SHUBHAM BAHUUDDESHIYA SANSTHA, WADDHAMANA &ANR.versusSHRI DNYANESHWAR GOVINDRAO DAIGAVHANE & ORS.

                             [2017] 6 S.C.R. 367


  SHUBHAM BAHUUDDESHIYA SANSTHA, WADDHAMANA                                A
                   &ANR.
                                  v.
  SHRI DNYANESHWAR GOVINDRAO DAIGAVHANE & ORS.
                     (CivilAppea!No.9161 of2017)
                             JULY 17, 2017
    [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE AND R. BANUMATHI, JJ.] .
         Service law: Termination - Charges levelled against school
, teacher-respondent no.I - S.aid c~arges upheld by the Inquiry            C
  Committee - School Management concurred with the Committee
  Report and terminated the services of respondent no. I ~ In appeal,
  the School tribunal upheld the termination order - During pendency
  of the writ petition, dispute between two rival groups of Management
  Committee wherein one supporting respondents termination and
  other filed intervention application making a statement of cancelling    D
  the termination order and reinstating respondent no. 1 - High Court
  on basis of the statement, cancelled the termination order of
  respondent no. 1 and permitted him to withdraw the writ petition -
  Held: There being a split between the Members of the Managing
  Committee, the High Court should not have accepted the stand of          E
  one group and should have proceeded to decide the writ petition
  on its merits, the legality of the tribunals order - Manner, reasoning
  and the conclusion of the High Court, cannot be concurred with
  and is set aside - Writ petition is revived for being heard on merits
  in accordance with law - Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools
  (Conditions of Service) Regulation Act.                                  F
        Partly allowing the appeal, the Court
       HELD: 1.1 The disputes which had surfaced in the
 meantime between two rival groups of Management Committee
 in regard to managing the affairs of the School wherein one group
 was supporting respondent No.1 's termination and the other group G
 opposing the termination should not have been taken note of
 much less relied on by the writ court for disposal of the writ-
 petition nor these facts, could be made subject matter of writ
 petition filed by respondent No.1-they being wholly irrelevant
 for deciding the lis involved in the writ petition. Had there been H
                                 367
368             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     [2017) 6 S.C.R.


A     unanimity between the Members of the Managing Committee of
      the School resolving to settle the issue with respondent No.I
      amicably on terms agreed upon then perhaps, compromise
      between respondent No.I on the one hand and the Management
      of School on the other would have been permissible subject to
      obtaining of any sanction from the authorities, if provided under
.B    the Rules for giving effect to it. However, such was not the case.
      There is a split between the Members of the Managing
      Committee - one group saying that there should be a compromise
      with respondent No.I and the other group saying that there should
      be not be a compromise with respondent No.I. In such situation,
 c    the High Court should not have accepted the stand of one group
      and should have proceeded to decide the writ petition on its merits
      regardless of the differences between the Management with a
      view to find out as to whether the order of the Tribunal impugned
      by respondent No.I is legally sustainable or not. [Para I9-22)
      [372-E-H ; 373-A-B]
D
             1.2 In view thereof, the manner, reasoning and the
      conclusion of the High Court, which on the one hand allowed
      respondent No.I to withdraw his writ petition and on the other
      hand proceeded to set aside the order of the School Tribunal
      without examining its legality and correctness on merits and at
.E    the same time proceeded to set aside the termination order also
      by accepting the statement of one group of Management, cannot
      be concurred with. The impugned order is set aside and the writ
      petition filed by respondent No.I is revived for being heard on
      merits in accordance with law [Para 23, 24) [373-C-D)
 F          CNIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 9161
      of2017.
            From the Judgment and Order dated 16.03.2017 of the High Court
      of Judicature at Bombay, Nagpur Bench, Nagpur in Writ Petition
      No. 1958 of2015.
 G
            Ms. Meenakshi Arora, Sr. Adv. Amo! B. Karande, Adv. for the
      Appellants.
            R. Basant, Sr. Adv., Satyajit A. Desai, Anagha S. Desai, Kishor
      Lambat, Sachin Pahwa (for Mis Lambat And Associates), Suvendu
      Suvasis Dash, Ms.Swati Vaibhav, Advs. for the Respondents.
 H
    SHUBHAM B. SANSTHA, WADDHAMANA v. DNYANESHWAR G.                        369
                        DAIGAVHANE

     The Judgment of the Court was delivered by                             A
      ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J. 1. Leave granted.
       2. This appeal is filed against the final judgment and order dated
16.03.2017 passed by the High Court ofJudicature at Bombay, Nagpur
Bench, Nagpur in Writ Petition No. 1958 of 2015 whereby the High
Court set aside the judgment and order of the School Tribunal, Nagpur,      B
cancelled the termination order of respondent No. l and permitted him
(writ petitiOner) to withdraw his writ petition.
      3. In order to appreciate the short controversy involved in this
appeal, the relevant facts need mention in brief infra.
                                                                            c
       4. There is a Trust called "Shubham Bahuuddeshiya Sanstha,
Waddhamana, Nagpur-23". It is registered under the provisions of the
Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act").
The Trust is running one school by and under the name of "Swami
Vivekanand High School" at "Waddhamana" in Tah. Hingna, District
Nagpur, Maharashtra. The affairs of the school is managed and looked        D
after by the Managing Committee of the Trust. Respondent No. I was
working as Assistant Teacher in this school.
       5. On 26.06.2003, Respondent No. I was served with charge-
sheet as per the procedure prescribed under Maharashtra Employees of
Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Regulation Act (hereinafter         E
referred to as "MEPS Rules"). The charge-sheet contained as many as
17 charges levelled against Respondent No. 1 which he is alleged to
have committed in discharge of his duties as Assistant Teacher. It is not
necessary to set out the details of the charges here except to mention
that perusal of the charges would reveal that most of them were quite
                                                                            F
serious in nature.
       6. The Managing Committee of the School then appointed Three-
Member Inquiry Committee to hold an inquiry into the charges levelled
against respondent No. I as per the provisions of the MEPS Rules and
submit the report. Respondent No. I, felt aggrieved of this action of the G
School Management, filed a civil suit and sought stay of the proceedings
initiated against him. The matter eventually went to the High Court at
the instance of the respondent in writ petition (W.P. No. 892/2004)
wherein the High Court disposed of the writ petition with the consent of
the parties by order dated 22.11.2005 and directed the Inquiry Committee
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370            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2017] 6 S.C.R.


A         .
      to conclude .the inquiry within 4 months strictly in accordance with the
      provisions of the MEPS Rules.
         7. The Inquiry Committee then held an inquiry wherein respondent
  No. I appeared and participated through his representative-one Mr.
  Keshavarao Dahake. He filed his reply and denied the charges levelled
B against him. Both parties, i.e., the appellant (School Management) and
  respondent No. I, filed documents and examined the witnesses in support
  of their case. The Inquiry Committee held several sittings.
             8. The Inquiry Committee on 20.03.2006 submitted the report,
      which runs into 43 pages (Annexure-P-3). The Committee (by majority)
c     held all the 17 charges proved against respondent No. 1. The School
      Management concurred with the report and keeping in view the gravity
      of the charges which stood proved, terminated the services of respondent
      No.I by order dated 01.02.2010 (Annexure-P-5 ).
         9. Respondent No. I, felt aggrieved of his termination order, filed
D appeal being Appeal No. STNI0/2010 before the School Tribunal at
  Nagpur as provided in the Rules. The School Management (Employer)
  on being noticed of the appeal filed reply and defended the termination
  Qrder including the inquiry report. By order date<!_30. 01.2015 (Annexure-
  P-6Jthe School Tribunal dismissed the appeal and upheld the termination
  order holding it legal and proper.
E
         I 0. Respondent No. I, felt aggrieved of the order of the School
  Tribunal, filed writ petition (W.P.No. 1958 of 2015) out of which this
  appeal arises before the High Court.
             11. It appears from the record that during the pendency of the
      writ petition, the disputes started inter se Members of the Management
 F
      Committee of the Trust resulting in emerging of two rival groups in the
      Management of the school.
          12. One group of the Committee, who are prosecuting this appeal,
  supported the termination order of respondent No. I before the School
G Tribunal and the High"Court in the writ petition and wanted the termination
  to be upheld whereas the other rival group was opposing the termination
  order and was keen to settle the matter with respondent No. I by
  withdrawing his termination order and reinstating him in service. This
  rival group of Committee Members, therefore, filed intervention application
  in the writ petition and made a statement that they have resolved to
H
  SHUBHAM B.SANSTHA, WADDHAMANA v. DNYANESHWAR G.                            371
        DAIGAVHANE [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.]

                            I
reinstate respondent No. 1 and are also ready to cancel his termination.     A
The intervener also stated that having regard to the fact that respondent
No. I was in school since long and secondly, some charges have also
not been proved against him, particularly the charge in relation to mass
copying, the Management Committee has resolved to withdraw his
termination and reinstate respondent No. I in service of the school. It      B
was opposed by other group who was supporting the termination, i.e.,
the group which has filed this appeal.
       13. The writ Court accepted the aforementioned statement of the
intervener and on that basis set aside the order of the Tribunal impugned
by respondent No. l in his writ petition and at the same time also allowed   C
respondent No. I to withdraw his writ petition. This is how the writ Court
(single Judge) dealt with the issue in para 8 of the impugned order.
         "8. As referred to above, in the peculiar circumstance~,
         when the management is ready to reinstate the petitioner
         and to cancel the termination order on the backdrop of
         the facts that the petitio11er is served in the institute for D
         more than 16 years. In addition, the charge leveled
         against the petitioner of his involvement in mass copy
         was not supported by any material in the investigation
         carried out by the investigation agency and the
         investigation agency sought discharge of the petitioner E
         from the criminal charges leveled against the petitioner. .
         In this situation, the petitioner is permitted to withdraw
         the petition in view of the resolution passed by the
         management committee dated 15.1.2017. On the
         backdrop· of the resolution passed by the management
         dated 15.1.2017, the judgment and order passed by the F
         learned Presiding Officer, School Tribunal is quashed and
         set aside."
       14. It is this order, which is impugned in this appeal by one group,
who had been defending the termination ofrespondent No. I before the
Tribunal and the High Court and opposing the prayers made by the · G
intervener in the writ petition which found acceptance to the writ Court
resulting in passing of the impugned order.
       15. It may be mentioned that the effect of the impugned order is
that firstly, the order of Tribunal dated 30.01.2015 stands set aside;
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372            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2017] 6 S.C.R.


A     secondly, the termination order dated 01.02.20 I 0 of respondent No. I
      also stands set aside; and thirdly, respondent No. I stands reinstated in
      services of the School. It is stated at the bar that respondent No. I has
      since been reinstated in service and now serving.
             16. Heard Ms. Meenakshi Arora, learned senior counsel for the
B     appellant, Mr. R. Basant, learned senior counsel for respondent No. I
      and Mr. Kishor Lambat, learned counsel for respondent No.2.
             17. Having heard lell(lled counsel for the parties and on perusal
      of the record of the case, we are inclined to allow the appeal in part and
      while setting aside the impugned order restore the writ petition filed by
C     respondent No. I to its original file and request the High Court to decide
      the writ petition on merits in accordance with law.
             18. In our considered view, the question before the High Court
      (writ court) was only one, namely, whether the order passed by the
      School Tribunal dated 30.01.2015, which upheld the Inquiry Report and,
      in consequence, the termination of respondent No. I, is legal or not? ft is
D     this question, which the High Court had to answer on its merits in
      accoi:dance with law, one way or the other.
              19. The disputes which had surfaced in the meantime between
      two rival groups of Management Committee in regard to managing the
      affairs of the School wherein one group was supporting respondent No.l's
 E    termination and the other group opposing the termination should not have
      been taken note of much less relied on by the Writ Court for disposal of
      the writ petition nor these facts, in our view, could be made subject
      matter of writ petition filed by respondent No.I-they being wholly
      irrelevant for deciding the tis involved in the writ petition.
        "' 20. Had there been unanimity between the Members of the
 F
      Managing Committee of the School resolving to settle the issue with
      respondent No. I amicably on terms agreed upon then perhaps,
      compromise between respondent No. I on the one hand and the
      Management of School on the other would have been permissible subject
      to obtaining of any sanction from the authorities, if provided under the
 G    Rules for giving effect to it.
              21. However, such was not the case. Here, as mentioned supra,
      appears to be a case where there is a split oetween the Memb~rs of the
      Managing Committee - one group saying that we should compromise
      with respondent No. I and the other group saying that we should not
H     compromise with respondent No. I.
  SHUBHAM B. SANSTHA, WADDHAMANA v. DNYANESHWAR G.                            373
         DAIGAVHANE (ABHAY MANO HAR SAPRE, J.]


       22. In such situation, the High Court should not have accepted the     A
stand of one group and should have proceeded to decide the writ petition
on its merits regardless of any internal differences between the
Management Committee Members with a view to find out as to whether
the order of the Tribunal impugned by respondent No. I (writ petitioner)
is legally sustainable or not?
                                                                              B
       23. It is for these reasons, we are of the considered view that we
cannot concur with the manner, reasoning and the conclusion of the
High Court, which on the one hand allowed respondent No. I to withdraw
his writ petition and on the other hand proceeded to set aside the order
of the School Tribunal without examining its legality and correctness on
merits and at the same time proceeded to set aside the termination order      c
also by accepting the statement of one group of Management.
      24. In view of foregoing discussion, the appeal succeeds and is
allowed. Impugned order is set aside and the writ petition filed by
respondent No. I is revived for being heard on merits in accordance with
law.                                                                          D

       25. We, however, consider it apposite to make it clear that the
writ Court would only decide the main question which is involved in the
writ petition as to whether the order passed by the School Tribunal,
which is impugned by the writ petitioner (respondent No. I) is legally
sustainable or not? Depending upon the outcome of the writ petition,          E
consequential orders would be passed. We also make it clear that the
writ Court would consider the Management (employer) to be the
contesting respondent who would be supporting the order of the Tribunal
and opposing the writ petition. We also make it clear that the writ Court
would not probe into any internal issues arising between these warring        F
groups of Managing Committee of the School nor they would be allowed
to take inconsistent stand qua the writ petitioner except the one mentioned
above. We also make it clear that we have not gone into the merits of
the controversy which is subject-matter of writ petition before the High
Court and hence writ court would decide the writ petition strictly in
accordance with law on merits uninfluenced by any observations made           G
in this order.
      26. During the pendency of the writ petition, respondent No. I
will not be allowed to work (if he is already reinstated pursuant to the
impugned order).' In other words, so long as the termination order remains
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374                SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2017] 6 S.C.R.


·A    and not set aside by the competent Court, respondent No. 1 would remain
      out of employment of the appellant-Trust-School. We also grant liberty
      to the Members of Managing Committee (two rival groups) to settle
      their internal disputes, if any, in appropriate forum in accordance with
      law and in doing so, this order would not, in any manner, come in their
      way.
B
             27. We request the writ Court to ensure early disposal of the writ
      petition preferably within 6 months as an outer limit.


      Nidhi Jain                                            Appeal partly allowed.