items were used as weapons of offence rules out the possibility
of the presence of any outsider. Moreover, it is also 110t possible to infer
C anything from the nature of injuries as to how niany assailants were involved.
It is quite reasonable and probable that one assailant alone can cause so
much of injuries especially during the night when the victims might have been
in deep slumber.

The counsel for the appellant also raised serious doubts regarding the
D various recoveries effected at the instance of the appellant, but we do not find
any reason to disbelieve the evidence ·adduced by the prosecution as there
_is further corroborative evidence to support the recoveries. The articles were
recovered from the close relative of the appellant and they were identified by
PW-17. It is also established beyond doubt that the recovered blood stained
shirt belonged to the appellant.
E
Having regard to the various facts, we do not find any reason to
suspect the guilt of the accused as it is proved that the appellant was seen
with one of the deceased Jora Ram in the evening of 14th November, 1993
and the appellant had an acquaintance with the family members of the deceased
as he had already worked as an apprentice in the shop of PW- I 7 to learn the
F trade of goldsmithy. PW-17 deposed that the appellant was sent away from ~
the shop as he ·had committed some minor gold thefts. ~

It is also relevant to note that the appellant had some injuries at the time
of his arrest. These injuries are of minor nature, but even then the appellant
could not give any satisfactory explanation with regard thereto. The recovery
G of various articles at the instance of the appellant, that too immediately after
the incident, goes a Jong way in proving the guilt of the appellant.
I
The possession of the fruits of the crime recently after it has been
committed. affords a strong and reasonable ground for the presumption that
. I - -
the party in whose possession they are found was the real offender, unless
1--l he can account for such possession in some way consistent with his innocence.
SllRI HllMiWi\N 1·. ST/\TE OF R/\.IASTll/\N jK (i. llALAKRISllNi\N . .l.j 663

It is founded on the obvious principle that if such possession had been A
lawfully acquired, that party would be able to give an account of the manner
in which it was obtained. His unwillingness or inability to afford any reasonable
explanation is regarded as amounting to strong, self inculpatory evidence. If
the party gives a reasonable explanation as to how he obtained it, the courts
will be justified in not drawing the presumption of guilt. The force of this rule B
of presumption depends upon the recency of the possession as related to the
crime and that if the interval of time be considerable, the presumption is
weakened and more especially if the goods are of such kind as in the ordina~y
course of such things frequently change hands. It is not possible to fix any
precise period. This Court has drawn similar presumption of murder a11d
robbery in series of decisions especially when the accused was found in C
possession of these incriminating articles and was not in a position to gi~e
any reasonable explanation. Earabhadrappa @ Krishnappa v. State of
Karnataka, [ 1983] 2 SCC 330 was a case where the deceased Bachamma was
throttled to death and the appellant was taken into custody and gold ornaments
and other articles were recovered at his instance. This Court observed:
D
This is a case where murder and robbery are proved to have been
integral parts of one and the same transaction and therefore the
presumption arising under Illustration (a) to Section 114 of the Evidence
Act is that not only the appellant committed the murder of the deceased
but also committed robbery of her gold ornaments which form part of E
the same transaction.

In another case reported in [ 1997] I0 SCC 130 [Mukund v. State of M. P. ],
the prosecution case was that in the night intervening 17.1.1994 and 18.1.1994,
the appellants trespassed into the residential house of one Anuj Prasad
Dubey, committed murders of his wife and their two children and looted their
F
ornaments and other valuable articles. On the next night, the appellants were
arrested and interrogated. Pursuant to the statement made by one of the
accused, gold and silver ornaments and other articles were recovered. This
court, relying on an earlier decision reported in Guiab Chandv. State qf MP.
[ 1995] 3 sec 574, observed :

"If in a given case-as the present one-the prosecution can
G
successfully prove that the offences of robbery and murder were
committed in one and the same transaction and soon thereafter th<;:
stolen properties were recovered, a court may legitimately draw a
' presumption not only of the fact that the person in whose possession
the stolen articles were found committed the robbery but also that he H.
~

~ t-

664 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] 3 S.C.R.

A committed the murder."

In the instant case, the appellant could not give an explanation as to
)....
how he came into possession of various gold ornaments and other articles
belonging to Shiv Pratap and the members of his family. The appellant also
could not give any reasonable explanation how he sustained injuries on his
B body and how his shirt became blood-stained. In the facts and circumstances,
it is a fit case where the presumption under Illustration (a) to Section 114 of
the Evidence Act could be drawn that the appellant committed the murders
and the robbery. The courts below have rightly held the appellant guilty of
the offences charged against him.
)'..
c As regards the question of sentence, the counsel for the appellant
submitted that the appellant was a youngster aged 20 at the time of crime and
ever since the imposition of death penalty on him he has been under
devastating and degrading fear that is imposed on the condemned and that
appellant must have been under intense mental suffering that is inevitably
associated with confinement under sentence of death. It is submitted that
D these factors had been taken note of by this Court as relevant mitigating
factors to commute the sentence of death to life imprisonment.
~

Of course, the nature of the crime committed by the appellant was so
horrendous and exceptionally cruel and sadistic. However, we are inclined to -~
take a lenient view having regard to the various facts and circumstances of
E the case. In dealing with criminal matters where death sentence is prescribed
in law as the punishment for the crime, the courts are required to answer new
challenges as the object has to be not only to protect the society at large,
but impose appropriate sentence lest there should be a tendency to undermine
the public confidence in the criminal justice delivery· system.
""""~
F
In A. Devendran v. State of Tamil Nadu, [1997) I l SCC 720, while ~
considering the question of imposition of death penalty, this Court observed:-
(in para 26)
.. ~
"Bearing in mind the ratio of the aforesaid cases it may be seen that
since the evidence of an approver has been taken out of consideration
G
the conviction of the appellant Devendran under Section 302 has been
upheld on the basis of the evidence of PW2, PW5 and the recovery '"'
of the pistol which was used for the commission of murder from the
house of the said Devendran as well as the recoveries of ornaments )---
and other jewelleries belonging to the informant recovered from the r-
'
H · house of Devendran on the basis of his statement, while in custody
SllRI BllJ\GWAN t'. STATE OF RJ\.IJ\STHAN IK.G. L3ALAKRISl-INAN . .I.I 665

and those jewelleries being identified by PW4. The aforesaid evidence A
by no stretch of imagination brings the case ·in hand to be one of the
_,,(_ rarest of rare cases where the extreme penalty of death can be awarded."

Similar is the position in the present case. The circumstantial evidence
discussed above, even though held to be reliable for convicting the accused,
we do not think it to be one of the rarest of rare cases warranting death B
sentence.
Hence, what would be the appropriate punishment?
Crimes, like the one before us, cannot be looked upon with equanimity
y because they tend to destroy one's faith in all that is good in life. A young
man was given opportunity to learn gold-smithery. He was once sent away c
for alleged act of theft. Yet again, on the day of incident,· he was permitted
to accompany the deceased old man and as per the evidence, he accompanied
the deceased in his house. The reward of that kindness is murder of old man
and his wife alongwith three daughters including one whose marriage was
fixed after two months. Hence, even though we reduce the death penalty, we
D
think that punishment should be sufficient so as to have deterrent effect as
well as no further chance to the accused for relapsing into the crime and
becoming danger to the Society.
\ ·f
--( Section 57 !PC provides that in calculating fractions of terms of
punishment, imprisonment for life is to be reckoned as equivalent to the
imprisonment for twenty years. ln our view, considering the heinous barbaric E
offence committed by the accused, in no set of circumstances accused should
be released before completion of 20 years of imprisonment. This Court in
Dalbir Singh and others v. State of Punjab, [I 979) 3 SCC 745 considered the
question that in case where sentence of death is reduced to life imprisonment,
'~ for how many years accused should be detained in prison. The Court in F
paragraph 14 held thus:-
- ....L

"14. The sentences of death in the present appeal are liable to be
. reduced to life imprisonment. We may add a footnote to the ruling in
Rajendra Prasad case. Taking the cue from the English legislation on
abolition, we may suggest that life imprisonment which strictly means
G
imprisonment for the whole of the man's life, but in practice amounts
to incarceration for a period between 10 and 14 years may, at the
option of the convicting court, be su~jecl to the condition that the
sentence of imprisonment shall last as long as life lasts where there
--(
are exceptional indications of murderous recidivism and the
, co1111111111ity cannot run the risk of the convict being at large. This H
)
666 SUPREME COURT REPORTS l200 I] 3 S.C.R.

A takes care of judicial apprehensions that unless physically liquidated
the culprit may at some remote time repeat murder.
(Emphasis added) >-
In case of Subash Chander v. KrishanLal & Ors., [2001] 3 SCALE 130,
the said principle is followed by this Court and it was ordered that accused
B shall be incarcerated for the remainder of his life and that he shall not be let
loose upon the society as he is a potential danger.

Question may arise-whether in view of the provision of Section 433(b)
read with Section 433-A Cr.P:C. accused should be released on completion of
14 years of imprisonment? For this purpose, we would make it clear that under · 1--
C Section 433 (b) enables the appropriate Government to commute the sentence
of imprisonment for life, for imprisonment ofa term not exceeding 14 years
or for fine. Under Section 433-A, there is an embargo on that power by
providing that where a sentence of imprisonment for life is imposed on
conviction of a person for an offence for which death is one of the pun.ishments
D provided under the law, such person is not to be released from prison unless
he had s~Ned at least fourteen years of imprisonment. This question is
considered by various decisions rendered by this Court and by the Privy
Council and it has been reiterated that a sentence of imprisonment for. life
imposed primafacie be treated as imprisonment for the whole of the remaining '>.-
period of the convicted person's natural life. It is also established law that
E rules framed under the Prisons Act do not substitute a lesser sentence for
a sentence of transportation for life. This Court in State of Madhya Pradesh
v. Ratan Singh and Others, [1976] 3 SCC 470 in paragraphs 4 and 9 held thus:-

"4. As regards the first point, namely, that the prisoner could be
released automatically on the expiry of 20 years under the Punjab Jail
F Manual or the Rules framed under the Prisons Act, the matter is no
loriger res integra and stands concluded by a decision of this Cou1t ,;-
in Gopal Vinayak Godse v. State of Maharashtra, [ 1961] 3 SCR 440,
where the Court, following a decision of the Privy Council in Pandit
Kishori Lal v. King Emperor, [(LR 72 IA I : AIR 1945 PC 64] observed
as follows:
G
"Under that section, a person transported for life or any other
term before the enactment of the said section would be treated as a
person sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for life or for the said
tenn.

H If so, the next question is whether there is any provision of law

'
1-
SHRI Bl-IAGWAN '"STATE OF RAJASTl-IAN [K.G. 13ALAKRISl-INAN. J.] 667

whereunder a sentence for life imprisonment, without any formal A
remission by appropriate Government can be automatically treated as
one for a definite period. No such provision is found in the Indian
Penal Code of Criminal Procedure or the Prisons Act.

*****
A sentence of transportation for life or imprisonment for life must B
primafacie be treated as transpo11ation or imprisonment for the whole
of the remaining period of the convicted person's natural life.

The Court further observed thus:

But the Prisons Act does not confer on any authority a power to C
commute or remit sentences; it provides only for the regulation of
prisons and for the treatment of prisoners confined therein. Section
59 of the Prisons Act confers a power on the State Government to
make rules, inter alia, for rewards for good conduct. Therefore, the
rules made under the Act should be construed within the scope of the
ambit of the Act. ... Under the said rules the orders of an appropriate D
Government under Section 40 I, Criminal Procedure Code, are a pre-
requisite for a release. No other rule has been brought to our notice
. which confers an indefeasibie right on a prisoner sentenced to
transportation for life to an unconditional release on the expiry of a
particular term including remissions. The rules under the Prisons Act E
do not substitute a lesser sentence for a sentence of transportation
for life.

The question of remission is exclusively within the province of
the appropriate Government; and in this case it is admitted that,
though the appropriate Government made certain remissions under p
Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it did not remit the
entire sentence. We, therefore, hold that the petitioner has not yet
acquired any right to release.
It is, therefore, manifest from the decision of this Court that the
Rules framed under the Prisons Act or under the Jail Manual do not G
affect the total period which the prisoner has to suffer but merely
amount to administrative instructions regarding the various remissions
to be given to the prisoner from time to time in accordance with the
rules. This Court further pointed out that the question of remission
of the entire sentence or a part of it lies within the exclusive domain
of the appropriate Government under Section 40 I of the Code of H
668 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] 3 S.C.R.

A Crim in al Procedure and neither Section 57 of the Indian Penal Code
nor any Rules or local Acts can stultify the effect of the sentence qf
life imprisonment given by the court under the Indian Penal Code. In
other words, this Court has clearly held that a sentence for life would
ensure till the lifetime of the accused as it is not possible to fix a
particular period the prisoner's death and remissions given under the
B Rules cou Id not be regarded as a substitute for a sentence of
transportation for life.
In Marz1 Ram v. Union of India, [ 1981] I SCC 107, Constitutional Bench
of this Court reiterated the aforesaid position and observed that the inevitable
conclusion is that since in Section 433-A we deal only with life sentences,
c remissions lead nowhere and cannot entitle a prisoner to release. Further, in
laxman Naskar (LIFE CONVICT) v. State of W.B. and another [2000] 7 SCC
626, after referring to the decision of the case of Copa! Vinayak Godse v.
State of Maharashtra, [ 1961] 3 SCR 440, the Court reiterated that sentence for
"imprisonment for life" ordinarily means imprisonment for the whole of the
D remaining period of the convicted person's natural life; that a convict
undergoing such sentence may earn remissions of his part of sentence under
the Prison Rules but such remissions in the absence of an order of an
appropriate Government remitting the entire balance of his sentence under
this section does not entitle the convict to be released automatically before
the full life term is served. It was observed that though under the relevant
E . Rules a sentence for imprisonment for life is equated with the definite period
of 20 years, there is no indefeasible right of such prisoner to be unconditionally
released on the expiry of such particular term, including remissions an~ that
is only for the purpose of working out the remissions that the said sentence
is equated with definite period and not for any other purpose.
F Therefore, in the interest of justice, we commute the death sentence -<C'-

imposed upon the appellant and direct that the appellant shall undergo the
sentence of imprisonment for life. We further direct that the appellant shall
not be released from the prison unless he had served out at least 20 years
of imprisonment including the period already undergone by the appellant. As
G regards offences under Sections 392 & 397 !PC, we confirm the conviction or
the appellant and no separate sentence is awarded.

With the above directions and modification in the sentence, the appeal
is disposed of.

H K.K.T. Appeal disposed of.