Holding

The Supreme Court held that the 1990 Agreement to Sell was valid and enforceable, the Power of Attorney testimony sufficient, the suit not time‑barred, and the subsequent sales void under the doctrine of lis pendens.

Summary

The appellants purchased 23.98 acres of agricultural land from Sushila Devi under an Agreement to Sell dated 30‑08‑1990, paid full consideration and took possession, but the legal heirs refused to execute a sale deed. The trial court decreed specific performance, but the High Court reversed, holding the agreement void for alleged fraud, pardanashin status, lack of boundaries, and limitation. The Supreme Court examined the evidence, including testimony of the Power of Attorney holder and handwriting expert, and found the agreement valid, the POA testimony admissible, and the suit timely under Article 54 of the Limitation Act. It also held that the subsequent sale deeds executed during the pendency of the suit violated the interim injunction and were void under the doctrine of lis pendens. Consequently, the Court restored the trial court decree and ordered the defendants to execute the sale deeds in favour of the appellants.

Issues considered

Whether the Agreement to Sell dated 30‑08‑1990 was validly executed and enforceable.
Whether a General Power of Attorney holder could prove the execution of the agreement.
Whether the plaintiffs' failure to appear as witnesses attracted an adverse inference.
Whether the suit was barred by limitation under Article 54 of the Limitation Act.
Whether the allegation of fraud and misrepresentation was proved.
Whether Sushila Devi was a pardanashin woman, affecting the agreement's validity.
Whether the sale deeds executed during the pendency of the suit are void under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act (lis pendens).
Whether the plaintiffs were ready and willing to perform their contractual obligations.

Legislation cited

Indian Contract Act, 1872s. Section 29
Limitation Act, 1963s. Article 54
Specific Relief Act, 1963s. 16(c)
Transfer of Property Act, 1882s. Section 52, s. Section 53A

Headnote

Issue for Consideration Whether the Appellants are entitled to specific performance of an Agreement to Sell dated 30.08.1990. Whether the Agreement to Sell dated 30.08.1990 executed by one Sushila Devi was valid and enforceable; whether such execution could be proved by a General Power of Attorney of pardanashin status, illiteracy and old age affected the validity of the sale; whether the suit was barred by limitation under Article 54 of the Limitation Act; whether plaintiffs were in possession and whether consideration had been paid; whether plaintiffs were always ready and willing to

Subjects

Agreement to SellSpecific performanceLimitationPower of AttorneyPossessionPardanashinLis pendensFraudSale deedTransfer of Property Act

Judgment

[2024] 11 S.C.R. 2375 : 2024 INSC 865

Shyam Kumar Inani
v.
Vinod Agrawal & Ors.
(Civil Appeal No. 2845 of 2015)
12 November 2024
[Vikram Nath* and Prashant Kumar Mishra, JJ.]

Issue for Consideration
Whether the Appellants are entitled to specific performance of an
Agreement to Sell dated 30.08.1990. Whether the Agreement to
Sell dated 30.08.1990 executed by one Sushila Devi was valid and
enforceable; whether such execution could be proved by a General
Power of Attorney holder; whether the plea of pardanashin status,
illiteracy and old age affected the validity of the sale; whether the
suit was barred by limitation under Article 54 of the Limitation Act;
whether plaintiffs were in possession and whether consideration
had been paid; whether plaintiffs were always ready and willing
to perform their part of the contract; whether the subsequent sale
deeds executed during pendency of suit were protected under
Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act and whether they violated
the doctrine of lis pendens; and whether the High Court rightly
reversed concurrent findings of the Trial Court.

Headnotes†
Sale of Immovable Property – Specific Performance – Validity
of Agreement to Sell, Proof, Possession, Limitation, and
Appellate Interference – The appellant-plaintiffs sought
specific performance based on an Agreement to Sell with full
consideration paid and possession of 23.98 acres of disputed
agricultural land obtained from Sushila Devi, who passed
away in 1992 – The Trial Court decreed the suit, validating the
agreement, but the High Court reversed the decision, raising
concerns over under-valuation, vagueness of the agreement,
absence of direct testimony by all plaintiffs, lack of boundary
specifications, bar of limitation, and pardanashin status of the
executant – The High Court also questioned the credibility of
the Power of Attorney holder's testimony:

*Author
2376 [2024] 11 S.C.R.

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Held: Supreme Court restored the Trial Court's decree, concluding
that the Agreement to Sell was valid and enforceable under the
Contract Act and Specific Relief Act – It held that procedural and
substantive requirements were satisfied, with no conclusive proof
of fraud – The Court emphasized that the burden of proving fraud
lies on the defendant – The absence of boundary descriptions was
not fatal to enforceability where the property was clearly identifiable
and plaintiffs were in possession – It was further held that not every
plaintiff must depose if a Power of Attorney holder with firsthand
knowledge proves execution. [Paras 1, 2, 37]

Inference of fraud must be clearly established – The defendants
alleged that the Agreement to Sell was procured through
fraudulent means, citing undervaluation, vague boundaries,
and Sushila Devi's alleged incapacity:
Held: The Supreme Court emphasized that fraud must be strictly
pleaded and proved – The burden to proof lies squarely on the party
alleging it – Defendants failed to produce any direct or circumstantial
evidence showing deception, coercion, or concealment by the
plaintiffs – Allegation of fraud was unsubstantiated – No material
produced to prove fraud or misrepresentation – The Supreme
Court noted that the Trial Court correctly found the transaction to
be genuine and voluntary, and the High Court erred in accepting
a speculative charge of fraud. [Para 35.1]

Specific Relief – Validity – Proof of Execution by Power
of Attorney Holder – The Power of Attorney holder, M.K.
Maheshwari, had personal involvement in the transaction,
which was corroborated by an attesting witness and
handwriting expert – The High Court made misplaced adverse
inference from non-examination of other plaintiffs:
Held: Valid execution established – The Court relied on Man
Kaur v. Hartar Singh Sangha, (2010) 10 SCC 512 to affirm that
a Power of Attorney holder with personal knowledge may validly
depose – The Court distinguished the decision in Vidyadhar
Vishnupant Ratnaparkhi v. Manikrao Babarao Deshmukh, (1999)
3 SCC 573, to argue adverse inference for non-examination of
plaintiffs, on facts as the Power of Attorney holder had firsthand
knowledge and testified credibly – The Supreme Court distinguished
Janki Vashdeo v. IndusInd Bank, (2005) 2 SCC 217 and Rajesh
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 2377

Shyam Kumar Inani v. Vinod Agrawal & Ors.

Kumar v. Anand Kumar, (2024) SCC OnLine SC 981, cited to
challenge validity of POA evidence, on the ground that POA holder
in this case had direct knowledge and personal involvement.
[Paras 25–29, 34.4- 34.5 35.2]

Limitation – Article 54 – Second part applicable – No fixed time
for performance – Cause of action arose upon refusal – The
agreement did not fix a time for registration – After Sushila
Devi’s death, mutation was denied in 1994 – Suit filed in 1995
was within limitation:

Held: Suit not time-barred – The second part of Article 54 applied –
Section 54 prescribes that when no date is fixed for performance,
the limitation period begins when the plaintiff has notice that
performance is refused – The Court rejected the High Court’s view
that the limitation began immediately upon execution or death of
the executant – The agreement was consistently acted upon and
the plaintiffs had performed their part by paying full consideration
and remaining in possession. [Para 30]

Pardanashin Status – No pleading or proof – Age/illiteracy – No
seclusion – Voluntary execution – High Court assuming Sushila
Devi to be a pardanashin lady, applied higher evidentiary
threshold to the Agreement to Sell:
Held: Sushila Devi not entitled to pardanashin protection –
Presumption of undue influence not applicable – Burden of proof not
discharged by defendants – The Supreme Court found no pleading
or credible evidence to support such status – It distinguished
Mst. Kharbuja Kuer v. Jangbahadur Rai, AIR 1963 SC 1203, relied
on by respondents to invoke stricter scrutiny in transactions involving
pardanashin women, on facts, as Sushila Devi’s status was not
analogous due to the absence of seclusion or concealment – It
also distinguished Krishna Mohan Kul v. Pratima Maity, (2004) 9
SCC 468 relied on to suggest incapacity due age and infirmity,
on facts – Unlike the 100-year-old bedridden woman in that case,
Sushila Devi was active and voluntarily executed the agreement.
[Paras 34.2–34.3]

Possession and Title – Possession since 1990 – Title deeds
handed over – Part performance under Section 53A TPA –
Evidence supported by documents and conduct – The plaintiffs
2378 [2024] 11 S.C.R.

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had been in settled possession of the suit land since 1990,
following execution of the Agreement to Sell – They produced
documentary proof including the original sale deed, Rin
Pustika, and land revenue receipts have paid land revenue,
indicating de facto and de jure control – The defendants failed
to rebut the evidence of possession and title handover – It
also distinguished Thiruvengadam Pillai v. Navaneethammal,
(2008) 4 SCC 530, cited to argue execution defects, as the
plaintiffs were in possession, stamp duty and evidentiary
support were both satisfied in present case:
Held: Plaintiffs' continuous possession supported by documentary
evidence established part performance – The Court found
that possession pursuant to a lawful agreement, coupled
with part payment and willingness to perform, attracted
protection under Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act.
[Paras 31–32, 34.1, 34.6-34.8]

Readiness and Willingness – Full consideration paid –
Continuous willingness – Delay attributable to defendants –
The plaintiffs paid the full consideration under the Agreement
to Sell at the outset and remained ready and willing to execute
the formal sale deed – The delay was due to the inaction of
defendants – The plaintiffs’ consistent conduct and attempts
to seek mutation and performance were evident:
Held: Plaintiffs complied with Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief
Act. [Paras 20.4, 21.4]

Lis Pendens – Section 52 TPA – Sale during pendency –
Violation of injunction – Purchasers not bona fide – Doctrine
to prevent frustration of judicial process – On 18.01.2001, while
the suit for specific performance was pending and after an
injunction was granted on 04.12.2000, the defendants executed
four sale deeds in favour of third parties:
Held: Sale deeds executed during pendency and in violation of
injunction were void – Doctrine of lis pendens squarely applied –
Purchasers could not claim protection under bona fide doctrine due
to notice of pending suit and injunction – The Court distinguished
Thomson Press (India) Ltd. v. Nanak Builders and Investors Pvt.
Ltd., (2013) 5 SCC 397 and Yogesh Goel v. Govind Narayan,
2024 SCC OnLine SC 169, which were cited by the defendants to
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 2379

Shyam Kumar Inani v. Vinod Agrawal & Ors.

support protection of pendente lite purchasers – In those cases,
the purchasers had either no notice or the dispute lacked injunction
orders at the time of sale – In contrast, here the purchasers had
clear notice of the pending suit and express injunctive restraint.
[Paras 33, 34.6-34.8]

No enforceability bar due to vagueness – Boundaries
identifiable – Undervaluation not conclusive of mala fides –
The defendants also contended that the Agreement to Sell
was vague and lacked specific demarcation of boundaries,
and that the consideration was below market rate:
Held: Agreement not invalid for lack of precise boundaries or lower-
than-market consideration – No mala fides established – The Court
clarified that minor imprecision in boundary description does not
affect enforceability where the property can otherwise be identified
with certainty – Further, undervaluation alone does not establish
fraud or invalidate the contract when possession, consideration,
and intention to perform are established. [Paras 34.6]

Case Law Cited
Thiruvengadam Pillai v. Navaneethammal [2008] 3 SCR 23 : (2008)
4 SCC 530; Mst. Kharbuja Kuer v. Jangbahadur Rai & Ors. [1963]
Supp. 1 SCR 456 : AIR 1963 SC 1203; Vidyadhar Vishnupant
Ratnaparkhi v. Manikrao Babarao Deshmukh and Ors. [1999] 1
SCR 1168 : (1999) 3 SCC 573; Janki Vashdeo Bhojwani & Anr. v.
Indusind Bank Ltd. and Anr. [2004] Supp. 6 SCR 681 : (2005)
2 SCC 217; Rajesh Kumar v. Anand Kumar [2024] 5 SCR 612 :
2024 SCC OnLine SC 981; Thomson Press (India) Ltd. v. Nank
Builders & Investors (P) Ltd. [2013] 2 SCR 74 : (2013) 5 SCC
397 – distinguished.
Krishna Mohan Kul v. Pratima Maity and Ors. [2003] Supp. 3 SCR
496 : (2004) 9 SCC 468; Yogesh Goyanka v. Govind [2024] 7 SCR
668 : 2024 SCC OnLine SC 169 – referred to.
Man kaur v. Hartar Singh Sangha [2010] 12 SCR 515 : (2010)
10 SCC 512; Pawan Kumar Gupta v. Rochiram Nagdeo [1999] 2
SCR 767 : AIR 1999 SC 1823 – relied on.

List of Acts
Specific Relief Act, 1963; Limitation Act, 1963; Contract Act, 1872.
2380 [2024] 11 S.C.R.

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List of Keywords
Agreement to Sell; Specific performance; Limitation; Power of
Attorney; Possession; Pardanashin; Bonafide purchasers; Violation
of injunction.

Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2845 of 2015
From the Judgment and Order dated 15.03.2012 of the High Court
of M.P at Jabalpur in FA No. 372 of 2001
With
Civil Appeal No(s). 2846, 2850, 2847, 2848 and 2852 of 2015

Appearances for Parties
P. S. Patwalia, Rahul Sripat, Sr. Advs., Santosh Kumar, Madhurendra
Sharma, Rajiv R. Mishra, Ms. Suruchi Yadav, Yadav Narender
Singh, Advs. for the Appellant.
Sudhanshu Shashikumar Choudhari, Ardhendumauli Kumar Prasad,
Sunil Kumar, Sr. Advs., Harshvardhan Jha, Mrs. Yugandhara Pawar
Jha, Ms. Srishti Mishra, Aman Pathak, Ms. Shuchi Bharti, Ms. Tunika
Sharma, Akshat Shrivastava, Satvic Mathur, Divyakant Lahoti,
Kumar Vinayakam Gupta, Ms. Praveena Bisht, Ms. Vindhya Mehra,
Kartik Lahoti, Adith Menon, Ms. Samridhi Bhatt, Ms. Shreya Gokel,
Ms. Anushka Awasthi, Rohan Thawani, Ms. Vandana Sehgal, Ms.
S. Ambica, Advs. for the Respondents.
Shree Prakash Sinha, Rakesh Mishra, Ms. Mohua Sinha,
Nawalendra Kumar, Ms. Shwetam, Rishabh Kumar, Shekhar
Kumar, Anoop Kashyap, Advs. for the Interveners.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

Vikram Nath, J.

1. The six appellants are the plaintiffs in a suit for specific performance
of a contract. The Trial Court decreed the suit. However, the High
Court, on first appeal, allowed the appeal, set aside the order of the
Trial Court and dismissed the suit. Aggrieved, the present appeals
by the plaintiffs.
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 2381

Shyam Kumar Inani v. Vinod Agrawal & Ors.

2. The dispute relates to 23.98 acres of Khasra Nos.546, 547 and
548 situate in village Godar Mau, Tehsil Huzur, District Bhopal.
It is an admitted position between the parties that a larger area
measuring 27.56 acres of the aforesaid three khasra numbers was
purchased by one Sushila Bai, wife of late Chandra Mal Aggarwal,
vide registered sale deed dated 29.04.1966 executed by erstwhile
owner Vijay Chhatti for a sale consideration of Rs.7,000/-. Based
on the said instrument, the name of Sushila Bai was mutated in
land revenue records.
3. The appellants filed separate suits for specific performance in May,
1995 against the legal heirs of Sushila Devi.
4. It would be relevant to mention here that in the plaint, defendant
nos.1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 were the other legal heirs of late Sushila Devi.
We have mentioned the name of Kailash Aggarwal separately as he
had a distinct role to play in the entire transaction. The sequence of
events which would be discussed and pleaded upon at a later stage
will reflect upon the role of Kailash Aggarwal. However, needless to
say that Kailash Aggarwal was the eldest son of Sushila Devi. All the
plaints are more or less identically worded, as such, we are not giving
any specific details of the separate suit schedule property for each
of the plaint, but we have generally dealt with the plaint allegations.
Briefly stated the plaint allegations are as follows:
a) Sushila Devi was the owner of the suit schedule property. She
entered into an Agreement to Sell on 30.08.1990 with each
of the appellants separately after receiving the entire sale
consideration. The appellants had taken over actual possession,
having paid the entire sale consideration, the suit schedule
property was agricultural land and cultivated by the appellants.
b) Details of the land covered and the sale consideration with
respect to six Agreement to Sell are as follows:

S. Khasra Area Consideration Name of Purchaser
NO. No.
1. 548 3.48 Rs.58,000/- Bharat Kumar Lathi
acres
2. 547 3.50 Rs.70,000/- Shyam Kumar Inani
acres
2382 [2024] 11 S.C.R.

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3. 547 4.0 Rs. 80,000/- Suryakanta
acres Maheshwari w/o
KD Maheshwari
4. 547 4.0 Rs. 80,000/- Ram Kumar Inani
acres
5. 546 4.50 Rs. 90,000/- Sangeeta
acres Maheshwari d/o
K.D. Maheshwari
6. 546 4.50 Rs. 90,000/- K.D. Maheshwari
acres

c) The defendants are the legal heirs of Sushila Devi and
Agreement to Sell was binding upon them, but they declined
to fulfil their legal obligation by executing the sale deed in
favour of the appellants and had instead applied for mutation
for the suit schedule property which had been allowed by the
revenue authority.
d) As the entire sale consideration had been paid as per the
contents of the Agreement to Sell, the appellants were put
into possession also. The original title deed of 1966 in favour
of Sushila Devi was also handed over to the appellants. The
witnesses to the Agreement to Sell were Dipesh Chandra Patni
PW-2 and one Mr. Sharma. As the entire sale consideration had
been paid, the time was not the essence of contract and the
same was also incorporated in the Agreement to Sell in clause
6. Smt. Sushila Devi executed a registered General Power of
Attorney in favour of M.K. Maheshwari on 04.09.1990. She died
on 25.12.1992 leaving behind the respondent nos. 1, 2, 3, 9
and 10 as her legal heirs and representatives.
e) The legal heirs applied for mutation of their names over the
suit schedule property to which objections were filed by the
appellants. However, they were unsuccessful, and the Tehsildar
directed for mutation of the names of the legal heirs by order
dated 23.02.1999.
f) The appellants, vide notice dated 28.04.1994 called upon the
legal heirs of Sushila Devi to execute the sale deed. However,
the same was not honoured.
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 2383

Shyam Kumar Inani v. Vinod Agrawal & Ors.

g) The appellants instituted six separate Civil Suits, each seeking
a decree for specific performance of an Agreement to Sell
dated 30.08.1990, against the legal heirs of Sushila Devi,
compelling them to execute the sale deed in accordance with
the said agreement. In these suits, the following reliefs were
similarly claimed:
(i) A decree directing the defendants to specifically
perform their obligations under the Agreement to
Sell dated 30.08.1990 by registering a sale deed
for the agricultural land under the respective khasra
numbers in favour of the appellants. Alternatively, a
direction was sought for the court itself to execute a
legal sale deed for the disputed property in favour
of the appellants.
(ii) An award of costs of the suit in favour of the appellants
and against the defendants, along with any other
reliefs deemed appropriate by the court.
(iii) A permanent injunction restraining defendants
no. 1 to 5 from alienating, altering or placing any
encumbrances on the said property, and from
transferring the suit property to any third party or
governmental authority.
(iv) A declaration that the subsequent transfer of the suit
property, effected on 18.01.2001, was void and not
binding on the appellants.
h) Further, it was brought on record, by way of amendment to the
plaint that the defendant numbers 1 to 5 on the basis of the
mutation order passed on 23.02.1999 was likely to alienate the
suit schedule property in favour of third party and, later on, by
a further amendment, it was brought on record that defendant
nos. 2 to 5 by four separate sale deeds actually alienated the
suit schedule property in favour of newly added dependent
nos. 7 to 10 on 18.01.2001. State of Madhya Pradesh was also
made a party to the suit as defendant no. 6. Trial Court passed
an interim injunction order on 04.12.2000 putting a restraint on
the alienation of the property in suit.
i) Despite there being an injunction order restraining the defendants
from alienating the suit schedule property, the appellants were
2384 [2024] 11 S.C.R.

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always ready and willing to perform their part of the contract
which only required registration of the sale deed as the entire
sale consideration had already been paid. A prayer for specific
performance of the contract was made based on such plaint
averments.
5. A brief written statement was filed by the respondent State of Madhya
Pradesh-defendant number 6 (respondent no.8) to the effect that the
suit schedule property fell in urban area (Nagariya Kshetra) under
the Nagar Bhumi Seema Adhiniyam and as per the requirements
of the said Act, it was only after the enforcement of the new Master
Plan, that the actual area of land which the owner would be entitled
to possess, would be determined. As such, the defendant would not
have any right to sell the property, nor would the plaintiff have any right
to buy these properties. The plaintiff is, thus, not entitled to any relief.
6. Defendant nos. 2, 3 and 4, namely Vinod Aggarwal, Jagdish Aggarwal
and Usha Aggarwal, three of the legal heirs of Sushila Devi filed a
joint written statement. They denied the contents of the plaint except
to the extent that Sushila Devi was the owner of the suit schedule
property. It was further stated that she had never executed any
Agreement to Sell. It was, thus, claimed that the suit deserves to
be dismissed.
7. The subsequent purchasers, under the sale deed dated 18.01.2001,
filed a separate written statement denying the plaint allegations.
They also denied that any Agreement to Sell dated 30.08.1990
was executed by Sushila Devi. No specific answer has been given
as to whether the sale deed dated 18.01.2001 in their favour was
executed in violation of the injunction order. They also took the plea
that the Agreement to Sell required compulsory registration and also
payment of sufficient stamp duty which was not done, as such, the
same was not admissible in evidence.
8. It was further stated in their written statement that the sale
consideration mentioned in the Agreement to Sell was much below
the prevailing market rate which indicated mala fide on the part of the
appellants. A plea was also raised to the effect that the suit scheduled
property was owned by a HUF and as such the Agreement to Sell
having been executed only by Sushila Devi without the consent or
confirmation of the other members of HUF, the Agreement to Sell
was void. On such averments, the defendant nos. 7 to 10 stated
that the suit was liable to be dismissed.
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 2385

Shyam Kumar Inani v. Vinod Agrawal & Ors.

9. The Trial Court, on the pleadings of the parties, framed the following
issues as stated in paragraph 8 of the judgment along with its findings
on each issue. The same are reproduced hereunder:

“
Issues Finding
1. Whether an Agreement was Sushilabai had executed an
executed on 30.08.90 with the agreement dated 30.08.90 for
plaintiff by the mother of the the sale of disputed land with
defendants late Sushilabai for the the plaintiff.
sale of the disputed land situated
in Godar Mau Khasra No.548 area
3.49 acres?
2. Whether the plaintiff making full All the amount of the bai was paid
payment of the Agreement to late by the plaintiff to Sushila bai and
Sushilabai obtained the possession the possession of the disputed
of the disputed property on 30.08.90 property has been obtained.
itself?
3(a) Whether the plaintiff has been In compliance with the agreement
always ready to comply with the the plaintif has been willing and
Agreement? ready to fulfil.
3(b) Whether the defendants The Defendants have refused to
have refused to comply with the comply with the Agreement.
agreement?
4. Whether the dispute being of Proved
agricultural land, the State of M.P.
is necessary party?
5. Whether the Defendant No.2 to 5 Yes
had sold the disputed land to Deft.
No.7 to 10 even there being order of
prohibition during the course of trial?
6. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to All four sale-deeds dt.18.01.2001
get 4 sale deeds dated 18.01.2001 concerning up to the extent of
to be declared null and void? the disputed land the plaintiff is
entitled to get declared null and
void.
7. Relief and expenses As per last para of the judgment
& Decree issued.”
2386 [2024] 11 S.C.R.

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10. The parties led both oral and documentary evidence in support
of their respective cases. The Trial Court, vide judgment dated
14.05.2001, decreed all the suits as contained in paragraph 45 of
the judgment. The operative part of the judgment of the Trial Court
is reproduced hereunder:
“…..
1. The disputed land situated in Godar Mau in respect
of Khasra No.548 area 3.48 acres which was sold
by registered sale-deed dated 18.01.2001 b Usha
Aggarwal to Md. Shakir Khan, Vinod Aggarwal to Irfan
Khan, Sangita Aggarwal to Ashok Jaiswal and Jagdish
Aggarwal in favour of Tomo has been executed, the
lands of this Khasra No. to that extent of about 4
sale deeds are declared null and void.
2. That in favour of the plaintiff defendants No.1 to 5
may get executed the sale deed within a period of
two months of the disputed land Khasra No.548 area
3.48 acres.
3. In respect of the above land, the expenses are to
be incurred on getting the registered sale deed by
the plaintiff.
4. The cost of this suit of the plaintiff will be borne by
the defendants and the defendants will bear their
own expenses.
….”
11. RCS No.47A/01 and one more were decided on 14.05.2001 and
thereafter by a separate judgment dated 05.10.2001, four other suits
were decreed, details whereof are given in the table below:

S.No. Civil Suit Party Name Decided
No. on.
1. RCS No. Bharat Kumar Lathi vs. 14.05.2001
22-A/97 Kaliash Agarwal & 9 others.
(Pankaj Maheshwari – Power
of attorney Holder)
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 2387

Shyam Kumar Inani v. Vinod Agrawal & Ors.

2. RCS No. Shyam Kumar Inani Vs. 14.05.2001
23-A/97 Kailash Agarwal & 9 ors.
Filed through self (KDM
Power of attorney prosecuted
later)
3. RCS Smt. Suryakanta vs. Kailash 05.10.2001
45-A/01 Agarwal and ors.
(KDM Power of attorney)
4. RCS Raj Kumar Inani Vs. Kailash 05.10.2001
46-A/01 Agarwal & ors.
(KDM Power of attorney)
5. RCS Sangeeta Maheshwari Vs. 05.10.2001
47-A/01 Kailash Agarwal & ors.
(KDM Power of Attorney)
6. RCS K.D. Maheshwari vs. Kailash 05.10.2001
48-A/01 Agarwal and ors.
(KDM Power of Attorney)
Filed through self

12. Aggrieved by the aforesaid two judgments, the defendants filed an
appeal under section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 before
the High Court. The High Court, by the impugned judgment, has
allowed all the six appeals and after setting aside the judgment of
the Trial Court dismissed the suits. Aggrieved, the plaintiffs are in
appeal before this Court.
13. Before proceeding further, briefly, the evidence led by the appellant-
plaintiffs and the defendant-respondents may be noticed. The
appellants examined either the plaintiff or his Power of Attorney
holder as PW-1. Further, the attesting witness to the Agreement to
Sell dated 30.08.1990, Dipesh Patni was examined as PW-2 and
Mahesh Kumar Maheshwari was examined as PW-3, who was said to
have been Power of Attorney holder of Sushila Devi, vide registered
deed of Attorney dated 04.09.1990. R.K. Pathik was examined as
PW-4 as Handwriting Expert (HWE).
14. On behalf of the defendants, Mohd. Shakir Khan was examined as
DW-1. One of the legal heirs of Sushila Devi, namely Vinod Kumar
2388 [2024] 11 S.C.R.

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Aggarwal, was examined as DW-2, and Naveen Chandra Deshpande
was examined as DW-3 as Handwriting Expert (HWE). On behalf of
the plaintiffs, the Power of Attorneys of the respective plaintiffs were
filed and exhibited. The Agreement to Sell dated 30.08.1990 was
also filed and duly proved as Exhibit-P/2. The original documents
handed over by Sushila Devi to her Power of Attorney holder Mahesh
Kumar Maheshwari were also filed which included loan book, Ex.-P/3,
Original Sale deed dated 29.04.1966, Ex.-P/4, and the Power of
Attorney in favour of Mahesh Kumar Maheshwari, Ex.-P/5
15. Further, the defendants filed documents relating to the sale deed in
favour of the defendants 7 to 10 along with supporting documents
like loan book etc. which were marked as Exhibits - D/1 to D/6. The
list of documents with brief description filed by the plaintiffs as also
the defendants in one of the suits is given hereunder: -

“Documents filed by the Plaintiffs

Exhibit P-1 Sale agreement dated 30.8.1990
Exhibit P-2 Registered General Power of Attorney dated
4.9.1990 executed by Smt. Sushila Devi in favour
Shri M.K. Maheshwari
Exhibit P-3 Legal notice dated 28.04.1994
Exhibit P-4 Postal Receipt
Exhibit P-5 Sale-deed dated 29.4.1966 executed by Vijay
Chhatti in favour of Smt. Sushila Devi in respect
of Khasra Nos. 546, 547 and 548 area 9.3, 15.5
and 3.3 acres, total are 27.56 acres situated in
Godarmau, Tahsil Huzur District Bhopal
Exhibit P-6 Rin Pustika issued in favour Smt. Sushila Devi
Exhibit P-7 Registered Power of Attorney dated 20.04.1995
executed by Shri Ramkumar Inani (Plaintiff) in
favour of Shri K.D. Maheshwari.
Exhibit P-8 Judgment and decree dated 14.05.2001 passed by
learned Second Additional District Judge, Bhopal
in Civil Suit no.22-A/1994 [Bharat Kumar Lathi vs.
Kailash Agrawal]
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 2389

Shyam Kumar Inani v. Vinod Agrawal & Ors.

Exhibit P-9 Judgment and decree dated 14.05.2001 passed
by Second Additional District Judge, Bhopal in
Civil Suit No.23-A /1997 [Shyam Kumar Inani vs.
Kailash Agrawal]
Exhibit P-9A Evidence of Vinod Kumar Agrawal in Civil Suit
No.23-A/1997 [Shyam Kumar Inani vs. Kailash
Agrawal]
Exhibit P-10 Report of Handwriting Expert Shri R.K. Pathik

Documents filed by the Defendants

Exhibit D-1 Bhu Adhikar Evam Rin Pustika issued in favour
of Kailash, Vinod and Jagdish
Exhibit D-2 Rin Pustika issued in favour of Irfan Khan
Exhibit D-3 Rin Pustika issued in favour of Modh. Shakir
Exhibit D-4 Rin Pustika issued in favour of Mr. Tommy
Exhibit D-5 Rin Pustika issued in favour of Ashok Jaiswal
Exhibit D-6(c) Order sheets of Ceiling Case passed by Additional
Collector/Competent Authority
Exhibit D-7 Covering letter dated 28.08.2001 together with
opinion of Shri N.C. Deshpande (Handwriting
Expert)
Exhibit D-8 Copies of specimen signature of Smt. Sushila Bai
to D-20

16. We have mentioned this list only for the purpose of showing as to
what were the documents generally filed by the parties. Most of
the documents were common for all the six suits. The difference in
different suits could be of numbering of the documents as exhibits
but, more or less, they are one and the same.
17. We may now briefly refer to the discussion and analysis made
by the Trial Court including the documents relied upon by it while
decreeing the suit. The Trial Court thoroughly analysed the claims of
both the parties, particularly focusing on the Agreement to Sell dated
2390 [2024] 11 S.C.R.

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30.08.1990 and the subsequent conduct of the parties. Following
findings were recorded by the Trial Court:
17.1. The Trial Court found that the appellants had paid the entire
sale consideration at the time of the agreement, and the
possession of the disputed land was handed over by Sushila
Devi to the plaintiff-appellants. The appellants remained in
possession of the land since 30.08.1990, using it for agricultural
purposes. The Trial Court also noted that after Sushila Devi’s
death on 17.12.1992, the appellants had repeatedly requested
the defendants, as legal heirs, to execute the sale deed in
their favour, which the defendants failed to do. This refusal
constituted the cause of action for filing the suit for specific
performance.
17.2. The Trial Court relied on the Power of Attorney holder, Pankaj
Maheshwari, as a key witness. He testified to his personal
knowledge of the facts, the execution of the agreement, and
the possession handed over to the plaintiff. Notably, Pankaj
Maheshwari also presented crucial documents, including the
original loan book, the registered sale deed of 1966, and the
Power of Attorney, all of which were duly exhibited before the
Trial Court. The agreement was witnessed by Dipesh Chandra
Patni and one Mr. Sharma. Dipesh Chandra Patni was examined
as plaintiff’s witness supporting the appellants’ case.
17.3. The defendants, despite alleging fraud and forgery regarding
the execution of the agreement and Power of Attorney, failed
to appear or provide any rebuttal evidence. The Trial Court
emphasized that the burden of proving fraud lay with the
defendants, who did not present any credible evidence to
support their claims. The Trial Court held that the defendants’
absence and failure to present any substantial challenge to
the appellants’ evidence effectively confirmed the validity of
the agreement.
17.4. Further, the Trial Court addressed the sale of the disputed
property by the defendants to subsequent purchasers,
Defendant Nos. 7 to 10, during the pendency of the trial. It
noted that a prohibition order had been passed restraining
such a transfer, yet the defendants proceeded with the sale
in violation of the Court’s directive. As a result, the four sale
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 2391

Shyam Kumar Inani v. Vinod Agrawal & Ors.

deeds dated 18.01.2001 were declared null and void.
17.5. In its final findings, the Trial Court ruled that the appellants
had been ready and willing to perform their obligations under
the agreement. The suit was found to be within the period of
limitation, as the cause of action arose when the legal heirs of
Sushila Devi refused to execute the sale deed after her death.
17.6. The Trial Court directed that Defendant Nos. 1 to 5 must execute
the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff within two months and
further declared the sale deeds executed in favour of Defendant
Nos. 7 to 10 as null and void.
18. Now, we briefly refer to the reasoning and findings of the High Court
in allowing the appeal.
18.1. The High Court first scrutinized the Agreement to Sell dated
30.08.1990, emphasizing that it was not registered, and the
sale consideration appeared to be significantly below the
market rate prevailing at the time of the alleged transaction.
The High Court found this to be an indicator of potential mala
fides on the part of the plaintiff-appellants.
18.2. Furthermore, the High Court noted that the agreement lacked
specific details concerning the boundaries of the disputed
land, leading to ambiguity about the property that was to be
conveyed.
18.3. On the issue of possession, the High Court observed that while
the appellants claimed to have been put in possession of the
land by Sushila Devi, there was no substantial evidence to
corroborate this assertion.
18.4. The High Court found that the appellants had failed to
convincingly establish their possession of the land in question,
which significantly weakened their case for specific performance.
18.5. In addition, the High Court placed significant weight on the fact
that the appellants did not enter the witness box to testify in
support of their claims. Instead, the appellants relied on their
Power of Attorney holder, Pankaj Maheshwari, to provide
testimony. The High Court emphasized that while a Power
of Attorney holder may testify regarding facts within their
personal knowledge, critical facts regarding the execution of the
2392 [2024] 11 S.C.R.

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Agreement to Sell could only be testified to by the appellants
themselves. The failure of the appellants to take the witness
stand led the High Court to draw an adverse inference under
the established legal principle that the best evidence should
be produced, especially when a party to the agreement is alive
and capable of testifying.
18.6. The High Court further examined the issue of fraud and
misrepresentation, which had been raised by the defendants.
It found that the entire transaction was shrouded in suspicion,
given the low consideration, the alleged absence of clear
possession by the plaintiffs, and the fact that the legal heirs
of Sushila Devi were unaware of the agreement. The High
Court concluded that the burden of proving the validity of the
agreement rested on the appellants, particularly in light of the
defence of fraud, but the appellants had failed to discharge
this burden satisfactorily.
18.7. On the issue of limitation, the High Court disagreed with the Trial
Court’s finding. The High Court held that the suit was barred by
limitation under Article 54 of the Limitation Act, 1963. It found
that the cause of action for filing the suit arose immediately
after the death of Sushila Devi in 1992, yet the suit was filed
only in 1995. Given that no specific time was stipulated in the
agreement for the execution of the sale deed, the High Court
concluded that the suit was not filed within the prescribed period
of three years from the date of Sushila Devi’s death or the time
when the right to sue first accrued. Based on these findings,
the High Court concluded that the plaintiffs had failed to prove
their case for specific performance of the Agreement to Sell,
and the sale deeds executed in favour of Defendant Nos. 7 to
10 were not liable to be declared null and void. The High also
recorded a finding that the vendor Sushila Devi was entitled
to the benefits admissible to a Pardanashin lady and relied
upon the judgments in the case of MST. Kharbuja Kuer vs.
Jangbahadur Rai & Ors.1 and Krishna Mohan Kul.2 The High
Court, thus, allowed the appeal, set aside the decree passed
by the Trial Court, and dismissed the suits filed by the plaintiffs.

1 AIR 1963 SC 1203 (para 6)
2 (2004) 9 SCC 468
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 2393

Shyam Kumar Inani v. Vinod Agrawal & Ors.

19. We have heard Shri P.S. Patwalia and Shri Rahul Sripat, learned
senior counsels appearing for the appellants, Shri Sunil Kumar,
Shri Sudhanshu Shashikumr Choudhari and Shri Ardhendumauli
Kumar Prasad, learned senior advocates appearing for different
respondents in different appeals and Shri Shekhar Kumar, advocate
for the intervenor.
20. Briefly summarised, the arguments advanced on behalf of the
appellants by learned senior counsel are to the following effect:
20.1. The Agreement to Sell dated 30.08.1990 executed by Sushila
Devi was duly proved and it was valid and binding on the legal
representatives of late Sushila Devi. Our attention has been
drawn to the oral evidence as well as documentary evidence
led by the plaintiffs in support of the said Agreement to Sell.
The same would be dealt with at an appropriate stage.
20.2. It was next submitted that the defence taken by the respondents
regarding plea of fraud and misrepresentation with respect to
Agreement to Sell dated 30.08.1990, would be required to
be established by the defendants as the onus of proof in this
regard laid on the defendants. The High Court, in the impugned
judgment, erred to shift the burden on the plaintiff-appellants,
even though the High Court had specifically recorded that
the defendants had failed to lead any evidence in respect of
misrepresentation and fraud.
20.3. An objection and argument was raised by the respondents with
regard to the plaintiffs not entering the witness box to prove
Agreement to Sell dated 30.08.1990, and that the evidence led
by their Power of Attorney could not establish such facts. The
submission is that one of the plaintiffs, namely K.D. Maheshwari,
had entered the witness box in his suit and he had the Power
of Attorney of the other five plaintiffs. This witness, thus, had
full knowledge of the facts relating to Agreement to Sell as he
was present at the time of the execution of the Agreement to
Sell dated 30.08.1990 as one of the agreements was in his
favour. It was submitted that only a technical objection was
being raised by the respondent to frustrate the valid claim of
the appellants.
20.4. The High Court erred in observing that there was no readiness
and willingness on the part of the plaintiff-appellants. In fact, the
2394 [2024] 11 S.C.R.

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plaintiff-appellants had discharged their full burden of payment
of the entire sale consideration at the time of execution of the
Agreement to Sell and had also received possession of the suit
schedule property. The only requirement left was of execution
of the sale deed and its registration, for which, according to
the appellants, they had been requesting the legal heirs of late
Sushila Devi but as they declined and applied for mutation of their
names, the appellants instituted the suit for decree of specific
performance. It was not that any obligation on the part of the
plaintiff-appellants towards Sushila Devi, or after her death her
legal heirs, remained. The issue of readiness and willingness
would arise where any obligation of the plaintiff-purchaser
towards the seller was liable to be fulfilled and had not been
fulfilled within the time that may have been stipulated in the
Agreement to Sell. It is for this reason only that the time was not
the essence as stated in paragraph 6 of the Agreement to Sell.
20.5. With respect to the submissions of the intervenor of being
bona fide purchasers for value, it was submitted that the said
intervenors would only get the rights which their vendors had
and if the rights of the vendors are extinguished, no better
right can be claimed by the intervenors, who are the second
set of subsequent purchasers after the High Court decided
the appeals by the impugned order.
20.6. The High Court erred in holding that the suit was barred by
limitation. Once there was no specific time frame mentioned in
the Agreement to Sell for performance, in view of the second
part of the Article 54 of the Limitation Act, the limitation to file
the suit of three years would run from the time of refusal by
the seller, which in this case arose in 1994 when the mutation
proceedings were initiated. The suit was well within time as it
was filed in May 1995.
20.7. The observations and the findings by the High Court regarding
the vagueness of the Agreement to Sell and to declare the
said document as void is also not sustainable in law and such
plea could not have been raised by the seller having accepted
the consideration.
20.8. The conduct of the defendants has not been correctly
appreciated by the High Court which would actually disentitle
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 2395

Shyam Kumar Inani v. Vinod Agrawal & Ors.

them from raising their defence and contesting the claim of
the appellants. In this respect, reference has been made to
the oral evidence of the defendants which has been dealt with
at an appropriate stage later in this judgment. Referring to the
expert evidence relating to the genuineness of the signature
of Sushila Devi on the Agreement to Sell dated 30.08.1990,
it was submitted that even the expert witness introduced by
the defendants, Shri N.C. Deshpande, DW-3 had stated in his
report to the effect that this report would not go to establish
that the Agreement to Sell was not signed by Sushila Devi.
Thus, the defendants had failed to establish their claim that
no Agreement to Sell had been executed by Sushila Devi.
21. On behalf of the respondents, the following submissions have been
made which are summarised hereunder: -
21.1. The plaintiff-appellants failed to prove the Agreement to Sell
dated 30.08.1990 as also the General Power of Attorney dated
04.09.1990. Our attention was drawn to the evidence led by
the plaintiffs as also the defendants in support of the submis-
sions which would be dealt with appropriately at a later stage
while analysing the arguments. Reliance was placed upon the
judgment of this Court in the case of Thiruvengadam Pillai
vs. Navaneethammal and Anr.3
21.2. Not only the plaintiffs failed to prove the execution of Agreement
to Sell and General Power of Attorney, but they also failed to
prove the contents of the Agreement to Sell and the General
Power of Attorney. The submission that the contents of the
General Power of Attorney and the Agreement to Sell were not
read out and explained to the executor, namely Sushila Devi
as she was an old illiterate lady, it was submitted that Sushila
Devi would thus fall in the category of a Pardanashin lady and
would be entitled to the protection available to the Pardanashin
lady as explained and settled in the following judgments:
- MST. Kharbuja Kuer vs. Jangbahadur Rai & Ors.
(Supra)
- Krishna Mohan Kul vs. Pratima Maity and ors.(para 17)

3 (2008) 4 SCC 530# (Para 19)
# Ed. Note: “530” instead of “250” in terms of subsequent corrigendum.
2396 [2024] 11 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

21.3. The plaintiffs did not enter the witness box and therefore could
not have proved the Agreement to Sell executed on 30.08.1990.
Execution of a document could be proved only by a person
present at the time of the Agreement to Sell. Reliance is placed
upon the following four judgments:
- Vidyadhar Vishnupant Ratnaparkhi v. Manikrao
Babarao Deshmukh and ors.4
- Janki Vashdeo Bhojwani & Anr. V. Indusind Bank
Ltd. And Anr.5
- Man kaur vs. Hartar Singh Sangha6
- Rajesh Kumar vs. Anand Kumar7
21.4. The readiness and willingness were not proved by the plaintiff-
appellants as they never made any efforts to get the sale
deed executed and registered after getting the same typed
out on the payable stamp duty. The suit was not filed within
a reasonable time as it was not filed from three years of the
execution of the Agreement to Sell or from the date of death
of Smt. Sushila Devi who had died on 25.12.1992. The suit
was filed about two and a half years from the date of death
of Sushila Devi and about four and a half years from the date
of execution of the alleged Agreement to Sell. As such, no
discretionary relief should be granted in such a case where a
suit is filed with such delay.
21.5. The Agreement to Sell did not contain the specific boundaries
of the land covered by the same and the same being vague,
as such, no specific performance could have been granted.
Possession has always remained with Sushila Devi and
thereafter her legal heirs and now is with the transferees as
has been held by the High Court. The sale deeds executed
during the pendency of proceedings would not outrightly be
declared as void but would only be subject to adjudication.
Reliance is placed upon the following judgments:

4 (1999)‡ 3 SCC 573 (para 17)
5 (2005) 2 SCC 217
6 (2010) 10 SCC 512 (para 17 & 21)
7 (2024) SCC OnLine SC 981
‡ Ed. Note: “1999” instead of “1993” in terms of subsequent corrigendum.
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 2397

Shyam Kumar Inani v. Vinod Agrawal & Ors.

- Thomson Press (India) Ltd. V. Nank Builders &
Investors (P) Ltd.8
- Yogesh Goyanka v. Govind9
21.6. On the above submissions, no discretionary reliefs should
be granted to the plaintiff-appellants and the High Court has
rightly declined the same.
22. On behalf of the intervenor, in addition to what has been submitted
on behalf of the respondents, further submissions are summarised
hereunder:-
22.1. Bona Fide Purchaser Without Notice: The intervenor
argued that they purchased the suit property (22 acres) from
Respondent Nos. 4 to 7 on 26/03/2012 and 31/03/2012 through
a registered sale deed for a total consideration of Rs. 7.92
crores. At the time of the purchase, the intervenor had no
knowledge of the pending litigation. They only became aware
of the appeals after the purchase and filed the intervention
applications accordingly.
22.2. Lis Pendens Doctrine Not Applicable: The intervenor
submitted that the doctrine of lis pendens under Section 52
of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, does not apply in their
case as the sale took place after the High Court’s judgment
on 15/03/2012 and before the Supreme Court’s order on
30/04/2012 directing the parties to maintain the status quo.
Therefore, they asserted that no litigation was pending during
this period, and the transfer of the property was lawful.
22.3. Registered Sale Deeds Valid: The intervenor contended that
no relief can be granted to the appellants in the absence of
a specific challenge to the registered sale deeds executed in
their favor. They argued that as bona fide purchasers for value,
their rights should be protected.
22.4. Agreement to Sell and Specific Performance: The intervenor
further highlighted that the Agreement to Sell dated 30.08.1990
was vague and lacked specific details regarding the boundaries

8 (2013) 5 SCC 397 (para 53)
9 (2024) SCC OnLine SC 1692 (para 16 & 17)
2398 [2024] 11 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

of the land. This made the agreement void under Section 29
of the Contract Act, 1872.
22.5. Power of Attorney Holder’s Limitations: The intervenor
pointed out that the plaintiffs relied on Power of Attorney holder
to prove the Agreement to Sell, which was contrary to settled
law. The intervenor cited the case of Janki Vashdeo (supra),
to argue that a Power of Attorney holder cannot depose for
acts done by the principal unless they had direct knowledge
of the transaction.
22.6. Lack of Readiness and Willingness: The intervenor argued
that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate readiness and willingness
to execute the sale deed, which is a crucial requirement under
Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. They submitted
that the plaintiffs never acted to get the sale deed executed and
failed to take any concrete steps before the death of Sushila
Bai on 25/12/1992.

ANALYSIS
23. The present case is one of non-concurrent judgement, where the
Trial Court, after appreciating and analysing the evidence on record,
decreed the suit, however the High Court, on appeal, reversed
the findings of the Trial Court and dismissed the suit for specific
performance. We have carefully gone through the pleadings and the
evidence on record. The findings recorded by the Trial Court and the
High Court have already been briefly summarised. The key points
germane to the litigation are briefly stated below: -
(i). Whether the Agreement to Sell dated 13.08.1990 was validly
executed and proved?
(ii). Whether the General Power of Attorney executed by Sushila
Devi in favour of M.K. Maheshwari on 04.09.1990 and duly
registered created any doubt or suspicion on the conduct of
the plaintiff-appellants?
(iii). Whether the plaintiffs not entering into the witness box in five
of the suits would call for an adverse inference, although their
Power of Attorney had entered the witness box?
(iv). Whether the suit was barred by limitation?
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 2399

Shyam Kumar Inani v. Vinod Agrawal & Ors.

(v). Whether the forgery alleged by the defendants was actually
proved by way of proper pleading and evidence to establish
the same or was it just taken as a casual defence?
(vi). Whether Kailash Aggarwal (defendant No.1), the eldest son of
Sushila Devi, having not filed any written statement nor having
entered the witness box on behalf of the defendants, would have
an effect of adverse bearing against the defendants?
(vii). Whether the finding of the High Court that Sushila Devi was a
Pardanashin lady, and thus entitled to the benefit of the same,
was actually pleaded and proved by the defendants?
(viii). Whether the plaintiff-appellants producing the original sale deed
of 1966 under which Sushila Devi had acquired the rights of
ownership and the original Rin Pustika of Sushila Devi was a
relevant fact and would it adversely impact the defendants?
(ix). Whether the alienation by the defendant-legal heirs of Sushila
Devi in gross violation of interim injunction granted by the High
Court would have an impact on the validity of the sale deed
executed in favour of the 3rd parties and also have an adverse
impact on the conduct of the defendants?
(x). Whether there was any issue of readiness and willingness
relevant in a case where, at the time of entering into the
Agreement to Sell, the purchaser had paid the entire sale
consideration to the seller?
24. We now proceed to deal with the each of the above points framed
by us to test whether the judgment of the Trial Court or the High
Court deserved to be maintained.

1. AGREEMENT TO SELL DATED 30.08.1990
25. In all, there are seven Agreements to Sell executed by Sushila Devi
in favour of different purchasers on 30.08.1990, and accordingly,
seven suits were filed. Before us, only six purchasers are in appeal.
With respect to the 7th purchaser, apparently the matter is pending
before the High Court or the Trial Court. One of the purchasers is
K.D. Maheshwari, who is the plaintiff in suit RCS No. 48-A/01. He
held the Power of Attorney for the four other purchasers who are
before us. K.D. Maheshwari appeared as PW-1 in five suits, either
2400 [2024] 11 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

as the plaintiff in his own suit or as the Power of Attorney holder for
the other four plaintiffs. In one case, the plaintiff Bharat Kumar Lathi
had executed Power of Attorney in favour of Pankaj Maheshwari.
In the said suit, he examined himself as PW-I. K.D. Maheshwari
proved the execution of the Agreement to Sell, the payment of the
full consideration to Sushila Devi, and also that Sushila Devi and the
witnesses duly signed the Agreement to Sell. In addition, the plaintiffs
examined one of the attesting witnesses to the Agreement to Sell,
namely Dipesh Chandra Patni as PW-2. Further, M.K. Maheshwari,
who had a registered Power of Attorney from Sushila Devi executed
on 04.09.1990, was also examined as PW-3, and he supported the
plaintiffs stating that Sushila Devi had executed the Agreement to
Sell after receiving the full consideration. The plaintiffs also examined
Mr. R.K. Pathik, a handwriting expert, to prove that the signatures
on the Agreement to Sell were that of Sushila Devi.
26. The plaintiff-appellants, thus, discharged their burden of proving the
transaction between Sushila Devi and the plaintiffs on 13.08.1990, the
passing of the consideration, and the execution of Agreement to Sell.
27. Coming to the evidence of defendant-respondents, the legal heirs
of Sushila Devi, one Mohd. Shakir Khan was examined as DW-1,
one of the legal heirs of Sushila Devi namely Vinod Aggarwal was
examined as DW-2, and one N.C. Deshpande, a handwriting expert,
was examined as DW-3. Mohd. Shakir Khan is the subsequent
purchaser. He had no personal knowledge of the transaction that
took place on 30.08.1990 at the time of execution of the Agreement
to Sell. Vinod Kumar Aggarwal was one of the sons of Sushila Devi,
and was admittedly not residing with her. Defendants had set up a
case that the Agreement to Sell was a forged document, and had
denied its execution and also passing of any consideration. In support
of their allegation of forgery, the defendant had examined Mr. N.C.
Deshpande, a handwriting expert, as PW-3. Interestingly, Mr. N.C.
Deshpande could not come to a definite conclusion that the signatures
on the Agreement to Sell, upon being compared with the admitted
signatures, could not be said to be definitely not of Sushila Devi.
He, in fact, made a candid admission that according to his opinion,
it could not be said that the signatures on the Agreement to Sell
were not of Sushila Devi. The star witness of the defendants could
have been Kailash Aggarwal, the eldest son, in whose presence
the Agreement to Sell had been executed and also the subsequent
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 2401

Shyam Kumar Inani v. Vinod Agrawal & Ors.

registered Power of Attorney in favour of M.K. Maheshwari. For
reasons best known to the legal heirs of Sushila Devi (the original
defendants), Kailash Aggarwal chose not to appear in the witness
box. This clearly reflects that original defendants were trying to avoid
to face the real facts and, therefore, they avoided Kailash Aggarwal
from entering the witness box. In the totality of consideration of
evidence on record with regard to the execution of Agreement to
Sell, we are of the view that the same had been validly proved by
the plaintiff-appellants and the defendants had failed to establish
their claim that it was a forged document.

2. PLAINTIFF NOT ENTERING THE WITNESS BOX
28. Any adverse inference drawn by the High Court for the reason that
the plaintiffs did not enter the witness box to prove the Agreement to
Sell, in our opinion, was completely misplaced. Mr. K.D. Maheshwari is
one of the purchasers and plaintiff in his suit for specific performance.
He was throughout present in the transaction which took place on
30.08.1990. He held the Power of Attorney from the other plaintiffs
and therefore, it was not necessary for each of the plaintiffs in
separate suits to appear and prove the transaction of 30.08.1990.
Mr. K. D. Maheshwari, who was examined as PW-1 in each of the
suits whether in his capacity as plaintiff or as Power of Attorney
from other plaintiffs, was fully justified in establishing the facts that
transpired on 30.08.1990. The Trial Court had examined this aspect
and had found favour with the plaintiffs. The finding of the High Court
on this aspect is not approved in view of the above.

3. EFFECT OF THE REGISTERED POWER OF ATTORNEY
DATED 04.09.1990
29. Sushila Devi on 04.09.1990, in the presence of her son Kailash
Aggarwal, executed a General Power of Attorney in favour of
M.K. Maheshwari, who happened to be the real brother of K.D.
Maheshwari, one of the purchasers. If Sushila Devi executed the
Power of Attorney, no fault could be found with the same, as she
wanted herself to be free from repeatedly going to the Registry Office
for execution and registration of sale deeds. No suspicion could
arise on account of execution of General Power of Attorney which
was a registered document. Any challenge to the same by her legal
heirs was without any basis and totally based on conjectures. The
2402 [2024] 11 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

bona fides of the plaintiffs are also apparent from the fact that if they
were actually doing any mischief, fraud, or misrepresentation, they
would have immediately got the sale deeds executed and registered
through the Power of Attorney of M.K. Maheshwari soon after its
execution on 04.09.1990. But, they did not do so and continued to
request Sushila Devi and, later, her legal heirs to execute the sale
deed, even after her death. However, when they failed to do so
and upon the death of Sushila Devi, applied for mutation of their
names in the revenue records and the plaintiff-appellants had to
file objections in the revenue proceedings, they were compelled to
file the suit.

4. LIMITATION
30. The limitation for filing a suit for specific performance is three years
from the date fixed for the performance or if no such date is fixed,
when the plaintiff had notice that the performance is refused as
stipulated in Article 54 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963.
In the present case, the Agreement to Sell did not mention any date
for the performance, nor did Sushila Devi refused at any point of
time and soon after the death of Sushila Devi in December 1992,
the plaintiffs having come to know of the mutation proceedings by
her legal heirs, they proceeded to file the suit, after giving notice in
May 1995, which was well within a period of three years. The High
Court fell in error in holding that the suit is barred by limitation as it
was filed after more than three years from the date of execution of
Agreement to Sell. The High Court failed to take into consideration
that it was the second part of Article 54 of the Schedule to the
Limitation Act which would be applicable once there was no date
fixed for performance in the Agreement to Sell.

5. ORIGINAL TITLE DEEDS WITH THE PLAINTIFFS-
APPELLANTS
31. Sushila Devi had purchased the property in question in the year
1966 by way of a sale deed dated 23.04.1966. The said sale deed
would normally be in possession of Sushila Devi or her legal heirs.
Surprisingly, the said original sale deed of 1966 was filed and duly
exhibited by the plaintiffs-appellants. Even the original Rin Pustika in
the name of Sushila Devi was also filed by the plaintiffs-appellants
and duly exhibited. Kailash Aggarwal (Sushila Devi’s eldest son)
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 2403

Shyam Kumar Inani v. Vinod Agrawal & Ors.

is said to have been present both at the time of Agreement to Sell
dated 30.08.1990 and again at the time of execution and registration
of General Power of Attorney on 04.09.1990. Original title deed and
Rin Pustika must have been handed over in his presence. How
and why the original sale deed of 1966 and Rin Pustika of Sushila
Devi were in possession of the plaintiffs-appellants had not been
explained by the defendants, nor did they dispute that the 1966 sale
deed and the Rin Pustika in the name of Sushila Devi were forged
and fabricated documents. This clearly shows that the transaction
which took place on 30.08.1990 was valid transaction, the full sale
consideration was paid, and it is only thereafter that the seller would
part with the original title deed and the Rin Pustika and hand them
over to the purchasers.

6. POSSESSION
32. A purchaser who has paid the full consideration and received the
original title deeds from the seller would have taken possession under
normal circumstances. Any possession taken by any other party
thereafter would be unauthorised and illegal. Therefore, the finding
of the High Court regarding plaintiff not being in possession and
therefore the suit being barred in law, is untenable. It is relevant to
mention here that the plaintiffs-appellants had produced Rin Pustika
of the revenue department to show that they had been paying the
land revenue.

7. VIOLATION OF INJUNCTION
33. The plaintiffs-appellants had sought amendments in the plaint and
had expressed their apprehension that the legal heirs of Sushila Devi,
the original defendants, were likely to alienate the land in favour of
the third party. Upon their application, the Trial Court had passed an
interim injunction order on 04.12.2000, restraining the defendants
from alienating the property in dispute. Despite the same and having
full knowledge of the interim injunction order, the defendant nos.
2, 3, 4 and 5 executed four separate sale deeds on 18.01.2001 in
favour of third parties, who were later on impleaded in the suit as
defendant nos.7,8,9 and 10. This conduct by the original defendants
(legal heirs of Sushila Devi) clearly indicates their desperation, as
they wanted to further gain financial benefits by hook or by crook
and, therefore, alienated the property in violation of the injunction
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order. Such sale deed would be a void document. The conduct of
the original defendants disentitles them from any discretion being
exercised in their favour, as they blatantly and knowingly violated
the interim injunction order. The High Court failed to take note of
this conduct of the original defendants.
34. Learned counsel for the respondents have relied upon a number of
authorities. However, we find that none of the authorities cited by
the respondents really extend any help or benefit to them as the
same are all distinguishable on facts, as would be clear from the
following references in brief:
34.1. The respondents have relied upon the judgement of this
Court in Thiruvengadam Pillai (Supra) to argue that the
plaintiffs failed to prove the execution of the Agreement to
Sell dated 30.08.1990 and the General Power of Attorney
dated 04.09.1990. In that case, the Court dismissed the suit
for specific performance because the agreement was written
on old stamp papers purchased years earlier, the attesting
witnesses were close relatives of the plaintiff and one was not
examined, possession was not delivered despite being stated
in the agreement, and there was no expert verification of the
thumb impression alleged to be that of the defendant. The
plaintiff also failed to discharge the burden of proof, and the
appellate court wrongly shifted this burden to the defendants.
However, the present case is distinguishable on key facts. Here,
the Agreement to Sell was executed on appropriate stamp paper
without irregularities, and the plaintiffs diligently discharged their
burden by providing credible evidence, including the testimony
of PW-1 (either the plaintiffs or their Power of Attorney holder
with personal knowledge) and the attesting witness PW-2,
who was not a close relative but an independent witness.
Moreover, the plaintiffs produced the original title deed of
1966 and the Rin Pustika, handed over by Sushila Devi—a
fact not contested by the defendants—which corroborates the
genuineness of the transaction. An expert handwriting analysis
affirmed the authenticity of Sushila Devi’s signature, and the
defendants’ expert could not conclude otherwise. Unlike in
Thiruvengadam Pillai (Supra), the plaintiffs in this case were
given possession of the property, have been cultivating it, and
have been paying land revenue.
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 2405

Shyam Kumar Inani v. Vinod Agrawal & Ors.

34.2. The respondents further contended that Sushila Devi, being an
old and illiterate lady, fell into the category of a pardanashin
woman entitled to special protection under the law, as
established in the case of Mst. Kharbuja Kuer (Supra). In
that case, the Court held that the burden of proving that a
Pardanashin lady understood the contents of a document
lies on the person seeking to enforce it. However, the facts
of the present case are materially different. Firstly, there is
neither any pleading nor any evidence to suggest that Sushila
Devi was a Pardanashin lady who lived in seclusion; mere
old age and illiteracy do not suffice to classify her as such.
She had independently conducted property transactions in
the past, including the purchase of the suit property in 1966,
demonstrating her active involvement in legal and financial
matters. Secondly, the plaintiffs have adequately discharged
any burden of proof by providing credible evidence that the
contents of the Agreement to Sell and the General Power of
Attorney were duly explained to her. The attesting witness, PW-
2, testified that the documents were read over and explained
to Sushila Devi before she affixed her signature. Additionally,
her son, Kailash Aggarwal, was present during the execution
of these documents, and there is no allegation that he raised
any objections or that any undue influence was exerted. The
defendants have failed to provide any evidence to the contrary
or to establish that Sushila Devi did not understand the nature
of the transactions. Therefore, the reliance on the principles
laid down in Mst. Kharbuja Kuer (Supra) is misplaced, as
the circumstances of that case are distinguishable from the
present one, and the respondents’ argument on this ground
cannot be sustained.
34.3. The respondents have also relied upon the judgment in
Krishna Mohan Kul (supra), involving an old, illiterate, and
physically incapacitated person who allegedly executed a deed
of settlement. This Court held that when an aged, illiterate, and
infirm person is involved, the burden of proving the validity of
the document lies on the beneficiary, who must demonstrate that
the executant was in a fit state to understand the transaction
and that no undue influence was exerted. However, in the
present case, while Sushila Devi was elderly and illiterate,
2406 [2024] 11 S.C.R.

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there is no evidence to suggest that she was physically or
mentally incapacitated at the time of executing the Agreement
to Sell and the General Power of Attorney. Unlike in Krishna
Mohan Kul (supra), where the executant was over 100 years
old, paralytic, and bedridden, Sushila Devi was capable of
managing her affairs and had a history of independently
conducting property transactions.
34.4. The respondents have also relied upon the judgment in
Vidyadhar Vishnupant (supra) to contend that the plaintiffs’
absence from the witness box prevents them from proving
the execution of the Agreement to Sell dated 30.08.1990, as
such execution must be attested by someone present at the
time. In Vidyadhar Vishnupant (supra), this Court observed
that when a party refrains from testifying and avoids cross-
examination, it may lead to an adverse inference against
that party’s case. However, the circumstances of the present
case are significantly different. The plaintiffs’ interests were
represented by their Power of Attorney holders, namely Shri
K.D. Maheshwari and Shri Pankaj Maheshwari. Shri K.D.
Maheshwari is himself one of the purchasers and a plaintiff
in his own suit. He appeared as PW-1 in all the suits, either
as the plaintiff or as the Power of Attorney holder for the
other plaintiffs. He had personal, firsthand knowledge of the
execution of the Agreement to Sell, being directly involved in
the transaction and present at the time of its execution. His
detailed testimony provided substantial evidence supporting
the plaintiffs’ claims. Similarly, Shri Pankaj Maheshwari acted
as the Power of Attorney holder for the plaintiff Bharat Kumar
Lathi and also appeared as a witness. He had personal
knowledge of the transaction and corroborated the execution
of the Agreement to Sell and the payment of the consideration.
Both Shri K.D. Maheshwari and Shri Pankaj Maheshwari were
intimately connected with the transaction and were competent
to testify about the facts in issue. Moreover, one of the plaintiffs
did enter the witness box in his own suit, further reinforcing
the plaintiffs’ case. Unlike in Vidyadhar Vishnupant (supra),
where the defendant deliberately avoided the witness box,
here the plaintiffs ensured that competent and directly involved
witnesses testified on their behalf.
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 2407

Shyam Kumar Inani v. Vinod Agrawal & Ors.

34.5. The respondents have cited several other judgments to argue
that the plaintiffs’ failure to personally testify is detrimental to
their case. In Janki Vashdeo (supra), this Court held that
a power of attorney holder cannot depose on behalf of the
principal regarding matters within the principal’s personal
knowledge. In Rajesh Kumar (supra), the Court reiterated
that non-appearance of the plaintiff in the witness box can be
fatal in specific performance suits. However, the circumstances
in the present case are distinct as already discussed above.
Therefore, the principles from the cited cases do not apply here,
as the plaintiffs have adequately proved their case through
competent witnesses with personal knowledge.
34.6. The respondents have then referred to the judgment in Thomson
Press (India) Ltd. (supra) to argue that the Agreement to Sell
lacks specific boundaries of the land, rendering it vague and
unenforceable, and that possession has always remained with
Sushila Devi and her heirs, now with the transferees, as held
by the High Court. They further contend that the sale deeds
executed during the pendency of the proceedings are not void
but subject to adjudication. However, the circumstances and
legal issues in Thomson Press (India) Ltd. (Supra) are not
comparable to the present case. In Thomson Press (India) Ltd.
(Supra), this Court dealt with the impleadment of a transferee
pendente lite in a suit for specific performance and discussed
the doctrine of lis pendens under Section 52 of the Transfer of
Property Act. This Court held that a transferee pendente lite
is bound by the outcome of the litigation and may be added
as a party to the suit, especially if the transfer was made with
knowledge of the pending proceedings and in violation of an
injunction. In contrast, the present case revolves around the
enforceability of the Agreement to Sell dated 30.08.1990, which
sufficiently identifies the property through detailed descriptions,
including khasra numbers, area, and location. The absence of
explicit boundary details does not render the agreement vague
or unenforceable, as the property can be clearly identified
from the information provided. Moreover, the plaintiffs have
been in possession of the suit property since the execution
of the Agreement to Sell, actively cultivating it and paying
land revenue, which contradicts the respondents’ claim that
possession remained with Sushila Devi and her heirs.
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34.7. Regarding the sale deeds executed during the pendency of the
suit, while such transfers are not void ab initio, they are subject
to the doctrine of lis pendens and cannot prejudice the plaintiffs’
rights under the prior Agreement to Sell. The transferees acquire
the property subject to the outcome of the pending litigation
and cannot defeat the plaintiffs’ claim for specific performance.
Therefore, the legal principles established in Thomson Press
(India) Ltd. (Supra) do not apply to the present case, and the
respondents’ arguments based on that judgment do not hold
in light of the facts and circumstances here.
34.8. Similarly, the respondents have also relied upon the judgment
in Yogesh Goyanka v. Govind (supra) where this Court dealt
with the impleadment of a transferee pendente lite who had
notice of the pending litigation. In that case, the Court held
that while transfers made during the pendency of a suit are not
void ab initio under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act,
the transferee’s rights are subservient to those of the parties
in the litigation. The Court allowed the impleadment of the
transferee to protect his interests, especially when there was
a possibility of collusion between the original parties. However,
the facts and legal issues in Yogesh Goyanka are different from
the present case. In Yogesh Goyanka, the Court addressed
whether a transferee pendente lite could be impleaded in a suit
to protect his interests. In contrast, the present case involves
the enforceability of the Agreement to Sell dated 30.08.1990
and whether the subsequent sale deeds executed during
the pendency of the suit affect the plaintiffs’ rights. While the
respondents argue that the sale deeds are not void but subject
to adjudication, the doctrine of lis pendens ensures that such
transfers cannot prejudice the plaintiffs’ prior contractual rights.
35. Having thoroughly examined the judgments and authorities cited by
the respondents, it is imperative to consider the primary precedents
relied upon by the appellants. We will analyse their applicability to
the present case.
35.1. The appellants have relied upon the judgment in Pawan Kumar
Gupta v. Rochiram Nagdeo10 to assert that when fraud and

10 AIR 1999 SC 1823
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 2409

Shyam Kumar Inani v. Vinod Agrawal & Ors.

misrepresentation are alleged by the defendants, the burden of
proof lies upon them to substantiate such claims. In the present
case, the defendants contended that the Agreement to Sell
dated 30.08.1990 was forged and fraudulent. However, they
failed to provide credible evidence to support these allegations.
In Pawan Kumar Gupta (supra), this Court held that when a
party alleges fraud or that a transaction is benami, the onus
is on that party to prove the allegation. The Court emphasized
that the apparent tenor of a document is presumed to be true
unless disproved by the party alleging otherwise. The burden
does not shift to the party relying on the document to prove its
validity beyond its face value. Pawan Kumar Gupta (supra)
reinforces the appellants’ position and supports their claim for
specific performance of the contract.
35.2. The appellants have further relied upon the judgment in
Man Kaur (supra) to substantiate the argument that a power
of attorney holder can depose on behalf of the principal in
respect of acts and transactions that the attorney has personal
knowledge of. In this case, this Court clarified that while an
attorney holder can definitely testify regarding the acts they
have personally carried out on behalf of the principal, they
cannot testify about matters requiring personal knowledge of
the principal, such as the principal’s state of mind or readiness
and willingness to perform obligations under a contract. In the
present case, the power of attorney K.D. Maheshwari was
himself one of the vendees and all the transactions in the six
suits having taken place simultaneously on the same day, same
time and at the same place he was well aware personally of
all the facts.
36. The subsequent purchasers and the intervenors, who had further
purchased the property from third parties, will only get rights of their
vendors. And if the vendors did not have any rights, the vendees
cannot be said to be in any better position.
37. For all the reasons recorded above, the appeals are allowed. The
impugned judgment and order of the High Court is set aside in all six
appeals, and that of the Trial Court is restored. As the subsequent
purchasers also joined in this litigation by filing impleadment/
intervention application(s), we allow the same. We further direct
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that all the respondents, including the newly added respondents,
shall execute the sale deed in favour of the appellants as per the
directions of the Trial Court. Appellants to provide amended copy of
the memo of parties within four weeks.

Result of the case: Appeals allowed.

†
Headnotes prepared by: Aishani Narain, Hony. Associate Editor
(Verified by: Shadan Farasat, Sr. Adv.)