SHRIKANT G. MANTRIversusPUNJAB NATIONAL BANK

                        [2022] 5 S.C.R. 945                             945


                     SHRIKANT G. MANTRI                                 A
                                 v.
                   PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK
                  (Civil Appeal No. 11397 of 2016)
                       FEBRUARY 22, 2022                                B
        [L. NAGESWARA RAO AND B. R. GAVAI, JJ.]
       Consumer Protection Act, 1986: ss. 2(1)(d), 2(1)(d)(i),
2(1)(d)(ii) – Appellant was a stock-broker by profession – He was
also acting as stock broker for respondent bank – Appellant took
                                                                        C
overdraft facility from respondent-bank and also sought
enhancement of the same from time to time in furtherance of his
business as stock broker and for enhancing profit – Whether the
appellant had availed the services of the respondent for ‘commercial
purpose’ and therefore he was not a consumer as envisaged under
s.2(1)(d) of the Act – Held: Ordinarily, “commercial purpose” is        D
understood to include manufacturing /industrial activity or
business-to-business transactions between commercial entities and
that the purchase of the good or service should have a close and
direct nexus with a profit-generating activity – What is relevant is
the dominant intention or dominant purpose for the transaction and
                                                                        E
as to whether the same was to facilitate some kind of profit
generation for the purchaser and/or their beneficiary – The relations
between the appellant and the respondent was purely “business to
business” relationship – The transactions would clearly come within
the ambit of ‘commercial purpose’ – Therefore, it cannot be said
that the services were availed exclusively for the purposes of          F
earning his livelihood by means of self-employment – Appellant was
not consumer under s.2(1)(d) of the Act.
       Consumer Protection (Amendment) Act, 1993: Object of the
Amendment Act – Held: To enable the consumers, who are self-
employed, to file complaints before the redressal agencies, where       G
goods bought by them exclusively for earning their livelihood, suffer
from any defect – By the 1993 Amendment Act, insofar as services
are concerned, wherever the word “hires” was used, the same was
substituted by the word “hires or avails of” – By the 1993 Amendment
Act, insofar as s. 2(1)(d)(i) is concerned, an Explanation was
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                                945
946            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                       [2022] 5 S.C.R.


A     provided to the effect that ‘commercial purpose’ does not include
      use by a consumer of goods bought and used by him exclusively for
      the purpose of earning his livelihood by means of self-employment.
            Dismissing the appeal, the Court
            HELD:1.1 Section 2(1)(d) of the Consumer Protection
B     Act,1986 is in two parts. Section 2(1)(d)(i) of the said Act deals
      with buying of goods. A person who buys any goods for a
      consideration which has been paid or promised or partly paid and
      partly promised, or under any system of deferred payment would
      be a consumer within the meaning of Section 2(1)(d)(i) of the said
C     Act. It also includes any user of such goods other than the person
      who buys such goods for a consideration, which has been paid
      or promised or partly paid or partly promised, or under any system
      of deferred payment, when such use is made with the approval of
      such person. However, Section 2(1)(d)(i) of the said Act excludes
      a person who obtains such goods for resale or for any commercial
D     purpose. Section 2(1)(d)(ii) of the said Act is with respect to hiring
      of services. According to it, the term ‘consumer’ means any
      person who hires any services for a consideration, which has been
      paid or promised or partly paid and partly promised, or under any
      system of deferred payment. It also included any beneficiary of
E     such services other than the person who hires the services as is
      provided under Section 2(1)(d)(i) of the said Act. [Paras 24 &
      25][957-C-F]
             1.2. In order to plug the loopholes and enlarge the scope
      of areas covered, the legislature brought certain amendments to
F     the Act by the Consumer Protection (Amendment) Act, 1993.
      One of the objects of the said Act was to enable the consumers,
      who are self- employed, to file complaints before the redressal
      agencies, where goods bought by them exclusively for earning
      their livelihood, suffer from any defect. By the 1993 Amendment
      Act, insofar as services are concerned, wherever the word “hires”
G     was used, the same was substituted by the word “hires or avails
      of”. By the 1993 Amendment Act, insofar as Section 2(1)(d)(i) is
      concerned, an Explanation was provided to the effect that
      ‘commercial purpose’ does not include use by a consumer of
      goods bought and used by him exclusively for the purpose of
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    SHRIKANT G. MANTRI v. PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK                          947


earning his livelihood by means of self-employment. [Paras 27 &         A
28][958-A-B, E-F]
       1.3 By the 2002 Amendment Act, the legislature has done
two things. Firstly, it has kept the commercial transactions, insofar
as the services are concerned, beyond the ambit of the term
‘consumer’ and brought it in parity with Section 2(1)(d)(i), wherein    B
a person, who bought such goods for resale or for any commercial
purpose, was already out of the ambit of the term ‘consumer’.
The second thing that the legislature did was that even if a person
availed of the commercial services, if the services availed by him
were exclusively for the purposes of earning his livelihood by
means of self-employment, he would still be a ‘consumer’ for the        C
purposes of the said Act. Thus, a person who availed of services
for commercial purpose exclusively for the purposes of earning
his livelihood by means of self- employment was kept out of the
term ‘commercial purpose’ and brought into the ambit of
‘consumer’, by bringing him on par with similarly circumstanced         D
person, who bought and used goods exclusively for the purposes
of earning his livelihood by means of self-employment. It could
thus be seen that the legislature’s intent is clear. If a person
buys goods for commercial purpose or avails services for
commercial purpose, though ordinarily, he would have been out
of the ambit of the term ‘consumer’, by virtue of Explanation,          E
which is now common to both Sections 2(1)(d)(i) and 2(1)(d)(ii),
he would still come within the ambit of the term ‘consumer’, if
purchase of such goods or availing of such services was
exclusively for the purposes of earning his livelihood by means
of self-employment. [Para 31][960-B-F]                                  F
       2. The question as to whether a transaction is for a
commercial purpose would depend upon the facts and
circumstances of each case. However, ordinarily, “commercial
purpose” is understood to include manufacturing/industrial
activity or business-to-business transactions between commercial        G
entities; that the purchase of the good or service should have a
close and direct nexus with a profit-generating activity; that the
identity of the person making the purchase or the value of the
transaction is not conclusive for determining the question as to

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948           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2022] 5 S.C.R.


A     whether it is for a commercial purpose or not. What is relevant is
      the dominant intention or dominant purpose for the transaction
      and as to whether the same was to facilitate some kind of profit
      generation for the purchaser and/or their beneficiary. If the
      dominant purpose behind purchasing the good or service was for
      the personal use and the consumption of the purchaser and/or
B
      their beneficiary, or is otherwise not linked to any commercial
      activity, then the question of whether such a purchase was for
      the purpose of “generating livelihood by means of
      self-employment” need not be looked into. [Para 42][967-D-G]
            3. In the present case, the Commission has come to a
C
      finding that the appellant had opened an account with the
      respondent-Bank, took overdraft facility to expand his business
      profits, and subsequently from time to time the overdraft facility
      was enhanced so as to further expand his business and increase
      his profits. The relations between the appellant and the
D     respondent is purely “business to business” relationship. As such,
      the transactions would clearly come within the ambit of
      ‘commercial purpose’. It cannot be said that the services were
      availed “exclusively for the purposes of earning his livelihood”
      “by means of self-employment”. If the interpretation as sought
      to be placed by the appellant is to be accepted, then the ‘business
E
      to business’ disputes would also have to be construed as
      consumer disputes, thereby defeating the very purpose of
      providing speedy and simple redressal to consumer disputes.
      Therefore there is no error in the findings of the Commission.
      [Paras 47 and 48][969-B-E]
F
            Laxmi Engineering Works v. P.S.G. Industrial Institute
            (1995) 3 SCC 583 : [1995] 3 SCR 174 – relied on.
            Internet and Mobile Association of India v. Reserve
            Bank of India (2020) 10 SCC 274 : [2020] SCR 297;
G           Lilavati Kirtilal Mehta Medical Trust v. Unique Shanti
            Developers and Others (2020) 2 SCC 265 : [2019] 14
            SCR 563; Paramount Digital Colour Lab and Others
            v. AGFA India Private Limited and Others (2018) 14
            SCC 81; Sunil Kohli and Another v. Purearth

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    SHRIKANT G. MANTRI v. PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK                        949


      Infrastructure Limited (2020) 12 SCC 235; CBI, AHD,             A
      Patna v. Braj Bhushan Prasad and Others (2001) 9
      SCC 432 : [2001] 3 Suppl. SCR 627; Cheema
      Engineering Services v. Rajan Singh (1997) 1 SCC 131:
      [1996] 8 Suppl. SCR 340; Kalpavruksha Charitable
      Trust v. Toshniwal Brothers (Bombay) Pvt. Ltd. and
                                                                      B
      Another (2000) 1 SCC 512 : [1999] 3 Suppl. SCR
      619 – referred to.
                      Case Law Reference
[2020] 2 SCR 297                   referred to       Para 17
                                                                      C
[2019] 14 SCR 563                  referred to        Para 17 (i)
(2018) 14 SCC 81                   referred to        Para 17 (ii)
(2020) 12 SCC 235                  referred to        Para 17 (iii)
[2001] 3 Suppl. SCR 627            referred to        Para 17 (iv)    D
[1995] 3 SCR 174                   relied on          Para 32
[1996] 8 Suppl. SCR 340            referred to        Para 37
[1999] 3 Suppl. SCR 619            referred to        Para 38
                                                                      E
      CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 11397
of 2016.
     From the Judgment and Order dated 01.06.2016 of the National
Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, New Delhi in Consumer
Complaint No. 55 of 2006.                                             F
     Shyam Divan, Sr. Adv., Ms. Nandini Gore, Ms. Sonia Nigam,
Ms. Neha Khandelwal, Davesh Bhatia, Ms. Damini Bisht, Adith
Deshmukh, M/s Karanjawala & Co., Advs. for the Appellant.
      Dushyant Dave, Sr. Adv., Mohit Chaudhary, Ms. Puja Sharma,
Kunal Sachdeva, Chowdhary Zulfikar Ali, Balwinder Singh Suri, Paras   G
Mithal, Ms. Mahima Ahuja, Nimesh Joshi, Parveen Kumar, Advs. for
the Respondent.



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950             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2022] 5 S.C.R.


A           The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
            B. R. GAVAI, J.
             1. The present appeal filed by the appellant-complainant challenges
      the judgment and order dated 1st June, 2016, passed by the National
      Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, New Delhi (hereinafter
B     referred to as “the Commission”) in Consumer Complaint No. 55 of
      2006, thereby holding that the appellant-complainant was not a consumer
      as envisaged under Section 2(1)(d) of The Consumer Protection Act,
      1986 (hereinafter referred to as “the said Act”). As such, by the impugned
      judgment and order, the complaint of the appellant has been dismissed
C     being not maintainable.
            2. The facts in the present case are not in dispute. The bare
      necessary facts for adjudication of the present appeal are as under:
             3. The appellant-complainant had opened an account with
      erstwhile Nedungadi Bank Limited (hereinafter referred to as “the
D     erstwhile Bank”) in the year 1998. The appellant is a stock-broker by
      profession. The appellant had applied for an overdraft facility on
      25th April, 1998, in connection with his day-to-day share and stock
      transactions. It is not in dispute that the said overdraft facility was
      sanctioned by the erstwhile Bank to the appellant-complainant initially
E     for an amount of Rs.1 crore, for which the appellant-complainant had
      pledged certain shares worth more than Rs.1 crore, as security as per
      the margin requirements specified by the erstwhile Bank. Subsequently,
      in the year 1999, the appellant-complainant applied for enhancement of
      the said overdraft facility. The said overdraft facility was enhanced by
      the erstwhile Bank from Rs.1 crore to Rs. 5 crore, vide its letter dated
F     13th December, 1999.
             4. Again, in March 2001, the appellant-complainant approached
      the erstwhile Bank for temporary increase in the overdraft limit. The
      erstwhile Bank, vide its letter dated 17th March, 2001, granted the request
      of the appellant and temporarily enhanced the overdraft facility from
G     Rs.5 crore to Rs.6 crore, for a period of one week.
            5. It appears that due to steep fall in the share market, the erstwhile
      Bank, vide its letters dated 16th and 17th March, 2001, called upon the
      appellant-complainant to pledge additional shares to regularize the
      overdraft account. As an additional security, the appellant-complainant
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     SHRIKANT G. MANTRI v. PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK                                  951
                    [B. R. GAVAI, J.]

pledged 37,50,000 equity shares of face value of Rs.10/- of unlisted             A
company Ansal Hotels Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as “the said shares”)
towards the dues of the Bank, vide his letter dated 30th March, 2001. It
is not in dispute that subsequently, consequent to the merger of Ansal
Hotels Ltd. with ITC Ltd., and the bonus and splitting of ITC shares, the
aforesaid 37,50,000 equity shares of Ansal Hotels Ltd. became equivalent
                                                                                 B
to 3,75,000 shares of ITC Ltd.
       6. It appears that during 2001, the overdraft account of the
appellant-complainant became irregular and as such, the erstwhile Bank
called upon the appellant-complainant to regularise the overdraft account.
As the appellant-complainant was unable to regularise the overdraft
account, the erstwhile Bank, vide letter dated 14th September, 2001, called      C
upon the appellant-complainant to pay a sum of Rs.600.61 lakhs along
with interest thereon.
       7. It is the case of the appellant-complainant that though he had
advised the erstwhile Bank to sell the pledged shares in December, 2001,
so as to close overdraft account, the erstwhile Bank chose not to sell the       D
said shares at that point of time. It is the case of the appellant-complainant
that the said shares were sold by the erstwhile Bank in November 2002,
when the market value of the said pledged shares was at the lowest,
which resulted in huge loss to the appellant-complainant.
       8. After selling a part of the pledged shares for a sum of                E
Rs.2,69,66,215.79, the respondent Bank, the successor-in-interest of the
erstwhile Bank, filed a Recovery Petition before the Debts Recovery
Tribunal, Mumbai against the appellant-complainant for recovery of the
balance amount due as on 26th December, 2002. The said petition was
decreed by the Debts Recovery Tribunal, Mumbai, vide order dated                 F
26th May, 2004. However, the matter was settled between the parties
and a ‘One Time Settlement’ (“OTS” for short) was reached between
them on payment of Rs. 2 crore. As such, the respondent-Bank issued a
‘No Dues Certificate’ dated 14th May, 2005, certifying that no dues were
left outstanding against the overdraft account of the appellant. After the
OTS, the respondent-Bank withdrew the recovery proceedings filed                 G
against the appellant.
       9. It is the case of the appellant that since the respondent-Bank
failed to return the said shares to the appellant, he sent a notice on
14th June, 2005 to the respondent-Bank, seeking release of the said shares.
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952             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2022] 5 S.C.R.


A             10. It appears that the appellant was also working as a stock-
      broker of the respondent-Bank. With regard to the transactions with the
      appellant in the capacity as a stock-broker, the respondent-Bank had
      initiated arbitration proceedings against the appellant before the Arbitration
      forum of the Bombay Stock Exchange (‘BSE” for short). According to
      the appellant, the respondent-Bank failed in the said arbitration
B
      proceedings, which have attained finality.
             11. In this background, the appellant filed a complaint before the
      Commission, alleging deficiency in services on the part of the respondent-
      Bank. The main relief claimed in the said complaint was for a direction
      to the respondent-Bank to return 3,75,000 shares of ITC Ltd. (earlier
C     37,50,000 shares of Ansal Hotel Ltd.) along with dividend and all
      accretions thereon.
             12. In the said proceedings, on being served with the notice, the
      respondent-Bank raised a preliminary objection with regard to
      maintainability of the said complaint, on the ground that the appellant-
D     complainant was not a consumer as envisaged under Section 2(1)(d) of
      the said Act. The Commission, by the impugned order, held that the
      appellant had availed the services of the respondent-Bank for
      ‘commercial purpose’ and as such, he was not a consumer as envisaged
      under Section 2(1)(d) of the said Act.
E           13. Being aggrieved thereby, the appellant-complainant has
      approached this Court by way of the present appeal.
            14. We have heard Shri Shyam Divan, learned Senior Counsel
      appearing on behalf of the appellant and Shri Dushyant Dave, learned
      Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent.
F
             15. Shri Shyam Divan, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf
      of the appellant-complainant, submitted that the appellant had a dual
      relationship with the respondent-Bank. In the first capacity, as a consumer,
      he had taken the overdraft facility from the respondent-Bank for the
      purposes of his self-employment. In the second capacity, he was working
G     as the stock-broker for the respondent-Bank. The learned Senior Counsel
      submitted that with regard to the said relationship, though there were
      certain disputes, the claim of the respondent-Bank before the Arbitration
      Forum of BSE has been rejected by the BSE Arbitral Tribunal, which
      has attained finality.
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       SHRIKANT G. MANTRI v. PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK                             953
                      [B. R. GAVAI, J.]

       16. Shri Divan further submits that it is undisputed that the said     A
shares were pledged with the respondent-Bank only as a security towards
the overdraft facility. He submits that from the letter of the respondent-
Bank dated 14th May, 2005, it is clear that there were no dues outstanding
in the overdraft account of the appellant-complainant, which stood fully
and finally settled through compromise/OTS. He submitted that once
                                                                              B
the dues of the respondent-Bank towards the said overdraft facility stood
cleared, there was no reason for the respondent-Bank to have withheld
the said shares. He submitted that though the arbitration proceedings
between the parties had reached finality, the respondent-Bank had illegally
withheld the said shares of the appellant. He submitted that in spite of
repeated requests for return of the said shares, the same were not            C
returned and as such, the appellant had no option but to file the complaint
under the said Act.
        17. Shri Divan submitted that though Section 2(1)(d)(ii) of the
said Act, excludes a person who avails of such services for ‘any
commercial purpose’, the Explanation thereto, which could be construed        D
as proviso to proviso, would include even such a person if it is shown
that the services availed by him were exclusively for the purposes of
earning his livelihood by means of self-employment. He submitted that
the services of the overdraft facility were taken by the appellant from
the respondent-Bank for the purposes of his business as a stock-broker.
He submitted that since the appellant was engaged in the profession of        E
stock-broker and since the services of the said overdraft facility were
taken for the appellant’s profession as a stock-broker, the services
rendered by the respondent-Bank were exclusively for the purposes of
earning his livelihood. Learned Senior Counsel submits that the appellant
was self-employed as a stock-broker and as such, the services availed         F
were exclusively for the purpose of earning his livelihood by means of
self-employment. He relies on the dictionary meaning of the word
‘livelihood’ as provided in Black’s Law Dictionary, Ninth Edition. He
submits that the Commission has grossly erred in giving restricted meaning
to the term ‘earning his livelihood by means of self-employment’. Learned
Senior Counsel submits that merely because a person has availed the           G
services of the Bank for expanding his business, that cannot be a ground
to give a restricted meaning to the said term. Relying on the judgment of
this Court in the case of Internet and Mobile Association of India vs.
Reserve Bank of India1, he submits that the services of the Bank
1
    (2020) 10 SCC 274                                                         H
954                SUPREME COURT REPORTS                        [2022] 5 S.C.R.


A     provide lifeline for any business, trade or profession. He submits that in
      the present era, it is unable for any person to survive without availing the
      services of a Bank. Learned Senior Counsel submits that the Commission
      has erred in holding that the appellant is not a consumer within the meaning
      of Section 2(1)(d)(ii) of the said Act. In support of his submissions, he
      relied on the following judgments of this Court:
B
             (i)     Lilavati Kirtilal Mehta Medical Trust vs. Unique Shanti
                     Developers and others2;
             (ii)    Paramount Digital Colour Lab and others vs. AGFA
                     India Private Limited and others3;
C            (iii)   Sunil Kohli and another vs. Purearth Infrastructure
                     Limited4;
             (iv)    CBI, AHD, Patna vs. Braj Bhushan Prasad and others5.
             18. Shri Dushyant Dave, learned Senior Counsel appearing on
D     behalf of the respondent-Bank, on the contrary, submits that the said
      Act is a special statute enacted with the purpose of providing a speedy
      and simple redressal to consumer disputes. Shri Dave submits that the
      said Act provides a summary procedure so that the consumer disputes
      are settled without undue delay. He submitted that if the definition of the
      word ‘consumer’ is expanded, so as to include in it a person who avails
E     of such services for any commercial purpose, the very purpose of the
      said Act would be defeated. He submits that if any commercial dispute
      between the service provider and the availer/recipient of the service is
      included in the definition of the word ‘consumer’, it will give rise to
      floodgates of complaints. It is submitted that if such an interpretation is
F     accepted, apart from the same being inconsistent with the provisions of
      Section 2(1)(d)(ii) of the said Act, it will defeat the very purpose of
      providing speedy justice to the consumers. He, therefore, submits that
      no interference is warranted in the finding of the Commission and the
      appeal deserves to be dismissed.
             19. For appreciating the rival submissions, it will be necessary to
G
      refer to Section 2(1)(d) of the said Act, as it exists today, which is as
      follows:
      2
        (2020) 2 SCC 265
      3
        (2018) 14 SCC 81
      4
        (2020) 12 SCC 235
H     5
        (2001) 9 SCC 432
     SHRIKANT G. MANTRI v. PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK                               955
                    [B. R. GAVAI, J.]

      “2. Definition.- (1) In this Act, unless the context otherwise          A
          requires,-
      (a) ……………………………………………………
      ………………………………………
      (d) “consumer” means any person who,—                                   B
         (i)   buys any goods for a consideration which has been paid
               or promised or partly paid and partly promised, or under
               any system of deferred payment and includes any user of
               such goods other than the person who buys such goods
               for consideration paid or promised or partly paid or partly    C
               promised, or under any system of deferred payment when
               such use is made with the approval of such person, but
               does not include a person who obtains such goods for resale
               or for any commercial purpose; or
         (ii) hires or avails of any services for a consideration which       D
              has been paid or promised or partly paid and partly promised,
              or under any system of deferred payment and includes
              any beneficiary of such services other than the person
              who hires or avails of the services for consideration paid
              or promised, or partly paid and partly promised, or under
              any system of deferred payment, when such services are          E
              availed of with the approval of the first mentioned
              person but does not include a person who avails of such
              services for any commercial purpose;
          Explanation.—For the purposes of this clause, “commercial
          purpose” does not include use by a person of goods bought           F
          and used by him and services availed by him exclusively for
          the purposes of earning his livelihood by means of self-
          employment;”
       20. The short question, therefore, that would have to be answered
in the present case is, as to whether the services availed by the appellant   G
from the respondent-Bank would fall within the term ‘commercial
purpose’. The other question that would also have to be answered is, as
to whether such services are exclusively availed by the appellant for the
purposes of earning his livelihood by means of self-employment.
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956               SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2022] 5 S.C.R.


A            21. For considering the said issues, we will also have to examine
      the object while enacting the said Act as well as the legislative history as
      to how Section 2(1)(d) has come in its present form. The legislature
      found that though there were various provisions contained in various
      enactments to protect the consumers and provide relief to them, yet it
      became necessary to protect the consumers from the exploitation and to
B
      save them from adulterated and sub-standard goods and services and to
      safe guard the interests of the consumers. In order to provide for better
      protection of the interests of the consumer, the Consumer Protection
      Bill was introduced in the Parliament.
             22. Perusal of the ‘Statement of Objects and Reasons’ of the said
C     Act would show that the said Act seeks to provide for better protection
      of the interests of consumers and for that purpose, to make provision for
      the establishment of Consumer Councils and other authorities for the
      settlement of consumer disputes and for matters connected therewith.
      One of the objects for enacting the said Act was the right to be heard
D     and to be assured that consumers’ interests will receive due consideration
      at appropriate forums. To provide speedy and simple redressal to
      consumer disputes, a quasi-judicial machinery was sought to be set up at
      the district, State and Central levels. It will be apposite to refer to the
      preamble of the said Act, which reads thus:
E           “An Act to provide for better protection of the interests of
            consumers and for that purpose to make provision for the
            establishment of consumer councils and other authorities for the
            settlement of consumers’ disputes and for matters connected
            therewith.”

F            23. The definition of the term ‘consumer’ as contained in Section
      2(1)(d) of the said Act, as it existed in the original enactment of 1986,
      reads thus:
            “(d) “consumer” means any person who,—
            (i)     buys any goods for a consideration which has been paid or
G                   promised or partly paid and partly promised, or under any
                    system of deferred payment and includes any user of such
                    goods other than the person who buys such goods for
                    consideration paid or promised or partly paid or partly
                    promised, or under any system of deferred payment when
                    such use is made with the approval of such person, but
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     SHRIKANT G. MANTRI v. PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK                                    957
                    [B. R. GAVAI, J.]

              does not include a person who obtains such goods for resale          A
              or for any commercial purpose; or
       (ii)   hires any services for a consideration which has been paid
              or promised or partly paid and partly promised, or under
              any system of deferred payment and includes any
              beneficiary of such services other than the person who hires         B
              the services for consideration paid or promised, or partly
              paid and partly promised, or under any system of deferred
              payment, when such services are availed of with the
              approval of the first mentioned person”
      24. It could thus be seen that Section 2(1)(d) of the said Act is in         C
two parts. Section 2(1)(d)(i) of the said Act deals with buying of goods.
A person who buys any goods for a consideration which has been paid
or promised or partly paid and partly promised, or under any system of
deferred payment would be a consumer within the meaning of Section
2(1)(d)(i) of the said Act. It also includes any user of such goods other
than the person who buys such goods for a consideration, which has                 D
been paid or promised or partly paid or partly promised, or under any
system of deferred payment, when such use is made with the approval
of such person. However, Section 2(1)(d)(i) of the said Act excludes a
person who obtains such goods for resale or for any commercial purpose.
       25. Section 2(1)(d)(ii) of the said Act is with respect to hiring of        E
services. According to it, the term ‘consumer’ means any person who
hires any services for a consideration, which has been paid or promised
or partly paid and partly promised, or under any system of deferred
payment. It also included any beneficiary of such services other than
the person who hires the services as is provided under Section 2(1)(d)(i)          F
of the said Act.
       26. It could thus be seen that as per the definition of the term
‘consumer’, under Section 2(1)(d)(ii) of the said Act, as enacted originally,
even if a person who hires any services for any commercial purpose, he
could still be included in the definition of the term ‘consumer’. It is relevant   G
to note that Section 2(1)(d)(i) of the said Act clearly kept a person who
obtains such goods for resale or for any commercial purpose, out of the
ambit of definition of the term ‘consumer’. However, insofar as hiring
of services is concerned, no such provision was made in the original
enactment.
                                                                                   H
958            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2022] 5 S.C.R.


A            27. The legislature noticed various deficiencies and inadequacies
      in the said Act. Therefore, in order to plug these loopholes and enlarge
      the scope of areas covered, the legislature brought certain amendments
      to the said Act by the Consumer Protection (Amendment) Act, 1993
      (hereinafter referred to as “1993 Amendment Act”). One of the objects
      of the said Act was to enable the consumers, who are self-employed, to
B
      file complaints before the redressal agencies, where goods bought by
      them exclusively for earning their livelihood, suffer from any defect. By
      sub-section (5) of Section 2 of the 1993 Amendment Act, the following
      amendments were effected to the definition of the term ‘consumer’:
            “(5) in clause (d),-
C
            (A) in sub-clause (ii), for the word “hires”, in both the places
            where it occurs, the words “hires or avails of” shall be substituted;
            (B) after sub-clause (ii), the following Explanation shall be
            inserted at the end, namely:-
D                     ‘Explanation.- For the purposes of sub-clause (i),
                “commercial purpose” does not include use by a consumer of
                goods bought and used by him exclusively for the purpose of
                earning his livelihood, by means of self-employment’;”
              28. It could thus be seen that by the 1993 Amendment Act, insofar
E     as services are concerned, wherever the word “hires” was used, the
      same was substituted by the words “hires or avails of”. By the said 1993
      Amendment Act, insofar as Section 2(1)(d)(i) is concerned, an
      Explanation was provided to the effect that ‘commercial purpose’ does
      not include use by a consumer of goods bought and used by him exclusively
F     for the purpose of earning his livelihood by means of self-employment.
      It could thus be seen that though the original Act of 1986 excluded a
      person from the ambit of definition of the term ‘consumer’ whenever
      such purchases were made for commercial purpose; by the Explanation,
      which is an exception to an exception, even if a person made purchases
      for ‘commercial purpose’, he was included in the definition of the term
G     ‘consumer’, if such a person bought and used such goods exclusively
      for earning his livelihood by means of self-employment. The legislative
      intent is clear, that though the purchases for commercial purposes are
      out of the ambit of the definition of the term ‘consumer’ in the said Act,
      if a person buys and uses such goods exclusively for earning his livelihood
H
     SHRIKANT G. MANTRI v. PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK                                  959
                    [B. R. GAVAI, J.]

by way of self-employment, he would still be entitled to protection under        A
the said Act.
        29. The legislature further noticed several bottlenecks and
shortcomings in the implementation of various provisions of the said Act
and with a view to achieve quicker disposal of consumer complaints,
and to make the said Act more effective by removing various lacunae,             B
the legislature amended the said Act by the Consumer Protection
(Amendment) Act, 2002 (hereinafter referred to as “the 2002 Amendment
Act”). One of the objects for bringing out the 2002 Amendment Act
was “exclusion of services availed for commercial purposes from the
purview of the consumer disputes redressal agencies”. It could thus be
seen that the legislature noticed the mischief, that though Section 2(1)(d)(i)   C
of the said Act kept out of its purview the goods purchased for commercial
purpose, the said restriction was not found in Section 2(1)(d)(ii) of the
said Act. As such, in order to bring Section 2(1)(d)(ii) at par with Section
2(1)(d)(i), the following amendment was effected to in clause (d):
       “(c) in clause (d),-                                                      D

       (i) in sub-clause (ii), the following words shall be inserted at the
       end, namely:-
             “but does not include a person who avails of such services
       for any commercial purpose”;                                              E
       (ii) for the Explanation, the following Explanation shall be
       substituted, namely:-
             ‘Explanation.—For the purposes of this clause,
       “commercial purpose” does not include use by a person of goods
       bought and used by him and services availed by him exclusively            F
       for the purposes of earning his livelihood by means of self-
       employment’;”
       30. It could thus be seen that by the 2002 Amendment Act, the
legislature clearly provided that a person, who avails of such services
for any commercial purpose would be beyond the ambit of definition of            G
the term ‘consumer’. The Explanation, which is an exception to an
exception, which earlier excluded a person from the term ‘commercial
purpose’, if goods were purchased by such a person for the purposes of
earning his livelihood by means of self-employment, was substituted and
the Explanation was made applicable to both clauses (i) and (ii). It can
                                                                                 H
960                SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2022] 5 S.C.R.


A     thus clearly be seen that by the 2002 Amendment Act, though the
      legislature provided that whenever a person avails of services for
      commercial purposes, he would not be a consumer; it further clarified
      that the ‘commercial purpose’ does not include use by a person of goods
      bought and used by him and services availed by him exclusively for the
      purposes of earning his livelihood by means of self-employment.
B
             31. It is thus clear that by the 2002 Amendment Act, the legislature
      has done two things. Firstly, it has kept the commercial transactions,
      insofar as the services are concerned, beyond the ambit of the term
      ‘consumer’ and brought it in parity with Section 2(1)(d)(i), wherein a
      person, who bought such goods for resale or for any commercial purpose,
C     was already out of the ambit of the term ‘consumer’. The second thing
      that the legislature did was that even if a person availed of the commercial
      services, if the services availed by him were exclusively for the purposes
      of earning his livelihood by means of self-employment, he would still be
      a ‘consumer’ for the purposes of the said Act. Thus, a person who
D     availed of services for commercial purpose exclusively for the purposes
      of earning his livelihood by means of self-employment was kept out of
      the term ‘commercial purpose’ and brought into the ambit of ‘consumer’,
      by bringing him on par with similarly circumstanced person, who bought
      and used goods exclusively for the purposes of earning his livelihood by
      means of self-employment. It could thus be seen that the legislature’s
E     intent is clear. If a person buys goods for commercial purpose or avails
      services for commercial purpose, though ordinarily, he would have been
      out of the ambit of the term ‘consumer’, by virtue of Explanation, which
      is now common to both Sections 2(1)(d)(i) and 2(1)(d)(ii), he would still
      come within the ambit of the term ‘consumer’, if purchase of such goods
F     or availing of such services was exclusively for the purposes of earning
      his livelihood by means of self-employment. With this legislative history
      in background, we will have to consider the present case.
            32. The purpose of the said Act has been succinctly described by
      this Court in the case of Laxmi Engineering Works vs. P.S.G.
G     Industrial Institute6, which is as under:
               “10. A review of the provisions of the Act discloses that the quasi-
               judicial bodies/authorities/agencies created by the Act known as
               District Forums, State Commissions and the National Commission

H     6
          (1995) 3 SCC 583
     SHRIKANT G. MANTRI v. PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK                               961
                    [B. R. GAVAI, J.]

      are not courts though invested with some of the powers of a civil       A
      court. They are quasi-judicial tribunals brought into existence to
      render inexpensive and speedy remedies to consumers. It is equally
      clear that these forums/commissions were not supposed to supplant
      but supplement the existing judicial system. The idea was to provide
      an additional forum providing inexpensive and speedy resolution
                                                                              B
      of disputes arising between consumers and suppliers of goods
      and services. The forum so created is uninhibited by the
      requirement of court fee or the formal procedures of a court. Any
      consumer can go and file a complaint. Complaint need not
      necessarily be filed by the complainant himself; any recognized
      consumers’ association can espouse his cause. Where a large             C
      number of consumers have a similar complaint, one or more can
      file a complaint on behalf of all. Even the Central Government
      and State Governments can act on his/their behalf. The idea was
      to help the consumers get justice and fair treatment in the matter
      of goods and services purchased and availed by them in a market
                                                                              D
      dominated by large trading and manufacturing bodies. Indeed, the
      entire Act revolves round the consumer and is designed to protect
      his interest. The Act provides for “business-to-consumer” disputes
      and not for “business-to-business” disputes. This scheme of the
      Act, in our opinion, is relevant to and helps in interpreting the
      words that fall for consideration in this appeal.”                      E
        33. It could thus be seen that this Court has clearly held that the
idea of enacting the said Act was to help the consumers get justice and
fair treatment in the matter of goods and services purchased and availed
by them in a market dominated by large trading and manufacturing bodies.
It has been held that the entire Act revolves round the consumer and is       F
designed to protect his interest. It provides for “business-to-consumer”
disputes and not for “business-to-business” disputes. It has been held
that forums/commissions provided by the said Act are not supposed to
supplant but supplement the existing judicial system. The idea was to
provide an additional forum providing inexpensive and speedy resolution
of disputes arising between consumers and suppliers of goods and              G
services.
       34. In the case of Laxmi Engineering Works (supra), this Court,
while considering the scope of the definition of the expression ‘consumer’
with relation to Section 2(1)(d)(i) of the said Act and the Explanation
added by 1993 Amendment Act, observed thus:                                   H
962      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2022] 5 S.C.R.


A     “11. Now coming back to the definition of the expression
      ‘consumer’ in Section 2(d), a consumer means insofar as is
      relevant for the purpose of this appeal, (i) a person who buys any
      goods for consideration; it is immaterial whether the consideration
      is paid or promised, or partly paid and partly promised, or whether
      the payment of consideration is deferred; (ii) a person who uses
B
      such goods with the approval of the person who buys such goods
      for consideration; (iii) but does not include a person who buys
      such goods for resale or for any commercial purpose. The
      expression ‘resale’ is clear enough. Controversy has, however,
      arisen with respect to meaning of the expression “commercial
C     purpose”. It is also not defined in the Act. In the absence of a
      definition, we have to go by its ordinary meaning.
      ‘Commercial’ denotes “pertaining to commerce” (Chamber’s
      Twentieth Century Dictionary); it means “connected with, or
      engaged in commerce; mercantile; having profit as the main
      aim” (Collins English Dictionary) whereas the word
D
      ‘commerce’ means “financial transactions especially buying
      and selling of merchandise, on a large scale” (Concise Oxford
      Dictionary). The National Commission appears to have been
      taking a consistent view that where a person purchases goods
      “with a view to using such goods for carrying on any activity on a
E     large scale for the purpose of earning profit” he will not be a
      ‘consumer’ within the meaning of Section 2(d)(i) of the Act.
      Broadly affirming the said view and more particularly with a view
      to obviate any confusion — the expression “large scale” is not a
      very precise expression — Parliament stepped in and added
      the explanation to Section 2(d)(i) by Ordinance/Amendment
F
      Act, 1993. The explanation excludes certain purposes from
      the purview of the expression “commercial purpose” — a
      case of exception to an exception. Let us elaborate: a person
      who buys a typewriter or a car and uses them for his personal use
      is certainly a consumer but a person who buys a typewriter or a
G     car for typing others’ work for consideration or for plying the car
      as a taxi can be said to be using the typewriter/car for a commercial
      purpose. The explanation however clarifies that in certain
      situations, purchase of goods for “commercial purpose” would
      not yet take the purchaser out of the definition of expression
      ‘consumer’. If the commercial use is by the purchaser himself
H
    SHRIKANT G. MANTRI v. PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK                                  963
                   [B. R. GAVAI, J.]

      for the purpose of earning his livelihood by means of self-               A
      employment, such purchaser of goods is yet a ‘consumer’. In
      the illustration given above, if the purchaser himself works on
      typewriter or plies the car as a taxi himself, he does not cease to
      be a consumer. In other words, if the buyer of goods uses them
      himself, i.e., by self-employment, for earning his livelihood, it would
                                                                                B
      not be treated as a “commercial purpose” and he does not cease
      to be a consumer for the purposes of the Act. The explanation
      reduces the question, what is a “commercial purpose”, to a
      question of fact to be decided in the facts of each case. It is
      not the value of the goods that matters but the purpose to
      which the goods bought are put to. The several words                      C
      employed in the explanation, viz., “uses them by himself”,
      “exclusively for the purpose of earning his livelihood” and
      “by means of self-employment” make the intention of
      Parliament abundantly clear, that the goods bought must be
      used by the buyer himself, by employing himself for earning
                                                                                D
      his livelihood. A few more illustrations would serve to emphasise
      what we say. A person who purchases an auto-rickshaw to ply it
      himself on hire for earning his livelihood would be a consumer.
      Similarly, a purchaser of a truck who purchases it for plying it as
      a public carrier by himself would be a consumer. A person who
      purchases a lathe machine or other machine to operate it himself          E
      for earning his livelihood would be a consumer. (In the above
      illustrations, if such buyer takes the assistance of one or two
      persons to assist/help him in operating the vehicle or machinery,
      he does not cease to be a consumer.) As against this a person
      who purchases an auto-rickshaw, a car or a lathe machine or
                                                                                F
      other machine to be plied or operated exclusively by another person
      would not be a consumer. This is the necessary limitation
      flowing from the expressions “used by him”, and “by means
      of self-employment” in the explanation. The ambiguity in the
      meaning of the words “for the purpose of earning his
      livelihood” is explained and clarified by the other two sets of           G
      words.”
                                                    [Emphasis supplied]
    35. It can thus be seen that this Court observed that the National
Commission was taking a consistent view that where a person purchases
                                                                                H
964                SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2022] 5 S.C.R.


A     goods “with a view to using such goods for carrying on any activity on a
      large scale for the purpose of earning profit” he will not be a ‘consumer’
      within the meaning of Section 2(d)(i) of the Act. This Court observed
      that in order to obviate any confusion that the expression “large scale”
      was not a very precise expression, the Parliament stepped in and added
      the explanation to Section 2(d)(i) by Ordinance/Amendment Act, 1993.
B
      It has been held that that the explanation excludes certain purposes from
      the purview of the expression “commercial purpose”. Various examples
      have been given by this Court as to what would come within the term of
      ‘self-employment’.
             36. One instance given is that a person who purchases a typewriter
C     and works on the typewriter himself, the purchase would be for the
      purposes of earning his livelihood by means of self-employment and he
      would not cease to be a ‘consumer’ for the purposes of the said Act.
      Another example given is that, if a person who purchases an auto-
      rickshaw to ply it himself on hire for earning his livelihood, he would still
D     be a consumer too. This Court held that the question as to whether the
      transaction is for the ‘commercial purpose’ or for ‘earning his livelihood
      by means of self-employment’ is a question of fact that has to be decided
      in the facts of each case. It has been held that it is not the value of the
      goods that matters but the purpose to which the goods so bought, are put
      to. It has been held that several words used in the explanation, viz.,
E     “uses them by himself”, “exclusively for the purpose of earning his
      livelihood” and “by means of self-employment” make the intention of
      the Parliament abundantly clear, that the goods bought must be used by
      the buyer himself, for earning his livelihood.
             37. In the case of Cheema Engineering Services vs. Rajan
F              7
      Singh , this Court held that the manufacture and sale of bricks in a
      commercial way may also be to earn livelihood. As such, the question as
      to whether the complainant used the machinery for the manufacture of
      bricks alone or with members of his family and as to whether the same
      was for earning his livelihood, were the questions of fact to be decided
G     on the basis of evidence.
            38. In the case of Kalpavruksha Charitable Trust vs. Toshniwal
      Brothers (Bombay) Pvt. Ltd. and another8, this Court considered the
      question as to whether the machines purchased by the Charitable Trust
      7
          (1997) 1 SCC 131
H     8
          (2000) 1 SCC 512
     SHRIKANT G. MANTRI v. PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK                               965
                    [B. R. GAVAI, J.]

for use in the Diagnostic Centre were meant for ‘commercial purpose’          A
or not. It was sought to be urged on behalf of the Trust that the Trust
was not carrying out a profit-making activity and as such, the purchase
of diagnostic machines would not come within the ambit of the term
‘commercial purpose’. It was, therefore, sought to be urged that it would
fall within the definition of the term ‘consumer’. This Court held that the
                                                                              B
finding of the National Commission that the machinery was installed for
commercial purpose and as such, the Trust was not a ‘consumer’ within
the meaning of the said Act, required no interference.
        39. In the case of Paramount Digital Colour Lab (supra), this
Court was considering the case of unemployed graduates, who had started
a business of photography in partnership for self-employment and for          C
their livelihood. For the said purpose, they had purchased an advanced
photo processing, developing and printing machine. It was the case of
the appellants therein that the respondents, despite having the knowledge
that the machine was not working properly, had unfairly and carelessly
sold the same to the appellants. As such, the appellants were required to     D
file a complaint under the said Act. The State Commission had allowed
the complaint. In appeal, the National Commission held that the appellants
were not the consumers as envisaged under Section 2(1)(d) of the said
Act, since the purchase of the machine was for commercial purpose.
Reversing the view taken by the National Commission and upholding
the view taken by the State Commission, this Court observed thus:             E

      “12. In this case, since the appellants have purchased the machine,
      Section 2(1)(d) of the Act is applicable. “Consumer” as defined
      under Section 2(1)(d) of the Act does not include a person who
      obtains goods for a “commercial purpose”. The Explanation
      supplied to Section 2(1)(d) clarifies that “commercial purpose”         F
      does not include use by a person of goods bought and used by him
      and services availed by him exclusively for the purposes of earning
      his livelihood by means of “self-employment”. If both these
      provisions are read together, it leads to the conclusion that if a
      person purchased the goods for consideration not for any                G
      commercial purpose, but exclusively for the purposes of earning
      his livelihood by means of “self-employment”, such purchaser will
      come within the definition of “consumer”. If a person purchases
      the goods for a “commercial purpose” and not for the purposes of
      earning his livelihood by means of “self-employment”, such
                                                                              H
966             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2022] 5 S.C.R.


A           purchaser will not come within the definition of “consumer”. It is
            therefore clear, that despite “commercial activity”, whether a
            person would fall within the definition of “consumer” or not would
            be a question of fact in every case. Such question of fact ought to
            be decided in the facts and circumstances of each case.
B           13. ”Self-employment” necessarily includes earning for self.
            Without earning generally there cannot be “self-employment”.
            Thus, if a person buys and uses the machine exclusively for the
            purposes of earning his livelihood by means of “self-employment”,
            he definitely comes within the definition of “consumer”. In the
            matter on hand, the quality of ultimate production by the user of
C           the machine would depend upon the skill of the person who uses
            the machine. In case of exigencies, if a person trains another
            person to operate the machine so as to produce the final product
            based on skill and effort in the matter of photography and
            development, the same cannot take such person out of the definition
D           of “consumer”.”
              40. This Court, on facts in the said case, found that the appellants
      therein were unemployed graduates and had bought the said machine
      for their own utility, personal handling and for their small venture, which
      they had embarked upon to make a livelihood. This Court further found
E     that this was distinct from large-scale manufacturing or processing activity
      carried on for huge profits. It was, therefore, held that the appellants
      therein would be consumers within the meaning of Section 2(1)(d) of
      the said Act.
             41. Shri Shyam Divan, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf
F     of the appellant, strongly relied on the judgment of this Court in the case
      of Lilavati Kirtilal Mehta Medical Trust (supra), wherein this Court
      after considering the earlier judgments held thus:
            “19. To summarise from the above discussion, though a strait jacket
            formula cannot be adopted in every case, the following broad
G           principles can be culled out for determining whether an activity or
            transaction is “for a commercial purpose”:
            19.1. The question of whether a transaction is for a commercial
            purpose would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each
            case. However, ordinarily, “commercial purpose” is understood
            to include manufacturing/industrial activity or business-to-business
H
            transactions between commercial entities.
     SHRIKANT G. MANTRI v. PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK                                  967
                    [B. R. GAVAI, J.]

       19.2. The purchase of the good or service should have a close             A
       and direct nexus with a profit-generating activity.
       19.3. The identity of the person making the purchase or the value
       of the transaction is not conclusive to the question of whether it is
       for a commercial purpose. It has to be seen whether the dominant
       intention or dominant purpose for the transaction was to facilitate       B
       some kind of profit generation for the purchaser and/or their
       beneficiary.
       19.4. If it is found that the dominant purpose behind purchasing
       the good or service was for the personal use and consumption of
       the purchaser and/or their beneficiary, or is otherwise not linked        C
       to any commercial activity, the question of whether such a
       purchase was for the purpose of “generating livelihood by means
       of self-employment” need not be looked into.”
       42. It is thus clear, that this Court has held that the question, as to
whether a transaction is for a commercial purpose would depend upon              D
the facts and circumstances of each case. However, ordinarily,
“commercial purpose” is understood to include manufacturing/industrial
activity or business-to-business transactions between commercial entities;
that the purchase of the good or service should have a close and direct
nexus with a profit-generating activity; that the identity of the person
making the purchase or the value of the transaction is not conclusive for        E
determining the question as to whether it is for a commercial purpose or
not. What is relevant is the dominant intention or dominant purpose for
the transaction and as to whether the same was to facilitate some kind
of profit generation for the purchaser and/or their beneficiary. It has
further been held that if the dominant purpose behind purchasing the             F
good or service was for the personal use and the consumption of the
purchaser and/or their beneficiary, or is otherwise not linked to any
commercial activity, then the question of whether such a purchase was
for the purpose of “generating livelihood by means of self-employment”
need not be looked into.
                                                                                 G
       43. On facts, it was held that the purchase of flats by the appellant
therein had no direct nexus with the profit generating activities. The
flats were not occupied for undertaking any medical/diagnostic facilities
within the hospital but for accommodating the nurses employed by the
hospital. It was further held that the flats are being provided to the nurses
                                                                                 H
968             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2022] 5 S.C.R.


A     without any rent and that the appellant therein was not generating any
      surplus from occupying the flats or engaging in buying and selling of
      flats.
              44. Insofar as the judgment of this Court in the case of Sunil
      Kohli (supra), relied upon by the appellant, is concerned, this Court on
B     the basis of the evidence, clearly found that the complainants wanted to
      dispose of property in Denmark and wanted to come down to Delhi to
      start a business. It has further been found that for this purpose, the
      premises in question were booked. As such, the said case was a case
      wherein the commercial premises were booked by the appellants therein,
      who had left their employment in Denmark and purchased the premises
C     only for the purposes of starting their business for earning their livelihood
      by way of self-employment. Therefore, the said case was a case wherein
      the appellants therein had availed of the services exclusively for earning
      their livelihood by means of self-employment.
             45. It could thus be seen, that when a person avails a service for
D     a commercial purpose, to come within the meaning of ‘consumer’ as
      defined in the said Act, he will have to establish that the services were
      availed exclusively for the purposes of earning his livelihood by means
      of self-employment. There cannot be any straitjacket formula and such
      a question will have to be decided in the facts of each case, depending
E     upon the evidence placed on record.
             46. In the present matter, it is not in dispute that the appellant was
      already engaged in the profession of stock-broker, much before he availed
      of service of the overdraft facility from the respondent-Bank. It is also
      not in dispute that he was also acting as a stock-broker for the respondent-
F     Bank. It is also not in dispute that the appellant took the overdraft facility
      and also sought enhancement of the same from time to time in furtherance
      of his business as a stock-broker and for the purpose of enhancing the
      profits therein. As already held by this Court in the case of Laxmi
      Engineering Works (supra), the terms “services availed by him”,
      “exclusively for the purpose of earning his livelihood” and “by means of
G     self-employment” will have to be given its meaning, as intended by the
      legislature. The said terms will have to be construed in context with the
      purpose for which the said Act is enacted. We have elaborately discussed
      the legislative history as to how Section 2(1)(d) of the said Act has
      come in its present form from the original form. The amendments
H     incorporated by the 1993 Amendment Act as well as by the 2002
     SHRIKANT G. MANTRI v. PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK                                 969
                    [B. R. GAVAI, J.]

Amendment Act would clearly show that the legislative intent is to keep         A
the commercial transactions out of the purview of the said Act and at
the same time, to give benefit of the said Act to a person who enters into
such commercial transactions, when he uses such goods or avails such
services exclusively for the purposes of earning his livelihood by means
of self-employment.
                                                                                B
       47. In the present case, the Commission has come to a finding
that the appellant had opened an account with the respondent-Bank,
took overdraft facility to expand his business profits, and subsequently
from time to time the overdraft facility was enhanced so as to further
expand his business and increase his profits. The relations between the
appellant and the respondent is purely “business to business” relationship.     C
As such, the transactions would clearly come within the ambit of
‘commercial purpose’. It cannot be said that the services were availed
“exclusively for the purposes of earning his livelihood” “by means of
self-employment”. If the interpretation as sought to be placed by the
appellant is to be accepted, then the ‘business to business’ disputes would     D
also have to be construed as consumer disputes, thereby defeating the
very purpose of providing speedy and simple redressal to consumer
disputes.
       48. We, therefore, find no error with the findings of the Commission.
In any case, the Commission has already granted liberty to the appellant        E
to avail of his remedy by approaching the appropriate forum, having
jurisdiction.
       49. In the result, the appeal is dismissed. There shall be no order
as to costs. All pending applications, if any, shall stand disposed of.
                                                                                F

Bibhuti Bhushan Bose                                        Appeal dismissed.
(Assisted by : Neha Sharma, LCRA)



                                                                                G




                                                                                H