SNEHASIS GIRI AND ORS.versusSUBHASIS MITRA

                         [2023] 2 S.C.R. 297                            297


                   SNEHASIS GIRI AND ORS.                               A
                                 v.
                        SUBHASIS MITRA
             (Contempt Petition (Civil) No. 352 of 2022)
                       FEBRUARY 02, 2023                                B
    [S. RAVINDRA BHAT AND DIPANKAR DATTA, JJ.]
       Contempt of Court – Certain provisions of the West Bengal
Madrasa Service Commission Act, 2008 regulating the process of
appointment of teachers in aided Madrasas recognized as minority
                                                                        C
institutions, were declared unconstitutional by High Court –
However, Supreme Court declared the provisions of the Act to be
valid and binding – During the pendency of the appeals, some
appointments were made by the madrasas – Contempt proceedings
filed seeking release of salaries of teachers appointed after the
provisions of the Act were declared unconstitutional by the High        D
Court – Held: Given the nature of the interim orders made during
the pendency of the appeal, there is no doubt that the court declared
the appointments to be valid to the extent, they conformed to the
concerned rules and norms – However, there was no discussion
w.r.t whether the Court had applied its mind as to how the madrasas
had proceeded to appoint teachers as teaching/non-teaching staff        E
– Also, there was no discussion regarding rules/regulations,
applicable circulars and guidelines in terms of which aided and
unaided recognized institutions could make appointments – In
contempt proceeding, court cannot enlarge its scope and examine
matters which are not part of the directions/orders contained in the
judgement of which contempt is alleged – Argument of the                F
respondent-alleged contemnors that there ought to be an exercise
of verification, is merited – Further proceedings cannot be
continued as no determination can be made unless there is a due
verification in regard to the employment of each of the petitioners –
Committee constituted to consider the claims of the petitioners –       G
West Bengal Madrasa Service Commission Act, 2008 – Constitution
of India – Art.142.
      Disposing of the petitions, the Court
     HELD: 1.1 The judgement of the High Court in the appeal
had declared unconstitutional certain provisions of the Act. This       H
                                297
298            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2023] 2 S.C.R.


A     court, in its judgement set aside those findings of the High Court
      regarding validity of the Act. Consequently, the provisions of the
      Act were held to be valid and binding. In Para 58, the court
      declared the nominations by the Commission in pursuance of the
      provisions of the Act as valid, and the appointments made, after
      disposal of the matters by the High Court as deemed to be valid
B
      for all purpose. However, there is no discussion with respect to
      whether the court had applied its mind as to how the madrasas
      had proceeded to appoint teachers as teaching/non-teaching staff.
      Also there is no discussion regarding rules/regulations, applicable
      circulars and guidelines in terms of which aided and unaided
C     recognized institutions could make appointments, having regard
      to the standard of education required and the requisite
      experience; whether a transparent method was followed; whether
      the madrasa concerned was recognized one or not; whether the
      committee or body selecting the individual was constituted in
      accordance with the rules and regulations, etc. The argument of
D
      the respondent/alleged contemnors that there ought to be an
      exercise of verification, therefore, appears to be merited and
      substantial. Thus, given the nature of the interim orders made
      during the pendency of the appeal, there can be no doubt that the
      court declared the appointments to be valid to the extent, they
E     conformed to the concerned rules and binding norms. The court,
      in contempt proceeding cannot enlarge its scope and examine
      matters which are not part of its remit, i.e. extent of the direction
      or orders contained in the judgement of which contempt being
      alleged. [Paras 6-9][302-F; 304-D-H; 305-B]
F           Sudhir Vasudeva v. M. George Ravishekaran (2014) 3
            SCC 373 : [2014] 4 SCR 27 – relied on.
            1.2 Further proceedings cannot be continued as no
      determination can be made unless there is a due verification in
      regard to the employment of each of the petitioners. Furthermore,
G     this court, in lawful exercise of contempt jurisdiction, cannot
      examine the merits of a decision, whether the state or the
      madrasa’s stand that any of the petitioners is entitled to the
      benefits of being treated as an employee, having regard to the
      concerned rules and regulations. [Paras 10 and 11][306-E-G]

H
        SNEHASIS GIRI AND ORS. v. SUBHASIS MITRA                              299


      J.S. Parihar v. Ganpat Duggar (1996) 6 SCC 291 :                        A
      [1996] 6 Suppl. SCR 110; Midnapore Peoples’ Coop.
      Bank Ltd. v. Chunilal Nanda (2006) 5 SCC 39 – relied
      on.
     1.3 A Committee headed by retired Judge, Calcutta High
Court is constituted exercising powers under Article 142 of the               B
constitution. Further directions issued. The Committee is
requested to consider the claims of the petitioner, keeping in
mind the issues enumerated. [Para 17][309-G-H; 310-A]
      Shaikh Md. Rafique v. Managing Committee, Conti
      Rahamania High Madrasah & Ors 2020 (6) SCC 689 :                        C
      [2020] 1 SCR 185 – referred to.
                         Case Law Reference
[2020] 1 SCR 185                            referred to      Para 2
[2014] 4 SCR 27                             relied on        Para 5           D
[1996] 6 Suppl. SCR 110                     relied on        Para 11
       CIVIL APPELLATE/INHERENT JURISDICTION : Contempt
Petition (Civil) No.352 of 2022. In Civil Appeal No.5808 of 2017.
      From the Judgment and Order dated 09.12.2015 of the High Court
of Calcutta in AST No.192 of 2014.                                            E

      With
       Conmt. Pet. (C) Nos.513/2022, 565, 566, 567, 568, 569, 570, 571,
572, 573, 574, 575/2023, 514, 515, 498, 516, 517/2022, 576, 577, 578, 579,
580, 581, 582, 583, 584, 585, 586, 587, 588, 589, 590, 591, 592, 593, 594/    F
2023, 353, 354, 355, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374,
494, 512/2022, 595, 596, 597, 598, 599, 600, 601/2023, 360, 361, 362, 363,
375, 376, 377, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 378, 379, 380, 495, 496,
497, 499, 500, 501, 502, 510, 511/2022, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 608,
609, 610, 611/2023 and Civil Appeal No.768 of 2023
                                                                              G
      Vijay Hansaria, Partha Sarathi Bhattacharya, C. U. Singh, Huzefa
A. Ahmedi, Sr. Advs., Abu Sahel, Rajeev Kumar Gupta, Parminder
Singh Bhullar, Pijush K. Roy, Mrs. Kakali Roy, Nayeemul Haq, Rajan
K. Chourasia, Gaurav Choudhary, Chand Qureshi, Sanjay Saini, Rahul
Mohod, Pradeep Mohod, Shiv Kumar Vats, Rama Kant Sharma, Dr.
                                                                              H
300               SUPREME COURT REPORTS                        [2023] 2 S.C.R.


A     Ram Kishor Choudhary, Pulkit Agarwal, Atarup Banerjee, Sunando Raha,
      Abu Sohel, Nishant Kumar, Biswroop Bhattacharya, Golam Mohinddin,
      Anindo Mukherjee, Rameshwar Prasad Goyal, Ms. Madhumita
      Bhattacharjee, Ms. Arushi Mishra, Shamshad, Aditya Samaddar, M R
      Shamshad, Shashank Singh, Arijit Sarkar, Ms. Nabeela Jamil, Advs. for
      the appearing parties.
B
               The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
               S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.
            1. Leave granted in SLP(C) No. 3352 of 2021. Permission to file
C     Contempt Petitions in Civil Appeal No. 5808/ 2017 is granted. These are
      taken along with the remaining above-mentioned Contempt Petitions.

             2. This order will dispose of several contempt petitions which
      complained of willful and deliberate violation of judgment of this Court in
      Shaikh Md. Rafique v. Managing Committee, Conti Rahamania High
D     Madrasah & Ors1. This court had to consider the correctness of the
      view expressed by the Calcutta High Court which held that some
      provisions of the West Bengal Madrasa Service Commission Act, 2008
      (hereafter, “the Act”) was unconstitutional. Those provisions regulated
      the process of appointment of teachers in aided Madrasas which were
      recognized as minority institutions. This court recorded its finding that
E
      the provisions in question, i.e., Sections 8, 10, 11 & 12 of the Act were
      valid and constitutional. At the same time the court was conscious that
      some appointments were made by the madrasas during the pendency
      of the appeals and held as follows:

F              “58. In the end, we declare all nominations made by the
               Commission in pursuance of the provisions of the Commission
               Act to be valid and operative. However, if after the disposal
               of the matters by the High Court any appointments are made
               by the concerned Madarshas, such appointments of teachers
               shall be deemed to be valid for all purposes. But the
G
               Commission shall hereafter be competent to select and
               nominate teachers to various Madarshas in accordance with
               the provisions of the Commission Act and the Rules framed
               thereunder.”
      1
          2020 (6) SCC 689
H
        SNEHASIS GIRI AND ORS. v. SUBHASIS MITRA                                   301
                 [S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

       3. All the petitioners argued that even during the pendency of the          A
proceedings in appeal, contempt proceedings had been drawn seeking
release of salaries of teachers who were appointed after the provisions
of the Act were declared unconstitutional by the High Court. The
petitioners advert to interim orders dated 10.05.2016, 01.08.2016,
17.05.2018, directing that those recruited or working during the pendency          B
of the proceedings ought to be paid salary. It is argued that the effect of
the judgement is that even while upholding the provisions of the Act, the
court at the same time protected the recruitment of the petitioners. In
these circumstances, denial of the benefit of regular service to them on
one pretext or the other by the respondent contemnors amounts to
deliberate and willful disregard of the Act, and calls for appropriate             C
stringent action.
        4. After notice was issued in this contempt proceedings and
considering the submissions of the parties, this Court had on 12.07.2022
directed the respondents (alleged contemnors) to consider and verify
                                                                                   D
the claims of the petitioners to examine whether they were legal and
valid and release appropriate amounts. The subsequent order of
23.02.2022 had observed that the terms of the final judgement of this
court, especially para 58 disclosed that benefits were not confined and
relief not granted only to the parties to the litigation but that the directions
had the effect of in rem adjudication. The court therefore directed the            E
respondent contemnors to verify from the record with respect to
entitlement of all petitioners. The contempt petitioners in their response
urged that there are express directions of this court to release salaries of
the contempt petitioners without insisting on verifying genuineness of
their claims of being teaching/non-teaching staff or having requisite              F
qualifications as required by law. It is also pointed out that this Court
was conscious that several appointments had been made which were
either irregular or unsustainable having regard to the norms applicable.
In this regard the respondent/alleged contemnors relied upon the order
dated 07.05.2018 to submit that in that order, the court had unequivocally
                                                                                   G
recorded that no equity would be created on the arrangements made in
the stop gap arrangement which would be subject to the final orders in
the civil appeals.

        5. The respondents also argued that the judgement of this court –
i.e. in the directions contained in paragraph 58 - nowhere contained an            H
302               SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2023] 2 S.C.R.


A     express direction to release salary in favour of anyone including the
      contempt petitioners without insisting upon verification of their claims of
      their being teaching/non- teaching staff or their having requisite
      qualification as prescribed by law. It is further submitted that even if the
      petitioners rely upon earlier interim orders, those were only for release
B     of salary subject to eligibility and verification as per law. The respondents
      have relied upon the judgement of this court in Sudhir Vasudeva v. M.
      George Ravishekaran2 , to submit that the court exercising contempt
      jurisdiction cannot traverse beyond the four corners of the judgement or
      order alleged to have been flouted or examine questions which have not
      been dealt with or decided in the judgement of which violation is alleged.
C     It is argued that all that this court did in the final judgement was to hold
      appointments of individuals made during the pendency of the appeals
      and the High Court judgement valid. The context of the judgement was
      the applicability of provisions of the Act. However, that did not mean
      that other statutory conditions such as qualifications, recognition or
D     otherwise of the madrasa concerned; its eligibility for grant-in-aid; the
      qualifications held by the candidate at the time of appointment; existence
      of vacancies and the manner in which the selection took place, etc.
      could not be considered. The alleged contemnors relied upon the
      recruitment rules in this regard which prescribed the manner of
E     recruitment such as publication of employment notification; the roster of
      vacancies; staffing pattern; whether the institution is eligible and admitted
      to aid or not.

             6. As noted earlier, the judgement of the High Court in the appeal
      had declared unconstitutional certain provisions of the Act. This court, in
F     its judgement set aside those findings of the High Court regarding validity
      of the Act. Consequently, the provisions of the Act were held to be valid
      and binding. The Act sought to regulate appointments to various
      institutions covered by it, including the madrasas in West Bengal. This
      court upheld the provisions of the Act after examining the relevant details
      and inter alia held as follows:
G
               “54. The regime put in place by the State legislature thus
               ensures that the Commission comprising of experts in the field
               would screen the talent all across the State; will adopt a fair
               selection procedure and select the best available talent purely
H     2
          (2014) 3 SCC 373
 SNEHASIS GIRI AND ORS. v. SUBHASIS MITRA                            303
          [S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

on merit basis; and even while nominating, the interest of the       A
minority institution will also be given due weightage and taken
care of. The statutory provisions thus seek to achieve
‘excellence’ in education and also seek to promote the interest
of the minority institutions. The provisions satisfy the test as
culled out in the decision of this Court in TMA Pai Foundation       B
case.

55. In our considered view going by the principles laid down
in the decision in TMA Pai Foundation case, the concerned
provisions cannot, therefore, be said to be transgressing the
rights of the minority institutions. The selection of the teachers   C
and their nomination by the Commission constituted under
the provisions of the Commission Act would satisfy the national
interest as well as the interest of the minority educational
institutions and said provisions are not violative of the rights
of the minority educational institutions.
                                                                     D
56. The aforesaid conclusions have been arrived at by us in
keeping with the principles laid down by this Court in TMA
Pai Foundation case.

  We are aware that in Brahmo Samaj Education Society,
                                                                     E
Sindhi Education Society and Chandana Das (Malakar),
decided after TMA Pai Foundation, this Court had also dealt
with the question whether the concerned authorities could
validly nominate teachers to be appointed in minority
educational institutions. Brahmo Samaj Education Society did
not specifically deal with the question whether rules were valid     F
or not and left it to the authorities to bring the rules and
regulations in conformity with the principles in TMA Pai
Foundation case. Sindhi Education Society dealt with the issue
in the context of reservation. It also found that the teachers
nominated by the concerned authorities would not be                  G
compatible to teach in educational institutions run by linguistic
minorities. In Chandana Das (Malakar) the basic issue was
whether the concerned institution was a minority institution
or not. Sindhi Education Society and Chandana Das
(Malakar) dealt with statutory regimes which did not have
                                                                     H
304            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2023] 2 S.C.R.


A           any special features or matters concerning compatibility of
            teachers which could be required going by the special
            characteristics of the minority educational institutions.
            However, the additional feature in the present matter shows
            that the composition of the Commission with special emphasis
B           on persons having profound knowledge in Islamic Culture
            and Theology, would ensure that the special needs and
            requirements of minority educational institutions will always
            be taken care of and thus the present case stands on a different
            footing.

C             We, therefore, have no hesitation in going by the test culled
            out in the TMA Pai Foundation and hold that the provisions
            of the Commission Act are not violative of the rights of the
            minority educational institutions on any count.”
             7. In Para 58, the court declared the nominations by the
D     Commission in pursuance of the provisions of the Act as valid, and the
      appointments made, after disposal of the matters by the High Court as
      deemed to be valid for all purpose. However, there is no discussion with
      respect to whether the court had applied its mind as to how the madrasas
      had proceeded to appoint teachers as teaching/non-teaching staff. Also
E     there is no discussion regarding rules/regulations, applicable circulars
      and guidelines in terms of which aided and unaided recognized institutions
      could make appointments, having regard to the standard of education
      required and the requisite experience; whether a transparent method
      was followed; whether the madrasa concerned was recognized one or
      not; whether the committee or body selecting the individual was
F
      constituted in accordance with the rules and regulations, etc. The
      argument of the respondent/alleged contemnors that there ought to be
      an exercise of verification, therefore, appears to be merited and
      substantial.

G            8. In these circumstances, given the nature of the interim orders
      made during the pendency of the appeal, there can be no doubt that the
      court declared the appointments to be valid to the extent, they conformed
      to the concerned rules and binding norms. To hold otherwise would be to
      disregard the provisions, norms and guidelines constituting the essential
H
        SNEHASIS GIRI AND ORS. v. SUBHASIS MITRA                             305
                 [S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

and basic standards which every educational institution is expected to       A
conform to.
        9. Furthermore, there is merit in the respondents’ submission that
the court, in contempt proceeding cannot enlarge its scope and examine
matters which are not part of its remit, i.e. extent of the direction or
orders contained in the judgement of which contempt being alleged. In        B
fact, in the decision in Sudhir Vasudeva (supra), it was held as follows:

      “19. The power vested in the High Courts as well as this Court
      to punish for contempt is a special and rare power available
      both under the Constitution as well as the Contempt of Courts          C
      Act, 1971. It is a drastic power which, if misdirected, could
      even curb the liberty of the individual charged with commission
      of contempt. The very nature of the power casts a sacred duty
      in the Courts to exercise the same with the greatest of care
      and caution. This is also necessary as, more often than not,
                                                                             D
      adjudication of a contempt plea involves a process of self-
      determination of the sweep, meaning and effect of the order
      in respect of which disobedience is alleged. The Courts must
      not, therefore, travel beyond the four corners of the order
      which is alleged to have been flouted or enter into questions
      that have not been dealt with or decided in the judgment or            E
      the order violation of which is alleged. Only such directions
      which are explicit in a judgment or order or are plainly self-
      evident ought to be taken into account for the purpose of
      consideration as to whether there has been any disobedience
      or wilful violation of the same. Decided issues cannot be              F
      reopened; nor can the plea of equities be considered. The
      Courts must also ensure that while considering a contempt
      plea the power available to the Court in other corrective
      jurisdictions like review or appeal is not trenched upon. No
      order or direction supplemental to what has been already               G
      expressed should be issued by the Court while exercising
      jurisdiction in the domain of the contempt law; such an
      exercise is more appropriate in other jurisdictions vested in
      the Court, as noticed above. The above principles would
                                                                             H
306               SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2023] 2 S.C.R.


A              appear to be the cumulative outcome of the precedents cited
               at the Bar, namely, Jhareswar Prasad Paul v. Tarak Nath
               Ganguly [(2002) 5 SCC 352 : 2002 SCC (L&S) 703] , V.M.
               Manohar Prasad v. N. Ratnam Raju [(2004) 13 SCC 610 :
               2006 SCC (L&S) 907] , Bihar Finance Service House
B              ConstructionCoop. Society Ltd. v. Gautam Goswami [(2008)
               5 SCC 339] and Union of India v. Subedar Devassy PV
               [(2006) 1 SCC 613].”

             10. In the present case too, this court is of the opinion that the
      respondents’ stand that without verification of the petitioners’ appointment
C     and whether the procedures prescribed were duly followed in respect of
      matters such as fulfilling eligibility conditions (essential qualifications and
      relevant experience); availability of vacancy; staff pattern in respect of
      madrasas where recognition was granted and if so for what period;
      whether the institution was aided and recognized or not or recognized
D     and non-aided, and if so for what duration; whether a duly empowered
      selection body or bodies considered the candidature of the claimant before
      he/she was appointed and whether the committee or body selecting the
      individual/claimant was constituted in accordance with the rules or
      guidelines, etc is justified. In these circumstances, this court is of the
      opinion that further proceedings cannot be continued as no determination
E
      can be made unless there is a due verification in regard to the employment
      of each of the petitioners.

             11. Furthermore, this court, in lawful exercise of contempt
      jurisdiction, cannot examine the merits of a decision, whether the state
F     or the madrasa’s stand that any of the petitioners is entitled to the benefits
      of being treated as an employee, having regard to the concerned rules
      and regulations. In J.S. Parihar v. Ganpat Duggar3 this court explained
      the limited scope of contempt proceedings, as follows, in the facts of the
      case:

G              “6. The question then is whether the Division Bench was right
               in setting aside the direction issued by the learned Single
               Judge to redraw the seniority list. It is contended by Mr S.K.
               Jain, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant, that
               unless the learned Judge goes into the correctness of the
      3
H         (1996) 6 SCC 291
           SNEHASIS GIRI AND ORS. v. SUBHASIS MITRA                           307
                    [S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

         decision taken by the Government in preparation of the               A
         seniority list in the light of the law laid down by three Benches,
         the learned Judge cannot come to a conclusion whether or
         not the respondent had wilfully or deliberately disobeyed the
         orders of the Court as defined under Section 2(b) of the Act.
         Therefore, the learned Single Judge of the High Court                B
         necessarily has to go into the merits of that question. We do
         not find that the contention is well founded. It is seen that,
         admittedly, the respondents had prepared the seniority list on
         2-7-1991. Subsequently promotions came to be made. The
         question is whether seniority list is open to review in the
         contempt proceedings to find out whether it is in conformity         C
         with the directions issued by the earlier Benches. It is seen
         that once there is an order passed by the Government on the
         basis of the directions issued by the court, there arises a fresh
         cause of action to seek redressal in an appropriate forum.
         The preparation of the seniority list may be wrong or may be         D
         right or may or may not be in conformity with the directions.
         But that would be a fresh cause of action for the aggrieved
         party to avail of the opportunity of judicial review. But that
         cannot be considered to be the wilful violation of the order.
         After re-exercising the judicial review in contempt                  E
         proceedings, a fresh direction by the learned Single Judge
         cannot be given to redraw the seniority list. In other words,
         the learned Judge was exercising the jurisdiction to consider
         the matter on merits in the contempt proceedings. It would
         not be permissible under Section 12 of the Act. Therefore, the
         Division Bench has exercised the power under Section 18 of           F
         the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance being a judgment or
         order of the Single Judge; the Division Bench corrected the
         mistake committed by the learned Single Judge. Therefore, it
         may not be necessary for the State to file an appeal in this
         Court against the judgment of the learned Single Judge when          G
         the matter was already seized of the Division Bench.”
      12. In a later decision, Midnapore Peoples’ Coop. Bank Ltd. v.
Chunilal Nanda4 this court explained the limitations of a court exercising
contempt jurisdiction:
4
    (2006) 5 SCC 399                                                          H
308     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                       [2023] 2 S.C.R.


A     “11. The position emerging from these decisions, in regard to
      appeals against orders in contempt proceedings may be
      summarised thus:
          I. An appeal under Section 19 is maintainable only against
      an order or decision of the High Court passed in exercise of
B     its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, that is, an order
      imposing punishment for contempt.
         II. Neither an order declining to initiate proceedings for
      contempt, nor an order initiating proceedings for contempt
      nor an order dropping the proceedings for contempt nor an
C     order acquitting or exonerating the contemnor, is appealable
      under Section 19 of the CC Act. In special circumstances,
      they may be open to challenge under Article 136 of the
      Constitution.

         III. In a proceeding for contempt, the High Court can decide
D
      whether any contempt of court has been committed, and if so,
      what should be the punishment and matters incidental thereto.
      In such a proceeding, it is not appropriate to adjudicate or
      decide any issue relating to the merits of the dispute between
      the parties.
E
         IV. Any direction issued or decision made by the High Court
      on the merits of a dispute between the parties, will not be in
      the exercise of “jurisdiction to punish for contempt” and,
      therefore, not appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act.
      The only exception is where such direction or decision is
F
      incidental to or inextricably connected with the order
      punishing for contempt, in which event the appeal under
      Section 19 of the Act, can also encompass the incidental or
      inextricably connected directions.

G        V. If the High Court, for whatsoever reason, decides an
      issue or makes any direction, relating to the merits of the
      dispute between the parties, in a contempt proceedings, the
      aggrieved person is not without remedy. Such an order is open
      to challenge in an intra-court appeal (if the order was of a
      learned Single Judge and there is a provision for an intra-
H
        SNEHASIS GIRI AND ORS. v. SUBHASIS MITRA                               309
                 [S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

      court appeal), or by seeking special leave to appeal under               A
      Article 136 of the Constitution of India (in other cases).”
       13. It is thus, apparent, that if this court were to pronounce upon
the merits of the respondents’ position, it would necessarily have to
consider the facts of each case, and decide whether the stand of the
alleged contemnors – wherever a decision adverse to the petitioners is         B
taken, is correct on its merits. That exercise, plainly is not admissible in
proper exercise of contempt jurisdiction.
       14. The above observations would have ordinarily been conclusive
and dispositive of the present petitions. However, this court is conscious
                                                                               C
of the fact that the process of verification undertaken by the state would
result in further delay and may lead to multifarious litigation, spelling
uncertainty to individuals and members of staff of madrasas who were
appointed after following all norms and procedures.
       15. During the hearing this court had suggested constitution of a       D
committee which would examine all relevant factors and verify the claims
of the petitioners which could then be considered and acted upon by the
same. This suggestion was acceptable to the state, the commission and
concerned madrasas who are represented by Mr. Rakesh Dwivedi, Mr.
C.U. Singh, Sr. Advocates and other counsel.
                                                                               E
       16. During the hearing, the court had suggested constitution of a
committee which would go into all relevant factors and verify the claims
of the petitioners which would then be considered and acted upon by the
same. This suggestion was acceptable to the state, the concerned
madrasas and the petitioners, represented by M/s. Rakesh Dwivedi,              F
C.U. Singh, and Huzeffa Ahmadi, Sr. Advocates, Ms. Madhumita
Bhattacharjee, Mr. Bikash Ranjan Bhattacharya, and other counsel.

       17. Accordingly, this Court exercising its powers under Article
142 hereby constitutes a Committee headed by Justice Debi Prasad
Dey, retired Judge, Calcutta High Court. The Committee shall also consist      G
of a Principal Secretary ranking officer of the IAS, who had served in
the West Bengal cadre and stationed in Kolkata with experience in the
Higher Education Department as well as a retired Registrar of one of
the State Universities in West Bengal, residing in Kolkata. The State
Government shall nominate the members other than the Chairman. The             H
310             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2023] 2 S.C.R.


A     Committee is requested to consider the claims of the petitioner, keeping
      in mind the following:

            (a) Whether the madrasa or its managing committee was
            recognized by the state government on the date on which the
            appointment was made?
B
            (b) Whether such appointments were made, of candidates who
            possessed the requisite prescribed qualifications and fulfilled the
            experience and other eligible conditions stipulated for the post
            concerned?
C           (c) Whether such an appointment was made by following the
            recruitment procedure indicated in the Kolkata Gazette Notification
            dated 11-03- 2015 (No. 93-SE/S/10R-14/2013-9th February, 2015)
            and in Kolkata Gazette Notification dated 04-03-2016 (No. 486-
            MD/O/2M-11/2016)?
D
            (d) Whether the appointments were made against vacancies that
            existed and whether the vacancies conformed to the staffing
            pattern for the concerned institution/madrasas

            (e) Whether after the appointments were made, the persons
E           appointed actually worked on their respective posts?

            (f) Whether the appointments were actually made on the date of
            the appointment letter, or were backdated?

            18. The remuneration of the Chairperson of the Committee shall
F     be ` 10,00,000/- and that of each member shall be ` 5,00,000/-. The
      committee shall complete its task expeditiously; and, within four months
      from today, submit a report to the State Government, which shall then
      pass appropriate orders in respect of the petitioners within two months
      thereafter.

G            19. Ms. Madhumita Bhattacharjee submitted that all necessary
      co-operation would be extended by the State Government, which is
      directed to provide infrastructure, and the necessary staff to the committee
      to complete its task. The State Government is directed to notify the
      committee, within four weeks from today, and give appropriate publicity
      to those interested to seek verification of their claim. Such publicity shall
H
         SNEHASIS GIRI AND ORS. v. SUBHASIS MITRA                                311
                  [S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

be through appropriate advertisement in newspapers, both in English              A
and in Bengali. In addition, the notification shall also be placed on the
website of the State Government’s Minority Affairs & Madrasah
Education Department, Nabanna, Howrah. The notification shall indicate
the time within which representations can be made. It is open to those
claiming benefit, as well as those likely to be affected by the report, to       B
represent to the committee, within the time stipulated. The committee
shall also consider a suitable and practicable method of giving hearing to
those interested.

       20. These petitions and pending applications/appeal(s) are disposed
of in the above terms.                                                           C


Divya Pandey                                            Petitions disposed of.
(Assisted by : Shevali Monga, LCRA)


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