Holding

A conviction under Section 302 IPC based solely on a voluntary, fit, and trustworthy dying declaration is justified.

Summary

The appellant, Shakuntala, was convicted of murder under Section 302 IPC for setting her daughter‑in‑law on fire after a dowry dispute. The victim’s dying declaration, recorded by a First Class Judicial Magistrate and certified by a doctor as being made while she was fit, formed the core evidence. The Supreme Court examined the admissibility of the dying declaration under Section 32 of the Evidence Act, emphasizing that it must be voluntary, made by a fit person, and free from tutoring or prompting. Finding no material to suggest otherwise, the Court held the declaration trustworthy and sufficient even without corroboration. It also affirmed that the appellant’s act demonstrated clear intent to cause death, justifying the application of Section 302 IPC. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed.

Issues considered

The admissibility and reliability of the victim’s dying declaration under Section 32 of the Evidence Act.
Whether a dying declaration can form the sole basis of conviction without corroboration.
Whether the facts constitute murder punishable under Section 302 IPC rather than lesser offences.

Legislation cited

Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 32(1), s. 60
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 302, s. 304-B, s. 307, s. 498-A

Subjects

murderdying declarationSection 302 IPCIndian Evidence Acthearsay exceptioncorroborationdowry disputeintentcriminal law

Judgment

\
);-

A SMT. SHAKUNTALA
v..
STATE OF HARVANA

JULY 27, 2007

B [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT AND P.P. NAOLEKAR, JJ.]

Penal Code, I 860-s. 302-Murder-Daughter-in-law set on fire-By
mother-in-law-Dying declaration-Recorded by First Class Judicial
C Magistrate-After certification of the doctor that she was fit to make
statement-Conviction by courts below relying on dying declaration-On
appeal, held: Conviction justified-Murder was intentionally committed-
The evidence of the prosecution witnesses establish that dying declaration
was made when the deceased was in a fit condition to give declaration-No
material to show that dying declaration was result of imagination, tutoring
D or prompting.

Evidence Act, I872-s. 32(1)-Dying declaration-Nature of- ""\
Admissibility-Principles and grounds for-Held: It is an exception to the
general rule against hearsay just stated-It is a piece of untested evidence
and must like any other evidence satisfying the court that what is stated
E therein is unalloyed truth and it is absolutely safe to act upon it-If it is
coherent and consistent, the same can be formed basis of conviction without
any corroboration.

Maxims- 'nemo moriturus proesumitur mentiri '-Meaning of

F Words and Phrases- 'Dying declaration '-Meaning of in the context of
s. 32(1) of Evidence Act, I872.

The allegation against the appellant-accused was that she caused death
of her daughter-in-law. According to prosecution, subsequent to a quarrel
G between the accused and the deceased over inadequate dowry brought at the
time of marriage, the deceased poured kerosene oil on herself to scare her
mother-in-law appellant. But appellant took a match box and set the deceased
on fire. While the deceased was admitted in the hospital, PW 6 (Judicial
Magistrate, First Class) re{'.ordcd her dying declaration after it was certified
by PW 5 (doctor) that she was fit to make statement. FIR was registered u/s
H 608
SHAKUNT ALA v. STATE OF HARY ANA 609

307 IPC on the basis of dying declaration. After her death the offence was A
converted to one u/s 302 IPC. After investigation appellant was charged u/ss.
498-A and 304-B IPC and in the alternative u/s 302 IPC.

Trial Court relying on the dying declaration and on the evidence of PWs
5 and 6 convicted the appellant for the offence u/s 302 and acquitted her of
the rest of the charges. High Court confirmed the conviction. Hence the B
present appeal.

Dismissing the appeal, the Court

HELD: 1.1. The background in which the appellant put the deceased on
fire clearly indicates what was her intention as she fully knew that the C
deceased would be burnt to death. The deceased sprinkled kerosene all over
her body to scare the appellant but the appellant on the contrary took the
match stick and put the same on the body of the deceased. It is crystal clear
that the murder was intentionally committed. Accordingly, the trial Court and
the High Court have rightly held that Section 302 IPC was applicable.
(Para 13) (617-C, DJ D
'r
1.2. In the present case, there is no material to show that dying
declaration was result of product of imagination, tutoring or prompting. On
the contrary, the same appears to have been made by the deceased voluntarily.
It is trustworthy and has credibility. (Para ll) (616-G; 617-A)
E
1.3. The evidence of PWs 5 and 6 clearly established that the dying
declaration was made when the deceased was in a fit condition to give
declaration. The accident occurred on 6.4.1997 at about 9.00 a.m. but the
deceased breathed her last on I 1.4.I 997. The doctor (PW-5) has categorically
stated that the deceased was in a fit condition to give the statement. The
Judicial Magistrate (PW-6) also stated that the deceased was in a fit condition F
to give the statement and was able to understand what was being asked and
she answered specifically. In the aforesaid background, it cannot be said that
the dying declaration is not believable. (Para 12( [617-A-BI

2.1. The general rule of evidence is that all oral evidence must be direct
viz., if it refers to a fact which could be seen it must be the evidence of the G
witness who says he saw it, if it refers to a fact which could be heard, it must
be the evidence of the witness who says he heard it, if it refers to a fact which
-J could be perceived by any other sense, it must be the evidence of the witness
who says he perceived it by that sense. Similar is the case with opinion. These
aspects are elaborated in Section 60 of Evidence Act. [Para 7) (613-D, E) H
610 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007) 8 S.C.R.

A 2.2. The eight clauses of Section 32 of Evidence Act are exceptions to
the general rule against hearsay just stated. Clause (1) of Section 32 makes
relevant what is generally described as dying declaration, though such an
expression has not been used in any Statute. It essentially means statements
made by a person as to the cause of his death or as to the circumstances of
B the transaction resulting in his death. The grounds of admission are: firstly,
necessity for the victim b~ing generally the only principal eye-witness to the
crime, the exclusion of the statement might deflect the ends of justice; and
secondly, the sense of impending death, which creates a sanction equal to the ,J....
obligation of an oath. The general principle on which th is species of evidence
is admitted is that they are declarations made in extremity, when the party is
C at the point of death and when every hope of this world is gone, when every
motive to falsehood is silenced, and the mind is induced by the most powerful
considerations to speak the truth; a situation so solemn and so lawful is
considered by the law as creating an obligation equal to that which is imposed
by a positive oath administered in a Court of justice.
(Para 7) (613-F, G; 614-A)
D
R. v. Wood Cock, (1789) 1 Leach 500, referred to.

2.3. The principle on which dying declaration is admitted in evidence is
indicated in legal maxim "nemo moriturus proesumitur mentiri - a man will
E not meet his maker with a lie in his mouth." (Para 7) (614-E)

2.4 This is a case where the basis of conviction of the accused is the
dying declaration. The situation in which a person is on deathbed is so solemn
and serene when he is dying that the grave position in which he is placed, is
the reason in law to accept veracity of his statement. It is for this reason the
F requirements of oath and cross-examination are dispensed with. Besides,
should the dying declaration be excluded it will result in miscarriage of justice
because the victim being generally the only eye-witness in a serious crime,
the exclusion of the statement would leave the Court without a scrap of
evidence. (Para 8) (614-F-GJ

G 2.5. Though a dying declaration is entitled to great weight, it is
worthwhile to note th2t the accused has no power of cross-examination. The
Court has to be on guard that the statement of deceased was not as a result of
either tutoring, or prompting or a product of imagination. The Court must be l_ --
further satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind after a clear
opportunity to observe and identify the assailant. Once the Court is satisfied
H that the declaration was true and voluntary, undoubtedly, it can base its
i
-j

SHAKUNTALAv. STATEOFHARYANA 611

conviction without any further corroboration. It cannot be laid down as an A
absolute rule of law that the dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of
conviction unless it is corroborated. The rule requiring corroboration is
merely a rule of prudence. [Para 9) [614-G; 615-A-B)

Smt. Paniben v. State of Gujarat, AIR (1992) SC 1817; Munnu Raja
and Anr. v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, (1976) 2 SCR 764; State of Uttar B
Pradesh v. Ram Sagar Yadav and Ors., AIR (1985) SC 416; Ramavati Devi v.
State of Bihar, AIR (1983) SC 164; K. Ramachandra Reddy and Anr. v. The
J.,, Public Prosecutor, AIR (1976) SC 1994; Rasheed Beg v. State 1Jf Madhya
Pradesh, 11974) 4 SCC 264; Kaka Singh v. State ofMP., AIR (1982) SC 1021;
Ram Manorath and Ors. v. State of U.P., (1981( 2 SCC 654; State of C
Maharashtra v. Krishnamurthi Laxmipati Naidu, AIR (1981) SC 617; Surajdeo
Oza and Ors. v. State ofBihar, AIR (1979) SC 1505; Nanahau Ram and Anr.
v. State ofMadhya Pradesh, AIR (1988) SC 912; State of U.P. v. Madan Mohan
and Ors., AIR (1989) SC 1519; and Mohan/a/ Gangaram Gehani v. State of
Maharashtra, AIR (1982) SC 839, relied on.
D
2.6. The dying declaration is only a piece of untested evidence and must
like any other evidence, satisfy the Court that what is stated therein is the
unalloyed truth and that it is absolutely safe to act upon it. If after careful
scrutiny the Court is satisfied that it is true and free from any effort to induce
the deceased to make a false statement and if it is coherent and consistent,
there shall be no legal impediment to make it basis of conviction, even if there E
is no corroboration. (Para 10) (616-E-Fl

Gangotri Singh v. State of U.f'., JT (1992) 2 SC 417; Goverdhan Raoji
Ghyare v. State of Maharashtra, JT (1993) 5 SC 87; Meesala Ramakrishan v.
State ofAndhra Pradesh, JT (1994) 3 SC 232; State of Rajasthan v. Kishore, F
JT (19961 2 SC 595, relied on.

CRIMINAL APPELLATE ruRJSDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 376 of
2002.

From the Judgment & Order 24.02.200 I of the High Court of Punjab and G
Haryana at Chandigarh in Criminal Appeal No. 149-DB of 1998.

Jatika Kalra and Bhaskar Y. Kulkarni (SCLSC) for the Appellant.

Roopansh Purohit, Rajeev Gaur Naseem and T.V. George for the
(. Respondent. H
....,,
'i

612 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 8 S.C.R.
"
A The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
t
DR. ARIJIT PASAVAT, J. I. Challenge in this appeal is to the order
l
passed by a Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court upholding
the conviction of the appellant for an offence punishable under Section 302 '
of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short the 'IPC') and sentence of imprisonment
B for life as awarded 'by the learned Sessions Judge, Rohtak in Sessions Case
No.31 ofl997.

2. The appellant was charged for offences punishable under Sections
c>.__
498-A, 304-B and 302 IPC. The trial Court found the accused guilty of offence
punishable under Section 302 IPC while acquitting her from the other charges.
c
3. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:
')
..
I

Suman (hereinafter referred to as the 'deceased') daughter of Balbir
Singh had been married with one Bikram Singh son of accused-appellant,
resident of village Kab~lpur about two years prior to the incident. At about
1

D 9.00 A.M. on 6th April, 1997, the deceased and the accused had a quarrel
over the inadequate dowry brought at the time of the marriage. As the
i
deceased. was fed up with the daily squabbles, she picked up a can of
Kerosene oil to scare her mother-in-law-the appellant with an intention to
keep her quiet, but the appellant on the contrary, took out a match box and
E set the deceased on fire and having done so ran out of the room calling out
that deceased had set herself on fire. The villagers, who had collected there
on hearing the noise, rushed her to the P.G.l.M.S., Rohtak, A ruqa sent to
.
the police post, brought ASI Om ~arkash (PW-7) and after collecting the
medico-legal report from the hospifl, he moved an application before Dr.,
Ranbir Singh (PW,5) who certified her to be fit to make a statement. Shri A.K.
F Singhal, JMIC, Rohtak (PW-6) was brought to the hospital, who recorded her
~

1 ........
statement and on its basis, the formal F.l.R. was registered at 4.45 P.M. on 6th
April, 1997 initially for offences punishable under Section 307 IPC but on
Suman's death on I Ith April, 1997, the offence was converted to one under
Section 302 IPC. On completion of the investigation, the accused was charged
G for offences punishable under Sections 498-A and 304-B IPC and in the
alternative for an offence punishable under Section 302 IPC and as she
pleaded not guilty, was brought to trial.
)--

4. The prosecution version was centered primarily around the dying l -- ~
declaration which was recorded by the learned First Class Judicial Magistrate
.>
H (PW-6). Dr. Ranbir Singh (PW-5) had declared the deceased in a fit condition
~
SHAKUNTALA v. STATE OF HARYANA [PASA YAT, J.] 613
to-make the dying declaration. The trial Court found the dying declaration to A
be acceptable and relying on the evidence of PWs ·5 and 6, conviction of the
appellant as noted above was recorded. The appellant's stand, that the dying
declaration was not believable, was not accepted. As noted above, appeal
before High Court was dismissed.

5. In support of the appeal, learned counsel for the appellant submitted B
that the evidence of PWs 5 and .6 so far as the dying declaration is concerned
cannot be accepted. The deceased suffered from I 00% burns and therefoiie
>.
the statement of PWs 5 and 6 that the deceased was in a fit condition is nqt
acceptable. He also submitted t~at there was another dying declaration ·which
was recorded by PW-4. Unfortunately, the same was discarded without any
basis. Alternatively it was submitted that case under Section 302 IPC is ndt
c
maintainable.

6. Learned counsel for the State on the other hand supported the
judgment of the trial Court.
D
7. At this juncture, it is relevant to take note of Section 32 of the Indian
}'
Evidence Act, 1872 (in short 'Evidence Act') which deals with cases in which
statement of relevant fact by person who is dead or cannot be found, etc. is
relevant. The general rule is that all oral evidence must be direct viz., if it
refers to a fact which could be seen it must be the evidence of the witness'
who says he saw it, if it refers to a fact which could be heard, it must be the E
evidence of the witness who says he heard it, ifit refers to a fact which could 1

be perceived by any other sense, it must be the evidence of the witness who
says he perceived it by that sense. Similar is the case with opinion. These
aspects are elaborated in Section 60. The eight clauses of Section 32 are
exceptions to the general rule against hearsay just stated. Clause (I) of
'...... F
Section 32 makes relevant what is generally described as dying declaration,
though such an expression has not been used in any Statute. It essentially
means statements made by a person as to the cause of his death or as to the
circumstances of the transaction resulting in his death. The grounds of
admission are: firstly, necessity for the victim being generally the only principal
eye-witness to the crime, the exclusion of the statement might deflect the ends G
of justice; and secondly, the sense of impending death, which creates a
sanction equal to the obligation of an oath. The general principle on which
J this species of evidence is admitted is that they are declarations made in
extremity, when the party is at the point of death and when every hope of
this world is gone, when every motive to falsehood is silenced, and the mind
H
614 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 8 S.C.R.
-'
I
..

A is induced by the most powerful considerations to speak the truth; a situation
so solemn and so lawful is considered by the law as creating an obligation
equal to that which is imposed by· a positive oath administered in a Court of
justice. These aspects have been eloquently stated by Lyre LCR in R v. Wood
Cock, (l 789) l Leach 500. Shakespeare makes the wounded Melun, finding
B himself disbelieved while announcing the intended treachery of the Dauphin
Lewis explain:

"Have I met hideous death within my

view,

c Retaining but a quantity of life,

Which bleeds away even as a form of wax,

Resolveth from his figure 'gainst the fire?

What is the world should make me now deceive,
D
Since I must Jose the use of all deceit?

Why should I then be false since it is true

That I must die here and live hence by truth?"

E (See King John, Act 5, Sect.4)

The principle on which dying declaration is admitted in evidence is indicated
in legal maxim "nemo moriturus proesumitur mentiri - a man will not.meet his
maker with a lie in his mouth."

F 8. This is a case where the basis of conviction of the accused is the i- J=
dying declaration. The situation in which a person is on deathbed is so t
solemn and serene when he is dying that the grave position in which he is
placed, is the reason in law to accept v~racity of his statement. It is for this lo-

reason the requirements of oath and cross-examination are dispensed with.
Besides, should the dying declaration be excluded it will result in miscarriage
p
G of justice because the victim being generally the only eye-witness in a serious ?---
crime, the· exclusion of the statement would leave the Court without a scrap •
~

of evidence. F
l. -
~
9. Though a dying declaration is entitled to great weight, it is worthwhile
I-
H to note that the accused has no power of cross-examination. Such a power · ~
r
SHAKUNTALA v. STATE OF HARYANA[PASA YAT,J.) 615

is essential for eliciting the truth as an obligation of oath could be. This is A
the reason the Coqrt also insists that the dying declaration should be of such
a nature as to inspire full confidence of the Court in its correctness. The Court
has to be on guard that the statement of deceased was not as a result of either
tutoring, or prompting or a product of imagination. The Court must be further
satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind after a clear opportunity B
to observe and identify the assailant. Once the Court is satisfied that the ,
declaration was true and voluntary, undoubtedly, it can base its conviction
without any further corroboration. It cannot be laid down as an absolute rule
of law that the dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction
unless it is corroborated. The rule requiring corroboration is merely a rule of
prudence. This Court has laid down in several judgments the principles ,C
governing dying declaration, which could be summed up as under as indicated
in Smt. Paniben v. State of Gujarat, AIR (1992) SC 1817:

(i) There is neither rule of law nor of prudence that dying declaration
cannot be acted upon without corroboration. [See Munnu Raja & Anr. v. The
State of Madhya Pradesh, [1976] 2 SCR 764] D
(ii) If the Court is satisfied that the dying declaration is true and
voluntary it can base conviction on it, without corroboration. [See State of
Uttar Pradesh v. Ram Sagar YadavandOrs., AIR (1985) SC 416 and Ramavati
Devi v. State of Bihar, AIR (1983) SC 164]
E
(iii) The Court has to scrutinize the dying declaration carefully and must
ensure that the declaration is not the result of tutoring, prompting or
imagination. The deceased had an opportunity to observe and identify the
assailants and was in a fit state to make the declaration. [See K Ramachandra
Reddy and Anr. v. The Public Prosecutor, AIR (1976) SC (1994)]
F
(iv) Where dying declaration is suspicious, it should not be acted upon
without corroborative evidence. [See Rasheed Beg v. State ofMadhya Pradesh,
[1974] 4 sec 2641

(v) Where the deceased was unconscious and could never make any ;Q
dying declaration the evidence with regard to it is to be rejected. [See Kaka
Singh v State of MP., AIR (1982) SC l 021]
-J
(vi) A dying declaration which suffers from infirmity cannot fonn the
basis of conviction. [See Ram Manorath and Ors. v. State of U.P., [1981] 2
~~ H
~J6 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2007] 8 S.C.R.

A (vii) Merely because a dying declaration does contain the details as to
the occurrence, it is not to be rejected. [See State of Maharashtra v.
Krishnamurthi Laxmipati Naidu, AIR (1981) SC 617]

(viii) Equally, merely because it is a brief statement, it is not to be
discarded. On the contrary; the shortness of the statement itself guarantees
B truth. [See Surajdeo Oza and Ors. v. State of Bihar, AIR (1979) SC 1505].

(ix) Normally the Court in order to satisfy whether deceased wa~ in a
fit mental condition to make the dying declaration look up to the medical
opinion. But where the eye-witness said that the deceased was in a fit and
C conscious state to make the dying declaration, the medical opinion cannot
prevail. [See Nanahau Ram and Anr. v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR (1988)
SC 912].

(x) Where the prosecution version differs from the version as given in
the dying declaration, the said declaration cannot be acted upon. [See State
D of U.P. v. Madan Mohan and Ors., AIR (1989) SC 1519].

(xi) Where there are more than one statement in the nature of dying
declaration, one first in point of time must be preferred. Of course, if the
plurality of dying declaration could be held to be trustworthy and reliable, it
has to be accepted. [See Mohan/al Gangaram Gehani v. State of Maharashtra,
E AIR(1982)SC839] '>
JO. In the light of the above principles, the acceptability of alleged
dying declaration in the instant case has to be considered. The dying
declaration is only a piece of untested evidence and must like any other
evidence, satisfy the Court that what is stated therein is the unalloyed truth
F and that it is absolutely safe to act upon it. If after careful scrutiny the Court
is satisfied that it is true and free from any effort to induce the deceased to
make a false statement and if it is coherent and consistent, there shall be no
legal impediment to make it basis of conviction, even if there is no
corroboration. [See Gangotri Singh v. State of UP. JT (1992) 2 SC 417,
G Goverdhan Raoji Ghyare v. State ofMaharashtra, JT (1993) 5 SC 87, Meesala
Ramakrishan v. State of Andhra Pradesh, JT (1994) 3 SC 232 and State of
Rajasthan v. Kishore, JT (1996) 2 SC 595].

11. There is no material to show that dying declaration was result of l-
product of imagination, tutoring or prompting. On the contrary, the same
H appears to have been made by the deceased voluntarily. It is trustworthy and
SHAKUNTALA v. STATE OF HARYANA [PASA YAT, J.) 617

has credibility. A
12. The evidence of PWs 5 and· 6 clearly established that the dying
declaration was made when the deceased was in a fit condition to give
declaration. Jt is to be noted that the accident occurred on 6.4.1997 at about
9.00 a.m. but the deceased breathed her last on 11.4.1997. The doctor (PW-
5) has categorically stated that the deceased was in a fit condition to give B
the statement. The Judicial Magistrate (PW-6) also stated that the deceased
was in a fit condition to give the statement and was able to understand what
,.• was being asked and he answered specifically. In the aforesaid background,
it cannot be said that the dying declaration is not believable.

13. Coming to the plea of non applicability of Section 302 IPC the same C
is equally without substance. The background in which the appellant put the·
deceased on fire clearly indicates what was her intention as she fully knew
that the deceased would be burnt to death. The deceased sprinkled kerosene
all over her body to scare the appellant but the appellant on the contrary took
the match stick and put the same on the body of the deceased. It is crystal D
clear that the murder was intentionally committed. Accordingly, the trial Court
and the High Court have rightly held that Section 302 IPC was applicable.

14. The appeal is sans merit and is dismissed.

K.K.T. Appeal dismissed E