SHRI RAJENDRA LALITKUMAR AGRAWALversusSMT. RATNA ASHOK MURANJAN & ANR.

                        [2019] 1 S.C.R. 815                             815


         SHRI RAJENDRA LALITKUMAR AGRAWAL                               A
                                 v.
          SMT. RATNA ASHOK MURANJAN & ANR.
                   (Civil Appeal No.1331 of 2019)
                         JANUARY 31, 2019                               B
                [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE AND
                   DINESH MAHESHWARI, JJ.]
       Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – s. 100(4), (5) – Second
appeal – Substantial question of law – On facts, suit for specific
performance of contract on basis of an agreement – Decreed by           C
the trial court, however, set aside by the first Appellate Court – In
second appeal, dismissal by the High Court on the ground that it
does not involve any substantial question of law – Justification of –
Held: Interpretation of any terms and conditions of a document
such as the agreement which is admitted by the parties, constitutes     D
a substantial question of law within the meaning of s.100 – High
Court should have framed substantial question of law in relation to
the true intent, rights and obligations arising from the agreement –
Also it could have framed questions on the issues material for grant
or refusal of specific performance – High Court decided the second
appeal bipartite like the first appeal without keeping in view the      E
scope of its jurisdiction conferred by s.100 (4) and (5) – Approach
of the High Court not in conformity with the requirements of s.100
– Thus, the matter remanded to High Court for deciding the second
appeal after framing substantial question of law.
      Allowing the appeal, the Court                                    F
      HELD: 1.1 The High Court was not right in holding that
the appeal does not involve any substantial question of law within
the meaning of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.
The appeal did involve the substantial question of law and the
same, therefore, should have been framed at the time of admission       G
of the second appeal as provided under Section 100 (4) for its
final hearing. Indeed Section 100 (5) provides that the appeal
shall be heard only on the substantial question of law framed by
the High Court under Section 100 (4) of the Code. [Para 11][818-
C-D]
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                                815
816            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2019] 1 S.C.R.


A           1.2 It cannot be disputed that the interpretation of any terms
      and conditions of a document (such as the agreement in this case)
      constitutes a substantial question of law within the meaning of
      Section 100 of the Code. It is more so when both the parties
      admit the document. Since the interpretation of documents
      constitutes the substantial question of law, the High Court should
B
      have first framed appropriate substantial question(s) arising in
      the case especially on the questions in relation to the true intent,
      rights and obligations arising from the agreement in the context
      of pleadings and the reversing findings of the two courts below
      and then should have called upon the respondents to reply to the
C     questions framed keeping in view its jurisdiction under Section
      100(5) and its proviso. In addition, the High Court also could
      have framed questions on the issues, which are material for grant
      or refusal of specific performance keeping in view the
      requirements of Section 16 of the Specific Relief Act, pleadings
      of the parties, and the reversing findings of the two courts below
D
      on such issues with a view to find out as to which finding is more
      preferable. [Paras 12-14][818-E-H; 819-A]
            1.3 From the reading the impugned order, it is found that
      on one hand, the High Court went on interpreting the terms of
      the document after hearing the argument of both sides and on
E     the other hand, in conclusion, held that it does not involve any
      substantial question of law. It virtually, therefore, decided the
      second appeal bipartite like the first appeal without keeping in
      view the scope of its jurisdiction conferred by Section 100 (4)
      and (5) of the Code. The approach of the High Court while
F     deciding the second appeal was not in conformity with the
      requirements of Section 100. While setting aside the impugned
      order, the case is remanded to the High Court for deciding the
      second appeal on merits in accordance with law after framing
      appropriate substantial question of law arising in the case. [Para
      15][819-B-C, E-F]
G
            CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1331
      of 2019.
            From the Judgment and Order dated 06.08.2018 of the High Court
      of Judicature at Bombay in Second Appeal No. 44 of 2017.
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 SHRI RAJENDRA LALITKUMAR AGRAWAL v. SMT. RATNA                                   817
                ASHOK MURANJAN

      Mukul Rohatgi, Sr. Adv., Makarand D. Adkar, Braj K. Mishra,                 A
Vijay Kumar, Ms. Bharti Tyagi, Advs. for the Appellant.
      R.B. Singhal, Sr. Adv., R.K. Singh, Ms. Rashmi Singh, Advs. for
the Respondents.
       The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
                                                                                  B
       ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J. 1. Leave granted.
      2. This appeal is directed against the final judgment and order
dated 06.08.2018 of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in Second
Appeal No. 44 of 2017 whereby the High Court dismissed the second
appeal filed by the appellant herein.                                             C
      3. In order to appreciate the short controversy involved in this
appeal, few relevant facts need mention hereinbelow.
      4. The appellant is the plaintiff whereas the respondents are the
defendants in the civil suit out of which this appeal arises.
                                                                                  D
       5. The appellant filed a civil suit against the respondents for specific
performance of the contract in relation to the suit property. The said suit
was based on an agreement dated 08.08.1984. The respondents filed
their written statement and denied the appellant’s claim. The Trial Court
by judgment/decree dated 05.07.2004 decreed the appellant’s suit and
passed a decree for specific performance of the contract against the              E
respondents.
       6. The respondents felt aggrieved and filed first appeal before the
District Judge, Pune. By judgment/decree dated 10.11.2016, the first
Appellate Court allowed the respondents’ (defendants’) appeal and
dismissed the suit. The appellant (plaintiff) felt aggrieved and filed second     F
appeal before the High Court.
        7. By impugned order, the High Court dismissed the second appeal
holding that the appeal does not involve any substantial question of law
as is required to be made out under Section 100 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as “the Code”) which has given           G
rise to filing of the present appeal by way of special leave by the plaintiff
in this Court.
      8. The short question, which arises for consideration in this appeal,
is whether the High Court was justified in dismissing the plaintiff’s second
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818             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2019] 1 S.C.R.


A     appeal on the ground that it does not involve any substantial question(s)
      of law within the meaning of Section 100 of the Code.
            9. Heard learned counsel for the parties.
             10. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and on perusal
      of the record of the case, we are inclined to allow the appeal and while
B     setting aside the impugned order remand the case to the High Court for
      deciding the second appeal on merits in accordance with law after framing
      appropriate substantial question(s) of law arising in the case.
             11. Having perused the record and the judgments of the Trial
      Court, first Appellate Court and the impugned order, we are of the
C     considered view that the High Court was not right in holding that the
      appeal does not involve any substantial question of law within the meaning
      of Section 100 of the Code. In our view, the appeal did involve the
      substantial question of law and the same, therefore, should have been
      framed at the time of admission of the second appeal as provided under
D     Section 100 (4) of the Code for its final hearing. Indeed Section 100 (5)
      of the Code provides that the appeal shall be heard only on the substantial
      question of law framed by the High Court under Section 100 (4) of the
      Code.
             12. It cannot be disputed that the interpretation of any terms and
E     conditions of a document (such as the agreement dated 08.08.1984 in
      this case) constitutes a substantial question of law within the meaning of
      Section 100 of the Code. It is more so when both the parties admit the
      document.
             13. As mentioned above, since the interpretation of documents
F     constitutes the substantial question of law, the High Court should have
      first framed appropriate substantial question(s) arising in the case
      especially on the questions in relation to the true intent, rights and
      obligations arising from Clauses 3, 5 and 15 of the agreement dated
      08.08.1984 in the context of pleadings and the reversing findings of the
      two Courts below and then should have called upon the respondents to
G     reply to the questions framed keeping in view its jurisdiction under Section
      100(5) of the Code and its proviso.
            14. In addition, the High Court also could have framed questions
      on the issues, which are material for grant or refusal of specific
      performance keeping in view the requirements of Section 16 of the
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 SHRI RAJENDRA LALITKUMAR AGRAWAL v. SMT. RATNA                                 819
   ASHOK MURANJAN [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.]

Specific Relief Act, pleadings of the parties, and the reversing findings       A
of the two Courts below on such issues with a view to find out as to
which finding is more preferable.
       15. From the reading the impugned order, we find that, on one
hand, the High Court went on interpreting the terms of the document
after hearing the argument of both sides (see appearance of both parties        B
through lawyers) and on the other hand, in conclusion, held that it does
not involve any substantial question of law. It virtually, therefore, decided
the second appeal bipartite like the first appeal without keeping in view
the scope of its jurisdiction conferred by Section 100 (4) and (5) of the
Code. In our view, the approach of the High Court while deciding the
second appeal was not in conformity with the requirements of Section            C
100 of the Code.
      16. Learned counsel for the respondents(defendants), however,
vehemently argued that the findings of the High Court, which are of
affirmance, do not call for any interference which rightly resulted in
dismissal of the suit on material issues but, in our view, it is now for the    D
High Court to examine the issue afresh on merits after framing the
substantial question(s) of law. We, therefore, express no opinion on the
merits of the issues urged.
       17. In the light of the foregoing discussion, we refrain from entering
into the merits of the case having formed an opinion to remand the case         E
and while allowing the appeal and setting aside the impugned order remand
the case to the High Court with a request to admit the appeal and frame
appropriate substantial question(s) of law which arise(s) in the case in
terms of Section 100 (4) of the Code and then decide the second appeal
on merits by answering the question(s) framed as per Section 100 (5) of         F
the Code in accordance with law without being influenced by any of our
observations on merits.
         18. The appeal is accordingly allowed. The impugned order is set
aside.
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Nidhi Jain                                                    Appeal allowed.




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