SONU@AMARversusSTATE OF HARYANA

                       [2017] 8 S.C.R. 151


                         SONU@AMAR                                     A
                                 v.
                      STATE OF HARYANA
                                               /
                 (Criminal Appeal Np.1418 of2013)
                           JULY 18,2017                                B

       [S. A. BOBDE AND L. NAGESWARA RAO, JJ.]
     Penal Code, 1860:
      ss. 120B, 364A, 302, 328A and 201 - Abduction and
murder - On facts, abduction and murder of victim - Conviction of C
Al to A5 for the offences punishable u/s. 120B, 364A, 302, 328A
and 201 and sentenced to life imprisonment - Conviction of A6 uls.
328 and 201 and sentenced to seven years - On the basis of
testimonies of PWJ and PW3, recoveries made pursuant to the
disclosure statement of the accused and Call Detail Records (CDR) D
of the mobile phones of the accused - Upheld by the High Court -
On appeal, held: Prosecution proved the arrest and subsequent
recoveries made pursuant to disclosure statement made by Al,
interested testimonies of DWs 2 and 5 does not merit acceptance -
Dead body of the victim-deceased was ident(fied by his relatives -
As regards A4, there was sufficient evidence to suggest that he was E
in constant touch with other accused - His mobile phone and
recoveries were made pursuant to the disclosure statement clearly
                                                             s
proves his involvement-As regards A5, recovery of deceased wallet
from underneath his seat reliable - Thus, the judgment of the High
 Court is upheld.
                                                                    F
       Evidence Act, 1872:
       s. 65B (4) - interpretation - Admissibility of electronic
 records - Admissibility of Call Detail Record (CDR) - No objection
 taken when the CDRs were adduced in evidence before the trial
 court or appellate stage before the High Court - Permissibility of G
 an objection regarding inadmissibility at this stage - Held:
·Objection relating to the mode or method of proof has to be raised
 at the time of marking of the document as an exhibit and not later -
 Crucial test is whether the d~fect could have been cured at the stage .
 of marking the document - Objections regarding admissibility of
                                                                         H
                                   151
152            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2017] 8 S.C.R.


A documents which are per se inadmissible can be taken even at the
      appellate stage because it is a .fundamental issue - Mode or method
      of proof is procedural and objections, if not taken at the trial, cannot
      be permitted at the appellate stage - Objection that CDRs are
      unreliable due to violation of the procedure prescribed in s. 65 B (4
B     cannot be permitted to be raised at this stage as the objection relates
      to the mode or method of proof - Chainchal Singh s case does not
      lay down a general proposition taht the acrnsed is not competent to
      waive his right to object to the mode of proof of a document in a
      criminal case.
            s. 65B (4) - Certificate for proving electronic records - Held:
c Contents of electronic records may be proved in accordance with
  the provisions contained in s. 65B - Electronic record is not
  admissible unless it is accompanied by a certificate as contemplated
  uls. 65B (4) - This Court in 2014, in Anvar's case held that an
  electronic record is inadmissible in evidence without the
D certification - This Court in 2005 in Navjot Sandhu's case held that
  there was no necessity of a certificate for proving electronic records
  which held the field till it was overruled in Anvar's case - In Anvar's
  case, the Court did not apply principle of 'prospective
  overruling' - If the judgment in Anvar's case is applied
  retrospectively, it would result in unscrambling past transactions
E
  and adversely affecting the administration of justice - As Anvar's
  case was decided by a Three Judge Bench, in view of judicial
  propriety this Court refrains from declaring that the judgment would
  be prospective in operation - Matter left open to be decided in an
  appropriate case by a Three Judge Bench - Principle of 'prospective
F overruling' - Retrospective operation - Judicial propriety.
            Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973:
         s. 294 - Procedure for filing documents in a court by the
  prosecution or the accused - Documents have to be included in a
  list and the other side shall be given an opportunity to admit or
G deny the genuineness of each document - In case the genuineness
  is not disputed, such document shall be read in evidence without
  formal proof in accordance with the Evidence Act.
            Dismissing the appeals, the Court
            HELD: 1.1 An electronic record is not admissible unless it
H
            SONU @AMAR v. STATE OF HARYANA                            153


is accompanied by a certificate as contemplated under Section         A
65B (4) of the Evidence Act. As regards the permissibility of an
objection regarding inadmissibility at this stage, no objection was
taken when the CDRs were adduced in evidence before the trial
court. It does not appear from the record that any such objection
was taken even at the appellate stage before the High Court.          B
[Para 261 [168-B-C)
       1.2 It is nobody's case that CDRs which are a form of
electronic record are not inherently admissible in evidence. The
objection is that they were marked before the trial court without
a certificate as required by Section 658 (4). It is clear that an
objection relating to the mode or method of proof has to be raised c
at the time of marking of the document as an exhibit and not
later. The crucial test is whether the defect could have been cured
at the stage of marking the document. Applying this test to the
instant case, if an objection was taken to the CDRs being marked
without a certificate, the Court could have given the prosecution D
an opportunity to rectify the deficiency. It is also clear that
objections regarding admissibility of documents which are per se
inadmissible can be taken even at the appellate stage.
Admissibility of a document which is inherently inadmissible is
an issue which can be taken up at the appellate stage because it
is a fundamental issue. The mode or method of proof is procedural E
and objections, if not taken at the trial, cannot be permitted at
the appellate stage. If the objections to the mode of proof are
permitted to be taken at the appellate stage by a party, the other
side does not have an opportunity of rectifying the deficiencies.
The Counsel for the State referred to statements under Section F
161 Cr. P.C. 1973 as an example of documents falling under the
said category of inherently inadmissible evidence. CDRs do not
fall in the said category of documents. An objection that CDRs
 are unreliable due to violation of the procedure prescribed in
 Section 65 B (4) cannot be permitted to be raised at this stage as
the objection relates to the mode or method of proof. In the instant G
 case, there is a clear failure to object to the mode of proof of the
 CDRs. [Paras 27, 28] [170-B-G]
    1.3 Section 294 Cr. P.C. 1973 provides a procedure for filing
documents in a Court by the prosecution or the accused. The
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154           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     [2017) 8 S.C.R.


A documents have to be included in a list and the other side shall
  be given an opportunity to admit or deny the genuineness of each
  document. In case the genuineness is not disputed, such
  document shall be read in evidence without formal proof in
  accordance with the Evidence Act. [Para 301 [173-E-Fl
B            1.4 Electronic records play a crucial role in criminal
      investigations and prosecutions. The contents of electronic
      records may be proved in accordance with the provisions
      contained in Section 65B. Interpreting section 65B(4), this Court
      in Anvar s case held that an electronic record is inadmissible in
      evidence without the certification as provided therein. The
 C    interpretation of section 65B (4) by this Court by a judgment
      dated 04.08.2005 in Navjot Sandhu held the field till it was
      overruled on 18.09.2014 in Anvar's case. All the criminal courts
      in this country are bound to follow the law as interpreted by this
      Court. Because of the interpretation of s. 65B in Navjot Sandhu,
D     there was no necessity of a certificate for proving electronic
      records. A large number of trials have been held during the said
      period. Electronic records without a certificate might have been
      adduced in evidence. There is no doubt that the judgment of this
      Court in Anvar's case has to be retrospective in operation unless
      the judicial tool of 'prospective overruling' is applied. However,
 E    retrospective application of the judgment is not in the interests
      of administration of justice as it would necessitate the reopening
      of a large number of criminal cases. Criminal cases decided on
      the basis of electronic records adduced in evidence without
      certification have to be revisited as and when objections are taken
 F    by the accused at the appellate stage. Attempts will be made to
       reopen cases which have become final. [Paras 31, 32[ [173-G-H;
       174-A-Dl
         1.5 This Court did not apply the principle of prospective
   overruling in Anvar's case. If the judgment in the case of Anvar
 G is applied retrospectively, it would result in unscrambling past
   transactions and adversely affecting the administration of justice.
   As Anvar's case was decided by a Three Judge Bench, propriety
   demands that this Court refrains from declaring that the judgment
   would be prospective in operation. It is left open to be decided in
   an appropriate case by a Three Judge Bench. In any event, this
 H
           SONU @ AMAR v. STATE OF HARYANA                           155


question is not germane for adjudication of the instant dispute in   A
view of the adjudication of the other issues against the accused.
The judgment of the High Court confirming the trial court is
upheld. [Paras 35, 36) [176-B-D)
     Dalbir Kaur v. State ofPunjab (1976) 4 SCC 158:(1977)
     1 SCR 280; Anvar P. V. v. P.K. Basheer (2014) 10 SCC            B
     473 : (2014) 11 SCR 399; State (NCT ofDelhi) v. Navjot
     Sandhu (2005) 11 SCC 600 : [2005) 2 Suppl. SCR 79;
     Padman v. Hanwanta AIR 1915 PC 1; RVE
     Venkatachala Gounder v. Arulmigu Visweswaraswami
     (2003) 8 sec 752 : (20031 4 Suppl. SCR 450;
     Chainchal Singh v. King Emperor AIR 1946 PC 1;                  c
     Shaikh Farid v. State of Maharashtra 1983 CrLJ 487;
     Gopal Das v. Sri Thakurji AIR 1943 PC 83; P C
     Purshothama Reddiar v. S Perumal (1972) 1 SCC 9 :
     [1972) 2 SCR 646; IC Golak Nath v. State of Punjab,
     (19671 2 SCR 762; K. Madhav Reddy v. State ofAndhra             D
     Pradesh (2014) 6 SCC 537: (2014( 7 SCR 348 -
     referred to.
      Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914); Wolf v.
      Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949); Mapp v. Ohio 367 U.S.
      643 (1961); Linkletter v. Walker 381 U.S. 618 (1965);          E
      R. v. Governor of H.M. Prison Brockhill, ex p. Evans
      (No. 2) (20001 4 All ER 15 - referred to.
                      Case Law Reference
(1977) 1 SCR 280                    referred to       Para 14
(2014) 11 SCR 399                   referred to       Para 23        F
[2005) 2 Suppl. SCR 79              referred to       Para 23
AIR 1915 PC 1                       referred to       Para 24
[2003) 4 Suppl. SCR 450             referred to       Para 25
AIR 1946 PC 1                       referred to       Para 25        G
1983 CrLJ 487                       referred to       Para 25
AIR 1943 PC 83                      referred to       Para 26
[1972) 2 SCR 646                    referred to       Para 26
[1967) 2 SCR 762                    referred to       Para 33
[2014) 7 SCR 348                    referred to       Para 35        H
156            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                        [2017] 8 S.C.R.


A           CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
      No. 1418 of2013.
            From the Judgment and Order dated 11.l 0.2012 of the High Court
      of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in CRA No. I 066-DB of 2010
                                      WITH
B
            Cr!. A. No. 1416 of2013
            Crl.A. Nos. 1652and1653 of2014.
         Sidharth Luthra, Sr. Adv., Sunil Malhotra, Santosh Srivastava,
   Ms. Sudha Srivastava, Kuna! Malhotra, Ms. Reeta Puri, P. N. Puri, Pawan
 C Sharma, D. B. Goswami, Deepak Thokchom, Sri Loknath Rath,
   Dr. Sushil Balwada, Harikesh Singh, Satyendra Kumar, Ram Lal Roy,
   Advs. for the Appellant.
        Vivek Sood, U. K. Uniyal, Sr. Advs., Vinod Sharma, Dinesh
   Chander Yadav, AAGs, Pawan Reley, Dr. Monika Gusain, D. K. Garg,
 D Dhananjay Garg, Vishwa Pal Singh, Advs. for the Respondent.
            The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
          L. NAGESWARA RAO, J. I. The Appellants in the above
   appeals along with Dharmender@Bunty were found guilty of abduction
   and murder of Ramesh Jain. They were convicted and sentenced for
 E life imprisonment. Their conviction and sentence was confirmed by the
   High Court. Accused Dharmender@ Bunty did not file an appeal before
   this Court. Accused Rampa) was convicted under Section 328 read
   with 20 I IPC and was sentenced to 7 years imprisonment. His conviction
   was also confirmed by the High Court which is not assailed before us.
 F        2. Dinesh Jain (PW-I) approached the SHO, Ganaur Police Station
   (PW 31) at 01 :30 pm on 26.12.2005 with a complaint that his father was
   missing on the basis of which FIR was registered by PW 31. As per the
   FIR, Dinesh Jain left the rice mill at 7:00 pm on 25.12.2005 and went
   home while his father stayed back. As his father did not reach home
   even at l 0:00 pm, he called his father's mobile number and found it to be
 G switched off. He went to the rice mill and enquired about the whereabouts
   of his father from Radhey, the Chowkidar and was informed that his
   father left the rice mill at 9:30 pm on his motor cycle bearing Registration
   No. DL-8-SY-4510. He along with his family members searched for his
   father but could not trace him. He apprehended that his father might
 H have been kidnapped.
             SONU @AMAR v. STATE OF HARYANA                                157
                  [L. NAGESWARA RAO, J.]

       3. After registration of the FIR, PW 31 started investigation by A
visiting the rice mill and making inquiries. On 28.12.2005 one motor cycle
was recovered from a pit near Bai crossing. As the number plate of the
vehicle was blurred, PW31 verified the engine number, compared it with
the registration certificate to find that the seized motor cycle belonged to
Ramesh Jain.
                                                                             B
       4. On 09.01.2006, Dinesh Jain (PW 1) and Ashok Jain (PW 3)
informed PW 31 that a call was received on the mobile phone of PW 1
from a person who identified himself as Bunty and who was speaking in
Bihari dialect. He informed them that Ramesh Jain was in his .custody
and demanded a ransom of Rs. I crore for his release. They were also
asked to purchase another mobile phone having Delhi network to which C
future calls would be made. The Investigating Officer (PW31) visited
the rice mill belonging to deceased Ramesh Jain on 17.01.2006 and met
PW 1, PW3 and Dhir Singh (PW 7). They handed over four threatening
letters (Exh.P 1 to P 4), one key ring (Exh.P 9), one silver ring having a
precious stone (Exh.P 10) and a piece of cloth of a shirt worn by the D
deceased on 25.12.2005 when he was kidnapped (Exh.Pl 1). PW 1 and
PW 3 informed the Investigating Officer that Bunty called them and told
them that they would find the key ring, silver ring, a piece of cloth and
cuttings of newspaper near Bai crossing. They collected the said articles
from Bai crossing.
                                                                             E
        5. The Investigating Officer along with SRO Special Cell, Rohini,
Delhi constituted three raiding parties on 20.01.2006 on the basis of
information that the accused would visit Tibetan Market. Pawan (Al),
Surender (A2) and Dharmender@ Bunty (A3) were arrested at 11 :45
pm when they visited the Tibetan Market, Delhi in a Maruti car. Their
mobile phones and some cash were recovered from them.                        F
       6. On 22.01.2006, Amar@ Sonu (AS) and Parveen (A4) were
arrested near the bus stand at Ganaur Chowk, GT Road, Ganaur. Two
mobile phones were seized from Sonu (AS). Parveen @ Titu (A4)
suffered a disclosure statement during the course of investigation that
Ramesh Jain was abducted and a demand of Rs. 1 crore was made               G
from his family members for his release. Parveen (A4) stated that
Ramesh Jain was murdered and his dead body was buried at Baba Rude
Nath temple in village Kheri Khusnam. In his disclosure statement,
Surender (A2) further disclosed that Dr. Rampa! administered injections
to keep Ramesh Jain unconscious. He further disclosed that Ramesh           H
158           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2017] 8 S.C.R.


A Jain was murdered on 29.12.2005 and his dead body was buried in a pit
  at Baba Rude Nath temple. Dharmender@ Bunty (A3) and Surender
  (A2) also suffered disclosure statements in which they stated that they
  can identify the place where Ramesh Jain was murdered and buried.
         7. The Investigating Officer was led by Parveen (A4),
B Dharmender (A3) and Surender (A2) to Baba Rude Nath temple in
  village Kheri Khusnam on 22.01.2006. The room in which Ramesh Jain
  was confined and murdered was pointed out by A2 to A4. The dead
  body of Ramesh Jain was exhumed from the place identified by A2 and
  A4. PWl, PW3, PW6 along with PWl 1 Jai Chand, SDM were present
C at the spot from where the dead body of Ramesh Jain was taken out
  from the pit.
             8. On 24.01.2006, a disclosure statement was made by Parveen
     (A4) pursuant to which he identified the place where the key ring of the
     motor cycle, threatening letters and a ring of deceased Ramesh Jain
     were placed near a sign board at the crossing of village Bai. He further
 D · disclosed that he concealed another ring of Ramesh Jain at his house in
     village Ghasoli at a place which he can only identify. Parveen led the
     police party to the place where he concealed the golden ring of the
     deceased which was identified by PWl and recovered through memo
     Exh.PT/5. Dharmender@ Bunty (A3) Jed the police party to a rented
 E room situated at Shashtri Park, Delhi from where the SIM card of mobile
     No. 9896351091 belonging to deceased Ramesh Jain was recovered
     from a concealed place. Pursuant to a disclosure statement, he also
     identified the place where the motor cycle of deceased was thrown
     after he was abducted. On 30.01.2006, Sonu @Amar suffered a
     disclosure statement to the effect that he had concealed the wallet of
 F Ramesh Jain and certain documents like PAN card, diary, three electricity
     bills, two water bills and his photographs underneath the seat of his shop
     which were exclusively in his knowledge. The said documents were
      seized by the Investigating Officer from the shop belonging to Sonu @
      Amar (AS). The registration certificate of the motor cycle of deceased
 G Ramesh Jain was recovered from a drawer of the table in the house
      situated at Begha Road, Ganaur which was occupied by Pawan (A I)
      pursuant to a disclosure statement by him. A country made pistol with
      two live cartridges were recovered from the same room situated at Begha
      Road on the basis of disclosure statement made by Surender (A2).

 H          9. Dr. Ram Pal (A6) surrendered in the Court of Sub Divisional
            SONU @AMAR v. STATE OF HARYANA _,                              1S9
                 [L. NAGESWARA RAO, J.]

Judicial Magistrate (SDJM), Ganaur on 01.02.2006. He suffered a A
disclosure statement on the basis of which a syringe which was used for
giving injections to keep the deceased unconscious was seized from the
roof of Baba Rude Nath temple, village Kheri Khusnam. A spade was
also recovered from underneath a cot in his house on the basis of his
disclosure statement.
                                                                        B
       10. The Investigating Officer collected the Call Detail Records
(CDRs) of all the mobile phones that were recovered from the accused,
mobile phones of the deceased and Dinesh Jain (PW 1) from the Nodal
officers of the mobile companies.
       11. Accused Manish (A 7) who is a cousin of Sonu (AS) c
surrendered on 12.04.2006 in the Court ofSDJM, Ganaur. He is alleged
to have assisted AS in the abduction. He was acquitted by the Trial .
Court which was confirmed by the High Court which remains
unchallenged. The accused were tried for offences punishable tinder
Section 120 B, 364A, 302, 328Aand201 read with 120 B of the Indian
Penal Code. In addition, A2 was also charged for committing an offence D
under Section 2S of the Arms Act. The Additional Sessions Judge, Sonepat
by his judgment dated 11.10.2010 convicted Al to AS for the aforesaid
 offences and sentenced them to life imprisonment. A6 was convicted
under Section 328 and 201 oflPC and sentenced to seven years. All the
 convicted accused filed appeals before the High Court. Dinesh Jain E
 (PW 1) filed an appeal for enhancement of the sentence of the convicted
 appellants. He also challenged the acquittal of accused Manish (A7).
 The High Court dismissed all the appeals after a detailed re-appreciation
 of the material on record. Al, A2, A4 and AS have approached this
 Court by filing appeals against the confirmation of their conviction and
 sentence.                                                                 F

       12. We have carefully examined the entire material on record and
the judgments of the Trial Court and the High Court. The Trial Court relied ·
on the testimonies of PW l and PW3, the recoveries made pursuant to the
disclosure statements of the accused and the CDRs of the mobile phones
of the accused, the deceased and PW 1 to conclude that the prosecution G
established that the accused are guilty beyond reasonable doubt. The Trial
Court also discussed the complicity of each of the accused threadbare.
The High Court re-appreciated the evidence and placed reliance on the
disclosure statements, the consequential recoveries and the CDRs of the
mobile phones to confirm the findings of the Trial Court.
                                                                              H
160           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2017] 8 S.CR.


A         13. Ramesh Jain left his rice mill at 9:30 pm on 25.12.2005. His
  dead body was exhumed from the premises of the temple in village
  Kheri Khusnam on the intervening night of 22/23.01.2006. The post
  mortem examination was conducted by Dr. Pankaj Jain (PWl6) on
  23.01.2006. He deposed that the process of decomposition was in
  progress. The skin was peeled off at most places. A muffler was present
8
  around the neck of the dead body. Both wrists and ankles were tied by
  a piece of cloth. The hyoid bone was found fractured. In the opinion of
  PW 16, Ramesh Jain died of asphyxia. The probable time of death,
  according to him, was 3/4 weeks prior to 23.01.2006. He also deposed
  that the process of decomposition would be slower during winter. Dinesh
C Jain (PW!) deposed that there was a demand of ransom of Rs. I crore
  for the release of his father which was made through a telephone call on
  06.01.2006 from a person who identified himself as Bunty and who was
  speaking in Bihari dialect. He also spoke of the calls that were made
  from the mobile phone bearing No. 9896351091 belonging to his father
D on 08.01.2006 and 09.01.2006 by which the ransom demands were
  repeated. He further stated about the threatening letters received by
  him at his shop address. He also deposed that he collected a piece of
  shirt worn by his father on the day of his abduction along with one silver
  ring and a key ring of the motor cycle of his father at a place specified in
  a call received by him on 16.01.2006. He was present when the dead
E body of his father was being taken out and he video-graphed the
  exhumation. Ashok Jain (PW3) who is the brother of deceased Ramesh
  Jain, corroborated the evidence of PW! regarding the demands that
  were. made for payment of ransom for the release of Ramesh Jain.
           14. The arrest of Al to A3 from Tibetan Market, Delhi at 11 :45
 F pm on 20.01.2006 led to several disclosure statements made by the
   accused pursuant to which relevant material was recovered. The details
   of recoveries made from each of the accused will be discussed later.
   The dead body of the deceased Ramesh Jain was also recovered pursuant
   to a disclosure statement made by A2 to A4. The CDRs that were
   obtained from the Nodal officers of the telephone companies which were
 G exhibited in the Court without objection clearly prove the complicity of
   all the accused. A detailed and thorough examination of the number of
   calls that were made between the accused during the period 25.12.2005
   to 20.01.2006 was made by the Courts below to hold the accused guilty
   of committing the offences. We do not see any reason to differ from the
 H conclusions of the Courts below on the basis of the evidence available
             SONU @AMAR v. STATE OF HARYANA                                    161
                  [L. NAGESWARA RAO, J.] .

on record. Neither do we see any perversity in the reasons and the A
conclusion of the Courts below. The jurisdiction of this Court in criminal
appeals filed against concurrent findings is circumscribed by principles
summarised by this Court in Dalbir Kaur v. State of Punjab, (1976) 4
sec 158 ir 8, as follows;
        "8. Thus the principles governing interference by this Court in a      B
        criminal appeal by special leave may be summarised as follows:
          "(J) that this Court would not interfere with the concurrent
          finding offact based on pure appreciation of evidence even if
          it were to take a different view on the evidence;
          (2) that the Court will not nonnally enter into a re-appraisement    C
          or review of the evidence, unless the assessment of the High
          Court is vitiated by an error oflaw or procedure or is based on
          error ofrecord, misreading of evidence or is inconsistent with
          the evidence, for instance, where the ocular evidence is totally
           inconsistent with the medical evidence and so on;
           (3) that the Court would not enter into credibility of the          D
           evidence with a view to substitute its own opinion for that of
           the High Court;
           (4) that the Court would interfere where the High Court has
           arrived at a finding of fact in disregard of a judicial process,
           principles of natural justice or a fair hearing or has acted in     E
           violation of a mandatory provision oflaw or procedure resulting
            in serious prejudice or injustice to the accused;
            (5) this Court might also interfere where on the proved facts
            wrong inferences of law have been drawn or where the
            conclusions of the High Court are manifestly perverse and           F
            based on no evidence."
        15. Admittedly, there is no direct evidence of kidnapping or the
 murder of Ramesh Jain. This is a case of circumstantial evidence. In a
 catena of cases, this Court has laid down certain principles to be followed
 in cases of circumstantial evidence. They are as under:                        G
        1. The circumstances from which an inference of guilt is sought
           to be proved must be cogently or finnly established.
        2. The circumstances should be of a definite tendency unerringly
           pointing towards the guilt of the accused.
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162              SUPREME COURT REPORTS                       [2017] 8 S.C.R.


A          3. The circumstances taken cumulatively must form a chain so
              complete that there is no escape from the conclusion that within
              all human probability, the crime was committed by the accused
              and none else.
           4. The circumstantial evidence in order to sustain conviction must
B             be complete and incapable of explanation of any other
              hypothesis than that of the guilt of the accused and such
              evidence should not only be consistent with the guilt of the
              accused but should be inconsistent with his innocence.
                 (See: Shanti Devi v. State of Rajasthan, (2012) 12 SCC
c                158 ~10); (See also: Hanumant v. State of Madhya Pradesh
                 (1952) SCR 1091 (P. l 097) Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State
                 of Maharashtra (1984) 4 SCC 116 ~153).
         16. Applying the above principles to the facts of this case, we find
  that the following circumstances would lead to the conclusion of guilt
D against the accused:
            A.      The deceased was missing from 23.12.2005 and his dead
                    body was dug out from the premises of a temple on
                    23.01.2006.
            B.      Demand of ransom for the release of the deceased is proved
E                   by the oral testimonies of PW 1 and PW3.
            C.      Disclosure statements of A2 to A4 and the recovery of the
                    dead body from the premises of the temple.
            D.      Disclosure statements made by the accused pursuant to
                    which there was recovery of several articles belonging to
F
                    the deceased including the SIM card of his mobile number,
                    wallet containing his personal belongings, etc.
            E.      The CDRs of the mobile which clearly show the interaction
                    of the accused during the period from 25.12.2005 to
                    20.01.2006 as well as the calls made to PW! including the
G                   calls made from the mobile phone of the deceased.
            F.     The silver ring, key ring of the motor cycle and a piece of
                   cloth worn by the deceased on 25.12.2005 which were sent
                   to PW! by the accused.

H
             SONU @AMAR v. STATE OF HARYANA                                   163
                  [L. NAGESWARA RAO, J.]

       17. We deem it proper to consider the submissions made by the A
"learned counsel for the accused.
Al - Pawan (Criminal Appeal No.1416 of 2013)
       18. The registration certificate of motor cycle No. DL-8-SY-4510
of the deceased was recovered from Al pursuant to the disclosure
statement Exh.PDD. The registration certificate was recovered from            B
the drawer of a table lying in the room of his house situated at Begha
Road, Ganaur.
        19. Mr. D. B. Goswami, learned counsel appearing for Al
submitted that Al and A4 are brothers. A4 and A2 were partners in
transport business. He submitted that Al was arrested from his house          C
in his village Ghasoli, District Sonepat. He relied upon the evidence of
DW 2 and DW 5 in support thereof. DW2 and DW 5 who are residents
of village Ghasoli deposed that police personnel visited the village around
9 am in search of Parveen (A4) on 20.01.2006. They stated that Al
accompanied the police to the police station. He travelled in his own car     D
and the police went in the Govt. Jeep. On the other hand, the case of the
prosecution is that Al was arrested along with A2 and A3 at 11 :45 PM
on 20.01.2006 at Tibetan Market, Delhi. The police from Rohini Police
Station, Delhi were also involved in the raid pursuant to which Al was
arrested. The interested testimonies of DW2 and DW5 do not merit
acceptance, especially when the prosecution has proved the arrest and         E
the subsequent recoveries made pursuant to the disclosure statement of
Al. The learned counsel submitted that the application filed by A1 to
take his voice sample was rejected by the Trial Court and so he cannot
be found fault with for not giving his voice sample. Al refused to give
his voice sample when the prosecution moved the Court. Thereafter, Al         F
filed an application to take his voice sample and the said application was
disposed of by the Trial Court giving liberty to Al to file again after the
prosecution evidence was completed. Therefore, the learned counsel
for Al is wrong in contending that his application for giving voice samples
 was rejected by the Court. The learned counsel further submitted that
 the CDRs of the mobile phone of AI would suggest that he was making          G
 calls only to A2, A3 and A4. He made an attempt to justify the calls on
 the ground that A4 was his brother and A2 was his brother's partner.
 No justification has been given for the 28 calls between him andA3 who
 is from Bihar and who was making the calls demanding a ransom of
 Rs. I crore from PW I.                                                       H
164            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                        (2017] 8 S.C.R.


A     A2 - Surender (Criminal Appeal No.1652 of 2014)
             20. A2 was arrested on 20.01.2006 in Tibetan Market, Delhi along
      with A 1 and A3 and was found to be in possession of a mobile phone
      bearing No.9813091701 which was used by him for conversing with A1,
      A3 andA4 between 25.12.2005 to 20.01.2006. Three STD booth receipts
B     Exh.P41, P42 and P43 were recovered fromA2. These receipts showed
      calls being made to mobile No. 9896001906 which belongs toA5 Sonu.
      He was a resident of Jhinjhana village and the calls made from the STD
      booth with telephone No. 01398257974 pertain to Jhinjhana. An amount
      of Rs.20,000/- was also recovered from him at the time of his arrest.
      The said amount was supposed to have been given to him by A5 Sonu.
C     Pursuant to his disclosure statement Exh.PCC A2 led the police party to
      his rented accommodation at Begha Road, Ganaur and a country made
      pistol with two live cartridges .315 bore were recovered in the presence
      of PW5 Mohan Lal. He also identified the place ofabduction of Ramesh
      Jain at Ganaur and the place where the dead body was buried at Baba
 D    Rude Nath temple in village Kheri Khusnam. Mr. Ram Lal Roy, learned
      counsel for A2 doubted the recovery of the country made pistol and
      cartridges. He submitted that the dead body recovered on 22.01.2006 is
      that of a priest and not of Ramesh Jain. There is no foundation laid by
      the defence in support of this contention. There is nothing on record to
      prove that the dead body is that of a priest. We are of the opinion that
 E    the dead body is that of Ramesh Jain as identified by his relatives. The
      medical evidence shows that the skin was peeled off at several places
      but the features of the body could easily be made out. PW 16 also
      deposed that decomposition is slow in winter months. We have perused
      the photograph of Ramesh Jain and compared it with a photograph of
 F    the dead body recovered. We are convinced that the body recovered is
      that of the deceased Ramesh Jain.
      A4 - Parveen @ Titu (Criminal Appeal No.1653 of 2014)
          21. The STD booth receipt Exh. P44 showing a call made from
   STD booth having No. 01398257974 from Shamli village in Uttar Pradesh
 G was recovered from A4 at the time of his arrest on 22.01.2006. As per
   the receipt, a call was made to mobile No.9896001906 which belongs to
   Sonu (A5). Pursuant to the disclosure statement made by him, he
   identified the place at village Bai crossing on GT Road where he kept
   the key ring of motor cycle, silver ring belonging to deceased Ramesh
 H Jain and the threatening letters. A golden ring of the deceased was also
              SONU @AMAR v. STATE OF HARYANA                                      16S
                   [L. NAGESWARA RAO, J.]

 recovered from his residential house at village Ghasoli. He also made a A
 disclosure statement which led the police to the place where the deceased
 was wrongfully confined. His SIM card with mobile No. 9812016269
 was seized from his residential house. There is sufficient evidence on
 record to suggest that he was in constant touch with the other accused.
 His mobile phone and the recoveries that were made pursuant to the B
 disclosure statement would clearly prove his involvement in the crime.
 AS - Sonu (Criminal Appeal No.1418 of 2013)
          22. Mr. Sidharth Luthra, learned Senior Counsel appearing for
  AS submitted that it is highly improbable that AS was arrested at a bus
  stop at Ganaur Chowk, GT Roa-d, Ganaur. According to him, AS was                c
  arrested on 20.01.2006 at 10:1S(30) pm from his house. He relied upon
  the evidence ofDWS and DW8. We do not find any substance in the
  submission that AS was arrested on 20.01.2006 itself as it is clear from
  the testimony ofDW8 that no complaint was made regarding the forcible
  arrest of AS on 20.01.2006. A disclosure statement was made by AS
  which was marked as Exh.PBB pursuant to which there was a recovery              D
  of the wallet belonging to the deceased from the shop ofAS. A laminated
  PAN card, one passport size photograph of the deceased, three electri,·ity
  bills, two water bills and a small diary of Jain Mantras bearing title 'Aa1.u
  Purvi' were recovered from underneath- the seat of his Aarat shop ·at
  Ganaur Mandi. The STD booth receipts which were recovered from                  E
  A2 Surender andA4 Parveen at the time of their arrest show that they
  made calls on the mobile No.9896001906 belonging to AS on 29'h and
· 30'h December, 200S. AS also received a call from an STD booth in
  Patna on 06.01.2006. Pursuant to a disclosure statement made by him
 ·an Indica car bearing No. DL-3CW-2447 which was used in the
  abduction was seized. The recoveries made pursuant to the disclosure            F
  statements of AS cannot be relied upon, according to Mr. Luthra. He
  referred to the six disclosure statements made by AS between 22.01.2006
   and 04.02.2006. He commented upon the improbability ofrecovery of
  the wallet from underneath his seat at his shop. He also submitted that
  the recovery is from a public place accessible to everybody and so the          G
  recoveries made cannot be relied upon. We disagree with Mr. Luthra
   as the recovery of the wallet from underneath his seat is something
  which is to his exclusive knowledge though other people might have
   access to his shop.
        23. Mr. Luthra contended that the CDRs are not admissibl.e under H
166          SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2017] 8 S.C.R.


A Section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 as admittedly they were
  not certified in accordance with sub-section (4) thereof. He placed
  reliance upon the judgment of this Court in An var P. V. v. P.K. Basheer,
  (2014) 10 SCC 473 by which the judgment of this Court in State (NCT
  of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu, (2005) 11 SCC 600 was overruled. In
B Navjot Sandhu (supra) this court held as follows:
            "Irrespective of the compliance with the requirements of Section
            65-B, which is a provision dealing with admissibility of electronic
            records, there is no bar to adducing secondary evidence under
            the other provisions of the Evidence Act, namely, Sections 63
            and 65. It may be that the certificate containing the details in
c           sub-section (4) of Section 65-B is not filed in the instant case,
            but that does not mean that secondary evidence cannot be given
            even if the law permits such evidence to be given in the
            circumstances mentioned in the relevant provisions, namely,
            Sections 63 and 65".
D In Anvar's case, this Court held as under:
            "22. The evidence relating to electronic record, as noted
            hereinbefore, being a special provision, the general law on
            secondary evidence under Section 63 read with Section 65 of
            the Evidence Act shall yield to the same. Generalia specialibus
 E          non derogant, special law will always prevail over the general
            law. It appears, the court omitted to take note of Sections 59 and
            65-A dealing with the admissibility ofelectronic record. Sections
            63 and 65 have no application in the case of secondary evidence
            by way of electronic record; the same is wholly governed by
 F          Sections 65-A and 65-B. To that extent, the statement of law on
            admissibility of secondary evidence pertaining to electronic record,
            as stated by this Court in Navjot Sandhu, does not lay down the
            correct legal position. It requires to be overruled and we do so.
            An electronic record by way of secondary evidence shall not be
            admitted in evidence unless the requirements under Section 65-
 G          B are satisfied. Thus, in the case of CD, VCD, chip, etc., the
            same shall be accompanied by the certificate in terms of Section
            65-B obtained at the time of taking the document, without which,
            the secondary evidence pertaining to that electronic record, is
             inadmissible.
 H
            SONU @AMAR v. STATE OF HARYANA                                   167
                 [L. NAGESWARA RAO, J.)

       23. The appellant admittedly has not produced any certificate in A
       tenns of Section 65-B in respect of the CDs, Exts. P-4, P-8, P-
       9, P-10, P-12, P-13, P-15, P-20 and P-22. Therefore, the same
       cannot be admitted in evidence. Thus, the whole case set up
       regarding the corrupt practice using songs, announcements and
       speeches fall to the ground."
                                                                             B
In view of the law laid down in the case of An var, Mr. Luthra submitted
that the CDRs are liable to be eschewed from consideration.
      24. Mr. Vivek Sood, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the
State of Haryana submitted that the CDRs were adduced in evidence
without any objection from the defence. He submitted that the accused c
cannot be pennitted to raise the point of admissibility of the CDRs at the
appellate stage. He placed reliance on Padman v. Hanwanta, AIR
1915 PC 1 in which the Privy Council held that objections regarding
admissibility of a document must be raised in the Trial Court. Mr. Sood
contended that there can be two classes of objections regarding
admissibility of documents. The first class is that a document is per se D
inadmissible in evidence. The second is wh.ere the objection is regarding
the method or mode of the proof of the document. He submitted that the
objection of the accused in this case is regarding the mode or method of
proof as it cannot be said that the CDRs are per      se   inadmissible in
evidence.                                                                  E
       25. Refuting the contentions of the learned senior counsel for the
State, Mr. Luthra submitted that the objection raised by him pertains to
inadmissibility of the document and not the mode of proof. He urged
that the CDRs are inadmissible without the certificate which is clear
from the judgment of this Court in Anvar's case. He refers to the            F .
judgment of RYE Venkatachala Gounder v. Arulinigu
Visweswaraswami, (2003) 8 SCC 752 relied upon by the prosecution
to contend that an objection relating to admissibility can be raised even
at the appellate stage. Mr. Luthra also argued that proofrequired in a
criminal case cannot be waived by the accused. He relied upon a judgment
of the Privy Council in Chainchal Singh v. King Emperor, AIR 1946            G
PC 1 in which it was held as under:
        "In a civil case, a party can, if he chooses, waive the proof, but
        in a criminal case strict proof ought to be given that the witness
        is incapable of giving evidence"
                                                                             H
168             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                             [2017] 8 S.C.R.


A He further relied upon the judgment of a Full Bench of the Bombay
  High Court in Shaikh Farid v. State of Maharashtra, 1983 CrLJ
  487. He also submitted that Section 294 Cr. P.C. which is an exception
  to the rule as to mode of proof has no application to the facts of the
  present case.
8           26. That an electronic record is not admissible unless it is
      accompanied by a certificate as contemplated under Section 658 (4) of
      the Indian Evidence Act is no more res integra. The question that falls
      for our consideration in this case is the permissibility of an objection
      regarding inadmissibility·at this stage. Admittedly, no objection was taken
      when the CDRs were adduced in evidence before the Trial Court. It
c     does not appear from the record that any such objection was taken even
      at the appellate stage before the High Court. In Gopal Das v. Sri
      Thakurji, AIR 1943 PC 83, it was held that:
              "Where the objection to be taken is not that the document is in
              itself inadmissible but that the mode of proof put forward is
D             irregular or insufficient, it is essential that the objection should be
              taken at the trial before the document is marked as an exhibit
              and admitted to the record. A party cannot lie by until the case
              comes before a Court of Appeal and then complain for the first
              time of the mode of proof."
E In RYE Venkatachaia Gounder, this Court held as follows:
              "Ordinarily an objection to the admissibility of evidence should
              be taken when it is tendered and not subsequently. The objections
              as to admissibility of documents in evidence may be classified
              into two classes: (i) an objection that the document which is
F             sought to be proved is itself inadmissible in evidence; and (ii)
              where the objection does not dispute the admissibility of the
              document in evidence but is directed towards the mode ofproof
              alleging the same to be irregular or insufficient. In the first case,
              merely because a document has been marked as 'an exhibit', an
G             objection as to its admissibility is not excluded and is available to
              be raised even at a later stage or even in appeal or revision. In
              the latter case, the objection should be taken before the evidence
              is tendered and once the document has been admitted in evidence
              and marked as an exhibit, the objection that it should not have
              been admitted in evidence or that the mode adopted for proving
H             the document is irregular cannot be allowed to be raised at any
           SONU @AMAR v. STATE OF HARYANA                                      169
                [L. NAGESWARA RAO, J.]

      stage subsequent to the marking of the document as an exhibit.           A
      The later proposition is a rule of fair play. The crucial test is
      whether an objection, if taken at the appropriate point of
      time, would have enabled the party tendering the evidence
      to cure the defect and resort to such mode of proof as
      would be regular. The omission to object becomes fatal                   B
      because by his failure the party entitled to object allows
      the party tendering the evidence to act on an assumption
      that the opposite party is not serious about the mode of
      proof. On the other hand, a prompt objection does not
      prejudice the party tendering the evidence, for two
      reasons: firstly, it enables the Court to apply its mind and             C
      pronounce its decision on the question of admissibility then
       and there; and secondly, in the event of finding of the Court
       on the mode of proof sought to be adopted going against
       the party tendering the evidence, the opportunity of
       seeking indulgence of the Court for permitting a regular                D
       mode or method of proof and thereby removing the
       objection raised by the opposite party, is available to the
       party leading the evidence. Such practice and procedure is
       fair to both the parties. Out of the two types of objections,
       referred to hereinabove, in the later case, failure to raise a prompt
       and timely objection amounts to waiver of the necessity for             E
       insisting on formal proof of a document, the document itself which
       is sought to be proved being admissible in evidence. In the first
       case, acquiescence would be no bar to raising the objection in
       superior Court." [Emphasis supplied]
It would be relevant to refer to another case decided by this Court in PC F
Purshothama Reddiar v. S Perumal, (1972) 1 SCC 9. The earlier
cases referred to are civil cases while this case pertains to police reports
being admitted in evidence without objection during the trial. This Court
did not permit such an objection to be taken at the appellate stage by
holding that:
                                                                               G
        "Before leaving this case it is necessary to refer to one of the
        contentions taken by Mr. Ramamurthi, learned Counsel for the
        respondent. He contended that the police reports referred to
        earlier are inadmissible in evidence as the Head-constables who
        covered those meetings have not been examined in the case.
                                                                                H
170             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2017] 8 S.C.R.


A             Those reports were marked without any objection. Hence it is
              not open to the respondent now to object to their admissibility."
             27. It is nobody's case that CD Rs which are a form of electronic
      record are not inherently admissible in evidence. The objection is that
      they were marked before the Trial Court without a certificate as required
B     by Section 65B (4). It is clear from the judgments referred to supra
      that an objection relating to the mode or method of proof has to be raised
      at the time of marking of the document as an exhibit and not later. The
      crucial test, as affirmed by this Court, is whether the defect could have
      been cured at the stage of marking the document. Applying this test to
      the present case, if an objection was taken to the CDRs being marked
C     without a certificate, the Court could have given the prosecution an
      opportunity to rectify the deficiency. It is also clear from the above
      judgments that objections regarding admissibility of documents which
      are per se inadmissible can be taken even at the appellate stage.
      Admissibility of a document which is inherently inadmissible is an issue
D     which can be taken up at the appellate stage because it is a fundamental
      issue. The mode or method of proof is procedural and objections, if not
      taken at the trial, cannot be permitted at the appellate stage. lf the
      objections to the mode of proof are permitted to be taken at the appellate
      stage by a party, the other side does not have an opportunity of rectifying
      the deficiencies. The learned Senior Counsel for the State referred to
E     statements under Section 161 of the Cr. P.C. 1973 as an example of
      documents falling under the said category of inherently inadmissible
      evidence. CDRs do not fall in the said category of documents. We are
      satisfied that an objection that CDRs are unreliable due to violation of
      the procedure prescribed in Section 65 B (4) cannot be permitted to be
F     raised at this stage as the objection relates to the mode or method of
      proof.
         28. Another point which remains to be considered is whether the
  accused is competent to waive his right to mode of proof. Mr. Luthra's
  submission is that such a waiver is permissible in civil cases and not in
G criminal cases. He relies upon a judgment of the Privy Council in
  Chainchal Singh's case in support of the proposition. The Privy Council
  held that the accused was not competent to waive his right. Chainchal
  Singh 's case may have no application to the case in hand at all. In that
  case, the issue was under Section 33 of the Evidence Act, and was
  whether evidence recorded in an earlier judicial proceeding could be
H
            SONU @AMAR v. STATE OF HARYANA                                171
                 [L. NAGESWARA RAO, J.]

read into, or not. The question was whether the statements made by a A
witness in an earlier judicial proceeding can be considered relevant for
proving the truth or facts stated in a subsequent judicial proceeding.
Section 33 of the Evidence Act allows for this inter alia where the
witness is incapable of getting evidence in the subsequent proceeding.
In Chainchal Singh, the accused had not objected to the evidence being B
read into in the subsequent proceeding. In this context, the Privy Council
held that in a civil case, a party can waive proof but in a criminal case,
strict proof ought to be given that the witness is incapable of giving
evidence. Moreover, the judge must be satisfied that the witness cannot
 give evidence. Chainchal Singh also held that:
       "In a civil case a party can, ifhe chooses, waive the proof, but'in C
       a criminal case strict proof ought to be given that the witness is
       incapable of giving evidence".
The witness, who had deposed earlier, did not appear in the subsequent
proceeding on the ground that he was unable to move from his house
because of tuberculosis, as deposed by the process server. There was D
no medical evidence in this regard. The Court observed that the question
of whether or not he was incapable of giving evidence must be proved in
this context, and in the proof of such a fact it was a condition that
statements given in an earlier proceeding can be taken as proved in a ·
subsequent proceeding. Chainchal Singh's case therefore, does not E
lay down a general proposition that an accused cannot waive an objection
of mode of proof in a criminal case. In the present case, there is a clear
failure to object to the mode of proof of the CD Rs and the case is
therefore covered by the test in R.V.E. Venkatachala Gounder.
       29. We proceed to deal with the submission of Mr. Luthra that       F
the ratio of the judgment of the Bombay High Court in Shaikh Farid's
case is not applicable to the facts of this case. It was held in Shaikh
Farid's case as under:
        "6. In civil cases mode of proof can be waived by the person
        against whom it is sought to be used. Admission thereof or failure G
        to raise objection to their tendering in evidence amount to such
        waiver. No such waiver from the accused was permissible in
        criminal cases till the enactment of the present Code of Criminal
        Procedure in 1973. The accused was supposed to be a silent
         spectator at the trial, being under no obligation to open his mouth
                                                                           H
172     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2017] 8 S.C.R.


A     till the occasion to record his statement under section
      342 (present S. 313) of the Code arose. Even then he was not
      bound to answer and explain the circumstances put to him as
      being appearing against him. In the case of Chainchal Singh v.
      Emperor AIR 1946 PC 1 it was held by the Privy Council that
      the accused was not competent to waive his right and the
B
      obligation of the prosecution to prove the documents on which
      the prosecution relied. Resultantly, the prosecution was driven
      to examine witnesses even when the accused was not interested
      in challenging the facts sought to be proved though them. The
      inconvenience and the delay was avoidable.
c     7. Section 294 of the Code is introduced to dispense with this
      avoidable waste of time and facilitate removal of such obstruction
      in the speedy trial. The accused is now enabled to waive the
      said right and save the time. This is a new provision having no
      corresponding provision in the repealed Code of Criminal
D     Procedure. It requires the prosecutor or the accused, as the case
      may be, to admit or deny the genuineness of the document sought
      to be relied against him at the outset in writing. On his admitting
      or indicating no dispute as to the genuineness, the Court is
      authorised to dispense with its formal proof thereof. In fact after
      indication of no dispute as to the genuineness, proof of documents
E     is reduced to a sheer empty formality. The section is obviously
      aimed at undoing the judicial view by legislative process.
      8. The preceding Section 293 of the Code also dispenses with
      the proof of certain documents. It corresponds with Section
      510 of the repealed Code of Criminal Procedure. It enumerates
F     the category of documents, proof of which is not necessary unless
      the Court itself thinks it necessary. Section 294 makes
      dispensation of formal proof dependent on the accused or the
      prosecutor, not disputing the genuineness of the documents sought
      to be used against them. Such contemplated dispensation is not
G     restricted to any class or category of documents as under section
      293, in which ordinarily authenticity is dependent more on the
      mechanical process involved than on the knowledge, observation
      or the skill of the author rendering oral evidence just formal. Nor
      it is made dependent on the relative importance of the document
      or probative value thereof. The documents being primary or
H
            SONU @AMAR v. STATE OF HARYANA                                     173
                 [L. NAGESWARA RAO, J.]

       secondary or substantive or corroborative, is not relevant for A
       attracting Sec. 294 of the Code. Not disputing its genuineness is
       the only solitary test therefor.
       9. Now the post-mortem report is also a document as any other
       document. Primary evidence of such a document is the report
       itself. It is a contemporaneous record, prepared in the prescribed B
       form, of what the doctor has noticed in the course of post-mortem
       of the dead body, while investigation the cause of t:P.e death. It
       being relevant, it can be proved by producing the same. But
       production is only a step towards proof of it. It can be received
       in evidence only on the establishment of its authenticity by the
       mode of its proof as provided under sections 67 to 71 of the C
       Evidence Act. Section 294(1) of the Code enables the accused
       also, to waive this mode of proof, by admitting it or raising no
       dispute as to its genuineness when called upon to do so under
       sub-section (1 ). Sub-section (3) enables the Court to read it in
        evidence without requiring the same to be proved in accordance D
        with the Evidence Act. There is nothing in Section 294 to justify
        exclusion ofit, from the purview of"documents" covered thereby.
        The mode of proof of it also' is liable to be waived as of any other
        document."                                     ,
       30. Section 294 of the Cr. P.C. 1973 provides a procedure for E
filing documents in a Court by the prosecution or the accused. The
documents have to be included in a list and the other side shall be given
an opportunity to admit or deny the genuineness of each document. In
case the genuineness is not disputed, such document shall be read in
evidence without formal proof in accordance with the Evidence Act.
The judgment in Shaikh Farid's case is not applicable to the facts of F
this case and so, is not relevant.
The Effect of Overrule
       31. Electronic records play a crucial role in criminal investigations
and prosecutions. The contents of electronic records may be proved in          G
accordance with the provisions contained in Section 65B of the Indian
Evidence Act. Interpreting Section 65B (4), this Court in Anvar's case
held that an electronic record is inadmissible in evidence without the
certification as provided therein. Navjot Sandhu's case which took the
opposite view was overruled.
                                                                               H
174           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2017] 8 S.C.R.


A        32. The interpretation of Section 65B (4) by this Court by a
  judgment dated 04.08.2005 in Navjot Sandhu held the field till it was
  overruled on 18.09 .2014 in Anvar's case. All the criminal courts in this
  country are bound to follow the law as interpreted by this Court. Because
  of the interpretation of Section 65B in Navjot Sandhu, there was no
B necessity of a certificate for proving electronic records. A large number
  of trials have been held during the period between 04.08.2005 and
   18.09.2014. Electronic records without a certificate might have been
  adduced in evidence. There is no doubt that the judgment of this Court
  in Anvar's case has to be retrospective in operation unless the judicial
  tool of 'prospective overruling' is applied. However, retrospective
C application of the judgment is not in the interests of administration of
  justice as it would necessitate the reopening of a large number of criminal
  cases. Criminal cases decided on the basis of electronic records adduced
  in evidence without certification have to be revisited as and when
  objections are taken by the accused at the appellate stage. Attempts
D will be made to reopen cases which have become final.
          33. This Court in IC Golak Nath v. State of Punjab, (1967) 2
  SCR 762 held that there is no acceptable reason why it could not restrict
  the operation of the law declared by it to the future and save transactions
  that were effected on the basis of earlier law. While referring to the
  doctrine of prospective overruling as expounded by jurists George F.
E Canfield, Robert Hill Freeman, John Henry Wigmore and Cardozo, this
  Court held that when a subsequent decision changes an earlier one, the
  latter decision does not make law but rather discovers the correct principle
  of law and the result is that it is necessarily retrospective in operation.
  As the law declared by this Court is the law of land, it was held that
F there is no reason why this Court declaring the law in supersession of
  the law declared by it earlier cannot restrict the operation of the law as
  declared to the future and save transactions that were affected on the
  basis of earlier law. While so holding, this Court in Golak Nath laid
  down the following propositions:
G           "(I) The power of the Parliament to amend the Constitution is
            derived from Articles 245, 246 and 248 of the Constitution and
            not from Article 368 thereof which only deals with procedure.
            Amendment is a legislative process.
            (2) Amendment is 'law' within the meaning of Article 13 of the
H           Constitution and, therefore, if it takes away or abridges the rights
            SONU @AMAR v. STATE OF HARYANA                                  175
                 [L. NAGESWARA RAO, J.]

       conferred by Part Ill thereof, it is void.                           A
       (3) The Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951, Constitution
       (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955, and, the Constitution
       (Seventeenth Amendment) Act, 1964, abridge the scope of the
       fundamental rights. But, on the basis of earlier decisions of this
       Court, they were valid."                                             B
While taking note of the doctrine of'prospective ovem1ling' in the United
States, this Court referred to the decisions concerning the admissibility
of evidence obtained by unreasonable search and seizure. In Weeks v.
United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), the US Supreme Court held that
evidence obtained by an unreasonable search and seizure has to be c
excluded in criminal trials. In 1949, the US Supreme Court in Wolfv.
Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) held that the rule of exclusion laid down
in Weeks did not apply to proceedings in State Courts. The judgment in
Wolf was over ruled in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
Subsequently, the US Supreme Court applied the doctrine of prospective
overruling in Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965) as it was of D
the opinion that if Mapp was applied retrospectively it would affect the
interest of the administration of justice and the integrity of the judicial
process.
       34. The effect of overrule of a judgment on past transactions has
been the subject matter of discussion in England as well. In R. v.          E
Governor of H.M. Prison Brockhill, ex p. Evans (No. 2), [20001
4 All ER 15, Lord Slynn dealing with the principle of prospective over
rnling observed as under:
        "The judgment of the Divisional Court in this case follows the
        traditional route of declaring not only what was the meaning of F
        the section at the date of the judgment but what was always the
        correct meaning of the section. The court did not seek to limit
        the effect of its judgment to the future. I consider that there may
        be situations in which it would be desirable, and in no way unjust,
        that the effect ofjudicial rulings should be prospective or limited G
        to certain claimants. The European Court of Justice, though
        cautiously and infrequently, has restricted the effect of its ruling
        to the particular claimant in the case before it and to those who
        had begun proceedings before the date of its judgment. Those
        who had not sought to challenge the legality of acts perhaps
         done years before could only rely on the ruling H
176                SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2017) 8 S.C.R.


A              prospectively. Such a course avoided unscrambling
               transactions perhaps long since over and doing injustice
               to defendants." [Emphasis supplied]
         35. This Court did not apply the principle of prospective overruling
  in Anvar's case. The dilemma is whether we should. This Court in K.
B Madhav Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2014) 6 SCC 537
  held that an earlier judgment would be prospective taking note of the
  ramifications of its retrospective operation. If the judgment in the case
  of Anvar is applied retrospectively, it would result in unscrambling past
  transactions and adversely affecting the administration of justice. As
  Anvar's case was decided by a Three Judge Bench, propriety demands
C that we refrain from declaring that the judgment would be prospective in
  operation. We leave it open to be decided in an appropriate case by a
  Three Judge Bench. In any event, this question is not germane for
  adjudication of the present dispute in view of the adjudication of the
  other issues against the accused.
D           36. For the aforementioned reasons, the judgment of the ·High
      Court confirming the Trial Court is upheld. The appeals are dismissed.


      Nidhi Jain                                             Appeals dismissed.