SRI NRIPATI GHOSHAL, FIRST LAND ACQUISITION COLLECTOR AND ORS.versusPREMAVATL KAPUR (DEAD) BY LRS. AND ORS. ETC.

                                                                                          \

A          SRI NRIPATI GHOSHAL, FIRST LAND ACQUISITION
                        COLLECTOR AND ORS.
                                v.
          PRE!v!AVATl KAPUR (DEAD) BY LRS. AND ORS. ETC.

                                    JULY 23, 1996
B
                iK RAMASWAMY AND G.B. PATTANAIK, JJ.]

          VVest Bengal Preniiscs Requisition and Control (Tcn1jJora1y Provisions)
    1947: Section 3( 1).
                                                                                      •
c         Land Acquisition Act, 1894: Section 4, SA, 6, 11 and 12.

           Land-Acquisition and Requisition-Validity of-Premises requisi-
    tioned under !Vest Bengal Act for defence p1upose--Pre111ises in possession
    of Indian Nai:v-W!it challenging requisition-in the 111eanivhile acquisition
D   proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act-High Cowt holding
    that there 11.•as no public ]Jlll]JOse in requisition-In view of acquisition
    proceeding alreac(v initiated 1-iizh Cotat a'vvarding four nionths' ti111e to coni-
    plete enquhy and pass a1vard-Direction to hand over possession in case of
    default-In the 111ea11tin1e acquisition beco111ingfi11al-Another tt-·1it by respon-
    dent-Dismissal by single J11dge--Division Bench holding that there was no
E   public purpose and that the acquisition was ma/a fide-Appeal-Held
    notification and declaration became final before the single Judge passed its
    orde1~P11b/ic pwpo.ce viz. defence pwpose got Cl)'Stalized before the judgment
    ivas rendered by High Cciu11-There were no n1ala fidcs in acquisition-Ac-
    quisition was for p11b/ic µwpose.
F
           Govemment litigation-Delay in preferring appeals by govern-
    111ent-Deprecation of-Suggestion by Suprenze Coi:11 that Cabinet Conunittee
    should constitute a legal Cell centralising all cases to decide whether appeal
    should be filed-Fixing responsibility of officers for delay.

G        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 227 of
    1992 Etc.

         From the Judgment and Order dated 31.7.90 of the Calcutta High
    Court in Appeal from Original Order No. T. 3734 of 1986.

H          S. Muralidhar and Rathin Das for Appellants in C.A. No. 227/92.
                                            850
,.                  NRIP AT! GHOSHAL v. PREMi\VAT! KAPUR                       851

           Parveen Swamp, Ms. A. Subhashini, NP, for Union of India in C.A.           A
     No. 3790/92.

           A:K. Ganguli, Parag P. Tripathi, Rana Mukherjee, Ms. Sumita Muk-
     herjee, lndeevar Goodwill and Abha R. Sharma for the Respondents.

           The following Order of the Court was delivered :                           B

           Delay condoned.

           Substitution allowed.

          These appeals by special leave arise from the order of the Division         c
     Bench of the Calcutta High Court dated July, 31, 1990 made in Appeal
     from Original Order No. T.3734/86.

          The undisputed facts arc that the premises bearing No. 7, Chappel
     Road, Haslings, Calcutta \Vas requisitioned on Novcn1ber 29, 1971 under D
     Section 3(1) of the West Bengal Pren1ises Requisition and Control (Tem-
     pon1ry Provisions) Act, 1947 (for short, 'the Bengal Act') due to
     Bangladesh war. The Indian N.avy had taken possession thereof and has
     remained in possession of the said prcn1ises. Subsequently, it \VOtild appear,
     the respondents had filed Matter No. 1295179 in the Calcutta High Court
     questioning the legality of the requisition. It would appear that proceedings    E
     were initiated as early as in 1975 for acquisition of the property and the
     correspondence between various Departments \Vas going on. Notification
     under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1of1984) (for short,
     the 'Act') was published on November 26, 1981. Enquiry under Section 5-A
     was conducted. Thereafter, declaration under Section (, was published on         F
     November 25, 1982. The writ petition pending in the High Court came up
     for hearing. A learned single judge by his order dated April 8, 1983 had
     held that though there was no public purpose for requisition under the
     Bengal Act, since the acquisition \Vas initiated under the Act, four months'
     time ;vas granted for completing the award enquiry and to pass the award;        G
     in case of default, he directed the appellants to hand over possession of
     the premises to the respondents. In the meanwhile, the acquisition
     proceedings were completed by making award on September 21, 1983.
     Notice under Section 12 was issued to the respondents on Septen1ber 23,
     1983. Thus the acquisition under the Act had become final. An oral\._
     application came to be made before the learned Judge for extension of H
                                                                                   '
    852                  SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A   time on July 22, 1983 since the time was to expire on August 8, 1983. But
    the learned Judge declined lo extend the time by his order dated August
    2, 1983. Since the possession was not delivered, the respondents had filed
    another writ petition in the High Court which the learned single Judge had
    dismissed on November 12, 1986. On appeal, in the impugned order the
    Division Bench set aside the order of the learned single Judge am! issued
B
    mandamus as indicated in the order. The primary findings recorded by the
    Division Bench were that there was no public purpose and that the acquisi-
    tion was ma/a fide.

          The question, therefore, is : whether the lwo findings recorded by
C the Division Bench are correct in la\v? Shri Ganguli, learned senior counsel
    for the respondents, sought to support the findings of the Division Bench
    on the ground that there arc no bona fides on the part of the appellants in
    pursuing the mailer. In fact, when the respondent had pointed out in the
    High Court that there was no public purpose in requisitioning the property,
D   they came forward with the acquisition under the Act; when the learned
    single Ju<lge ha<l <lirected the appellants to have the a\vard en4uiry com-
    pleted and the award made within four months, the same were not done
    within the prescribed time. In spite of initiation of contempt proceedings,
    the possession \Vas not delivered. These circumstances could be considered
    lo show that the acquisition was ma/a fide and that, therefore, in the light
E of the above background, the High Court was right in reaching the con-
    clusion. We find no force in the contentions.


           H is seen that the acquisition proceedings under the Act were
    initiated no doubt after the first writ petition was filed challenging the
F   requisition under the West Bengal Act. But the notification under Section
    4( l) and the declaration published under Section 6 of the Act became final
    before the learned single judge had passed the order on April 8, 1983.
    Thereby the public purpose, namely, defence purposes, got crystalised
    before the judgment was rendered by the learned single Judge. The learned
    single .Judge accepting the legal position, quite rightly, had given time to
G   complete the award enquiry and to pass the award. unfortunately, due to
    lethargy on the part of the authorities to have the funds made available,
    award could nol be made for non- depositing of the amount. The question,
    therefore, emerges; .\vhether the acquisition is n1ala fide? So long as the
    public purpose subserves, the finding that the acquisition is ma/a fide is
H cx-facie unsustainable. No doubt there are !aches on the part of the
                    NRIPATIGHOSHALv. PREMAVATIKAPUR                             853

     authorities, hut so long as the acquisition proceedings were legal and the        A
     defence personnel remain in possession of the pren1ises for the defence
     purpose, the acquisition is for public purpose. Therefore, it cannot be
     characterised to be ma/a fide. It is seen that by the time the second writ
     petition, which is the subject n1atter ulti1natcly in this appeal, came to be
     filed) the acquisition ha<l bccon1c final; the a\vard had become final and
                                                                                       B
     the compensation was tendered. Under those circumstances, the High
     Court, without going into the validity in that behalf, was not right in setting
     aside the acquisition on the specious finding that it is ma/a fide. Therefore,
     the High Court has not properly considered that aspect in the correct
     perspective in deciding the matter.
                                                                                       c
            Pursuant to the interim direction granted by this Court appellants
     have deposited rent at the rate of Rs. 7500 per month beginning from
     1.l.92. Shri Ganguli has brought to our notice that the payments were not
     alleged to have been paid for the earlier period of requisition. It is also
     brought to our notice that the a1nount of con1pensation was not received
                                                                                       D
_,   by the respondents. Under these circumstances, it would be open to the
     Land Acquisition Collector to vary an<l, if found correct, to adjust the
     amounts, deposited as per the orders of the Court, to\vards the an1ount
     payable, if not already paid for the period of requisition. If there is any
     further amount due, that amount may also be directed to be paid to the
     respondents within a specified time. The amount deposited pursuant to             E
     orders of this court, if found excess, may be adjusted towards the amount
     payable as compensation for the acquired premises.

          It is unfortunate that in spite of peremptory direction to pass av.ard
     and on non-compliance of order to deliver possession of the building, no          F
     prompt action has been taken. The officers have not shown diligence
     required in this case. Even though the conten1pt proceedings were initiated
     for non-delivery of possession, yet no steps had been taken even to file
     appeal in this Court within the prescribed limitation. That would show
     apathy or absolute indifference on the part of the concerned officers in
     pursuing the proceedings. It would be obvious that since they do not have G
     personal interest in the Governmental matters, they do not show the
     required dispatch. It is our sad experience that invariably, all cases of the
     Government, 1;c that of Government of India or State Governments, except
     presently in the case of the Government of Punjab, are being filed \Vith
     abnormal delay. It would, therefore, be high time that all the Governments        H
                                                                                   (
    854                  SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A should necessarily streamline the process of taking decision in time to file
    appeals. The lack of responsibility and indifference further gets com-
    pounded from the fact that though the writ petitioner (3rd respondent in
    this case) died on September 18, 1993 and notice was given by her counsel
    to the counsel for the Union on October 4, 1993, no steps were taken to
B   bring the legal representatives on record till August 19, 1994. In August
    1994 the application for substitution came to be filed but unaccompanied
    by the application to condone the delay which came to be filed in septem-
    ber 1994 but still without any explanation. These facts do indicate the
    absolute lack of diligence and apathy or indifference in pursuing the
    matters on behalf of the Union of India.
c         It is unfortunate that we have come across that even the State
    Governments adopt the same indifferent attitude in pursuing the public
    causes in filing the appeals in this Court as well as in the High Courts and
    the courts below. It is high time for the Government of India through the
    Cabinet Secretary to constitute a legal cell centralising all the cases to
D   decide whether appeals should be !!led and if so have them filed in time
    or with utmost dispatch. The officers responsible should be made account-
    able for the delay. Same process is equally required to be adopted in case
    of appeals to be filed in this Court or in the High Courts by the respective
    State Governments and/or the Union of India.
E         The Registry is directed to communicate this order to the Cabinet
    Secretary and also to all the Chief Secretaries of the State Governments;
    so also to the Attorney General of India and the Advocates General of the
    concerned States so that appropriate measures could be taken in this
    behalf.
F
          The appeals are accordingly allowed, but, m the circumstances
    \vithout costs.

    T.N.A.                                                    Appeals allowed.