Holding

An acquittal in a criminal case does not preclude departmental proceedings, and while removal cannot be ordered without furnishing the employee copies of all documents relied upon, such a procedural lapse requires supply of the documents and a fresh hearing rather than automatic nullification of the removal order.

Summary

Swapan Kumar Mitra, a bus driver of South Bengal State Transport Corporation, was removed from service after a departmental inquiry that relied on the District Magistrate's report and the inquiry officer's findings, despite being acquitted in a criminal trial for the same accident. He challenged the removal via a writ petition under Art. 226; the High Court Single Judge set aside the removal and ordered the corporation to supply the documents for a fresh hearing. The Calcutta High Court Division Bench went further, quashing the disciplinary proceeding on procedural grounds and reinstating Mitra, without addressing the effect of the criminal acquittal. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that an acquittal does not bar continuation of departmental proceedings and that removal cannot be ordered without furnishing the employee copies of all documents relied upon, but such a lapse only mandates supply of the documents and a fresh hearing, not automatic set‑aside. The Court also emphasized that the inquiry officer and disciplinary authority are the sole judges of fact, and a writ court cannot re‑evaluate the adequacy or reliability of evidence or deem findings perverse. Consequently, the Division Bench’s order was set aside and the Single Judge’s directions were restored with modifications. The corporation was directed to supply the required documents, allow Mitra a fair hearing, and pay him subsistence allowance during the pendency of the inquiry.

Issues considered

The effect of an acquittal in a criminal case on the continuance of departmental disciplinary proceedings and the imposition of removal.
Whether failure to supply the employee with copies of the District Magistrate's report, inquiry report, and other documents relied upon vitiates the disciplinary proceeding.
Whether a High Court exercising supervisory jurisdiction under Art. 226 can go into the merits of the disciplinary findings and declare them perverse.
The admissibility of a xerox copy of the District Magistrate's report in the departmental inquiry.
The scope of judicial review over the adequacy and reliability of evidence in departmental proceedings.

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. Article 226

Subjects

disciplinary proceedingsdepartmental inquiryremoval from servicenatural justiceright to be heardacquittalcriminal vs departmental standard of proofArticle 226evidence admissibilityperverse finding

Judgment

t
\.

A SOUTH BENGAL STATE TRANSPORT CORPN.
v.
SWAPAN KUMAR MITRA AND ORS.

FEBRUARY 3, 2006

B [ARIJIT PASA YAT AND TA RUN CHATTERJEE, JJ.]

Service law

C Disciplinary proceedings-Appreciation offacts and adequacy/reliability
of evidence·-Held: Inquiry Officer and disciplinary authority are sole judges
of these-In a writ proceeding under Art. 226 of Constitution, these issues
cannot be canvassed and merits of case cannot be gone into.

Disciplinary proceedings- Punishment of removal frum service-Held:
D It ought not be passed without supplying to delinquent employee copies of
documents relied on by Inquiry Officer and Disciplinary Authority-Otherwise,
it would cause serious prejudice tu him and deny him reasonable opportunity
of hearing.

Disciplinary proceedings-Acquittal in criminal case-Effect of-Held:
E In departmental proceeding, o,.der of removal of delinquent employee from
service can be passed even after the acquittal in criminal case.

Respondent no. 1 was employed as a bus driver with appellant-transport
corporation. One day the bus he was driving met with an accident resulting
F in death of number of persons and injuries to some passengers. In an enquiry
into the incident ordered by State Government, the District Magistrate of the
place where the accident took place, held him responsible for accident as well
as deaths and injury to bus passengers. In the departmental inquiry, the
inquiry officer, after considering the report of the District Magistrate,
G depositions relied upon therein as well as recorded before him, concurred with
conclusions of the District Magistrate. Relying on these conclusions, the
Disciplinary authority ordered his remov'll from service. However, in criminal
proceedings initiated against him, he was acquitted on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence in support of conclusion of his guilt.

H Respondent no. l filed a writ petition challenging his removal from
30
.}
(
SOUTH BENGAL STATE TRANSPORT CORPN. 1'. SWAPAN KUMAR MITRA
31
'{
!
service on the grounds that (i) the Disciplinary Authority could not continue A
with the departmental proceeding and impose punishment of removal from
service after his acquittal in the criminal case; (ii) the documents relied on
by the inquiry officer featured neither in the list of documents annexed to
the charge sheet nor copies of the same were supplied to him.

Single Judge of High Court held (i) Non-supply of copies of the report B
of the District Magistrate and other allied documents relied on by him and
the enquiry report submitted by the Inquiry Officer, vitiated the departmental
'" proceedings. In view of that the order of removal was set aside. The
disciplinary authority was directed to supply copies of aforementioned
documents to respondent no. I for filing of comments and thereafter reach a c
fresh conclusion on the question of him removal from service after giving a
reasonable opportunity of hearing to him. (ii) As the degree of proof in a
criminal proceeding is higher than in a departmental proceeding, acquittal
in the criminal case could not be a bar fur the disciplinary authorities either
for initiating or continuing with departmental proceedings against an
D
employee and imposing penalty of removal from service.

·-"- Respondent No. I preferred an appeal before the Division Bench of the
High Court against the judgment of the Single Judge instead of appearing
before the disciplinary authority. As regards the report of District Magistrate,
the Division Bench found that only its photocopy was filed before the Inquiry E
Officer and held it to be inadmissible evidence. Further, as District Magistrate
was not examined and no one proved the reliability and authenticity of his
report, it was not open to the inquiry officer or to the disciplinary authority
to rely on the said report to arrive at their finding. It also held that the Inquiry
Officer, by relying on the depositions of witnesses allegedly examined by the
F
District Magistrate without himself examining them, exceeded his jurisdiction
____) and this was wholly illegal, void and leading to perversity. It also held that
since the FIR did not mention about the rash and negligent driving, no reliance
could be placed on it. In view of this, the Division Bench, without touching
on the acquittal of respondent no. 1 in the criminal case and its consequences,
quashed the disciplinal)· proceeding, set aside the judgment of the Single Judge G
as well as the order of removal from service of the respondent No. 1, and
directed the appellant to reinstate him with full .back wages and suspension
allowance from a particular date. Hence the present appeal.
-;
Allowing the appeal, the Court
H
-!-
)
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32 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006 I 2 S.C.R.

A HELD I. Single Judge was justified in sending the case back to the
disciplinary authority and ordering him to supply a copy of the inquiry report r
along with the report of the District Magistrate and other documents relied
upon by him to respondent No. I and thereafter to proceed from that stage
after seeking comments on those reports from respondent No. I to reach afresh
B conclusion. At the appellate stage, Division Bench was not justified to short
cut the procedure by going into the merits on the question of removal from
service of the respondent No. I, particularly when the Single Judge has not
decided the case of respondent No. I on the question of removal on merits
and when the disciplinary authority had passed the order of removal
practically relying on the Inquiry Report, a copy of which was not supplied
C to respondent No. I for filing of comments. It is well settled that the Inquiry
Officer and disciplinary authority are the sole judges of the facts. Adequacy
and reliability of the evidence is not a matter that can be canvassed before a
High Court in a writ proceeding under Art. 226 of the Constitution.
(42-G-H; 43-A-B)
D
State ofA.P. and Ors. v. S. Sree Rama Rao, AIR (1963) SC 1723; Air India
ltd v. M Yogeshwar Raj, (2000) 5 467 and B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India
and Ors., referred to.

2. Order of punishment of removal of delinquent employee from service
E ought not be passed without supplying copies of the documents relied on by
the Inquiry Officer and the disciplinary authority. Serious prejudice would
be caused to delinquent employee if documents on which reliance was placed
by the authorities in removing him from service were not supplied to him.
This will cause denial of reasonable opportunity of hearing to him.
F (38-F-H; 39-A)

Union ofIndia v. Mohd Ramzan Khan, (t 991 J t SCC 588 and Managing
Director ECIL Hyderabadv. 8. Karunakar and Ors., (l'i93J 4 SCC 727, followed.

Debotosh Pal Choudhary v. Punjab National Bank and Anr., (2002) 8 SCC
G 68, referred to.

3. An order of removal from service emanating from a departmental
proceeding can very well be passed even after acquittal of the delinquent
employee in a criminal case. This issue is no longer res-integra. (38-D; 37-FJ
H
Nelson Matis v. Union of India and Anr., [1992) 4 SCC 711 and Senior
SOUTH BENGAL STATE TRANSPORT CORPN. ''·SWAP AN KUMAR MITRA [TARUNCHATIERJEE. J.] 33

l Superintendent of Post Offices, Pathmathitta and Ors. v. A. Goplalan, I1997) 11 A
sec 239, reiterated.
4. Division Bench was wrong in its finding that order of disciplinary
authority removing delinquent from service was perverse. It appears that
disciplinary authority on the consideration of the reports of the Inquiry Officer
and the District Magistrate and evidences adduced before them, came to a B
conclusion of fact that it was due to rash and negligent driving of respondent
'} No. I, the accident occurred and as a result of this, 15 lives were lost and
some passengers were seriously injured. However, it cannot be said that for
non-supply of the inquiry report, it can legitimately be held that such a finding
of the disciplinary authority was perverse in nature.. (44-G; 45-B, C] C

Roshan Di Hatti v. Commissioner ofIncome Tax, Delhi, (1977] 2 SCC 378,
distinguished.

Ku/deep Singh v. Commissioner of Police, (1999) 2 CC 10, held
inappiicable. D

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1015 of2005.

From the Judgment and Order dated 26.8.2003 of the Calcutta High
Court in F.M.A. No. 292/ 2003.
E
Janaranajan Das and Swetaketu Mishra for the Appellants.

- Chanchal Kumar Ganguli, Ms. Aarti Khera al}d V.K. Monga for the
Respondents.
F
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

T ARUN CHATTERJEE, J. Shri Sapan Kumar Mitra, who is
Respondent No. 1 in this appeal was employed by the Appellant, South
Bengal State Transport Ccrporation (in short Corporation ) as a bus drive. On
21st April 1994 the bus which the Respondent No. 1 was driving left Durgapur G
for Maida. In early hours of 22nd April 1994, i.e. at around 0030 hours, the
bus met with an accident on the Farakka Barrage and fell into the bay. The
accident had occurred when a truck approached the bus from the opposite
side on the barrage and finding that the truck was approaching the bus from
the opposite side, the bus driver turned it sharply towards left and as a result, H
34 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2006] 2 S.C.R.

A it dashed into the lock-gate and the railings of the barrage, by which process, 'r
the bus fell into the day.

Due to this accident, 15 precious lives were lost and a number of other
passengers were seriously injured. A departmental inquiry as well as a criminal
proceeding was initiated against respondent No. I. The criminal proceeding
B was at the instance of one of the bus passengers who got injured and later
succumbed to injuries. This criminal case came to be registered as Farakka
Police case No. 34 of 1994 under Sections 279, 338, 427 and 301 A-of India
Penal Code. The departmental inquiry at the same time was also initiated
against Respondent No. I.
c So far as the criminal case is concerned, it ended in acquittal of
Respondent No. I on the ground that sufficient evidence was not available
to the Court to come to a conclusion of guilt of Respondent No. 1.

As noted hereinafter, the Respondent No. I was removed from service
D after holding the departmental inquiry into the incident that had occurred on
22nd April 1994 by which, 15 bus passengers died and some others had
serious injuries. Be it mentioned herein, the Transport. Department of the
State Government by a Notification, directed the District Magistrate,
Murshidabad, West Bengal to hold an enquiry as to who was responsible for
E this accident and the death of 15 passengers and injury to other bus passengers.
A report was submitted by the District Magistrate holding Respondent No. I
responsible. Considering the report of the District Magistrate, depositions
relied upon by him and also the depositions before the Inquiry Officer, the
inquiry officer came to the conclusion that the Respondent No. I due to his
rash and negligent driving, caused the accident resulting in death of 15 persons
F and also serious injuries to other bus passengers. The Disciplinary authority
-
passed an order of removal from service of Respondent No. I relying on the
report of the Inquiry Officer. The order of removal was challenged by
Respondent No. I by filing a Writ Petition in the High Court at Calcutta. In
this connection, we may notice that although a statutory appeal was available
G to Respondent No. I for filing an appeal before an appellate authority, he
chose to move the High Court in its Writ Jurisdiction challenging the order
of removal. The order of removal from service was challenged by the
respondent No. I in the High Court mainly on two grounds.

The first ground on which the order of removal was said to be bad and
H invalid in law was that, as the documents relied on by the inquiry officer did
r
J
SOUTH BENGAL STATE TRANSPORT CORPN. "· SWAPAN KUMAR MITRA [TARUN CHATTERJEE. J) JS
"j not at all feature in the list of documents annexed to the charge sheet nor A
copies of the same were supplied to Respondent No. I, no reliance could be
placed on such documents and, therefore, the order of removal from service
of the respondent No. I was liable to be set aside. The second ground of
challenge was that the Disciplinary Authority could not continue with the
departmental proceeding and impose punishment of removal from service
against the respondent No. I after his acquittal in the criminal case.
B

~ The learned Single Judge has upheld the first ground namely, non-
supply of the copies of the report of the District. Magistrate and other allied
documents relied on by him and the enquiry report submitted by the Inquiry
Officer, vitiates the departmental proceedings. It was also had held by· the c
learned Single Judge that since the degree of proof in a criminal proceeding
is much higher than in a departmental proceeding, acquittal in the criminal
case cannot be a bar for the disciplinary authorities either for imitating a
departmental proceeding against the employee, i.e. respondent No. I or from
proceeding with the same and imposing penalty of removal from service
against the respondent No. I However, the learned Single Judge thought it fit D
.>{ to set aside the order of removal and directed the disciplinary authority to
supply the copies of the documents referred to hereinbefore, to the respondent
No. I for filing comments against the said documents and thereafter to reach
a fresh conclusion of the question of removal 'or respondent No. I from
service after giving a reasonable opportunity of hearing to him. In view of E
the above findings arrived at by the learned Siitgle Judge, the final order was
passed in the following manner:-

In the result, the writ petition succeeds in part. The order of the
I disciplinary authority, appearing at page 46 of the writ petition is
quashed and set side. The writ petitioner is given liberty to ask for the F
--J copies of the documents which he wants for the purpose of the present
proceeding. Such request must be made by tomorrow to the learned
Advocate appearing for the respondent authority. Respondent authority
• would furnish copies of the same within three days thereafter. The
writ petitioner would be entitled to offer his comments on the said
G
documents to the disciplinary authority. The disciplinary authority
upon receipt of such explanation and would pass a final order and
~~ give adequate opportunity of hearing to the petitioner.

Needless to say that the petitioner must submit his explanation as
H
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36 SUPREME COURT REPORI'S (20061 2 S.C.R.

A early as possible and not later than two weeks from date. In case the
explanation is offered the disciplinary authority would pass a final
order and communicate the same within a period of four weeks
thereafter.

The writ petitioner is put under deemed suspension till the matter
B is finally decided by the disciplinary authority.

The disciplinary authority while passing the final order would
also decide the issue of back wages and/or the subsistence allowance
payable to the petitioner.
c Writ petition is disposed of accordingly without any order as to
costs."

Feeling aggrieved, the respondent No. I instead of appearing before the
disciplinary authority, had preferred an appeal before the Division Bench of
D the High Court. In appeal, however, the Division Bench did not say that after
acquittal in the criminal case, departmental proceeding could not be continued
and thereby no order of removal could be passed by the disciplinary authority.
But it was held by the Division Bench that, whether the delinquent had asked
for the copies of the documents relied on by enquiry officer as well as by the
E disciplinary authority was not at all material. According to the Division Bench,
unless a document is included in the list of documents annexed to the charge
sheet, the same cannot be used without giving sufficient opportunity to the
delinquent and without obtaining leave for relying on the same. As this was
not followed, according to the Division Bench, the disciplinary proceeding
itself was liable to be quashed. At this juncture, we may remind ourselves
F that the learned Single Judge had also held that no reliance could be placed
on the documents not supplied to the respondent No. I unless such documents
were supplied and sufficient opportunity was given to the Respondent No. I
for filing representation and/or comments against such documents. It is for
this reason that the learned single Judge directed the disciplinary authority to
supply copies of the documents to the respondent No. I, allow respondent
G No. 1 to file his comments and then reach a fresh and final conclusion on the
issue referred to hereinearlier after giving respondent No. I a fair hearing. It
was further held by the Division Bench that, since the District Magistrate was
not examined and no one had proved the reliability and authenticity of his
report, it was not open to the enquiry officer or to the disciplinary authority
H to rely on the said report of the District Magistrate on the basis of which a
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SOUTH BENGAL ST ATE TRANSPORT CORPN. "· SW A PAN KUMAR MITRA [T ARUN CHATTERJEE, J J ) 7

"i finding was arrived at by the disciplinary authority. The Division Bench had A
also drawn an adverse inference by holding that the Inquiry Officer had
exceeded his jurisdiction by relying on the depositions of witnesses alleged
to have been examined and relied on by the District Magistrate without
examining such witnesses, in making his report. Accordingly, the Division
Bench held that reliance on such depositions was wholly illegal and void,
leading to perversity. Thereafter, the Division Bench also had taken into
B
consideration the fact of non-mentioning of rash and negligent driving of
-j respondent No. I in the Firs Information Report (FIR). Going into the facts
and circumstances of the case leading to the filing of a FIR, the division
Bench held that since the FIR did not mention about the rash and negligent
driving, no reliance could be placed. It was also finding of the Division c
Bench that since only a xerox copy of the District Magistrate's report was
filed before the Inquiry Officer, such xerox copy of the report of the District
Magistrate was Inadmissible in evidence. On the above findings, the Division
Bench came to a conclusion that the findings of the disciplinary authority as
wen as the Inquiry Officer were wholly perverse. Accordingly, the Division
Bench had set aside the judgment of the learned Single Judge and the order D
of removal of the respondent. No. l and directed the Corporation to reinstate
the respondent No. I with full back wages and also suspension allowance
from a particular date.

Against this final order of the Division Bench setting aside the order of E
removal and directing reinstatement of the respondent No. I, this appeal has
been preferred by the Corporation and the same was heard in presence of the
learned counsel for the parties after grant of leave.

We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and also examined
the relevant records of this case. Although the Division Bench had not F
~.1, categorically said that the departmental proceeding could not be continued
and punishment could not be imposed on the delinquent employee when the
criminal case ended in acquittal, even then the learned counsel for the
respondents sought to argue this ground before us. In our view, this ground
is no longer res-integra. In Nelson Motis v. Union of India and Ors., [1992]
4 SCC 711 a three-Judge Bench of this Court observed at paragraph 5, as
G
follows:
;\
"So far the first point is concerned, namely whether the disciplinary
proceedings could have been continued in the face of the acquittal of
the appellant in the criminal case, the plea has no substance H
i
\

38 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2006) 2 S.C.R.

A whatsoever and does not merit a detailed consideration. The nature
and scope of a criminal case are very different from those of a
departmental qisciplinary proceeding and an order of acquittal
therefore, cannot conclude the departmental proceeding. Besides, the
Tribunal has pointed out that the acts which led to the initiation of the
departmental disciplinary proceeding were not exactly the same which
B were the subject matter of the criminal case." (Emphasis supplied)

Similarly in Senior Superintendent of Post Officer, Pathamthitta and
Ors., v. A. Gopa/an, [1997] 11SCC239 the view expressed in Ne/ason Motis
v. Union of India and Ors. (supra) was fully endorsed by this Court and
c similarly it was held that nature and scope of proof in a criminal case is very
different from that of a departmental disciplinary proceeding and order of
acquittal in the former, cannot conclude departmental proceedings. This Court
has further held that in a criminal case charge has to be proved by proof
beyond reasonable doubt while in departmental proceeding the standard of
proof for proving the charge is mere preponderance of probabilities. Such
D being the position of law now settled by various decisions of this Court, two
of which have already been referred to earlier, we need not deal in detail with
the question whether acquittal in a criminal case will lead to holding that the
departmental proceedings should also be discontinued. That being the position,
an order of removal from service emanating from a departmental proceeding
E can very well be passed even after acquittal of the delinquent employee in a
criminal case. In any case, the learned Single Judge as well as the Division
Bench did not base their decisions relying on the proposition that after acquittal
in the criminal case departmental proceedings could not be continued and
order of removal could not be passed.

F On the question, whether copies of the documents relied on by the
Inquiry Officer and the disciplinary authority must be served on respondent
No. I. Before passing any order of removal from service, it is no doubt true
that such order of punishment, ought not be passed without supplying the
copies of the documents to the respondent No. I. Now the question is whether
non-supply of the documents, as referred to herein before, would vitiate the
G
departmental proceeding in its entirely and directions for reinstatement should
be passed or directions to supply copies of documents relied on by the
authorities should be made and thereafter direct reinstatement of respondent ; ·.
No. I. into service on condition that the disciplinary authority shall continue
with the disciplinary proceeding from the stage of supplying copies of the
H documents to the respondent No. I. To reach a fresh and final conclusion. It
.·1
SOUTH BENGAL ST ATE TRANSPORT CORPN. '· SWAPAN KUMAR MITRA [T ARUN CHATTERJEE. J ] 39
cannot be disputed that serious prejudice would be caused to the respondent A
'i No. 1. If the documents on which reliance was placed by the authorities in
removing him from service were not supplied to him. This will cause denial
of reasonable opportunity of hearing to him. This view was also expressed
by the decision of this Court in the case of Union of India v. Mohd. Ramzan
Khan, [1991] 1SCC588, which was approved by the Constitution Bench of
this Court in Managing Director ECIL Hyderabad and Ors. v. B. Karunakar
B
and Ors., [1993] 4 SCC 727. This Court in Ramzan Khan's case (supra) at
Paragraph 18, has clearly observed as follows:
'i
" ... wherever there has been an inquiry officer and he has furnished
a report to the disciplinary authority at the conclusion of the inquiry c
holding the delinquent guilty of all or any of the charges with proposal
for any particular punishment or not, the delinquent is entitiled to a
copy ofsuch report and will also be entitled to make a representation
against it, if he so desires, and non furnishing of the report would
amount to violation of rules of natural justice and make the final
order liable to challenge hereafter. '' (Emphasis supplied) D

.JI As noted, this decision was approved by the Constitution Bench of this
Court in the case of Managing Director ECIV Hyderabad and Ors. v. B.
Karunakar and Ors., [1993] l SCC 727. The Constitution Bench has clearly
held that in order to impose punishment of removal on a delinquent employee,
E
it is necessary to supply a copy of the inquiry report to him before such
punishment is imposed by the disciplinary authority. The Constitution Bench
on the issue of non-supply of inquiry report, observed as follows:

"The reason why the right to receive the report of the Inquiry
Officer is considered an essential part of the reasonable opportunity F
at the first stage and also a principle of natural justice is that the
findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer form an important material
before the disciplinary authority which along with the evidence is
taken into consideration by it to come to its conclusions. It is difficult
to say in advance, to what extend. the said findings including the
punishment, if any, recommended in the ·report would influence the
G
disciplinary authority while drawing its conclusions. The findings
further might have ben recorded without considering the relevant
~~ evidence on record, or by misconstruing it or unsupported by it. If
such a finding is to be one of the documents to be considered by the
disciplinary authority, the principles of natural justice require that the H
~
t·
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40 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2006] 2 S.C.R.

A employee should have a fair opportunity to meet, explain and
controvert it before he is condemned. It is the negation of the tenets
of justice and a denial of fair opportunity to the employee to consider
the findings recorded by a third party like the Inquiry Officer without
giving the employee an opportunity to reply to it. Although it is true
that the disciplinary authority is supposed to arrive at its own findings
B on the basis of the evidence recorded in the enquiry, it is also equally
true that the disciplinary authority takes into consideration the findings
recorded by the Inquiry Officer along with the evidence on record. In
the circumstances, the findings of the Inquiry Officer do constitute an
important material before the disciplinary authority which is likely to
c influence its conclusions. If the Inquiry Officer were only to record
the evidence and forward the same to the disciplinary authority, that
would not constitute any additional material before the disciplinary
authority of which the delinquent employee has no knowledge.
However, when the Inquiry Officer goes further and records his
findings, as stated above, which may or may not be based on the
D evidence on record or are contrary to the same or in ignorance of it,
such findings are an additional material unknown to the employee
but are taken into consideration by the disciplinary authority while "
arriving at its conclusion. Both the dictates of the reasonable
opportunity as well as the principles of natural justice, therefore,
E require that before the disciplinary authority comes to its own
conclusions, the delinquent employee should have an opportunity to
reply to the Inquiry Officer's findings. The disciplinary authority is
then required to consider the evidence, the report of the Inquiry Officer
and the representation of the employee against it." (Emphasis
supplied).
F
In view of the Constitution Bench decision of this Court, as referred to
herein earlier, we, therefore, cannot have any dispute that the respondent No.
I was entitled to a copy of the inquiry report, report of the District Magistrate
and all allied documents, including depositions of witnesses relied on by the
G District Magistrate. What should. be the effect of non-supply of copies of
these documents to respondent No. I ? Was it open to the Court to set aside
the order of removal, quash the departmental proceedings and order
reinstatement mechanically on the ground that the copies of documents, ~.s
referred to herein earJ;er, were not supplied to the respondent No. I or a
direction be give to the disciplinary authority, as was done by the learned
H Single Judge to supply copes of the documents and then permit the delinquent
f SOUTH BENGAL STATE TRANSPORT CORPN. "· SWAPAN KUMA1l MITRA [T ARUNCHATTERJEE.J.J 41

employee to make a representation or to file a comment on the same and A
r thereafter to proceed from that stage to reach a fresh conclusion on the
question of removal from service of Respondent No. I after taking into
consideration the comments made by him and also the inquiry report and
other evidences placed before the disciplinary authority. This aspect was also
taken into consideration by the Consitition Bench of this Court in the case of
Managing Director ECIL (supra) and it was held as under: B

"The next question to be answered is what is the effect on the
1 order of punishment when the report of the Inquiry Officer is not
furnished to the employee and what relief should be granted to him
in such cases. The answer to this question has to be relative to the c
punishment awarded. When the employee is dismissed or removed
from service and the inquiry is set aside because the report is not
furnished to him, in some cases the non-furnishing of the report may
have prejudiced him gravely while in other cases it may have made
no difference to the ultimate punishment awarded to him. Hence to
direct reinstatement of the employee with back-wages in all cases is D
to reduce the rules of justice to a mechanical ritual. The iheory of
.y reasonable opportunity and the principles of natural justice have
been evolved to upholds the rule of law and to assist the individual
to vindicate his just rights. They are not incantations to be invoked
nor rites to be performed on all and sundry occasions. Whether in
E
fact, prejudice has been caused to the employee or not on account of
the denial to him of the report, has to be considered on the facts and
circumstances of each case. Where, th~refore, even after the furnishing
of the report, no different consequence would have followed, it would
be a perversion of justice to permit the employee to resume duty lll)d
to get all the consequential benefits. It amounts to rewarding the F
dishonest and the guilty and thus to, stretching the concept of justice
...J to illogical and exasperating limits. It amounts to an "unnatural
expansion of natural justice'' which in itself is antithetical to justice.

Hence, in all cases where the Inquiry Officer's report is not
G
furnished to the delinquent employee in the disciplinary proceedings,
the courts and Tribunals should cause the copy of the report to be
famished to the aggrieved employee if he has not already secured it
/\ before coming to the Court/Tribunal, and give the employee an
opportunity to show how his or her case was prejudiced because of
the non-supply of the report. If after hearing the parties, the Court/ H
/ '
~
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42 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (20061 2 S.C.R.

A Tribunal comes to the conclusion that the non-supply of the report
would have made no difference to the ultimate findings and the l'
punishment given, the Court/Tribunal should not interfere with the
order of punishment. The Court/Tribunal should not mechanically set
aside the order of punishment on the ground ihat the report was not
furnished as is regrettably being done at present. The courts should
B avoid resorting to short-cuts. Since it is the Courtsrfribunals which
will apply their judicial mind to the question and give their reasons
for setting aside or not setting aside the order of punishment, (and not
any internal appellate or revisional authority), there would be neither
a breach of the principles of natural justice nor a denial of the
c reasonable opportunity. It is only if the Courtsrfribunals find that the
furnishing of the report would have made a difference to the result
in the case that it should set aside the order of punishment. Where
after following the above procedure, the Court/Tribunal sets aside
the order of punishment, the proper relief that should be granted is
to direct reinstatement of the employee with liberty to the authority/
D management to proceed with the inquiry, by placing the employee
under suspension and continuing the inquiry from the stage of
furnishing him with the report. The question whether the employee
would be entitled to the back-wages and other benefits from the date
of his dismissal to the date of his reinstatement if ultimately ordered
E should invariably be left to be decided by Lhe authority concerned
according to law, after the culmination of the proceedings and
depending on the final outcome. If the employee succeeds in the fresh
inquiry and is directed to be reinstated, the authority should be al
liberty to decide according to law how it will treat the period from
the date of dismissal till the reinstatement and to what benefits, if any
F and the extent of the benefits, he will be entitled. The reinstatement
made as a result of the setting aside of the inquiry for failure to
furnish the report should be treated as a reinstatement for the purpose
of holding the fresh inquiry from the stage of furnishing the report
and no more, where such fresh inquiry is held. That will also be the
G correct position in law. " (Emphasis supplied).

Applying the principles laid down by the Constitution Bench, it cannot
be denied that the learned Single Judge was justified in sending the case back
to the disciplinary authorit;i and ordering him to supply a copy of the inquiry /.,
report along with the repot of the District Magistrate and other documents
H relied upon by him to respondent No. I and thereafter to proceed from that
.(
l
SOUTH BENGAL ST ATE TRANSPORT CORP~."· SWAPAN KUMAR MITRA [TARUN CHATTERJEE. J.J 4J .

stage after seeking comments on those reports from respondent no. I to reach A
y a fresh conclusion. We are of the view that at the appellate stage, the Division
Bench was not justified to short cut the procedure by going into the merits
on the question of removal from service of the respondent No. I particularly
when the learned Single Judge had not decided the came of respondent No.
I on the question of removal on merits and when the disciplinary authority
had passed the order of removal practically relying o'n the Inquiry Report, a B
copy of which was not supplied to the respondent No. I for filing comments.
It is well settled that the Inquiry Officer and disciplinary authority are the
sole judges of facts. Adequacy and reliability oli the evidence is not a matter
that can be canvassed before a High Court in a writ proceeding under Article
226 of the Constitution (See: State of A.P. and Ors. v. S. Sree Rama Rao, C
AIR (1963) SC 1723).

It is true that a copy of the report, which was filed before the Inquiry
Officer, was examined by the respondent No. I and his helper and thereafter
they accepted the documents and deposed before the Inquiry Officer. It is
alsd' true that after inspection of the report of the District Magistrate neither D
his:helper nor the respondent No. 1 asked for an opportunity to file comments
nor raised any objection as to the admissibility of the same as not being the
original of the report. This aspect may not be gone in to at this stage in view
of our findings and directions made herein above. Mr. Das appearing on
behalf of the Corporation urged that since the respondent No. I had inspected E
the report and other documents on which reliance was placed by the
disciplinary authority, it was not incumbent for the disciplinary authority to
supply copy of the enquiry report for filing comments. In support of this
contention, reliance was placed on the decision of this court in the case of
Debotosh Pal Choudhury v. Purijab National Bank and Ors., reported in
[2002] 8 SCC 68. In view of the Constitution Bench decision and in view of F
our directions made herein above to the effect that the disciplinary a'uthority
shall now proceed to dispose of the departmental proceeding after supplying
a copy of the inquiry report and other documents relied on by the Inquiry
Officer, it would not be necessary to go into this question at all.

In any view of the matter, the grounds on which the Division Bench
G
had set aside the judgment of the learned Single Judge and the order of
removal and quashed the departmental proceedings as referred to herein earlier,
.• \ were not open to it in the exercise of their supervisory power of Article 226
of the Constitution. One of the many grounds to quash the departmental
proceeding was that since in the list of documents that was attached to the H.
\

44 SUPRF\1~ COURI REPORTS (20061 2 S.C.R.

A charge-sheet, tht: report of the District Magistrate was not mentioned, no ..,
reliance could be placed on the said report of the District Magistrate and
therefore the order of removal that was passed relying on the said report, was
liable to be set aside and order of reinstatement must be passed without any
further inquiry. Furthermore, according to the respondent No. I, since the
original copy of the Inquiry Report was not filed and only a xerox copy of
B the same was filed, such xerox copy could not at all be taken into consideration
for the purpose of passing the order of removal of the respondent No. I. It
is well settled position now that the disciplinary authority or the inquiry
officer are not Courts and therefore the strict procedures that are to be followed i
in courts may not be strictly adhered t?. In B.C. C~aturvedi v. Union of India
c and Ors., ( 1995! 6 SCC 749, it has been laid down by this court that in a
departmental proceeding, the strict proof of legal evidence and findings on
that evidence are not relevant. Apart from that, in view of our directions
made herein earlier, that is, when the copies of the documents have been
directed to be supplied by th.: learned Smgle Judge and thereafter proceeding
will continue, it was not at all necessary for the Division Bench to decide this
D issue as was wrongly done by it.

Again on the question whether the respondent No. I was responsible
for rash and negligent driving on account of which 15 bus passengers had
died and some others received serious injuries, in view of our discussions
E made herein above, we do not think, at this stage, such questions need to be
gone into.

Therefore, we are of the view that the Division Bench had committed
a grave error to decide the question as referred to herein earlier at the appellate
stage before directing the disciplinary authority to decide such question on
F facts. Furthermore, when the learned Single Judge had directed fresh disposal
of the disciplinary proceeding in the manner indicated in the order, we are
of the view that the Division Bench should not have pre-empted decision of
the disciplinary authority on facts on a prima~(acie finding on the subject
matter of enquiry when the disciplinary authority was to make up its mind
(See: AIR India ltd. v. M. Yogeshwar Raj, (2000] 5 SCC 467).
G
There is yet another aspect which is to be considered by us before we
conclude this judgment. From a bare perusal of the order of the Division
Bench, we find that the Division Bench also found that the findings of the ~-

disciplinary authority in passing the order of removal were perverse. We are
H unable to agree with this view of the Division Bench. In Roshan Di Hatti v.
45
.
SOUTH BENGAL STATE TRANSPORT CORPN. •.SWAP AN KUMAR MITRA [TARUN CHATTERJEE, J.]

Commissioner of Income-tax, Delhi, [1977] 2 sec 378, this Court, while A
considering the question of perversity of a finding, held that when the finding
of fact was arrived at without any material or upon a view of the facts which
could not reasonably be entertained or the facts found were such that no
person acting judicially and properly instructed as to the relevant law would
have come to that determination, the decision can be said to be perverse. It B
is, however, true that if perversity is shown and proved, it would be open to
the Writ Court to hold as such. But, in our view, this was not a case of
perverse finding. It appears that disciplinary authority on consideration of the
reports of the Inquiry Officer and the District Magistrate and evidences
adduced before them, came to a conclusion of fact that it was due to rash and
negligent driving of the respondent No. I, the accident had occurred and as C
a result of this, 15 lives were lost and some passengers were seriously injured.
However, it cannot be said that for non supply of the inquiry report, it can
legitimately be held that such a finding of the disciplinary authority was
perverse in nature. In any view of the matter, when copies of the inquiry
report have ben directed, by the learned Single Judge, to be supplied to the
respondent No. I, and thereafter the departmental proceedings to continue D
thereas no earthy reason for the Division Bench to interfere with such an
)l
order and decide the matter by going into the merits and direct quashing of
the departmental proceeding at the appellate stage.

The decision in Ku/deep Singh v. Commissioner of Police, [1999] 2 E
SCC JO as relied on by Mr. Ganguly appearing for the respondent No. I in
the question of perversity of the finding is, in our view, not at all applicable
in view of our finding made hereinafter. Therefore, on his account also, the
findings of the Division Bench on the question of perversity cannot, at all,
be accepted and therefore liable to be set aside.
F
We have already indicated that the learned Single Judge was fully
justified in directing the disciplinary authority to proceed from the stage of
supplying the Inquiry Report and other documents to the respondent No. l.
It has now been stated before us that after the order of the learned Single
Judge, the copies of the documents on which the disciplinary authority placed .G
reliance have been supplied to the delinquent employee. Even if such
documents have not been supplied in terms of the order of the learned Single
Judge, they may be. supplied to the respondent No. I within a period of
fortnight from the date of applying a copy of this judgment to the authorities.
As directed by the learned Single Judge, it would be open to the respondent
No. I to file comments ore representation against the findings made in the H
46 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006) 2 S.C.R.

A Inquiry Report including the report of the District Magistrate. After considering
these comments, the disciplinary authority is directed to reach a fresh and
final conclusion, on the question whether an order of removal from service
of the respondent No. I can be passed. It is needless to say that it would be
open to the respondent No. I or his authorised representative to cross-examine
B the wi~nesses, and also to raise the question of admissibility of the zerox copy
of the report of the District Magistrate before the disciplinary authority.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court is set
aside and the order of the learned Single Judge is restored subject to
modifications made herein above. It is also directed that the respondent No.
I during the pendency of the departmental proceeding shall be paid subsistence
C allowance in accordance with the rules of the Corporation. The appeal is
allowed to the extent indicate above.

There will be no order as to costs.

v.s.s. Appeal allowed.

•

..

,._