SRI SAMIR SOBHAN SANYALversusTRACKS TRADE PRIVATE LTD. AND ORS.

                  SRI SAMIR SOBHAN SANYAL                                         A
                              v.
             TRACKS TRADE PRIVATE LTD. AND ORS.

                              APRIL 16, 1996

            [K. RAlvl.ASWAMY AND S.P. BHARUCHA, JJ.]                              B

      Code of Civil pmcedure, 1908/Specific Relief Act, 1963:

       Order 21 Rules 98 and 91}-Section 28-Vnder a lea;·e deed entered into
between the landlady and the appellant's employe1; appellant put in posses-       C
sion of the property-Landlady ente1ing into an agreement with some othef
company for sale of the property-She also filed an application u11der S.28 of
Specific Act for resci11ding the contract she had entered into with the
appellant's employei-However appellant not impleaded-Appellant filing an
application under Order 21 Rules 98 and 99-No order or decree of eviction
passed against him-However the landlady's suit for possession came to be          D
decreed and appellant dispossessed-Held: Dispossession of appellant unlaw-
ful-Court's giving its acceptance to such a high-handed action depre-
cated-Appellant to be put back in possession within 24 hours-Executing
 Court directed to dispose of the application under S.28 of the Specific Relief
Act, along with the appellant's application under Order 21 Rules 98 and           E
 99--Til/ the adjudication is over appellant to renzain in possession.

     CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 7515 of
1996·Etc.

     From the Judgment and Order dated 6.7.95 of the Calcutta High                F
Court in C.O./C.R. No. Nil of 1995.

       Gopal Subramaniam, Dr. R.N. Mukherjee, K. Madhava Reddy, R.K.
Jain, Parag P. Tripalhi, Rajesh Kumar Singh, Ranjit Thomas N. Ganapathy,
Ms. Sumita Mukherjee, Goodwil lndeevar, Rana Mukherjee, Raj Kr.
Gupta, H.P. Sharma, Rajesh, Dr. Sumant Bharadwan, Ms. Mridula Ray G
Bhardwaj, Mrs. I.M. Achari, K. V. Mohan, Sanjiv Sen, S.V. Deshpande ·and
Pramit Sexena for the appearing parties.

      The following Order of the Court was delivered :

      Leave granted.                                                              H
                                     397
    398                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.

A         This case is a classic illustration of the travesty of justice and high-
    handedness in the dispossession of a person in possession without due
    process of law. The appellant, arlmittedly, was inducted as a tenant on
    behalf of Mis. India Foils Ltd. into the premises bearing No. 16, May Fair
    Road, Calcutta-19. The property belongs to Mrs. Gertrud Chand
    (hereinafter referred to as 'landlady') who had entered into a lease with
B
    M/s. Indian Foils Ltd. on March 27, 1969 for the demise of the said
    property to the said company. In furtherance thereof, possession of the
    premises was, admittedly, given to the appellant. The landlady had entered
    into an agreement with the 6th respondent, M/s. Habitat Developers on
    October 17, 1985 for sale of the property for a sum of Rs. 40 lakhs. For
c   the enforcement thereof, the 6th respondent filed title suit No. 137 of 1986
    for specific performance in the court of the Second Assistant Judge,
    Alipur. In the written statement filed by the landlady, she had admitted
    thus:

D               "One Mr. Sanyal was inducted into the premises by India Foils
            Ltd Consequently, the defendant was not in a position to offer the
            suit property free from encumbrances, but the plaintiff-Company
            despite full knowledge of such encumbrances expressed its desire
            to purchase the property at a consideration price of Rs. 40 lakhs."

E         It would thus be seen that in the suit for specific performance, the
    6th respondent was put on notice that the appellant was in possession and
    enjoyment of the demised premises and yet the 6th respondent had entered
    into the agreement subject to the encumbrances. Subsequently; the suit
    came to be decreed for khas possession also which decree became final.
F   In spite of the fact that the 6th respondent was aware of the continuance
    in possession and enjoyment of the demised premises by the appellant, no
    steps have been taken either to have him impleaded as a party defendant
    to the suit for specific performance nor a decree personally against him
    was obtained in any other independent proceedings as on date.

G         The question, therefore, is whether the appellant can be dispossessed
    in execution of the decree in title suit No. 137 of 1986. When the possession
    of the appellant was sought to be interdicted, admittedly, he filed a petition
    under Order 21, Rules 98 and 99, CPC claiming adjudication of his right
    to remain in possession of the said property. It is his case that his employer
H   had agreed to allow him in possession •.ill alternative accommodation is
·'

                    S.S.SANYALv. TRACKS TRADE PVT.LTD.                      399

     given to him even after retirement. It is not necessary to narrate the A
     subsequent events in chronology which have cropped up in several of the
     proceedings. Admittedly, on a petition filed by the appellant, the High
     Court had directed a Court Officer to be in possession of the property. In
     furtherance thereof, the Court Officer did take possession of the property.
     Later, attempts have been made by the first respondent who was said to B
     have entered into a lease with the 3rd· respondent, to come into the
     possession of the property, but they were rejected by the executing Court
     as well as by the High Court on appeal. The 6th respondent assigned his
     rights in the decree to the 3rd respondent Pranav Merchandise Pvt. Ltd.
     In the application for continuance of the appellant's possession the execut-
     ing Court directed the Court Officer appointed by the High Court to C
     remain in possession of the property till the application filed under Order
     21, Rules 98 and 99, CPC was disposed of.

            In the meanwhile, the 1st respondent had taken two other applica-
     tions before the trial Court at different times seeking for possession of the D
     property. The first application was dismissed. Consequently, he filed a
     revision in the High Court. The subsequent two applications also came to
     be dismissed, one day prior to hearing of the revision under appeal and
     the same became final. The High Court in the impugned order dated July
     6, 1995 has directed induction of the 1st respondent into possession of the
     property. We are informed that even before that order came to be passed, E
     he had already come into possession of the property. When the matter had
     come up before this Court at the time of admission, the 1st respondent had
     entered appearance through the counsel and it was brought to our notice
     that he had already come in possession of the property in execution of the
     decree. Nonetheless, by order dated July 24, 1995 this Court passed the
     order as under :                                                              F

                "Issue notice.

                Mr. goodwill Indcevar and Ms. Mridula Ray Bharadwaj, Ad-
             vocates take notice for Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 respectively. Four   G
             weeks' time is granted for filing counter affidavits and two weeks
             thereafter for rejoinder. Post after six weeks.

                Though the counsel for the respondents state that the posses-
             sion was taken on 12th July, 1995, on the facts and circumstances,
             we think that interim suspension of the High Court's order be H
    400                  SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.

A           made. It is accordingly made".

          It would thus be clear that without any decree or order of eviction
    of the appellant from the demised premises, he had been unlawfully
    dispossessed from the premises without any due process of law. The
    question, therefore, is: whether he should be allowed to remain in posses-
B   sion till his application under Order 21, Rules 98 and 99 is adjudicated
    upon and an order made. Though the learned counsel for the 1st respon-
    dent and also for the 3rd respondent, who is one of the transferees from
    the 6th respondent, sought to contend that the appellant has no right to
    remain in possession after the lessee, M/s. India Foils Ltd. had admitted
c   by a resolution that the appellant has no right to remain in possession, we
    are not impressed with the arguments. At this state, we are only concerned
    with his admitted possession of the demised premises. What rights would
    flow from a contract between him and him employer is a matter to be
    adjudicated in his application filed under Order 21, Rules 98 and 99 C.P .C.
D   At this stage, it is pre-mature to go into and record any finding in that
    behalf. The learned counsel for the 1st respondent also repeatedly sought
    to bring to our notice that on account of the orders of the Court Officer
    passed by the High Court the maintenance cost has been mounting up due
    to the delay in disposal of the proceedings in various courts. Even with
    regard to that, we are not impressed with the same. Since the letter of the
E   law should strictly be adhered to, we find that high-handed action taken by
    the respondent Nos. 1, 3 and 6 in having the appellant dispossessed without
    due process of law, cannot be overlooked nor condoned. The Court cannot
    blink at their unlawful conduct to dispossess the appellant from demised
    property and would say that the status quo be maintained. If the Court gives
    acceptance to such high-handed action, there will be no respect for rule of
F
    law and unlawful elements would take hold of the due process of law for
    ransom and it would be a field day for anarchy. Due process of law would
    be put to ridicule in the estimate of the law-abiding citizens and rule of
    law would remain a mortuary.

G          Under these circumstances, we are left with no option but to allow
    the appeal with costs quantified at Rs. 7,500, against each of the respondent
    Nos. l, 3 and 6 to be payable to the Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee.
    If the amount is not paid within one month from to-day, the Supreme Court
    legal Aid Committee would be entitled to recover the same from them by
H   execution of this order as decree.
               S.S. SANYAL v. TRACKS TRADE PVT. LTD.                    401

       The 1st respondent is directed to put the appellant in possession A
within 24 hours. The executing Court is directed to dispose of the applica-
tion filed by respondent Nos. 7, 8 and 9, heirs of the landlady filed under
Section 28 of the Special Relief Act, 1963 for rescinding the contract along
with the application filed under Order 21, Rules 98 and 99, CPC and
dispose it of after the former is decided.
                                                                               B
Contempt Petition No. 61 of 1996.

      Notice is issued to the 1st respondent to show cause why he should
not be convicted for deliberate disobedience of the ?rder dated July 24,
1995, directing that the appellant be put into possession through Court
Officer. Counsel for the 1st respondent takes notice for contempt. He seeks    c
for and is granted time for filing counter-affidavit. The 1st respondent
through its Chief Executive/Managing Director or by whatever name is
called, shall be present in person in the Court on 15.7.96 to which date the
matter is directed to be posted.

       Contempt Petition No. 309 of 1995 to be posted on the same day.
                                                                               D

G.N.                                                       Appeal allowed.