SOUNDARAJANversusSTATE REP. BY THE INSPECTOR OF POLICE VIGILANCE ANTICORRUPTION DINDIGUL
- Citation
- 2023 INSC 377
- Decided
- 17 April 2023
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- ABHAY S OKA
Holding
A conviction under Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act cannot stand without proof of a specific demand for gratification, and the omission of a proper charge, absent prejudice, is not fatal.
Summary
The appellant, a Sub‑Registrar, was convicted under the Prevention of Corruption Act for demanding a Rs.500 gratification to release a registered sale deed. The prosecution relied on a trap operation and the testimony of a shadow witness, but the complainant, who was the key witness to the alleged demand, was declared hostile and did not corroborate the charge. The Supreme Court held that for an offence under Section 7, the prosecution must prove a specific demand for gratification beyond reasonable doubt, which was absent both on direct and circumstantial evidence. The Court also examined the omission of a proper charge under Section 464 of the CrPC, concluding that the defect did not prejudice the appellant’s right to defence. Consequently, the Court quashed the convictions, set aside the lower court judgments, and acquitted the appellant.
Issues considered
- Whether the prosecution proved the demand for gratification required under Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act.
- Whether the acceptance of the alleged gratification was established.
- Whether the omission or error in framing the charge under Section 464 of the CrPC is fatal to the prosecution.
- Whether circumstantial evidence can suffice to establish a demand for gratification.
Legislation cited
- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 464
- Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988s. 13(1)(d), s. 13(2), s. 7
Subjects
Judgment
[2023] 4 S.C.R. 133 133
SOUNDARAJAN A
v.
STATE REP. BY THE INSPECTOR OF POLICE VIGILANCE
ANTICORRUPTION DINDIGUL
(Criminal Appeal No. 1592 of 2022) B
APRIL 17, 2023
[ABHAY S. OKA AND RAJESH BINDAL, JJ.]
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 : ss. 7, 13(1)(d), r/w 13(2)
– Illegal gratification – Appellant-Sub-Registrar demanded
C
gratification of Rs.500/- from the complainant-PW 2, for handing
over the registered sale deed – Complaint filed – Trap laid and in
presence of shadow witness PW-3, the appellant caught red-handed
while accepting the bribe – However, complainant did not support
the prosecution and was declared hostile – Trial court convicted
and sentenced the appellant for the offences punishable u/s 7 and D
s. 13(2) r/w s. 13(1)(d) – Upheld by the High Court – On appeal,
held : To attract s. 7, the demand for gratification has to be proved
by the prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt – It is not a simple
demand for money, but it has to be a demand for gratification – On
facts, the complainant did not support the prosecution – In his
E
examination-in-chief, he did not say anything about the demand
made by the appellant – PW-3 did not say that the appellant made a
specific demand of gratification in his presence to PW-2 – No
circumstantial evidence of demand for gratification – Thus, the
offences punishable u/s. 7 and s. 13(2) r/w s. 13(1)(d) not established
– Furthermore, there was omission or error to frame charge, which F
may lead to acquittal – Thus, the impugned judgment quashed and
set aside – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.464.
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: s. 464 – Effect of omission
to frame or absence of, or error in, charge – Held: Under s. 464,
omission to frame a charge or any error in charge is never fatal G
unless, in the opinion of the Court, a failure of justice has in fact
been occasioned thereby – Instant case is of omission to frame a
proper charge, and whatever charge has been framed is, per se
defective – However, by reason of the said omission, the accused
not prejudiced insofar as his right to defend is concerned.
H
133
134 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 4 S.C.R.
A Neeraj Dutta v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) 2022 SCC
online SC 1724 - relied on.
Mohan Singh v. State of Bihar (2011) 9 SCC 272; Union
of India v. Ex-GNR Ajeet Singh (2013) 4 SCC 186 -
referred to.
B
Case Law Reference
(2011) 9 SCC 272 Referred to Para 8
(2013) 4 SCC 186 Referred to Para 8
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
C 1592 of 2022.
From the Judgment and Order dated 08.01.2019 of the High Court
of Judicature at Madras at Madurai in CRLAMD No. 140 of 2012.
S. Nagamuthu, Sr. Adv., B. Balaji, M. P. Parthiban, Duvvuri
D Subrahmanya Bhanu, Ms. Shalini Mishra, Raja Rajeshwaran S., Advs.
for the Appellant.
Dr. Joseph Aristotle S., Shobhit Dwivedi, Ms. Vaidehi Rastogi,
Advs. for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
E
ABHAY S. OKA, J.
FACTS
1. The appellant was convicted for the offences punishable under
Section 7 and Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention
F of Corruption Act, 1988 (for short, ‘the PC Act’). The appellant was
sentenced to undergo imprisonment for one year and to pay a fine of Rs.
2,000/-. High Court, by the impugned judgment, has confirmed the
conviction and sentence of the appellant.
2. The appellant was holding the post of Sub-Registrar at
G Kannivadi, Dindigul District, Tamil Nadu. The complainant M.
Sundaramoorthy (PW-2), had purchased land measuring 16.05 cents.
Accordingly, on 12th July 2004, sale deed was presented before the
appellant who was the Sub-Registrar in the concerned office. The
complainant and his vendors were present. According to the case made
out by the complainant in his complaint, apart from getting the sale deed
H
SOUNDARAJAN v. STATE REP. BY THE INSP. OF POLICE 135
VIG. ANTICORRUPTION DINDIGUL [ABHAY S. OKA, J.]
typed on a stamp paper of Rs.880/-, he paid a sum of Rs.190/- towards A
the registration charges of the sale deed. A receipt for the said amount
was issued by the appellant. On 16th July 2004, when the complainant
visited the appellant’s office, he was informed to bring FMB Sketch
from the concerned Government office. According to the complainant,
on 31st July 2004, the said sketch was produced by him. After the sketch B
was produced, the appellant informed him that he would have to make a
site visit. Accordingly, the complainant arranged for transport for the
appellant to enable him to make a site visit. After noticing trees on the
land, the appellant instructed the complainant to get a TOPO Sketch
from the concerned office to show that the land subject matter of sale
was cultivable. Thereafter, the complainant obtained requisite documents C
and handed over the same to the appellant on 6 th August 2004 at 11.30
am. According to the complainant, at that time, the appellant demanded
gratification of Rs.500/- for handing over the registered sale deed. As
the complainant was not willing to give gratification, on 11th August 2004,
he filed a complaint with the Inspector of Police of the Anti-Corruption D
Unit.
3. Based on the complaint, a trap was laid on 12th August 2004,
which was unsuccessful. According to the prosecution case, the trap
was again laid on 13th August 2004. It was successful, and in the presence
of the shadow witness Michael (PW-3), the appellant was caught red- E
handed while accepting the bribe.
4. The prosecution examined 12 witnesses. PW-1 N.Dhanam
Jeyan was examined to prove the sanction order. As stated earlier, PW-
2 M.Sundaramoorthy is the complainant and PW-3 Michael is the shadow
witness. No other witness is relevant for proving the alleged demand F
made by the appellant. The complainant (PW-2) did not support the
prosecution and was declared as hostile. The appellant examined two
defence witnesses, S. Kathiresan and Kalaiselvi to bring on the record
audit report of the office in which the appellant was working and a
circular issued by the Inspector General of Registration, which required
the Sub-Registrar to visit a land subject matter of sale deed for ascertaining G
its valuation.
SUBMISSIONS
5. The learned senior counsel Mr S.Nagamuthu, appearing for
the appellant, submitted that there was no charge framed as regards the H
136 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 4 S.C.R.
A demands made on 6th August 2004 and 13th August 2004. Inviting our
attention to the first charge framed by the Special Court, he urged that
the charge is about the alleged demand made on 12th July 2004 when the
sale deed was registered. He submitted that even according to the
prosecution case, there was no demand made on 12th July 2004 at the
B time of the registration of the sale deed. He submitted that because of
this material defect in the charge and omission to frame a proper charge
regarding demand allegedly made on 6th August 2004 and 13th August
2004, grave prejudice has been caused to the appellant, who could not
defend himself properly.
C 6. The learned senior counsel for the appellant submitted that, in
any event, the complainant had not supported the prosecution, and the
shadow witness (PW-3) did not depose that in his presence there was
any demand of the sum of Rs.500/- by the appellant for returning the
sale deed to the complainant. He urged that the offence punishable under
Section 7 was not made out without proof of demand. He urged that as
D no offence was made out under Section 7, even the offence under clause
(d) of sub-section (1) of Section 13 was not established.
7. Dr Joseph Aristotle, the learned counsel representing the State
Government, submitted that in view of Section 464 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (for short ‘CrPC’), no defect or omission in the framing
E of charge is fatal to the prosecution case unless any prejudice caused
due to the said omission or failure of justice is established by the accused.
He submitted that, in this case, prejudice has not been shown.
8. He relied on this Court’s decisions in the cases of Mohan
Singh v. State of Bihar1 and Union of India v. Ex-GNR Ajeet Singh2.
F The learned counsel lastly relied upon a decision of the Constitution
Bench in the case of Neeraj Dutta v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi)3
for submitting that a demand for gratification can be established even on
the basis of circumstantial evidence.
FINDING ON PROOF OF DEMAND
G
9. We have considered the submissions. It is well settled that for
establishing the commission of an offence punishable under Section 7
1
(2011) 9 SCC 272
2
(2013) 4 SCC 186
3
H 2022 SCC online SC 1724
SOUNDARAJAN v. STATE REP. BY THE INSP. OF POLICE 137
VIG. ANTICORRUPTION DINDIGUL [ABHAY S. OKA, J.]
of the PC Act, proof of demand of gratification and acceptance of the A
gratification is a sine qua non. Moreover, the Constitution Bench in
the case of Neeraj Dutta3 has reiterated that the presumption under
Section 20 of the PC Act can be invoked only on proof of facts in
issue, namely, the demand of gratification by the accused and the
acceptance thereof.
B
10. As stated earlier, complainant PW-2 has not supported the
prosecution. He has not said anything in his examination-in-chief about
the demand made by the appellant. The public prosecutor cross-examined
PW-2. The witness stated that there was no demand of a bribe made by
the appellant. According to him, he filed a complaint as the return of the
sale deed was delayed. Though PW-2 accepted that he had filed the C
complaint, in the cross-examination, he was not confronted with the
material portions of the complaint in which he had narrated how the
alleged demand was made. The public prosecutor ought to have
confronted the witness with his alleged prior statements in the complaint
and proved that part of the complaint through the concerned police officer D
who had reduced the complaint into writing. However, that was not
done.
11. Now, we turn to the evidence of the shadow witness (PW-3).
In the examination-in-chief, he stated that the appellant asked the PW-2
whether he had brought the amount. PW-3 did not say that the appellant E
made a specific demand of gratification in his presence to PW-2. To
attract Section 7 of the PC Act, the demand for gratification has to be
proved by the prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt. The word used in
Section 7, as it existed before 26th July 2018, is ‘gratification’. There has
to be a demand for gratification. It is not a simple demand for money, but
it has to be a demand for gratification. If the factum of demand of F
gratification and acceptance thereof is proved, then the presumption
under Section 20 can be invoked, and the Court can presume that the
demand must be as a motive or reward for doing any official act. This
presumption can be rebutted by the accused.
12. There is no circumstantial evidence of demand for gratification G
in this case. In the circumstances, the offences punishable under Section
7 and Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) have not been established.
Unless both demand and acceptance are established, offence of obtaining
pecuniary advantage by corrupt means covered by clauses (i) and (ii) of
Section 13(1)(d) cannot be proved. H
138 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 4 S.C.R.
A EFFECT OF THE FAILURE TO FRAME A PROPER
CHARGE
13. We must deal with another argument made by the learned
senior counsel appearing for the appellant. That is about the failure to
frame a proper charge for the offence punishable under Section 7. The
B relevant portion of the charge reads thus:
“You, working as the Sub Registrar at Kannivadi, Dindigul District
from 27.10.2003 to 27.10.2003 and as such you are a public servant
you registered the sale deed of 16.05 cents of land purchased by
Sundaramoorthy on 12.07.2004 and demanded a sum of Rs.500/-
C from Sundaramoorthy as gratification other than legal
remuneration for returning the registered document and also
received Rs.500/- as bribe, hence you disclosed the offences
punishable u/s. 7 of Prevention of Corruption Act 1988 and triable
by this Court.”
D 14. Thus, the Special Court omitted to frame a specific charge on
demand allegedly made by the appellant on 6th and 13th August 2004 and
acceptance thereof on 13th August 2004.
15. Under Section 464 of CrPC, omission to frame a charge or
any error in charge is never fatal unless, in the opinion of the Court, a
E
failure of justice has in fact been occasioned thereby. In this case, from
the perusal of the cross-examination of PW-3 and other prosecution
witnesses made by the Advocate for the appellant, it is apparent that the
appellant had clearly understood the prosecution case about the first
alleged demand made on 6th August 2004 and the subsequent alleged
F demand and acceptance on 13th August 2004. There is no doubt that this
is a case of omission to frame a proper charge, and whatever charge
has been framed is, per se defective. However, by reason of the said
omission or defect, the accused was not prejudiced insofar as his right to
defend is concerned. Therefore, in this case, the omission to frame charge
and/or error in framing charge is not fatal.
G
16. We find that, in this case, the charge has been framed very
casually. The Trial Courts ought to be very meticulous when it comes to
the framing of charges. In a given case, any such error or omission may
lead to acquittal and/or a long delay in trial due to an order of remand
H which can be passed under sub-section (2) of Section 464 of CrPC.
SOUNDARAJAN v. STATE REP. BY THE INSP. OF POLICE 139
VIG. ANTICORRUPTION DINDIGUL [ABHAY S. OKA, J.]
Apart from the duty of the Trial Court, even the public prosecutor has a A
duty to be vigilant, and if a proper charge is not framed, it is his duty to
apply to the Court to frame an appropriate charge.
17. The appeal is allowed. The impugned judgments are quashed
and set aside, and the appellant is acquitted of the offences alleged against
him. The bail bonds of the appellant stand cancelled. B
Nidhi Jain Appeal allowed.
(Assisted by : Yash Chavan and Tamana, LCRAs)
C
D
E
F
G
H
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