SITA SORENversusUNION OF INDIA

                  [2023] 12 S.C.R. 753 : 2023 INSC 856



                             CASE DETAILS

                               SITA SOREN
                                      v.
                            UNION OF INDIA
                    (Criminal Appeal No. 451 of 2019)
                          SEPTEMBER 20, 2023
         [DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, CJI,
  A. S. BOPANNA, M M SUNDRESH, J. B. PARDIWALA AND
                  MANOJ MISRA, JJ.]
                              HEADNOTES
     Issue for consideration: Issue pertains to whether an MP or MLA can
claim immunity from criminal prosecution for taking bribery for making a
speech or voting in a particular manner in the House; and as to correctness
of PV Narasmiha Rao’s case.
      Constitution of India – Art. 194(2) – Powers, privileges, etc, of the
House of Legislatures and of the members and committees thereof –
Issue as regards immunity to an MP or MLA from criminal prosecution
for taking bribery for making a speech or voting in a particular manner
in the House in PV Narasmiha Rao’s case – Correctness:
      Held: View of the majority in PV Narasmiha Rao’s case has serious
ramifications for the polity and the preservation of probity in public life – In
view thereof, the correctness of the view of the majority in PV Narasmiha
Rao to be reconsidered by a larger Bench of seven judges – Reference to
larger Bench.
     Judicial discipline – Correctness of a decision – Reconsideration:
     Held: It is settled position of judicial discipline that only a bench of
coequal strength may express an opinion doubting the correctness of a view
taken by an earlier Bench of coequal strength – If such a doubt is expressed,
the matter may be placed before a Bench consisting of a quorum larger than
the one which pronounced the decision in challenge.


                                     753
754           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2023] 12 S.C.R.



         LIST OF CITATIONS AND OTHER REFERENCES

      PV Narasimha Rao v. State (CBI/SPE) (1998) 4 SCC 626 : [1998] 2
SCR 870; State (CBI/SPE) v. PV Narasimha Rao (2001) 9 SCC 249; Centre
for PIL & Anr. v. Union of India (2000) 9 SCC 393; Rupa Ashok Hurra vs.
Ashok Hurra & Anr. (2002) 4 SCC 388 : [2002] 2 SCR 1006; Pashupati
Nath Sukul v. Nem Chandra Jain & Ors. (1984) 2 SCC 404 : [1984] 1 SCR
939; Madhukar Jetly v. Union of India & Ors. (1997) 11 SCC 111; Kuldip
Nayar & Ors v. Union of India & Ors. (2006) 7 SCC 1 : [2006] 5 Suppl.
SCR 1; Joseph Shine v. Union of India (2019) 3 SCC 39 : [2018] 11 SCR
765; Kalpana Mehta v. Union of India (2018) 7 SCC 1 : [2018] 4 SCR
1 – referred to.
         OTHER CASE DETAILS INCLUDING IMPUGNED
                ORDER AND APPEARANCES

        CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 451 of
2019.
     From the Judgment and Order dated 17.02.2014 of the High Court of
Jharkhand at Ranchi in WPCRL No. 128 of 2013.
        Appearances:
     Raju Ramachandran, Sr. Adv., Vivek Singh, Kaushik Laik, Akshay Kaushik,
Shashank Tiwari, M V Mukunda, Rahul Arya, Pratap Shankar, Ms. Devyani Gupta,
Ms. Tanvi Anand, Advs. for the Appellant.
     R Venkataramani, AGI, Tushar Mehta, SG, K M Nataraj, A.S.G.,
Paramjit Singh Patwalia, Sr. Adv., (AC), Gopal Sankaranarayan, Sr.
Adv., Ms. Harshika Verma, Dipanshu Krishan, Gauravjit Singh Patwalia,
Manan Daga, Ms. Samradhi Srivastava, Gaurav Agrawal, Kanu Agarwal,
Ms. Chinmayee Chandra, K Parmeshwar, Udai Khanna, Akshay Amritanshu,
Anmol Chandan, Ankur Talwar, Anandh Venkataramani, Mrs. Vijayalakshmi
Venkataramani, Vinayak Mehrotra, Ms. Mansi Sood, Chitvan Singhal,
Ms. Sonali Jain, Abhishek Kumar Pandey, Raman Yadav, Kartikey Aggarwal,
Arvind Kumar Sharma, Dr. Vivek Sharma, Anand Nandan, Aakarsh,
Ms. Shivangi, Hasan Zubair Waris, Mrs. Mohd. Faiz, Ms. Savita Kumari, Amit
Pawan, Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay, Ashwani Kumar Dubey, Ms. Tanya Srivastva,
Vishal Sinha, Ms. Shivani Vij, Rameshwar Prasad Goyal, Advs. for the Respondent.
                   SITA SOREN v. UNION OF INDIA                            755



       JUDGMENT / ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT
                                 ORDER
     1. The Criminal Appeal arises from a judgment and order dated
17 February 2014 of the High Court of Jharkhand in Writ Petition (Criminal)
No 128 of 2013.
      2. An election was held on 30 March 2012 for two members of the
Rajya Sabha representing the State of Jharkhand. The appellant was a
member of the Legislative Assembly belonging to the Jharkhand Mukti
Morcha. The allegation against the appellant is that she accepted a bribe
from an independent candidate for casting her vote in his favour. However,
as borne out from the open balloting for the Rajya Sabha seat, she did not
cast her vote in favour of the alleged bribe giver and instead cast her vote in
favour of a candidate belonging to her own party. The round of election in
question was rescinded and a fresh election was held at which the appellant
voted in favour of the candidate belonging to her own party.
      3. The appellant moved the High Court for quashing the charge-sheet
and the criminal proceedings instituted against her. The appellant relied
on the provisions of Article 194(2) of the Constitution. The High Court by
the impugned judgement declined to quash the criminal proceedings on
the ground that the appellant had not cast her vote in favour of the alleged
bribe giver and thus, is not entitled to the protection under Article 194(2).
     4. The judgment of the High Court has given rise to the present appeal.
      5. On 23 September 2014, when the proceedings were placed before
a bench of two judges of this Court, the Court was of the view that since
the issue arising for consideration is “substantial and of general public
importance”, it should be placed before a larger bench of three judges of
this Court.
      6. On 7 March 2019, when a Bench of three judges of this Court took
up the appeal, it noted that the gravamen of the charge against the appellant
is that she had accepted a bribe to vote in favour of a particular candidate
in the Rajya Sabha election for a member representing Jharkhand. The
precise question, as the three Judge Bench observed, was dealt with in a
judgment of a Bench of five judges in PV Narasimha Rao Vs State (CBI/
756            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                       [2023] 12 S.C.R.


SPE)1. Two judges on the Bench, Justice S.C. Agarwal and Justice A.S.
Anand, took the view that the immunity granted under Article 105(2)
and correspondingly, under Article 194(2) of the Constitution would not
extend to cases where bribery for making a speech or voting in a particular
manner in the House is alleged. However, the view of the majority was
to the contrary.
      7. The three-judge Bench hearing the present appeal was of the view
that “having regard to the wide ramification of the question that has arisen,
the doubts raised and the issue being a matter of public importance”, it
required to be referred to a larger Bench, as may be considered appropriate.
Accordingly, the matter has been placed, pursuant to the administrative
directions of the Chief Justice of India, before this Bench of five judges.
      8. Before proceeding further, it would be appropriate to note that prior
attempts to challenge the correctness of the constitutional position in PV
Narsimha Rao have not borne fruit. Review petitions (Review Petition
Nos. 2210-27/1998) were instituted before a Bench of five judges of this
Court questioning the correctness of the decision in PV Narsimha Rao.
The petitions for review were dismissed on 18 July 2002 on the ground of
a delay of 179 days in filing the review petitions, reported as State (CBI/
SPE) Vs PV Narasimha Rao 2.
       9. In addition to the above, a petition under Article 32 of the
Constitution (Writ Petition (Civil) diary No 7490/99) seeking a
declaration on the correctness of the position in PV Narsimha Rao was
instituted before this Court. By an order dated 1 May 2000 in Centre
for PIL & Anr Vs Union of India3, a Bench of three judges of this
Court referred the petition to a Bench of five judges while noting a
submission regarding the maintainability of the petition. Eventually, by
an order dated 18 July 2002, the petition was dismissed on the ground
of maintainability in view of the judgment in Rupa Ashok Hurra Vs.
Ashok Hurra & Anr 4.



1     (1998) 4 SCC 626
2     (2001) 9 SCC 249
3     (2000) 9 SCC 393
4     (2002) 4 SCC 388
                    SITA SOREN v. UNION OF INDIA                             757


      10. Mr. Raju Ramachandran, senior counsel appearing on behalf of
the appellant submitted that a reference of the correctness of the decision
in PV Narsimha Rao (supra) may not strictly speaking be necessary in the
facts of the present case. Mr. Ramachandran, in his written submissions
dated 17 September 2023, as well as in the course of the oral arguments,
submitted that none of the contesting parties has challenged the ratio in
PV Narsimha Rao (supra). On the contrary, it is urged that the contesting
parties are ad idem on the ratio and what is sought to be contested is the
applicability of the judgment. The appellant is of the view that the Judgement
in PV Narsimha Rao applies squarely to the instance case. However, the
respondent has contended that the judgment does not apply as polling for
the Rajya Sabha election was held outside the precincts of the House and
cannot be considered as a proceeding of the House in a manner similar to
a No-Confidence Motion. On this basis, Mr. Ramachandran has submitted
that the reference would not be warranted.
      11. Mr. R Venkataramani, Attorney General for India agrees with Mr.
Raju Ramachandran that a reference is not warranted, though they disagree
on the applicability of the judgement in PV Narsimha Rao to the present
case. According to Mr. Venkataramani, the correctness of PV Narsimha
Rao does not arise as an election to the Rajya Sabha cannot be considered
as a “proceeding of the House”. Mr. Venkataramani primarily relies on the
decisions of this Court in:
      (i) Pashupati Nath Sukul Vs Nem Chandra Jain & Ors; 5
      (ii) Madhukar Jetly Vs Union of India & Ors 6; and
      (iii) Kuldip Nayar & Ors Vs Union of India & Ors. 7
      12. Apart from the significance of the issues raised, which shall be
explained in brief a little later in the course of this order, we are not inclined
to accept the plea that the correctness of the decision in PV Narasimha Rao
(supra) does not arise in this case. Firstly, it is common ground that the
impugned judgment of the High Court relied on the judgment of the majority



5   (1984) 2 SCC 404
6   (1997) 11 SCC 111
7   (2006) 7 SCC 1
758             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2023] 12 S.C.R.


in PV Narasimha Rao. Secondly, it is beyond doubt that the defence itself
relies on the decision of the majority. The correctness of the view which has
been propounded in the judgment of the majority in PV Narasimha Rao
would, therefore, have to be enquired into during the course of the hearing
of the present case.
      13. It is a settled position of judicial discipline that only a bench of
coequal strength may express an opinion doubting the correctness of a view
taken by an earlier Bench of coequal strength. If such a doubt is expressed,
the matter may be placed before a Bench consisting of a quorum larger than
the one which the pronounced the decision in challenge.8 Having determined
that the correctness of the decision in PV Narasmiha Rao does arise in the
present case, it becomes necessary for us to determine as to whether prima
facie reconsideration of the judgment in PV Narasimha Rao is warranted,
and if the matter should be placed before a larger bench.
      14. The controversy in PV Narasimha Rao and the present case, turns
on the interpretation of the provisions of Article 105(2) of the Constitution
and the equivalent provision, Article 194(2) of the Constitution. The former
deals with the powers, privileges and immunities of the members of the
Houses of Parliament, while the latter confers a similar immunity to members
of the State Legislatures.
       15. Article 105(2) of the Constitution provides as follows:
       “105(2) No member of Parliament shall be liable to any proceedings
       in any court in respect of anything said or any vote given by him in
       Parliament or any committee thereof, and no person shall be so liable
       in respect of the publication by or under the authority of either House
       of Parliament of any report, paper, votes or proceedings.”
      16. The language of Article 105(2) indicates that the immunity attaches
to a Member of Parliament “in respect of anything said or any vote given
by him” in Parliament or any committee thereof. The expression “anything
said, or any vote given” would postulate that the immunity is attached with
respect to conduct, namely, a vote which has been given or a speech which
has been made in Parliament or any committee of Parliament. The expression


8     (2019) 3 SCC 39, paragraph 10 at page 79.
                   SITA SOREN v. UNION OF INDIA                           759


“in respect of anything said or any vote given” arose for consideration before
the Constitution Bench in PV Narasimha Rao. The charge in that case was
that the bribe takers had taken a bribe to secure the defeat of a No Confidence
Motion on the floor of the House. In analysing the above expression, Justice
SP Bharucha, took the view that Article 105(2) would have to be interpreted
broadly so as to protect Members of Parliament against proceedings in
Court that relate to or are concerned with or have connection or nexus with
anything said or vote given by them in Parliament (Paragraph 133 at page
729). Justice Bharucha was of the view that the nexus between the alleged
conspiracy/bribe and the No Confidence Motion was explicit, the charge
being that the alleged bribe takers had received bribes to secure the defeat
of the No Confidence Motion in Parliament.
      17. The Attorney General for India, in that case, had urged before
the Constitution Bench that though the words “in respect of” must
receive a broad meaning, the protection under Article 105(2) of the
Constitution is limited to court proceedings that impugn the speech
that is given or the vote that is cast or anything that arises therefrom.
Noting that the object of the protection was to enable Members of
Parliament to speak their minds in Parliament and vote in the same
way without the fear of being made answerable, the judgment of
Justice S.P. Bharucha contains the following observations (Paragraph
136 at pg. 730):
     “… It is not enough that Members should be protected against civil
     action and criminal proceedings, the cause of action of which is their
     speech or their vote. To enable Members to participate fearlessly in
     parliamentary debates, Members need the wider protection of immunity
     against all civil and criminal proceedings that bear a nexus to their
     speech or vote. It is for that reason that a Member is not “liable to any
     proceedings in any court in respect of anything said or any vote given
     by him”. Article 105(2) does not say, which it would have if the learned
     Attorney General were right, that a Member is not liable for what he
     has said or how he has voted. While imputing no such motive to the
     present prosecution, it is not difficult to envisage a Member who has
     made a speech or cast a vote that is not to the liking of the powers that
     be being troubled by a prosecution alleging that he had been party to
760          SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2023] 12 S.C.R.


      an agreement and conspiracy to achieve a certain result in Parliament
      and had been paid a bribe.”
      18. The learned Judge observed that he was conscious of the seriousness
of the offence which the alleged bribe takers were said to have committed
and that by reason of the lucre that they have received, they enabled the
Government to survive. But the judgment opined, “our sense of indignation
should not lead us to construe the Constitution narrowing, impairing the
guarantee to effective parliamentary participation and debate.” However, it
is significant to note that despite the above observations, the majority was
of the view that the immunity which covers bribe takers did not protect a
particular Member of Parliament (Mr Ajit Singh) in the case, as ultimately,
he did not cast his vote in the No Confidence Motion.
       19. The contrary view of two judges in PV Narasimha Rao was
elucidated in the judgment of Justice S.C. Agarwal. The learned Judge
observed that the expression “in respect of” would have to be construed
in its true perspective. The minority recognized that while the object and
purpose of Article 105(2) of the Constitution is to enable Members of
Parliament to speak freely or to cast their votes without fear of consequences
an interpretation that places Members of Parliament above the law would
be repugnant to the healthy functioning of a parliamentary democracy. In
this context, the divergence in the views of Justice S C Agarwal (speaking
for two judges) with that of Justice S.P Bharucha (speaking for two judges)
emerges from the following extract (paragraph 47 at page 673):
      “47. As mentioned earlier, the object of the immunity conferred
      under Article 105(2) is to ensure the independence of the individual
      legislators. Such independence is necessary for healthy functioning of
      the system of parliamentary democracy adopted in the Constitution.
      Parliamentary democracy is a part of the basic structure of the
      Constitution. An interpretation of the provisions of Article 105(2)
      which would enable a Member of Parliament to claim immunity from
      prosecution in a criminal court for an offence of bribery in connection
      with anything said by him or a vote given by him in Parliament or any
      committee thereof and thereby place such Members above the law
      would not only be repugnant to healthy functioning of parliamentary
      democracy but would also be subversive of the rule of law which is
             SITA SOREN v. UNION OF INDIA                             761


also an essential part of the basic structure of the Constitution. It is
settled law that in interpreting the constitutional provisions the court
should adopt a construction which strengthens the foundational features
and the basic structure of the Constitution. (See: Sub-Committee on
Judicial Accountability v. Union of India [(1991) 4 SCC 699] SCC at
p. 719.) The expression “in respect of” precedes the words “anything
said or any vote given” in Article 105(2). The words “anything said
or any vote given” can only mean speech that has already been made
or a vote that has already been given. The immunity from liability,
therefore, comes into play only if a speech has been made or vote has
been given. The immunity would not be available in a case where a
speech has not been made or a vote has not been given. When there is
a prior agreement whereunder a Member of Parliament has received
an illegal consideration in order to exercise his right to speak or to give
his vote in a particular manner on a matter coming up for consideration
before the House, there can be two possible situations. There may be
an agreement whereunder a Member accepts illegal gratification and
agrees not to speak in Parliament or not to give his vote in Parliament.
The immunity granted under Article 105(2) would not be available to
such a Member and he would be liable to be prosecuted on the charge of
bribery in a criminal court. What would be the position if the agreement
is that in lieu of the illegal gratification paid or promised the Member
would speak or give his vote in Parliament in a particular manner and
he speaks and gives his vote in that manner? As per the wide meaning
suggested by Shri Rao for the expression “in respect of”, the immunity
for prosecution would be available to the Member who has received
illegal gratification under such an agreement for speaking or giving his
vote and who has spoken or given his vote in Parliament as per the said
agreement because such acceptance of illegal gratification has a nexus
or connection with such speaking or giving of vote by that Member. If
the construction placed by Shri Rao on the expression “in respect of”
is adopted, a Member would be liable to be prosecuted on a charge
of bribery if he accepts bribe for not speaking or for not giving his
vote on a matter under consideration before the House but he would
enjoy immunity from prosecution for such a charge if he accepts bribe
for speaking or giving his vote in Parliament in a particular manner
762          SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2023] 12 S.C.R.


      and he speaks or gives his vote in Parliament in that manner. It is
      difficult to conceive that the framers of the Constitution intended to
      make such a distinction in the matter of grant of immunity between
      a Member of Parliament who receives bribe for speaking or giving
      his vote in Parliament in a particular manner and speaks or gives his
      vote in that manner and a Member of Parliament who receives bribe
      for not speaking or not giving his vote on a particular matter coming
      up before the House and does not speak or give his vote as per the
      agreement so as to confer an immunity from prosecution on charge of
      bribery on the former but denying such immunity to the latter. Such
      an anomalous situation would be avoided if the words “in respect
      of” in Article 105(2) are construed to mean “arising out of”. If the
      expression “in respect of” is thus construed, the immunity conferred
      under Article 105(2) would be confined to liability that arises out of
      or is attributable to something that has been said or to a vote that has
      been given by a Member in Parliament or any committee thereof. The
      immunity would be available only if the speech that has been made
      or the vote that has been given is an essential and integral part of the
      cause of action for the proceedings giving rise to the liability. The
      immunity would not be available to give protection against liability
      for an act that precedes the making of the speech or giving of vote by
      a Member in Parliament even though it may have a connection with
      the speech made or the vote given by the Member if such an act gives
      rise to a liability which arises independently and does not depend on
      the making of the speech or the giving of vote in Parliament by the
      Member. Such an independent liability cannot be regarded as liability
      in respect of anything said or vote given by the Member in Parliament.
      The liability for which immunity can be claimed under Article 105(2)
      is the liability that has arisen as a consequence of the speech that has
      been made or the vote that has been given in Parliament.”
      20. Significantly, Justice Agarwal, in the course of his judgment also
dwelt on the issue as to when the offence of bribery is complete. According
to the view of the learned Judge, the offence of bribery is complete against
the receiver of a bribe, if he takes or agrees to take money for a promise to
act in a certain way. The offence would be complete with the acceptance of
the money or on the agreement to accept the money being concluded and is
                   SITA SOREN v. UNION OF INDIA                            763


not dependent on the performance of the illegal promise by the receiver. The
receiver of the money will be treated to have committed the offence even if
he were to default in the performance of the bargain. Hence, it was Justice
Agarwal’s view that for proving the offence of bribery, all that is required to
be established is that the offender had received or agreed to receive money
for a promise to act in a certain way and it was not necessary to prove further
that he had actually acted in the way as promised.
     21. The third judgment in the case was delivered by Justice G.N. Ray.
A reading of the judgment of Justice GN Ray indicates that the learned Judge
concurred with Justice S.C. Agarwal in concluding that:
     (i) A Member of Parliament is a public servant under Section 2(c)
         of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1988; and
     (ii) Since there is no authority competent to grant sanction for the
          prosecution of a Member of Parliament under Section 19(1) of the
          Prevention of Corruption Act 1988, the Court can take cognizance
          of the offences mentioned in the provision but the prosecuting
          agency must obtain the permission of the Chairperson of the
          Rajya Sabha or, as the case may be, the Speaker of the Lok Sabha
          before filing a charge-sheet against the Member of Parliament in
          a criminal court.
     22. On the above two issues, Justice G.N. Ray concurred with the
judgment of Justice SC Agarwal. However, on the interpretation of Article
105(2), Justice G.N. Ray concurred with the judgment of Justice S.P
Bharucha speaking for two judges. Hence, the judgment of Justice S.P.
Bharucha, on the interpretation of Article 105(2) represents the view of the
majority of three learned judges.
     23. We may note, at this stage, that besides Mr. Raju Ramachandran,
senior counsel and Mr. R Venkataramani, Attorney General for India, we
have also heard Mr. P.S. Patwalia, senior counsel who has been appointed
as Amicus Curiae to assist the Court, Mr. Gopal Sankarnarayanam, senior
counsel, appearing on behalf of the intervener and Dr. Vivek Sharma, counsel
appearing on behalf of the intervener.
     24. We are inclined to agree with the submission of the Amicus Curiae
and Mr Gopal Sankarnarayan, senior counsel that the view which has been
764          SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     [2023] 12 S.C.R.


expressed in the decision of the majority in PV Narasmiha Rao requires
to be reconsidered by a larger Bench. Our reasons prima facie for doing
so are formulated below:
      (i) Firstly, the interpr etation of Article 105(2) and the
          corresponding provisions of Article 194(2) of the Constitution
          must be guided by the text, context and the object and purpose
          underlying the provision. The fundamental purpose and object
          underlying Article 105(2) of the Constitution is that Members
          of Parliament, or as the case may be of the State Legislatures
          must be free to express their views on the floor of the House
          or to cast their votes either in the House or as members of
          the Committees of the House without fear of consequences.
          While Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution recognises the
          individual right to the freedom of speech and expression,
          Article 105(2) institutionalises that right by recognising
          the importance of the Members of the Legislature having
          the freedom to express themselves and to cast their ballots
          without fear of reprisal or consequences. In other words, the
          object of Article 105(2) or Article 194(2) does not prima facie
          appear to be to render immunity from the launch of criminal
          proceedings for a violation of the criminal law which may
          arise independently of the exercise of the rights and duties
          as a Member of Parliament or of the legislature of a state;
      (ii) Secondly, in the course of judgment in PV Narasmiha
           Rao, Justice S.C. Agarwal noted a serious anomaly if the
           construction in support of the immunity under Article 105(2)
           for a bribe taker were to be accepted: a member would
           enjoy immunity from prosecution for such a charge, if the
           member accepts the bribe for speaking or giving their vote in
           Parliament in a particular manner and in fact speaks or gives
           a vote in Parliament in that manner. On the other hand, no
           immunity would attach, and the member of the legislature
           would be liable to be prosecuted on a charge of bribery,
           if they accept the bribe for not speaking or for not giving
                     SITA SOREN v. UNION OF INDIA                    765


          their vote on a matter under consideration before the House
          but they act to the contrary. This anomaly, Justice Agarwal
          observed, would be avoided if the words “in respect of” in
          Article 105(2) are construed to mean ‘arising out of’. In other
          words, in such a case, the immunity would be available only
          if the speech that has been made or the vote that has been
          given is an essential and integral part for the cause of action
          for the proceedings giving rise to the law; and
     (iii) Thirdly, the judgment of Justice SC Agarwal has specifically
           dwelt on the question as to when the offence of bribery would
           be complete. The judgment notes that the offence is complete
           with the acceptance of the money or on the agreement to
           accept the money being concluded and is not dependent on
           the performance of the illegal promise by the receiver. The
           receiver of the bribe would be treated to have committed the
           offence even when he fails to perform the bargain underlying
           the tender and acceptance of the bribe. This aspect bearing
           on the constituent elements of the offence of a bribe finds
           elaboration in the judgment of Justice Agarwal but is not
           dealt with in the judgment of the majority.
     25. We have already noted above that efforts in seeking a review
of the judgment in PV Narasmiha Rao and later in proceedings under
Article 32 of the Constitution were not successful. One of us (Justice
Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud), while delivering a concurrent opinion for a
Bench of five judges in Kalpana Mehta Vs Union of India9 (para 221)
had occasion to observe that should the correctness of the view in PV
Narasmiha Rao fall for reconsideration in an appropriate case, a larger
bench may have to consider the issue. The view of the majority has
serious ramifications for the polity and the preservation of probity in
public life.
     26. For the above reasons, prima facie at this stage, we are of
the considered view that the correctness of the view of the majority



9   (2018) 7 SCC 1
766            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                       [2023] 12 S.C.R.


in PV Narasmiha Rao should be reconsidered by a larger Bench of
seven judges.
     27 . We accordingly request the Registry to place the papers before
the Chief Justice for constituting a larger Bench of seven judges.


Headnotes prepared by:                     Papers to be placed before Hon’ble CJI
Nidhi Jain                           for constituting larger Bench of seven judges.