Holding

An adult prosecutrix of full understanding can be the basis of conviction without corroboration unless her evidence is shown to be infirm, and a explained delay in filing the FIR does not invalidate the conviction.

Summary

The appellants, Sri Narayan Saha and another, were convicted under IPC sections 376 read with 34 for raping a married woman (PW‑3). The victim reported the crime five days after the incident, and the medical examination was inconclusive due to profuse bleeding. Both the trial court and the High Court upheld the conviction based solely on the victim’s testimony, despite minor discrepancies and the delay in filing the FIR. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined whether the delay and the lack of corroborative medical evidence rendered the conviction unsafe, and whether a prosecutrix’s testimony requires corroboration under the Evidence Act. The Court held that a competent adult prosecutrix may be the sole basis of conviction unless her evidence is shown to be infirm, and that a explained delay in lodging the FIR is not fatal. Consequently, the conviction was affirmed and the appeal dismissed.

Issues considered

Whether a five‑day delay in lodging the FIR defeats the prosecution’s case.
Whether the testimony of a prosecutrix in a sexual offence must be corroborated under the Evidence Act.
Whether the medical evidence of profuse bleeding undermines the victim’s testimony.
Whether minor inconsistencies in the victim’s and her husband’s statements affect the reliability of the evidence.
Whether conviction can be sustained on the victim’s testimony alone.

Legislation cited

Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 114, s. 118
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 34, s. 376

Subjects

rapedelay in FIRcorroborationprosecutrixIndian Evidence ActIPC 376IPC 34victim testimonysexual offence

Judgment

• SRI NARAYAN SAHA AND ANR. A
v.
STATE OF TRIPURA

SEPTEMBER 8, 2004

[ARIJIT PASAYAT AND C.K. THAKKER, JJ.] B

Penal Code, 1860-Section 376 r/w 34-RapP-Conviction based on
testimony of victim-Relying on her evidence, Trial Court convicted the two
accused-Appellants-Conviction confirmed by High Court-On appeal,
held : If victim is adult and offull understanding, Court is entitled to base
conviction on her evidence unless the same is shown to be infirm-Mere delay
c
in lodging FIR is ofno consequence, if delay explained-Statement ofdoctor,
that there was profuse bleeding rendering any definite opinion difficult,
inconsequential in view of unimpeached evidence of PW 3-There was also
no reason for false implication-Minor discrepancies in testimony of PW3
and her husband rightly held inconsequential by Courts below in view of the D
evidence having been recorded in Court after seven years ofthe occurrence-
Evidence Act, 1872-Section 118.

According to prosecution version PW 3 was proceeding towards
her house on foot, when accused-Appellants forcibly dragged her to a
nearby jungle and after gagging her mouth, committed rape on her one
E
after the other for the whole night. Next day morning, PW 3 werit to her
maternal uncle's house wherefrom she was taken to her house by her
husband when she disclosed the incident to her husband. The matter
was reported to the police and FIR was recorded, and she was examined
by PW 5, the Doctor. F
Appellants faced trial for alleged commission ofoffences punishable
under Section 376 read with Section 34 IPC. Placing reliance on evidence
of PW 3, Trial Court found them guilty and sentenced each one to suffer
rigorous imprisonment for six years and to pay a fine of Rs. 1000 each G
with default stipulation. High Court affirmed the conviction and the
sentence.

In appeal to this Court, Appellants assailed the conviction, inter
alia, on grounds that there was unexplained delay of five days in reporting
the matter to the police; that additionally there was no corroboration to H
213
214 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A the evidence of PW 3, the victim, and that the medical evidence did not
lend any assurance to her testimony.

Dismissing the appeal, the Court

HELD : 1.1. Mere delay in lodging the FIR is really of no
B consequence, if the reason is explained. In the instant case, the evidence
of PW 3, the victim and that of her husban<I:, PW 4, clearly show that
there was initial reluctance to report the matter to the police by PW 4.
He, in fact had taken his wife to task for the incident and had slapped
her. (216-H; 217-A]
c 1.2. In India if the prosecutrix happened to be a married person,
she will not do anything without informing her husband. Merely because
the complaint was lodged less than promptly, does not raise the question
that the complaint was false. The reluctance to go the police is because
of society's attitude towards such women. It casts doubt and shame
D upon her rather than comfort and sympathy with her. Therefore, the
delay lodging complaint in such cases does not necessarily indicate that
her version is false. (218-B]

2.1. A prosecutrix of a sex offence cannot be put on par with an
accomplice; She is in fact a victim of the crime. The Indian Evidence Act,
E 1972 nowhere says that her evidence cannot be accepted unless it is
corroborated in material particulars. She is undoubtedly a competent
witness under Section 118 and her evidence must receive the same weight
as is attached to an injured in cases of physical violence. The same degree
of care and caution must attach in evaluation of her evidence as in the case
F of an injured complainant or witness and no more. What is necessary is
that the Court must be alive to the conscious of the fact that it is dealing
with the evidence of a person who is interested in the outcome of the
charge levelled by her. If the Court keeps this in .mind and feels satisfied
that it can act on the evidence ?f the prosecutrix, there is no rule of law ur.
G practice incorporatedin the Ev~dence Act similar to illustration (b) to
Section 114 which requires it to look for corroboration. (217-C, D, E]

2.2. If for some reason the Court is hesitant to place implicit reliance
on the testimony of the prosecutrix it may look for evidence which may
lend assurance to her testimony short of corroboration' required in the
H case of an a~complice. The nature of evidence required to lend assurance
N. SAHA v. STATE [PASAYAT, J.] 215

to the testimony of the prosecutrix must necessarily depend on the facts A
and circumstances of each case. But if a prosecutrix is an adult and. of
full understanding the Court is entitled to base a conviction on her
evidence unless the same is shown to be infirm and not trustworthy. If
the totality of the circumstances appearing on ·the record of the case
disclose that the prosecutrix does not have a strong motive to falsely B
involve the person charged, the Court should ordinarily have no hesitation
in accepting her evidence. [217-F, G)

State of Maharashtra v. Chandraprakash Kewalchand Jain, 119901 1
SCC 550 and Karnel Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR (1995) SC
2472, relied on. c
3. It was categorically stated by the Doctor that there was profuse
bleeding which rendered any definite opinion difficult. That really is of
no consequence in view of the un-impeached evidence of the victim
PW 3. (218-C)
D
4. There is no reason as to why a woman, more particularly a
married woman would falsely implicate the two accused persons. Minor
discrepancies in the testimony of PWs 3 and 4 were sought to be
highlighted. Taking into account the fact that the evidence was recorded
in court after about seven years of the occurrence, these have been E
rightly held to be of no consequence by both the Trial Court and the
High Court. [218-DJ

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 637
of 2003.
F
From the Judgment Order dated 20.8.2002 of the Gauhati High Court
at Assam in Crl.A. No. 1997.

Vimal Chandra and S. Dave for the Appellants.

Gopal Singh and Anurag Sharma for the Respondent.
G

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

ARIJIT PASA YAT, J. : The appellants faced trial for alleged
commission of offences punishable under Section 376 read with Section 34 H
216 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short the 'IPC'). The Trial Court found
the accused-appellants guilty and sentenced each one to suffer rigorous
imprisonment for six years and to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000 each with default
stipulation. The High Court, by the impugned judgment, affirmed the •
conviction and the sentence.

B The prosecution version, in a nut shell i~ as follows :

On 22.07.1989, the victim, a married, women, aged about 20 years
alighted from the bus and around 6 P.M. was proceeding towards her house ...
on foot. When she reached near a Banyan tree, the accused persons forcibly
dragged her to a nearby jungle and after gagging her mouth, committed rape
c on her one after the other. She suffered the trauma for the whole night and
in the early morning, she was dropped near Bhattapukur. Next day morning,
the victim went to her maternal uncle's house wherefrom she was taken to
her house by her husband when she disclosed the incident to her husband.
She was moved to the hospital on 24.07.1989. The matter was reported to
D the police and FIR was recorded at the hospital on the version of the victim.
She was examined by PW-5, the Do~tor on 24.07.1989. Placing reliance on
the evidence of PW-3, the Victim, the Trial Court found the accused persons
guilty, ordered convicted and sentence, as noted above. The matter was
carried in appeal before the High Court which did not bring relief to the
accused-appellants.
E
Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that there was unexplained
delay of five days in reporting the matter to the police. Additionally, there
was no corroboration to the evidence of the victim. The medical evidence
does not lend any assurance to the testimony of the victim. It was further
submitted that one of the accused persons had an amputed arm and it is highly
F improper that he would be able to control the victim facilitating.rape by the
co-accused. In the aforesaid background, it is submitted that the conviction,
as recorded, is not proper.

In response, learned counsel for the respondent-State ofTripura submitted
that both the Trial Court and High Court had placed reliance on the evidence
G •,
of the victim, PW-3. There is nothing brought out in cross-examination to
render her evidence fragile. The reason for the delayed reporting of the FIR
has been also explained by the prosecution.

We wish to first deal with the plea relating to the delayed lodging of fl!-

H the FIR. As held in a large number of cases, mere delay in lodging the FIR
N. SAHA v. STATE [PASAYAT,J.] 217

is really of no consequence, if the reason is explained. In the instant case, A
the evidence of PW-3, the victim and that of her husband, PW-4, clearly show
that there was initial reluctance to report the matter to the police by PW-4.
He, in fact, had taken his wife to task for the incident and had slapped her.
In Karnel Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR (1995) SC 2472, it was
observed that a women who was a victim of a ~~x~i?l violence, is not an B
accomplice to the crime but is a victim of another persons' lust and, therefore,
her evidence need not be tested with the same amount of suspicion as that

-
of a culprit. Therefore, the Rule of prudence that her evidence in material
particulars, has no application. At the most, the court may look for some
evidence which lends assurance.
c
A prosecutrix of a sex offence cannot be put on par with an accomplice.
She is in fact a victim of the crime. The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (in short
'The Evidence Act') nowhere says that her evidence cannot be accepted
unless it is corroborated in material particulars. She is undoubtedly a
competent witness under S. 118 and her evidence must receive the same D
weight as is attached to an injured in cases of physical violence. The same
degree of care and caution must attach in the evaluation of her evidence as
in the case of an injured complainant or witness and no more. What is
necessary is that the Court must be alive to and conscious of the fact that
it is dealing with the evidence of a person who is interested in the outcome
of the charge levelled by her. If the Court keeps this in mind and feels E
satisfied that it can act on the evidence of the prosecutrix, there is no rule
of law or practice incorporated in the Evidence Act similar to illustration (b)
to S. 114 which requires it to look for corroboration. If for some reason the
Court is hesitant to place implicit reliance on the testimony of the prosecutrix
it may look for evidence which may lend assurance to her testimony short F
of corroboration required in the case of an accomplice. The nature of
evidence required to lend assurance to the testimony of the prosecutrix must
necessary depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. But if a
prosecutrix is an adult and of full understanding the Court is entitled to base
a conviction on her evidence unless the same is shown to be infirm and not
trustworthy. If the totality of the circumstances appearing on the record of G
the case disclose that the prosecutrix does not have a strong motive to falsely
involve the person charged, the Court should ordinarily have no hesitation
in accepting her evidence.

The aforesaid position was highlighted in State of Maharashtra v. H
218 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A Chandraprakash Kewalchand Jain, [1990] 1 SCC 550 and Karnel Singh's
case (supra).

In India if the prosecutrix happened to be a married person, she will
not do anything informing her husband. Merely because the complaint was
lodged less than promptly, does not raise the question that the complaint was
B false. The reluctance to go to the police is because of society's attitude
towards such women. It casts doubt and same upon her rather than comfort
and sympathy with her. Therefore, the delay in lodging complaint in such
cases does not necessarily indicate that her version is false. .._
C Coming to the Doctor's evidence, it was categorically stated by him that
there was profuse bleeding which rendered any definite opinion difficult.
That really is of no consequence in view of the un-impeached evidence of
the victim-PW-3.

There was no reason as to why a women, more partiCularly a married
D women would falsely implicate the two accused persons. Minor discrepancies
in the testimony of Pws. 3 and 4 were sought to be highlighted. Taking into
account the fact that the evidence was recorded in court after about seven
years.of the occurrence, these have been rightly held to be of no consequence
by both the Trial Court and the High Court. ·
E
We do not find any infirmity in the conclusions arrived at by the High ·
Court to warrant any interference. The appeal fails and is hereby dismissed.

B.B.B. Appeal dismissed.