Holding

A murder committed incidentally in the course of stealing a motor vehicle constitutes an accident arising out of the use of the vehicle, making the claimant entitled to compensation under Section 163‑A, and the insurer’s appeal was not maintainable without leave.

Summary

The case involved the death of Dasarath Singh, an auto‑rickshaw driver, who was killed by unknown passengers while they attempted to steal the vehicle. The claimants, Rita Devi and others, filed a petition under Section 163‑A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 for compensation, which was awarded by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. The insurer, New India Assurance Co., appealed to the High Court, arguing that the death was a murder, not an accident, and that the appeal was not maintainable without leave under Section 170. The Supreme Court held that the killing was an accidental murder arising out of the use of the vehicle and that the tribunal was correct in granting compensation. It also ruled that the insurer’s appeal was inadmissible because it had not obtained the required leave from the tribunal. Consequently, the High Court’s order was set aside and the tribunal’s award restored.

Issues considered

The death of the driver qualifies as an "accident" under Section 163‑A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.
Whether the meaning of "death" and "accident" in the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 can be applied to the Motor Vehicles Act.
Whether the insurer’s appeal was maintainable without obtaining leave under Section 170 of the Motor Vehicles Act.

Legislation cited

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988s. 163-A, s. 167, s. 170
Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923

Subjects

Motor Vehicles Actaccident compensationinterpretation of deathaccidental murderSection 170 leave requirementinsurance appeal

Judgment

SMT. RITA DEVI AND ORS. A
v.
NEW INDIA ASSURANCE CO. LTD. AND ANR.

APRIL 27, 2000

[D.P. WADHWAAND N. SANTOSH HEGDE, JJ.J B

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 :

S. 163-A-Accident-CompensaJion-Payment of-Autorickshaw driver-
killed by unknown passengers for stealing the vehicle-Legal representaJives-
Claim for compensation-Maintainability of-Held, death of the deceased
c
driver was an accident arising out of the use of motor vehicle-Thus, entitled
to claim compensation.

'Death'-Meaning of-Held, interpretation of word 'death' in Work-
men's Compensation Act, applicable to Motor Vehicles Act also-Workmen's D
Compensation Act, 1923-lnterpretation of statutes.

S. 170-Appeal-Maintainahility of-Accident-Claim for compensa-
tion-Allowed by Tribunal-.,.Appeal filed by insurer without obtaining leave
from the Tribunal-Held, not maintainable.
E
Won.is- & Phrases :

'Death'-Meaning of in the context of Motor Vehicle Act, 1988 and
Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923.

Driver of an auto-rickshaw was murdered by some unknown passen- F
gers for stealing the vehicle. Owner of the said vehicle claimed compensa-
tion for the loss of the vehicle, which was accepted by the respondent-
Insurance Company. Appellant-legal representatives of the deceased driver
filed a claim petition under S. 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. The
Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal allowed the claim and awarded
G
compensation. However, on appeal, High Court holding that the case was
one of murder and not of an accident, set aside the award. Hence the
present appeal.

On behalf of appellants it was contended that the murder of the
deceased squarely falls within the word 'death' due to accident arising out H
741
742 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] 3 S.C.R.

A of the use of motor vehicle found in Section 163-A(l) of the Act and thus,
tribunal was justified in awarding the compensation; that the word 'acci-
dent' was not defined under the Motor Vehicles Act and the said Act being
a beneficial legislation, a liberal interpretation should be given so as to
achieve the objects of the Act; the appeal filed by the Insurance Company
was not maintainable for not having obtained the leave of the tribunal as
B
required under Section 170 of the Act.

On behalf of respondent Insurance Company it was contended that
the death of the deceased driver was caused by felonious act of certain
unknown persons and the same is not caused by an accident arising out of
c the use of the vehicle; the meaning ascribed to the word 'accident' in the
Workmen's Compensation Act by judicial pronouncements cannot heap-
plied to the word 'accident' in the Motor Vehicles Act because the object of.
the two Acts are different.

Allowing the appeal, the Court
D
HELD: 1.1. Murder of the deceased driver was due to an accident
arising out of the use of motot: vehicle. Thus, trial court was justified in
awarding compensation to appellant-legal representatives. [750-F)

E 1.2. There is no doubt that 'murder', as it is understood, in the
common parlance is a felonious act where death is caused with intent and
the perpetrators of that act normally have a motive against the victim for
such killing. But there are also instances where murder can be by accident
on a given set of facts. The difference between a 'murder' which is not an
accident and a 'murder' which is an accident, depends on the proximity of
F
the cause of such murder. H the dominent intention of the act offelony is to
kill any particular person then such killing is not an accidental murder but
is a murder simplicitor, while if the case of murder or act of murder was
originally not intended and the same was caused in furtherance of any
other felonious act then such murder is an accidental murder. In the
G instant case, the stealing of the auto-rickshaw was the object of felony and
the murder that was caused in the said process of stealing the auto-
rickshaw is only incidental to the act of stealing of the auto-rickshaw. ._ ~
Therefore, it has to be said that on the facts and circumstances of this case
the dc3:th of the deceased driver was caused accidentally in the process of
H committing the theft of the auto-rickshaw. (747-D-E; 748-H; 749-A)
RITA DEVI v. NEW INDIA ASSURANCE CO. LTD. 743
Challis v. wndon and South Western Railway Company, (1905) 2 King's A
Bench 154; Nisbet v. Rayne & Burn, (1910) 1 KB 689 and Board of Manage-
ment of Trim Joint District School v. Kelly, (1914) AC 667, referred to.

2. The object of the Motor Vehicles Act and the Workmen's Com-
pensation Act are not in any way different. The relevant object of both the
Acts are to provide compensation to the victims of accidents. The only B
difference between the two enactments is that so far as the Workmen's
Compensation Act is concerned, it is confined to workmen as defined
under that Act while the relief provided under Chapters X to XIl of the
Motor Vehicles Act is available to all the victims of accidents involving a
motor vehicle. This is supported by Section 167 of the Motor Vehicles Act c
which provides that it is open to the claimants either to proceed to claim
compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act or under the Mo-
tor Vehicles Act. A perusal of the objects of the two enactments clearly
establishes that both the enactments are beneficial enactments operating
in the same field, hence judicially accepted interpretation of the word
D
'death' in Workmen's Compensation Act is applicable to the interpreta-
tion of the word death in the Motor Vehicles Act also. (749-D-F]

Shivaji Dayanu Patil & Am: v. Vatschala Uttam More, [1991] 3 SCC
530, relied on.
E
3. In the instant case, the Insurance Company had not obtained leave
from the tribunal under S. 170 of the Act before filing the appeal. Thus, the
appeal filed by the Insurance Company before the High Court was not
maintainable in law.

Shankarayya & Anr. v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. & Am:, [ 1998] 3 F
sec 140, relied on.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 3021 of 2000.

From the Judgment and Order dated 9.3.98 of the Assam High Court
in M.A.(F) No. 8(K) of 1996. G

Anurabh Chowdhury, (D.N. Ray) for Mrs. Manik Karanjawala.
Ms. Pankaj Bala Verma, Ms. Kiran Suri, Rajiv Mehta for the appearing
parties.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by H
ct
744 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2000) 3 S.C.R.
A SANTOSH HEGDE, J. One Dasarath Singh was a driver of an auto
rickshaw owned by Lalit Singh. The vehicle in question was registered as a
public carrier vehicle used for hire by the passengers. This vehicle was
insured with the respondent-Insurance Company. On 22nd of March, 1995,
it is stated that some unknown passengers hired the above auto rickshaw from
B rickshaw stand at Dimapur between 5 to 6 p.m. It is also not in dispute that
the said auto rickshaw was reported stolen and the dead body of driver
Dasarath Singh was recovered by the police on the next day, the auto
rickshaw was never recovered and the claim of the owner for the loss of auto
rickshaw was accepted by the respondent-Insurance Company and a sum of
Rs.47,220 was settled by the said company towards the loss suffered by the
c owner.

One Darshan Singh claiming to be a Power of Attorney holder of the
present appellants filed a claim petition along with tlie present appellants
under Section 163 A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short the 'Act')
D claiming damages for the death caused to the deceased Dasarath Singh during
the course of his employment under Lalit Singh as a death caused in an
accident arising out of the use of vehicle. The Motor Accidents Claims
Tribunal, Nagaland as per its judgment dated 24th of June, 1996 came to the
conclusion that the death of the driver of the auto rickshaw (Dasarath Singh)
was caused by an accident coming within the purview of the Motor Vehicles
E
Act, therefore, held that the owner of the vehicle was liable to compensate
the death of the driver in money value. Since there was an agreement between
the vehicle owner and the respondent-Insurance Company to compensate the
employer of the vehicle, said legal and statutory liability stood fastened on
the respondent-Insurance Company. The tribunal also held that the quantum
F of claim of the claimants stood established and consequently it awarded a sum
of Rs.2,81,500 against the Insurance Company with interes~ @ 12% on the
amount awarded from the date of application till payment.

TI1e Insurance Company preferred an appeal by itself before the
G Gauhati High Court (Kohima Bench) in M.A.(F) No.8(K)96. The High Court
by its judgment dated 9.3.1998 came to the conclusion that there was no
motor accident as contemplated under the Act. The High Court further held
that the case in hand was a case of murder and not of an accident, hence a
petition for claim under the provisions of the Act did not arise. The High
Court, accordingly, allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment and the
H
RITA DEVI v. NEW INDIA ASSURANCE CO. LTD. [SANTOSH HEGDE, J.] 745

- ,..(
award made by the tribunal.

Originally, the above mentioned Power of Attorney holder had pre-
feITed the above appeal making the wife and children of the deceased as
A

profonna respondents along with the other respondent. By an order of this
Court dated 18th of February, 2000, this Court felt that to protect the interest
B
of the heirs of the deceased the wife and children of the deceased should be
first impleaded as appellants to this appeal and the cause-title be amended,
which having been done and notice being issued, the respondent- Insurance
~ Company is represented before us.

We have heard the parties. Leave granted. c
On behalf of the appellants, Shri Anurabh Chowdhury contends that the
deceased was employed to drive the auto rickshaw for ferrying passengers
on hire and on the fateful day the auto rickshaw was parked at the richhaw
stand at Dimapur and at about 5 to 6 p.m. some unknown passengers had D
engaged the said auto rickshaw for their journey towards Singrijan area and
thereafter nothing was known of the driver or rickshaw. It is only on the next
day that the authorities were able to recover the body of the deceased and
the auto iickshaw in question was never traced till date. The owner of the
auto rickshaw has, therefore, been compensated by the Insurance Company
E
"' •• for the loss of the said auto rickshaw, therefore, the murder of the deceased
Dasarath Singh squarely comes within the word 'death' due to accident
arising out of the use of motor vehicle found in Section 163A(l) of the Act.
Consequently the tribunal was justified in awarding the compensation claimed
by the appellants. He contended the word 'accident' has not been defined
under t11e Motor Vehicles Act and the said Act being a beneficial legislation, F
a liberal interpretation should be given so as to achieve the objects of the
Act. He contended t11at the deceased being an employee was entitled for
compensation both under the Motor Vehicles Act and also under the Work-
men's Compensation Act, 1923. However, under Section 167 of the Motor
Vehicles Act, the heirs of the deceased had a choice either to claim compen-
G
sation under that Act or under the Workmen's Compensation Act. The
appellants having chosen to invoke the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act,
the Tribunal was wholly justified in awarding the compensation, while the
' ~
High Court, according to him, without properly appreciating t11e reasonings
adopted by the tribunal has interfered witl1 the just order of the tribunal. He
also contends that the appeal filed by the Insurance Company was not H
746 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000) 3 S.C.R.
A maintainable for not having obtained the leave of the tribunal as required
under Section 170 of the Act. He relies on a judgment of this Coutl in the
case of Shankarayya & Am: v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd & Am:, [1998)
3 SCC 140. Ms. Pankaj Bala Verma, appearing for the respondent- Insurance
Company does not in fact dispute the maintainability of the petition filed by
the appellants under Section 163A of the Motor Vehicles Act but contends
B
that the meaning ascribed to the word 'accident' in the Workmen's Compen-
sation Act by judicial pronouncements cannot be applied to the word 'acci-
dent' in the Motor Vehicles Act because the object of the two Acts are
different. She supported the judgment of the High Court by contending that
on the facts of the present appeal, the death of the driver of the auto rickshaw
c was caused by felonious acts of certain unknown persons and the same is not
caused by an accident arising out of the use of the ·vehicle. Regarding the
maintainability of the appeal, she submits the judgment of this Court was
reported subsequent to the High Court Judgment, hence no fault could be
found with the impugned judgment on that score and no such objection was
D taken in regard to the maintainability before the High Court.

As pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellants, the Motor
Vehicles Act does not define the word 'accident'. However, Section 163A of
the Motor Vehicles Act provides for payment of compensation for the death
or injw·y suffered in a motor vehicle accident on a suuctured formula basis
E in Section 163 A of the Act. Sub-clause (I) of the said Section says that
notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or in any other law for the
time being in force or instrument having the force of law, the owner of the
motor vehicle or the authorised insurer shall be liable to pay in the case of
death or permanent disablement due to accident arising out of the use of
F motor vehicle, compensation, as indicated in the Second Schedule, to the legal
heirs or the victim, as the case may be;

Sub-section (2) of the said Section also provides, in any claim for
compensation under that sub-section, the claimant shall not be required to
plead or establish that the death or permanent disablement in respect of which
G
the claim has been made was due to any wrongful act or neglect or default
of the owner of th~ vehicle or vehicles concerned or of any other person
(emphasis supplied).

A conjoint reading of the above two sub-clauses of Section 163A shows
H that a victim or his heirs are entitled to claim from the owner/Insurance
RITA DEVI v. NEW INDIA ASSURANCE CO. LTD. [SANTOSH HEGDE, J.] 747

Company a compensation for death or permanent disablement suffered due A
to accident arising out of the use of the motor vehicle (emphasis supplied),
without having to prove wrongful act or neglect or default of any one. Tims
it is clear, if it is established by the claimants that the death or disablement
was caused due to an accident arising out of the use of motor vehicle then
they will be entitled for payment of compensation. In the present case, the B
contention of the Insurance Company which was accepted by the High Court.
is that the death of the deceased (Dasarath Singh) was not caused by an
accident arising out of the use of motor vehicle. Therefore, we will have to
examine the actual legal import of the words 'death due to accident arising
out of the use of motor vehicle'.
c
The question, tl1erefore, is can a murder be an accident in any given
case? There is no doubt that 'murder', as it is understood, in the common
parlance is a felonious act where death is caused with intent and the
perpetrators of that act normally have a motive against the victim for such
killing. But there are also instances where murder can be by accident on a D
given set of facts . The difference between a 'murder' which is not an accident
and a 'murder' which is an accident, depends on the proximity of the cause
of such murder. In our opinion, if the dominent intention of the Act of felony
is to kill any particular person then such killing is not an accidental murder
but is a murder simplicitor, while if the cause of murder or act of murder
E
was originally not intended and the same was caused in furtherance of any
other felonious act then such murder is an accidental murder.

In Challis v. London and South Western Railway Company (1905 2
King's Bench 154), the Court of Appeal held where an engine driver while
driving a train under a bridge was killed by a stone willfully dropped on the F
train by a boy from the bridge, that his injuries were caused by an accident.
In the said case, the Court rejecting an argument that the said incident calll\ot
be treated as an accident held:
... "The accident which befell the deceased was, as it appears to me, one
G
which was incidental to his employment as an engine driver; in other
words it arose out of his employment. The argument for the respond-
ents really involves the reading into the Act of a proviso to the effect
that an accident shall not be deemed to be within the Act, if it arose
from the mischievous act of a person not in the service of the
employer. I see no reason to suppose that the Legislature intended so H
748 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2000] 3 S.C.R.
A to limit the operation of the Act. The result is the same to the engine
driver, from whatever cause the accident happened; and it does not
appear to me to be any answer to the claim for indemnification under
the Act to say that the accident was caused by some person who acted
mischievously.

B
In the case of Nisbet v. Rayne & Burn, (1910] 1 KB 689, where a
cashier, while travelling in a railway to a colliery with a large sum of money
for the payment of his employers' workmen, was robbed and murdered. The
Court of Appeal held:

c "That the murder was an "accident" from the standpoint of the person
who suffered from it and that it arose "out of' an employment which
involved more than the ordinary risk, and consequently that the
widow was entitled to compensation under the Workmen's Compen-
sation Act 1906. In this case the Court followed its earlier judgment
in the case of Challis (supra). In the case of Nisbet, the Court also
D
observed that "it is contended by the employer that this was not an
"accident" within the meaning of the Act, because it was an inten-
tional felonious act which caused the death, and that the word
"accident" negatives the idea of intention. In my 6pinion, this
contention ought not to prevail. I think it was an accident from the
E point of view of Nisbet, and that it makes no difference whether the
pistol shot wa~ deliberately fired at Nisbet or whether it was intended
for somebody else and not for Nisbet."

The judgment of the Court of Appeal in Nisbet's case was followed
F by the m~jority judgment by the House of Lords in the case of Board of
Management of Trim Joint District School v. Kelly, (1914) AC 667.

Applying the principles laid down in the above cases to the facts of
the case in hand, we find t11at the deceased, a driver of the auto rickshaw,
was duty bound to have accepted the demand of fare paying passengers to
G transport tl1em to the place of their destination. During the course of this duty,
if the passengers had decided to commit an act of felony of stealing the auto
rickshaw and in the course of achieving the said object of stealing the auto
rickshaw, they had to eliminate the driver of the auto rickshaw then it cannot
but be said that the death so caused to the driver of the auto rickshaw was
-" -
H an accidental murder. The stealing of the auto rickshaw was the object of the
RITA DEVI v. NEW INDIA ASSURANCE CO. LTD. iSAf'D'OSH HEGDE, J.] 749

felony and the murder that was caused in the said process of stealing the auto ·A
rickshaw is only incidental to the act of stealing of the auto rickshaw.
TI1erefore, it has to be said that on the facts and circumstances of this case
the death of the deceased (Dasarath Singh) was caused accidentally in the
process of committing the theft of the auto rickshaw.

Learned counsel for the respondents contended before us that since the B
Motor Vehicles Act has not defined the word 'death' and the legal interpre-
.J. tations relied upon by us are with reference to definition of the word 'death'
in Workmen's Compensation Act the same will not be applic<ible while
interpreting the word 'death' in Motor Vehicles Act because according to her,
the objects of the two Acts are entirely different. She also contends on the C
facts of this case no proximity could be presumed between the murder of the
driver and the stealing of the auto rickshaw. We are unable to accept this
contention advanced on behalf of the respondents. We do not see how the
object of the two Acts, namely, the Motor Vehicles Act and the Workmen's
Compensation Act are in any way different. In our opinion, the relevant object D
of both the Acts are to provide compensation to the victims of accidents. The
only difference between the two enactments is that so far as the Workmen's
Compensation Act is concerned, it is confined to workmen as defined under
that Act while the relief provided under Chapter X to XII of the Motor
Vehicles Act is available to all the victims of accidents involving a motor
vehicle. In this conclusion of ours we are supported by Section 167 of the E
Motor Vehicles Act as per which provision, it is open to the claimants either
to proceed to claim compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act
or under the Motor Vehicles Act. A perusal of the objects of the two
enactments clearly establishes that both the enactments are beneficial enactments
operating in the same field, hence judicially accepted interpretation of the F
word 'death' in Workmen's Compensation Act is, in our opinion, applicable
to the interpretation of the word death in the Motor Vehicles Act also.

In the case of Slzivaji Dayanu Pali[ & Anr: v. Vatschala Uttam More,
[1991] 3 SCC 530 this Court while pronouncing on the interpretation of
Section 92 A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 held as follows :
G

"Section 92-A was in the nature of a beneficial legislation enacted
with a view to confer the benefit of expeditious payment of a limited
amount by way of compensation to the victims of an accident arising
out of the use of a 1p.otor vehicle on the basis of no fault liability. In H
750 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] 3 S.C.R.
A the matter of interpretation of a beneficial legislation the approach of
the comts is to adopt a construction which advances the beneficent
purpose underlying the enactment in preference to a construction
which tends to defeat that pmpose."

In that case in regard to the contention of proximity between the
B accident and the explosion that took place this Comt held :

"This would show that as compared to the expression "caused by",
the expression "arising out of' has a wider connotation. The expres-
sion "caused by" was used in Sections 95(1)(b)(i) and (ii) and
96(2)(b)(ii) of the Act. In Section 92-A, Parliament, however, chose
c to use the expression "arising out of' which indicates that for the
purpose of awarding compensation under Section 92-A, the casual
relationship between the use of the motor vehicle and the accident
resulting in death or permanent disablement is not required to be
direct and proximate and it can be less immediate. This would imply
D that accident should be connected with the use of the motor vehicle
but the said connection need not be direct and immediate. This
construction of the expression "arising out of the use of a motor
vehicle" in Section 92-A enlarges the field of protection made
available to the victims of an accident and is in consonance with the
E beneficial object underlying the enactment."

In the instant case, as we have noticed the facts, we have no hesitation
in coming to the conclusion that the murder of the deceased (Dasarath Singh)
was due to an accident arising out of the use of motor vehicle. Therefore,
the trial court rightly came to the conclusion that the claimants were entitled
F for compensation as claimed by them and the High Court was wrong in
coming to the conclusion that tl1e death of Dasarath Singh was not caused
by an accident involving tl1e use of motor vehicle.

This leaves us to consider the second point raised before us by the
counsel for the appellant. It is ~ued on behalf of the appellants tl1at the
G
appeal preferred by the Insurance Company purported to be under Section
173 of the Motor Vehicles Act was not maintainable because prior permission
of the Court as required wa,s not obtained by the appellants. In support of
this contention of the appellants, reliance is placed on a judgment of this
,court in the case of Slzankarayya & Am: v. United India Insurance Co. lJd.
H & Am:, [1998] 3 SCC 140. In tl1e said judgment a Division Bench of this
RITA DEVI v. NEW INDIA ASSURANCE CO. LTD. [SANTOSH HEGDE, J.] 751

Court held : A

"The Insurance Company when impleaded as a party by the Court can
be permitted to contest the proceedings on merits only if the condi-
tions precedent mentioned in Section 170 are found to be satisfied and
for that purpose the Insurance Company has to obtain an order in
writing from the Tribunal and which should be a reasoned order by B
the Tribunal. Unless that procedure is followed, the Insurance Com-
pany cannot have a wider defence on merits than what is available ·
to it by way of statutory defence. It is true that the claimants
themselves had joined Respondent I Insurance Company in the claim
petition but that was done with a view to thrust the statutory liability c
on the Insurance Company on account of the contract of the insur-
ance. That was not an order of the Court itself permitting the
Insurance Company which was impleaded to avail of a larger defence
on merits on being satisfied on the aforesaid two conditions men-
tioned in Section 170. Consequently, it must be held that on the facts
of the present case, Respondent 1 Insurance Company was not
D
entitled to file an appeal on merits of the claim which was awarded
by the Tribunal."

We respectfully agree with the ratio laid down in the above case and
in view of the fact admittedly the Insurance Company had not obtained leave E
from the tribunal before filing the above appeal. We are of the opinion that
the appeal filed by the Insurance Company before the High Court was not
maintainable in law.

For the reasons mentioned above, this appeal succeeds, the judgment
and order of the High Court dated 9.3.1998 is set aside and that of the F
r Tribunal dated 24.6.1996 is restored. The appellants are entitled to costs in
all the counts.

S.V.K. Appeal allowed.

- .Y