SMT. SHYAMA DEVI AND ORS.versusMRS. MANJU SHUKLA AND ANR.
- Citation
- 1994 INSC 382
- Decided
- 12 September 1994
- Disposal
- Disposed off
- Bench
- R M SAHAI
Holding
Jamuna Prasad was a member of the coparcenary at his death; therefore Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 and its Explanation I apply, and his interest devolves by intestate succession among his widow and daughters, rendering the family settlement and the contested will irrelevant for the present distribution.
Summary
A partition suit was filed in 1965 and a preliminary decree was passed in 1975. Jamuna Prasad (J) died in 1987 leaving his widow, two sons and four daughters, one of whom claimed a one‑third share of the property. The Supreme Court, in an earlier order dated 3 March 1992, directed that the shares of J’s legal representatives be allotted according to the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, without reference to a will claimed by the widow. The present appeals questioned whether Section 6 of the Act and its Explanation I applied despite the earlier partition suit and whether a family settlement alleged by the widow should affect the distribution. The Court held that J was a coparcener at his death, that Section 6 (with its proviso and Explanation I) governs the devolution of his interest, and that the property must be divided among the widow and daughters by intestate succession, ignoring the family settlement and the contested will. Consequently, the lower courts were directed to adjudicate the shares in accordance with the Act.
Issues considered
- Whether Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 and Explanation I apply to Jamuna Prasad’s interest in coparcenary property despite the earlier partition suit.
- Whether the family settlement alleged by the widow should be taken into account while determining the shares of the legal representatives.
- Whether the daughter is entitled to a one‑third share of the property.
Legislation cited
Subjects
Judgment
A SMT. SHYAMA DEVI AND ORS.
v.
· MRS. MANW SHUKLA AND ANR.
SEPTEMBER 12, 1994
B [R.M. SARAI ANDN.P. SINGH, JJ.]
Hin¢u Succession Act, 1956 :
Section 6 Explanation I-Partition of Coparcenery propeny-Presump-
C tion of deemed partition just prior to the death of Coparcene,-Shares to legal
representatives-Adjudication of-Courts below to adjudicate according-
ly-Directions issued.
A suit for partition was filed by 'D' in the year 1965 and a preliminary
decree was passed on 24.1.1975 in respect of the properties in dispute.
D Though there were two defendants J and G and both of them filed appeal
before the High Court, the present appeals are confined to the branch of
J. The appellant is wife of J and the first respondent is the daughter of J.
On 5.5.1980, a petition of compromise was filed on behalf of D, J and
E G before the High Court. Respondent No. 1 filed an application for
impleading her as a party, she being the daughter of J. The said applica-
tion was rejected. The High Court disposed of the appeal in terms of the
petition of compromise. Thereafter J died leaving behind his widow (the
appellant), two sons and four daughters including Respondent No.1.
During the preparation of the final decree the respondent No.1 filed a
F petition claiming one-third share in the properties. The application was
allowed by the District Judge.
Appellant preferred a Civil Revision Petition and the High Court felt
that death of J. the application filed on behalf of Respondent No.1 was
maintainable but the Trial court should decide afresh as regards her
G share, after hearing all the parties concerned. Against this, Respondent
filed a Special Leave Petition. This Court disposed of the Petition and
directed the trial Court to allot the shares of each legal representatives in
respect of the share of J as per Hindu Law without reference to the Will
alleged to have been left by J. However, the question of validity of the Will
H of J bequeathing his property to the appellant was left open. Accordingly
362
S. DEVI v. M.SHUKIA 363
the Additional District Judge directed the Commissioner to divide the A
property as per the decree and to submit his proposals after hearing the
parties concerned. However, he observed that the question of family settle·
ment dated 17.7.1981 alleged by the appellant was still open for adjudica-
tion.
Respondent preferred a Civil Revision and the High Court allowed B
the same and directed the Additional District Judge to make a fresh
adjudication of the objections filed by the parties to the report of the
Commissioner.
In these appeals, the appellant contended that in the order passed C
on the earlier Special leave Petition, the family settlement was not rejected
i or held invalid and as such the same has to be taken into consideration.
It was also contended that the properties left behind by J were to be shared
by his legal representatives in accordance with the Hindu Succession Act,
the respondent cannot get one-third share, since the said properties would
devolve upon his widow (appellant), his two sons of four daughters includ- D
ing the Respondent •
. The Respondent contended that since there was a partition, it should
be deemed that there was no Mitakshara Coparcenery property in exist·
ence when J Died. E
Disposing of the appeals, this Court
HELD : 1.1. Admittedly the parti~on suit in ~ich preliminary decree
was passed on 24.1.1975, the partition sought for was by D representing one
of the three branches. It is nobody's case that at that stage or any time later F
there was inter se partition between J and his sons, who were members of
coparcenery. As such it has to be assumed that on the date of death J was a
member of coparcenery, and Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 as
well as Explanation I to the said section was applicable to the interest of J
in the coparcenery properties at the time of his death. (369-B-C]
G
1.2 As J died leaving behind his widow (the appellant) and four
daughters, who shall be deemed to be the family relatives specified in Class
I of the Schedule to the Act, the proviso to Section 6 shall come into play
and the interest of J shall devolve according to the said proviso by way of
intestate succession under the Act. The claim of the execution of a Will H
364 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1994] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.
A made by the appellant is not to be taken into account at this stage in view
of the earlier order dated 3.3.1992 passed by this Court. The Explanation
I contains the formula for determining the share of the deceased and for
that purpose of statutory fiction has been introduced saying that interest
of the person dying intestate shall be deemed to be the share in the·
B property that would have been allotted to him, if the partition of the
property had taken place immediately before his death. As such one has
to imagine for purpose of ascertaining the interest of J in the coparcenery
at the time of his death that a partition of the property had been effected
a little prior to his death. [368-D-G]
C 2. The Courts below shall adjudicate the shares of the legal repre-
sentatives of J in accordance with the provisions of the Hindu Succession
Act, as directed by this Court in its order dated 3.3.1992. [369-D]
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 5993-94
of 1994.
n·
From the Judgment and Order dated 21.4.94 of the Rajasthan High
Court in S.B.C.R.P. Nos. 151/93 & 220 of 1993. '
D.D. Thakur, K.V. Veiikataraman and S.N. Sharma for the Appel-
lants.
E
Gopal Subarmanium and H.M. Singh, D .N. Misra for the JBD & Co.
for the Respondent No. 2.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
p N.P. SINGH, J. Leave granted.
This appeal has been filed on behalf of the appellants, for setting
aside an order dated 21.4.1994, passed by the High Court of Rajasthan. By
the aforesaid order, the Revision Petition of Respondent No. 1 was allowed
and a direction was given to the Additional District Judge, to make afresh
G adjudication of the objections filed on behalf of the parties, to the report
of the Commissioner. A further direction was given by the High Court at
while doing so, the order dated 3.3.1992, passed by this Court, should be
strictly followed.
,
A suit for partition was filed in the year 1965 by Dhanpat Rai. In the
H said suit a prefuninary decree was passed on 24.1.1975 in respect of the
S. DEVI v. MSHUKlA[N.P. SINGH,J.) 365
properties in dispute. Jamuna Prasad and Ganga Prasad were defendants A
in the said suit. J amuna Prasad and Ganga· Prasad filed an appeal before
the High Court against the said decree. It may be mentioned that in that
in the present appeal, we are concerned with the branch of Jamuna Prasad,
who had two sons and four daughters, apart from his wife, who is appellant
No. 1 (hereinafter referred to as the 'appellant') Mrs. Manju Shukla, B
respondent No. 1 (hereinafter referred to as the 'respondent') is one of the
daughters of the aforesaid Jamuna Prasad. On 5.5.1980, a petition of
compromise was filed on behalf of Dhanpat Rai, Jamuna Prasad and
Ganga Prasad in the High Court. On 28.6.1982, the respondent made an
application before the High Court, to be impleaded as a party being the
daughter of Jamuna Prasad. That petition was rejected on 22.2.1983. On C
1.9.1986, the appeal which had been filed before the High Court on behalf
of J amuna Prasad and Ganga Prasad, was disposed of in terms of the
petition of compromise. Jamuna Prasad died on 7.1.1987 leaving behind
the appellant as his widow and two sons. and four daughters including the
respondent. During the preparation of the final decree on 6.5.1989 respon- D
dent filed a petitiol\claiming l/3rd share in the properties. This applicatio~
was entertained because after the death of J amuna Prasad, respondent
claimed to be his one of the legal heirs. The application filed by the said
respondent was allowed by the Additional District Judge on 13.7.1990. The
appellant being arrived by the said order filed a Civil Revision Petition
before the High Court. The High Court was of the opinion that the E
application dated 6.5.1989 filed on behalf of the respondent was main-
tainable but the Trial Court has to decide afresh as to what share she was
entitled after hearing all the parties concerned. Against the said order of
the High Court, Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 15175 of 1991 was filed
before this Court, on behalf of the respondent, which was disposed of on F
3.3.1992. This Court gave the following direction: - .
"The appeal is, therefore,, allowed and the trial Court directed
to allot the shares of each legal representatives separately in
respect· of the share of J amuna Prasad as per Hindu Law without G
reference to any Will alleged to have been executed by J amuna
Prasad: However, we make it clear that this Will not preclude the
widow of J amuna Prasad to file a separate suit claiming title on
the basis of the Will. We further make it clear that on the ground
that she has filed or is going to file any such suit the final decree
proceedings should not be held up. The result of le~ving open the H
366 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1994] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.
'>
A truth and validity of the Will in question is to be separate suit is
that the allotment of the shares of Jamuna Prasad among the legal
representatives would confer title on the legal representatives only
subject to any defeasance at a later stage in case the Will was found
to be true, genuine and valid." ~
~
B It may be mentioned that, the appellant as widow of the aforesaid J amuna
Prasad, claimed in tbe proceedings pending before the trial Court that
Jamuna Prasad had executed a Will on 7.3.1986 bequeathing his property
to the appellant. The aforesaid observation/direction of this Court was in
connection with the said Will. The Additional District Judge on 7.12.1992
c purporting to pass an order .in the proceeding in terms of the order dated
3.3.1992 aforesaid passed by this Court, directed the Commissioner to
divide the property as per the decree and to submit his proposals before
the Court, after hearing the parties concerned. The Additional District
Judge, however, made an observation that the question of family settlement
alleged by the appellant was still open for adjudication. According to the
D appellant, after filing of the compromise petition aforesaid in the appeal
pending before the High Court on 5.5.1980, there was a family settlement
on 17.7.1981 and the Trial Court in its order aforesaid made reference to
the family settlement.
E The respondent being aggrieved by the aforesaid order dated
7.12.i992 filed a Civil Revision Petition No. 151 of 1993 before the High
Court, which has been disposed of by the impugned order dated 21.4.1994.
The High Court pointed out that by the order dated 3.3.1992, this Court
had not directed to Jake any family settlement into consideration before
F adjudication of the objections raised by the parties and as such it was not
open to the Trial Comt to make any reference to the said family settlement.
Having said so, the order dated 7.12.1992 was set aside and a direction was
given for afresh adjudication of objections raised by the parties to the
report of the Commissioner and while doing so the Trial Court was
directed to strictly follow the direction given by this Court on 3.3.1992..
---
..
._
~
G
On behalf of the appellant, it was pointed out that in the order dated
3.3.1992, passed on the earlier Special Leave Petition, filed on behalf of
the respondent, the family settlement has not been rejected or held to be
invalid and as such the sam~ has to be take~ into consideration for
H ascertaining the shares devolving on one or the other heirs of Jamuna
S. DEVI v. M.SHUKLA[N.P. SINGH, J.) 367
Prasad after his death. According to us, in view of the direction dated A
3.3.1992 given by this Court, which has become final, it was not open to
the Trial Court to take into consideration any family settlement alleged to
have been made by Jamuna Prasad, during his life time, in respect of the
,.. properties, which he got after partition from his other co-sharers. If any
such direction is given, it will amount to modifying the order dated 3.3.1992. B
The High Court was justified in issuing a direction to the Trial Court to
consider the objections to the report of the Commissioner in the light of
the direction given in the earlier Special Leave Petition on 3.3.1992. It need
not be pointed that when this Court said, the Trial Count shall allot the
shares of each legal representatives separately in respect of the properties
of J amuna Prasad as per the Hindu Law, this Court meant in accordance C
with the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act').
The learned counsel, appearing for the appellant, pointed out that if
the shares of the legal representatives of Jamuna Prasad, in respect of the
properties of Jamuna Prasad is to be worked out iji accordance with the
Act, there is no question of respondent getting l/3rd share, out of the D
properties left behind by J amuna Prasad, because after death of J amuna
Prasad, his interest in the coparcenery property would devolve upon his
widow the appellant, his two sons and four daughters.
The relevant part of Section 6 of the Act is as follows : - E
"Sec. 6 When a male Hindu dies after the commencement of
this Act, having at the time of his death an interest in a Mitakshara·
coparcenery property, his interest in the property shall devolve by
survivorship upon the surviving members of the coparcenery and
not in accordance with this Act : F
Provided that, _if the deceased had left him surviving a female
relative specified in Class I of the Schedule or a male relative,
specified in that class who claims, through such female relative,
the interest of the deceased in the Mitakshara coparcenery proper- G
ty shall devolve by testamentary or intestate succession, as the case
may be, under this Act and not by survivorship.
Explanation 1.-For the purposes of this section, the interest of a
Hindu Mitakshara coparcener shall be deemed to be the share in
the property that would have been allotted to him if a partition of H
368 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.
A the property had taken place immediately before this death, ir-
respective whether he was entitled to claitn partition or not."
In view of the direction given by this Court on 3.3.1992, we have to
proceed on the assumption that J amuna Prasad at the time of his death
had an interest in Mitakshara Coparcenery property and as such the
B pre-conditions of Section 6 are satisfied. Under the main provision of
Section 6, the interest of J amuna Prasad in the coparcenery property would
have devolved by survivorship upon the surviving members-of the copar-
cenery and not in accordance with the provisions of the Act. But in the
facts and circumstances of the case, the proviso to Section 6 along with the
.C Explanation I is attracted since the widow and daughters are amongst the
family relatives specified in Class I of Schedule to the Act. Proviso to
Section 6 come into operation, if the deceased leaves behind any female
relative specified in Class I of the Schedule of the Act or a male relative,
specified in that Class, who claims through such. female relative, the
interest of the deceased in the Mitakshara coparcenery property. Then in
D that event, it shall devolve by intestate succession under the provisions of
the Act and not by survivorship. As J amuna Prasad leaving behind his
widow the appellant and four daughter who shall be deemed to be family
relatives specified in class I of the Schedule to the Act, the proviso to
Section 6 shall come into play and the interest of J amuna Prasad shall
E devolve according to the said proviso by way of intestate succession under
the Act. The claim of the execution of a Will made by the appellant is not ·
to be taken into account at this stage in view of the earlier order dated
3.3.1992 passed by this court. The Explanation I contains the formula for
determining the share of the deceased and for that purpose a statutory
fiction has been introduced saying that interest of the person dying intes-
F tate shall be deemed to be share in the property that would have been
allotted to him, if partition of the property had taken place immediately
before his death. As such one had to imagine for purpose of ascertaining
the intestate of Jamuna Prasad in the coparcenery at the time of his death
that a partition of the property had been effected a little prior to his death.·
The scope of section 6 of the Act along with proviso and Explanation I has
G been examined in detail by this Court in the case of Gurupad Khandappa
Megdum v. Hirabai Khandappa Magdum, AIR (1978) SC 1239.
Mr. Gopal Subarmanium., Senior Advocate, appearing on behalf of
the respondents, took a stand that Section 6 is attracted only when the
H dispute is in respect of interest in Mitakshara Coparcenery property. As in
S. DEVI v. M.SHUKIA[N.P. SINGH, J.] 369
the present case there was partition, out of which the present dispute has A
arisen, it shall be deemed that there was no Mitakshara coparcenery
property in existence when Jamuna Prasad died. It is an admitted position
that the partition: suit which had been filed in the year 1965 in which
preliminary decree was passed on 24.1.1975, the partition sought for was
by Dhanpat Rai, representing one of the three15'ranches. It iS nobody's case B
that at that stage or any time later was inter se partition between Jamuna.
Prasad and his sons, who were members of coparcenery. As such it has to
be assumed that on the date of death, Jamuna Prasad was ~member of
coparcenery, and Section 6 as well as Explanation I to the said Section was
applicable to the interest of J amuna Prasad in the coparcenery properties
at the time of his death. C
Accordingly, the appeals are disposed of with a direction that the
Courts below shall adjudicate the shares of the legal representatives of
J amuna Prasad in accordance with the provisions of the Act, as directed
by this Court in its order dated 3.3.1992. However, in the facts and
circumstances of the case, there shall be no orders as to cost. D
G.N. Appeals disposed of.
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