Holding

FERA, being part of the Ninth Schedule, is immune from constitutional challenge, and Section 68 applies to both adjudication and prosecution, making the show‑cause notices valid and non‑justiciable by writ of prohibition.

Summary

Standard Chartered Bank and its officers challenged show‑cause notices issued under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 (FERA) alleging that Sections 50, 51, 56 and 68 were unconstitutional as they violated Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution. The Bank argued that FERA, being in the Ninth Schedule, should not be immune from judicial review and that Section 68 applied only to criminal prosecutions, not to adjudication for penalty. The Supreme Court held that inclusion of FERA in the Ninth Schedule bars any challenge on the ground of Articles 14 or 21, and that Section 68 applies equally to both adjudication and prosecution. It also ruled that show‑cause notices under Section 61 are merely enquiries and not subject to a writ of prohibition, and that adjudication and prosecution under FERA are independent proceedings that may run simultaneously. Consequently, the Court dismissed the writ petitions and most appeals, but allowed Civil Appeals Nos. 1751 and 1944 of 1999, overturning the High Court’s view that Section 68 is confined to prosecutions.

Issues considered

The constitutional validity of Sections 50, 51, 56 and 68 of FERA in view of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution.
Whether inclusion of FERA in the Ninth Schedule immunises its provisions from challenge under the basic structure doctrine.
The scope of Section 68(1): does it apply only to criminal prosecutions or also to adjudication for penalty?
The nature and jurisdiction of show‑cause notices issued under Section 61 and whether a writ of prohibition is maintainable.
The relationship between adjudication (Section 51) and prosecution (Section 56) under FERA – must one precede the other?

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. 14, s. 21, s. 31, s. 318
Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973s. 50, s. 51, s. 52, s. 54, s. 56, s. 61, s. 63, s. 64, s. 68
General Clauses Act, 1897s. 3

Subjects

Foreign Exchange Regulation ActNinth ScheduleConstitutional validitySection 68Show‑cause noticeAdjudicationProsecutionWrit of prohibitionArticles 14 and 21Corporate liability

Judgment

STANDARD CHARTERED BANK AND ORS. A
v.
DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT AND ORS.

FEBRUARY 24, 2006

[Y.K. SABHARWAL, CJ., C.K. THAKKER AND B
P.K. BALASUBRAMANY AN, JJ.]

Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973:

Sections 50, 51, 56 and 68-Constitutional validity of-FERA included C
in the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution of India-Immunity from challenge
enjoyed by the provisions of FERA-Show-cause notices issued to a Bank and
its Officers-High Court rejected challenge to the constitutional validity o/Ss.
50, 51, 56 and 68-But High Court clarified that S. 68(1) was confined to
prosecution for penal offences only and not to an adjudication proceeding D
under FERA-Correctness of-Held: As FERA is included in the Ninth schedule
to the Constitution, no challenge based on violation of Arts. I 4 or 21, even
~ if it has substance, is maintainable-Further, S. 68 is not merely confined to
prosecution of penal offences and is equally applicable to adjudication
proceeding under FERA.

Section 61-Show-cause notices issued to a Bank and its Officers-
E
Scope and ambit of-Writ ofprohibition-Maintainability of-Held: The show.
cause notices are merely notices of enquiry giving an opportunity to the Bank
and its Officers of showing that they had the necessary permission from the
concerned authority under FERA in respect of a particular transaction-The
Bank and its Officers are entitled to put forward their defences before the F
1 criminal court-Hence, writ of prohibi!ion not maintainable.

Section 50-Adjudication under-Show-cause notices issued to a Bank
and its Officers-Writ petition for stay of adjudication-Maintainability a/-
Held: It is for the concerned authority to decide any objections put forward
by the Bank-The Bank and its Officers have a right of appeal under S. 52 G
to the Appellate Board and a further right of appeal to the High Court under
S. 54-Hence, writ of prohibition restraining the authority under the FERA
from proceeding further with the adjudication, not maintainable.

Section 68(1)-Constitutional validity of-Person in-charge and
709 H
710 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006) 2 S.C.R.

A responsible for conduct of business of company-Prosecution of-Held: In
view of the fact that FERA has been included in the Ninth Schedule to the
Constitution, the challenge based on Articles I 4 and 2 I cannot prevail even
if it has substance-Even if there is any violation by the company of any of
the provisions of FERA. the person in-charge of the company is given an
opportunity to show that the alleged contravention by the company took place
B without his knowledge or in spite of the exercise of all due diligence by him
to prevent such contravention -Hence, S. 68( I) is not unreasonable.

Sections 51, 56 and 68---Show-cause notices issued to a Bank and its
Officers--Adjudication and prosecution-Simultaneous launching of-Held:
C Adjudication need not precede prosecution---The two proceedings are
independent of each other and are controlled by the respective provisions
themselves-Both proceedings can simultaneously be launched and can
simultaneously be pursued.

The appellant-Bank filed a writ petition before the High Court
D seeking a declaration that Sections 50, 51, 56 and 158 of the Foreign
Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 (FERA) were unconstitutional, invalid and
void being violative of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India and
for a writ of prohibition directing the authorities under the Act from
proceeding further, based on the show-cause notices i.ssued to the bank
and its officers. The High Court rejected the challenge to the constitutional
E validity of the said Sections of FERA, but clarified that Section 68(1) of
FERA was not applicable to an adjudication proceeding and that it was
confined to prosecution for penal offences under the Act. Hence the appeal.

Dismissing the appeal, the Court

F HELD: 1. The challenge to the constitutional validity of Sections 50,
51, 56 and 68 of The Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 (FERA) is
based on the alleged violation of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of
India. It is admitted that FERA has been included in the Ninth Schedule
to the Constitution of India, as Item No. 100. Therefore, in terms of Article
G 318 of the Constitution of India, none of the provisions of FERA can be
deemed to be void or ever to have become void on the i~round that FERA
or any of the provisions thereof, are inconsistent with or take away or
abridge any of the rights conferred by Part Ill of the Constitution.
Obviously, the rights conferred by Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution
are rights flowing from Part Ill of the Constitution and, therefore, it is
H clear that no challenge based on violation of Articles 14 or 21, even if it
STANDARD CHARTERED BANK''· DIRECTORATEOFENFORCEMENT 71 J

has substance, can enable the appellants to get the relevant provisions of A
the Act struck down as prayed for by them in the prayer of the writ
petition. Now that the Constitution Bench has already ruled that penal
proceedings under the Act can be initiated against a company or a
corporation, that avenue of challenge is also closed to the appellants.
(720-G-H; 721-A-D) B
Assistant Commissioner, Assessment If, Bangalore v. Valliappa Textiles
Ltd., (2003) 11 SCC 405 and State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar, (1952)
SCR 284, referred to.

2. In view of the immunity from challenge enjoyed by the provisions
of the Act because of its inclusion in the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution C
of India, there arises no necessity to read down the provisions of the Act
so as to ensure that they do not violate the rights conferred by Article 14
of the Constitution. The provisions, therefore, call for a natural
interpretation and, if necessary, a purposive interpretation, keeping in view
the object sought to be achieved by the Act. In the guise of interpretation, D
there is no occasion to whittle down the ambit of the provisions to save
them from the charge of arbitrariness, hit by Article 14 of the Constitution.
(722-F-G[

3.1. The notices issued under Section 61 of FERA are merely notices
of enquiry, giving an opportunity to the appellants of showing that they - E
had the necessary permission from the concerned authority under FERA
in respect of the particular transaction. These notices, therefore, do not
in any manner decide anything against the appellants and they merely set
out the grounds based on which the appellants allegedly violated the
provisions of FERA and since one of the ingredients of th~ offence is F
absence of permission from the concerned authority, they are intended
only to give an opportunity to the appellants to show that they had the
necessary permission and hence, there was no violation of the relevant
provision or provisions of FERA as sought to be made out in the notice.
(723-A-C)
G
3.2. On the failure of the appellants to show that they had the
requisite permission, a complaint will have to be lodged before the
concerned Magistrate - here it has been launched with the permission of
this Court pending these appeals - and the Magistrate will consider
whether the process should issue on the basis of the complaint made before
, him. In view of the fact that suffici.ent opportunities are available to the H
712 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2006] 2 S.C.R.

A appellants to put forward their contentions before the concerned criminal
court, it cannot be said that there is any merit in the challenge to the
notices issued under Section 61 of FERA. The said notices are really in
terms of Section 61 of FERA and their scope and ambit is also controlled
by Section 61 of FERA and on receipt of those notices, it was open to the
appellants to show that they had the necessary pe1rmission from the
B concerned authority under the Act. Of course, if they do not have such
permission, apparently, in the case on hand, there was no such permission,
they have necessarily to put forward their defences before the criminal
court in the prosecutions that have ben launched in that behalf. ~
[723-C-EJ
c 4. The notices issued under Section 61 of the Act are in terms of that
Section and there is no reason to interfere with them in these writ petitions
and that it would be appropriate to leave the appellants to their available
defences in the prosecutions that have been initiated. Suffice it to say that
it is not possible to issue the writ of prohibition as s.ought for by the
D appellants on the ground that these notices do not satisfy the jurisdictional
requirement under Section 61 of the Act. [724-E-F[

East India Commercial Co. Ltd v. Collector of Customs, (1963[ 3 SCR J
338, referred to.

5. It is for the appellants to put forward their objections thereto
E before the concerned authority and it is for that authority to decide the
relevant aspects while deciding to impose or not to impose any penalty on
the appellants. The appellants have a right of appeal under Section 52 of
FERA to the appellate Board and a further right of appeal to the High
Court under Section 54 of FERA. There is no justification for the issue of
F a writ of prohibition restraining the authority under FERA from
proceeding further with the adjudication. It is for the appellants to put
forward their defences, if any available, before the adjudicating authority
and pursue it in accordance with law. [725-A-BI

6. In view of the fact that FERA has been included in the Ninth
G Schedule to the Constitution, the challenge based on Articles 14 and 21
cannot prevail even assuming that the arguments have any substance. But
on the scheme of the Act, with particular regard to Sections 56, 59, 61
and 68 of FERA, the provisions cannot be successfully challenged as either
being arbitrary or discriminatory. All that Section 68(1) says is that if the

H
commission of an offence by the company is proved, the person who was
in charge and was responsible to the company for the conduct of the -
STANDARD CHARTERED BANK '· DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT 713
business of the company at the time the contravention was committed, was A
to be deemed to be guilty of the contravention and was liable to be
proceeded against and punished. He is being punished in view of his status
in the company and because it is proved that the company is guilty of
contravention of any of the provisions of FERA. There is nothing
unreasonable in this, since a company normally acts through a person who B
is in charge of its affairs and even in that case, the person in charge and
responsible to the company for the conduct of its business, is given an
opportunity to show that the alleged contravention by the company took
place without his knowledge or in spite of the exercise of all due diligence
by him to prevent such contravention. Section 68(2) is attracted in a case
where a company has contravened the provisions of the Act or any rule, C
.direction or order made thereunder and that particular contravention is
proved to have taken place with the consent or connivance or is
attributable to any neglect on the part of any Director, Manager,
Secretary, or other officer of the company. In other words, the prosecution,
in addition to prosecuting the company, can also prosecute any particular
officer whose action or inaction or negligence resulted in the commission D
of the particular offence by the company. This only means that a person
who is instrumental in the commission of an act by the company that is
in contravention of FERA or the rules or directions issued thereunder,
also lays himself open to prosecution. Having done something or omitted
to do something leading to the company contravening the provisions of E
the Act, the officer concerned cannot say that it is unreasonable to
prosecute him also, along with the company and the person in charge of
and responsible to the company for the conduct of its business.
(726-E-H; 727-A-C)

Collector of Customs Nathe/la v. Sampathu Chetty, (1962) 3 SCR 786, F
1 referred to.

7.1. The argument that Section 68 of FERA violates Article 14 of
the Constitution cannot thus be accepted. The same is the position
regarding the argument based on Article 21 of the Constitution. The object
of the Act is clearly to protect the economic interests of the country and G
to deal with any violation that causes economic loss to the country. In the
context of that object, any contravention of the provisions of the Act has
to be viewed seriously and anyone directly responsible or conniving at the
offence is liable to be punished. (727-D-E)
7.2. The question whether a particular person who is sought to be H
714 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] 2 S.C.R.

A prosecuted under Section 68(1) of the Act is the person, who is liable to /.
be prosecuted under Section 68(1), is a question that has to be raised at
the trial. [727-FJ

Assistant Commissioner, Assessment//, Bangalore v. Valliappa Textiles
Ltd., [2003) 11 SCC 405, referred to.
B 8.1. The Act was enacted, as indicated by its preamble, for the
conservation of foreign exchange resources of the country and the proper
utilization thereof in the economic development of the country. When
interpreting such a law, in the absence of any provision in that regard in
the Act itself, there is no reason to r:strict the sc,ope of any of the
C provisions of the Act, especially in the context of tl~e presence of the
"without prejudice" clause in Section 56 of the Act df,aling with offences
and prosecutions. The Act sub-serves a twin purpose. One, to ensure that
no economic loss is caused by the alleged contravention by the imposition
of an appropriate penalty after an adjudication unde1r Section 51 of the
Act and two, to ensure that the tendency to violate is curbed by imposing
D an appropriate punishment after due prosecution in terms of Section 56
of the Act. The contention that as a matter of construction - since the
provisions could not be attacked as violative of the rights under Part III +
of the Constitution - the provisions of the Act should be so interpreted
that an adjudication has to precede a prosecution cannot be accepted as
E there is nothing in the provisions of the Act justifying suich a construction.
On the scheme of the Act, the two proceedings are seen to be independent
and the launching of the one or the other or both is seen to be controlled
by the respective provisions themselves. [729-D-G I
Shanthi Prasad Jain v. Director of Enforcement, [19631 2 SCR 297,
F referred to.
8.2. The very purpose of the Act and very object of inclusion of the
Act in the Ninth Schedule justifies an interpretation of the provisions as
they stand on the basis that there is nothing arbitrary 01r unreasonable in
the provisions and in the scheme as enacted. (730-AI
G Roya/a Corporation (P) Ltd. v. Director of Enforcement, [1969) 2 SCC
412, held inapplicable.
8.3. The legislature intended to treat the two proceedings as
independent of each other. Obviously, the legislature must be taken to have
been conscious of the interpretation placed on the corresponding
H provisions by this Court when the 1973 Act was enacted and it was also
STANDARD CHARTERED BANK"· DIRECTORATE OFENFORCEMENT 715
· "-included in the Ninth Schedule to ward off any challenge on the ground A
that it would be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, unless
understood or read in a particular fashion. [730-B-DJ

9. There is no justification in accepting the argument that unless an
adjudication proceeding under Section 51 of the Act is completed, a
prosecution under Section 56 of the FERA cannot be initiated. Both B
proceedings can simultaneously be launched and can simultaneously be
pursued. (730-H; 731-Al

Assistant Collector of Customs v. L.R. Melwani, AIR (1970) SC 962
and P. Jayappan v. S.K. Peumal, AIR (1984) SC 1693, referred to.

A.S.G. Jothimani Nodar v. The Deputy Director, Enforcement
c
Directorate, (1984) ECC 319 (Mad) and Anil Kumar Agarwal v. K.C. Basu,
(2003) Cr. L.J. 2197 (Andh), approved.

10. There is nothing in the Act to indicate that a finding in an
adjudication is binding on the court in a prosecution under Section 56 of D
the Act. There is no indication that the prosecution depends upon the result
of the adjudication. Therefore, it is held that on the scheme of the Act,
the two proceedings are independent. The finding in one is not conclusive
in the other. [731-B-DJ

K.C. Builders v. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, [20041 2 SCC E
731, held inapplicable.

Assistant Collector of Customs v. L.R. Melwani, AIR (1970) SC 962
and P. Jayappan v. S.K. Peumal, AIR (1984) SC 1693, referred to.

11.1. The prayer in the writ petition for the issue of a writ of F
prohibition restraining the authorities under the Act from proceeding with
the adjudication and the prosecution is essentially based on the
constitutional challenge to the relevant provisions of the Act on the ground
that they violate Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India. Once it
is held that the provisions are constitutional, the basis on which the writ
of prohibition is sought for by the appellants disappears. It is settled by G
the decisions of this Court that a writ of prohibition will issue to prevent
a Tribunal or Authority from proceeding further when the Authority
proceeds to act without or in excess of jurisdiction; proceeds to act in

-
violation of the rules of natural justice; or proceeds to act under a law
which is itself ultra vires or unconstitutional. Since the basis of the claim
H
716 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] 2 S.C.R.

A for the relief is found not to exist, the High Court rightly refused the
prayer for the issue of a writ of prohibition restraining the Authorities
from continuing the proceedings pursuant to the notices issued.
(732-A-D(

11.2. When a show-cause notice is issued under a statutory provision
B calling upon the person concerned to show cause, ordinarily that person
must place his case before the Authority concerned by showing cause and
the courts should be reluctant to interfere with the notice at that stage
unless the notice is shown to have been issued palpably without any \. -
authority of law. On the facts of thi:s case, it cannot be said that these
notices are palpably without authority of law. In that situation, the
C appellants cannot successfully challenge the refusal by the High Court of
the writs of prohibition prayed for by them. (732-D-EI

State ofUttar Pradesh v. Brahm Datt Sharma, (198712 SCC 179, relied
on.

D 12.1. Both, Section 50 providing for imposition of penalty and Section
56 providing for prosecution, speak of contravention of the provisions of
the Act. Contravention is the basic element. The contravention makes a
person liable both for penalty and for prosecution. Even though the
heading to Section 56 refers to offenc1!S and prosecutions, what is made
E punishable by the Section is the contravention of the provisions of the Act
and the prosecution is without prejudice to any award of penalty. The
award of penalty is also based on the same contravention. Section 63 is
the power of confiscation of currency, security or any other money or
property in respect of which a contravention of the provisions of the Act
has taken place conferred equally on the Adjudicating Authority and the
F Court, whether it is during an adjudication of the penalty or during a
prosecution. Whereas Section 64(1) relating to preparation or attempt at t
contravention is confined to Section 56, the provision for prosecution,
Section 64(2) makes the attempt to contravene or abetment of
contravention, itself a contravention, for the purposes of the Act including
an adjudication of penalty under the Act. Section 68 relating to offences
G by companies, by sub-Section (1) introd111ces a deeming provision that the
person who was in-charge of and was r~,sponsible to the company for the
conduct of the business of the company, shall also be deemed to be guilty
along with the company of the contrave11tion of the provisions of the Act
and liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly.
H [734-E-H; 735-Al
I >-

STANDARD CHARTERED BANK v. DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT 7J7
..f · 12.2. An offence only means the commission of an act contrary to A
or forbidden by law. It is not confined to the commission of a crime alone.
It is an act committed against law or omitted where the law requires it
and punishable by it. In its legal signification, an offence is the
transgression of a law; a breach of the laws established for the protection
of the public as distinguished from an infringement of mere private rights; B
a punishable violation of law, a crime, the doing of which a penal law
forbids or omitting to do what it commands. (735-D-E)

~ -\
' Depot Manager, Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation v.
Mohd. Yousuf Miya, (1997) 2 SCC 699, referred to.

Brown v. All-weather Mechanical Co., (1954) 2 QB 443, referred to. C
Concise Oxford English Dictionary, P. Ramanatha Aiyar: Advanced
Law Lexicon 3rd Edn. 2005, p. 3302, referred to.

12.3. It is significant to notice that Section 68, both in sub-Section D
(1) and in sub-Section (2) uses the expression, shall be liable to .be
pi:oceeded against and punished accordingly. There does not appear to
be any reason to confine the operation of Section 68 only to a prosecution
and to exclude its operation from a penalty proceeding under Section 50
of the Act, since the essential ingredient of both is the contravention of
the provisions of the Act. A company is liable to be proceeded against E
under both the provisions. Section 68 is only a provision indicating who
all in addition can be proceeded against when the contravention is by a
company or who all should or can be roped in, in a contravention by a
company. Section 68 only clarifies the nature and mode of proceeding
when the contravention of any of the provisions of the Act is by a company,
whether it be by way .of adjudication to impose a penalty or by way of F
prosecution leading to imprisonment and a fine. [736-B-D)

Sube Singh v. State of Haryana, (1989) 1SCC235 and Santram Paper
Mills v. Collector of Central Excise, [1998) 8 SCC 335, referred to.

New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary Vol. 2, 3rd Edn., reprint G
1993, Black's Law Dictionary 8th Edn. And John Burks: Jowitts
Dictionary of English Law Vol. 2, 2nd Edn., referred to.

13. There does not appear to be any reason to confine the operation
of Section 68 of the Act as was done by the High Court. Merely because .H
718 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2006) 2 S.C.R..

A the expression 'punished' is used, it does not mean that it is confined to a >
prosecution under Section 56 of the Act, since the element that attracts
the imposition of penalty and the prosecution is the same, namely, the
contravention by any of the provisions of the Act. Moreover; there is
nothing in the Act which confiD1es the expression 'punished' only to a
B punishment for a criminal prosecution. An imposition of a penalty can also
be a punishment. The second part of the reasoning appears to be self-
contradictory. If a person includes a company, there is no reason to confine
Section 68 to a prosecution only, because the company as a person is liable
to be proceeded against under Section 50 and Section 56 of the Act, though
...
in a criminal prosecution the punishment by way of imprisonment can be
C imposed only on the officer or officers of the company referred to in
Section 68 of the Act. Section 68 only indicates the manner in which a
contravention by a company can be dealt with and it does not show that
it is confined in its operation only to prosecutions against a company. It
is a general provision relating to a contravening company, which is to be
proceeded against whether it is under Section 50 or under Section 56 of
D the Act. The fact that a fine alone can be imposed on a company in a
prosecution under Section 56 of the Act, cannot enable this Court to
confine the operation of Section 68 to criminal prosecutions alone under
the Act. There is no reason to whittle down the scope of Section 68 of the
Act. [737-8-F[
E
14. It is true that the entire penalty that may be imposed on
adjudication is capable of being recovered from the company itself. But
that does not mean that it cannot be recovered from the officer in-charge
of the company or those who connived at or were instrumental in the
contravention. of the provisions of the Act by the company. Once the
F ingredient of the offence is contravention of the provisions of the Act and
the consequences flowing from the contravention is to make that person
including a company liable for penalty as well as for prosecution, there
does not appear to be any justification in confining the scope of Section
68 only to prosecutions under Section 56 of the Act. Use of the expression
G 'offence' in the marginal heading of Section 68 is not indicative of the
expression 'being confined to a criminal offence alone' because an offence
in the context of the Act is really a contravention of any of the provisions
of the Act referred to in Section 50 and in Section 56 of the Act.
[737-F-H; 738-A)

H CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1748 of 1999.
STANDARD CHARTERED BANK'· DIRECTORATEOFENFORCEMENT [BALASUBRAMANYAN. l.] 719

~
From the Final Judgment and Order dated 7.11.1998 of the Bombay A
High Court in W.P. (C) No. 1972 of 2004.

P.P. Malhotra, ASG, K.K. Venugopal, Jaideep Gupta, T.R. Andhyarujina,
U.U. Lalit, A.K. Panda, S. Divan, Ms. B. Vijayalakshmi Menon, Ms. Indu
Malhotra, Ms. Sunita, Ms. Haripriya, U .A. Rana, Sadeep Khare I, Ms. Srabonee
Roy (for Mis. Gagrat & Co.), Santosh Paul, A.K. Rao, Rajeev Sharma, M.J. B
Paul, Amit Sibal, Ms. Radha Rangaswamy, Ms. Prachi Bajpal, AtifChaudhary,
Pradeep Kumar Malik, R.K. Handoo, K.V. Mohan, Rana Mukherjee, Ms .

.,. " Anuradha, Ms. Swati Grover, Ms. Sonia Dube, Prasenjit Keswani, Ms. Indra
Sawhney, A. Subba Rao, N.K .. Matta, P. Parmeswaran, B. Krisna Prasad,
V.K. Verma, H.D. Petit, Tara Chand Sharma, Ms. Neelam Sharma and D.
Bharathi Reddy, Mis. Fox Manda! & Co. (N.P.) for the appearing parties.
c
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

P.K. BALASUBRAMANYAN, J. Leave granted in SLP(Crl.) No.5892/
2004.
D
I I. On receipt of notices under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act,
-1 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the FERA) for showing cause why adjudication
proceedings for imposition of penalty under Sections 50 and 51 of the FERA
be not initiated against the appellant bank and some of its officers and further
notices under Section 61 of the FERA giving an opportunity to the first E
appellant bank and its officers of showing that they had the necessary
permission from the concerned authority for the transaction involved, the
appellant bank filed Writ Petition No.1972 of 1994, seeking a declaration
that the relevant sections of the FERA are unconstitutional, being- violative
of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution oflndia and for writs of prohibition
restraining the authorities under the FERA from proceeding with the proposed F
-1 adjudication and the proposed prosecution, in terms of the Act. Yet another
writ petition was filed by the officers of the bank as CWP No.2377of1996
challenging the individual notices. The High Court of Bombay rejected the
challenge to the constitutional validity of Sections 50, 51, 56 and 68 of the
FERA; but clarified that Section 68(1) of the FERA was not applicable to an G
adjudication proceeding and that it was coniined to a prosecution for penal
offences under the Act. Being aggrieved, the appellant bank and its officers
' ...\,
have filed Civil Appeal Nos.1748/99 and 1749/99. The Union of India, in its

-
tum has filed C.A. Nos.1751 and 1944 of 1999 challenging the very decision,
to the extent the High Court restricted the application of Section 68(1) of the
FERA. H
720 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] 2 S.C.R.

A 2. Civil Appeal No.1750/1999 is filed by the Standard Chartered Bank
to which also notices have been issued under the Act. That challenges the
dismissal of the Writ Petition No.509/1994 filed by the appellant therein,
which was disposed of along with Writ Petition No.1972 of 1994, by a
common judgment.

B 3. These appeals which came up before a Bench of two learned Judges,
were referred to a Bench of three Jludges by order dated 20.04.2004. When
the matters came up before a three Judge Bench, the three Judge Bench
doubted the correctness of a decision relied upon by the bank and its officers
in Assistant Commissioner, Assessment-If, Bangalore & Ors. v. Va//iappa
...
c Textiles Ltd and Anr., [2003] 11 SCC 405) which was a Judgment of a
Bench of three Judges and by order dated 16.07.2004 referred the question
to a Constitution Bench. The matti:rs, thus, came up before a Constitution
Bench, which, by Judgment dated 5.5.05, [reported in [2005] 4 SCC 530]
overruled the decision in Assistant Commissioner, Assessment-II, Bangalore
& Ors. v. Valliappa Textiles Ltd. and Anr., [2003] 11 SCC 405 and sent
D down these appeals for being heard on merits by a Division Bench. The
question that was decided was whether in a case where an offence was
punishable with a mandatory sentence of imprisonment. a company
incorporated under the Companies Act, can be prosecuted, as the sentence of
imprisonment cannot be imposed on the company. The majority in the
Constitution Bench, held that there could be no objection to a company being
E prosecuted for penal offences under the FERA and the fact that a sentence
of imprisonment and fine has to be imposed and no imprisonment can be
imposed on a company or an incorporated body, would not make Section 56
of the FERA inapplicable and that a company did not enjoy any immunity
from prosecution in respect of offences for which a mandatory punishment
F of imprisonment is prescribed. In the light of the said decision of the
Constitution Bench, the controversy before us has narrowed down and we
have to proceed on the basis that the appellant banks are liable to be prosecuted
for offences under the FERA.

4. In this context, it is necessary to refer to the scope of the writ
G petitions filed by the appellant bank and its officers in the High Court of
Bombay. The prayers in the said writ petition are for a declaration that
>
provisions of Sections 50, 51, 56 and 68 of the FERA are unconstitutional,
invalid and void being violative of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of

-
India and for a writ of prohibition directing the authorities under the Act
from proceeding further, based on the notices issued to the bank and its
H
}
I

STANDARD CHARTERED BANK,., DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT [BALASUBRAMANY AN. I.] 721

~
. officers. It may be seen that the challenge to the constitutional validity is A
based on the alleged violation of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of
India. It is admitted that the Act has been included in the Ninth Schedule to
the Constitution of India, as Item No.JOO. Therefore, in tenns of Article 31 B
of the Constitution of India, none of the provisions of the FERA can be
deemed to be void or ever to have become void on the ground that the FERA
or any of the provisions thereof, are inconsistent with or take away or abridge
B
any of the rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution. Obviously, the
rights conferred by Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution are rights flowing
~~ from Part III of the Constitution and, therefore, it is clear that no challenge .
based on violation of Articles 14 or 21, even if it has substance, can enable
the appellants to get the relevant provisions of the Act struck down as prayed c
for by them in prayer (a) of the writ petition. Now that the Constitution
Bench has already ruled that penal proceedings under the Act can be initiated
against a company or a corporation, that avenue of challenge is also closed
to the appellants. Probably, it is in that context that learned senior counsel
appearing in C.A.No.1750/99 argued that the submission was that a penal
proceeding cannot be initiated simultaneously with an adjudication under the D
Act and that the adjudication must precede and only after its conclusion,

' penal action could be initiated.

' 5. Before proceeding further, we must notice that though on behalf of
the appellants, in the written submissions, a contention was taken that the
E
inclusion of the FERA in the Ninth Schedule was violative of the basic
structure of the Constitution, at the time of hearing, Mr. K.K. Venugopal,
learned senior counsel, submitted that that contention was not being pursued.
Once that contention is not pursued, the appellants are confronted with Article
318 of the Constitution in view of the inclusion of the Act in the Ninth
Schedule and there will be no necessity for this Court to undertake the exercise F
of considering whether the provisions of the Act violate Article 14 of the
"i'
Constitution, an argument which was sought to be pursued at considerable
length based on the interpretation to be placed on Section 68 of FERA.

6. It appears from the judgment of the High Court, especially from
paragraph 2 thereof, that the argument before that court was on the basis that G
the violation of Articles 14 and 21 amounted to a violation of the basic
.·-A structure of the Constitution, namely, the rule of law, and the court had to
quash the legislative provisions. If the contention founded on the basic structure
theory is not pursued, it is not very clear how far it would be open to the
appellants to urge and necessary for this Court to consider the validity of the H
722 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006) 2 S. C.R.

A relevant provisions on the ground that they are violative of Articles 14 and
21 of the Constitution. The High Court found no reason to accept the argument
based on the violation of rights under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution
or based on the alleged impact of the provisions on rule of law and rejected
the contention, though it upheld the plea that Section 68 of the FERA had no
B application for imposition of a penalty based on an adjudication under Sections
50 and 51 of FERA. The question is whether there is any reason to interfere
with the decision of the High Court on either of these aspects.

7. Mr. K.K. Venugopal, learned senior counsel, advanced considerable \. .
arguments on the interpretation and scope of Section 68 of the FERA.
C Considering the prayers in the writ petitions filed in the High Court of Bombay
by the appellants, it is possible to say that all that is required is to decide
whether the appella11ts can successfully challenge the constitutional validity
of the relevant provisions of the FERA as being violative of Articles 14 and
21 of the Constitution and whether the statutory authority has to be restrained
by the issue of a writ of prohibition from proceeding further on the basis of
D the notices it had issued for adjudication as well as for penal action. It is not
a case where any successful challenge could be mounted on the provisions
providing both for adjudication and imposition of penalty and for penal action
in the context of the objectives sought to be achieved by the Act and the
serious repercussions of transgression of the provisions of the Act on the
E economy of the country. Therefore, the argument based on violation of Article
14 relying on the decision in State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar,
[1952] SCR 284 and those following it, are of no avail to the appellants. No
merit can also be found in the argument that Section 68 of the FERA confers
an unfettered power on the investiga1:ing officer to pick and choose at his
will, those whom he desires to prosecute and omit those whom he does not
F want to prosecute, in a case to which Section 68 of the FERA is attracted.

8. In view of the immunity from challenge enjoyed by the provisions
of the Act, there arises no necessity to read down the provisions of the Act
so as to ensure that they do not violate the rights conferred by Article 14 of
the Constitution. The provisions therefore call for a natural interpretation
G and, if necessary, a purposive interpretation, keeping in view the object sought
to be achieved by the Act. In the guis1e of interpretation, there is no occasion
to whittle down the ambit of the provisions to save them from the charge of
arbitrariness, hit by Article 14 of the Constitution.

H
9. Before proceeding further it is necessary to point out that the notices
-
'~
,/

STANDARD CHARTERED BANK"· DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT [BALASUBRAMANYAN, J.] 72J

-.\ issued under Section 61 of the FERA are merely notices of enquiry, giving A
an opportunity to the appellants of showing that they had; the necessary
pennission from the concerned authority under the FERA in respect of the
particular transaction. These notices, therefore, do not in any manner decide
anything against the appellants and they merely set out the grounds based on
which the appellants allegedly violated the provisions of the FERA and since
one of the ingredients of the offence is absence of permission from the B
concerned authority, they are intended only to give an opportunity to the
appellants to show that they had the necessary permission and hence, there
... ~ was no violation of the. relevant provision or provisions of the FERA as
sought to be made out in the notice. As pointed out by the learned Additional
Solicitor General, on the failure of the appellants to show that they had the c
requisite pennission, a complaint will have to be lodged before the concerned
magistrate here it has been launched with the permission of this Court pending
these appeals and the magistrate will consider whether the process should
issue on the basis of the complaint made before him. In view of the fact that
sufficient opportunities will be available to the appellants to put forward their
contentions before the concerned criminal court, it cannot be said that there D
:is any merit in the challenge to the notices issued under Section 61 of the
FERA. The said notices are really in tenns of Section 61 of the FERA and
' their scope and ambit is also controlled by Section 61 of the FERA and on
receipt of those notices, it was open to the appellants to show that they had
the necessary pennission from the concerned authority under the Act. Of E
course, if they do not have such permission, apparently, in the case on hand,
there was no such pennission, they have necessarily to put forward their
defences before the criminal court in the prosecutions that have been launched
in that behalf.

., 10. It is argued that the issue of a notice under Section 61 is not a mere F

" fonnality and that it is a real right given to a person accused of an offence
to establish that the proceedings are being initiated without jurisdiction or
wholly in violation of the provisions ofFERA. Article 20(3) of the Constitution
is referred to and it is submitted that many rights including the right against
self incrimination is available to a person accused of an offence. Section
61 (2) of FERA makes it clear that no court can take cognizance of an offence
G
except upon a complaint by the officer referred to therein. The proviso to
• J., Section 61 (2) of the Act provides that no complaint regarding the offences
referred to in that Section shall be made unless an opportunity is given to the
...J.
concerned person to show that he had the requisite permission where the
'
offence charged is an act which requires permission under the Act. We think H
724 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006) 2 S.C.R.

A that if the notice sets out the alleged contravention, (an act which could have
been done with permission) and calls upon the person accused of the offence
whether he had the requisite permission for the transaction, that will satisfy
the requirement of the Section.

11. Learned counsel relied on East India Commercial Co. ltd., Calcutta
B andAnr. v. The Collector of Customs, Calcutta (1963) 3 SCR 338 to emphasise
that the notice is not a mere formality and should contain the relevant materials
based on which the prosecution v.as being initiated. The following passage
was relied on: " ~

Assuming that a notice could be laconic, in the present case it was a
c speaking one clearly specifying the alleged act of contravention. If on
a reading of the said notice, it is manifest that on the assumption that
the facts alleged or allegations made therein were true, none of the
conditions laid down in the specified sections was contravened, the
respondent would have no jurisdiction to initiate proceedings pursuant
D to that notice. To state it differently, if on a true construction of the
provisions of the said two sections the respondent has no jurisdiction
to initiate proceedings or make an inquiry under the said sections in 1
respect of certain acts alleged to have been done by the appellants,
the respondent can certainly be prohibited from proceedings with the
same."
E
On a reading of the notices issued under Section 61 of the Act, we are
of the view that they are in terms of that Section and there is no reason to
interfere with them in these writ petitions and that it would be appropriate to
leave the appellants to their available defences in the prosecutions that have
F been initiated. Suffice it to say that it is not possible to issue the writ of
prohibition as sought for by the appellants on the ground that these notices
do not satisfy the jurisdictional requirement under Section 61 of the Act.

12. At this stage. we cannot ignore the argument on behalf of the
respondents that if the appellants are not able to show any permission,
G complaints have to be filed before the concerned magistrate and that magistrate
will issue process only on being satisfied that a case has been made out for
such issue and that the attempt of the appellants to block the prosecution
should not be countenanced. The object of the present notice, submitted
counsel, is limited and the arguments attempted on behalf of the appellants
can be raised before the criminal court when the occasion arises. We find
H merit in this submission. Obviously, it is open to the appellants to put forward
STANDARD CHARTERED BANK'· DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT [BALASUBRAMANYAN, J.] 725
all their· defences to the prosecution at the appropriate stage. A
13. The other set of notices are in respect of the adjudication under
Section 50 of the FERA. Again, it is for the appellants to put forward their
objections thereto before the concerned authority and it is for that authority
to decide the relevant aspects while deciding to impose or not to impose any
penalty on the appellants. The appellants have a right of appeal under Section B
52 of the FERA to the Appellate Board and a further right of appeal to the
High Court under Section 54 of the FERA. We see no justification for the
~ ,,;I issue of a writ of prohibition restraining the authority under the FERA from
proceeding further with the adjudication. It is for the appellants to put forward
their defences, if any available, before the adjudicating authority and pursue C
it in accordance with law. ·

14. Considerable arguments were put forward by learned counsel for
the appellants in Civil Appeal No.1749 of 1999 in attempting to establish that
Section 68(1) of FERA is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. It was
contended that the provisions empowered an investigating officer to pick and D
choose at his will, in the absence of any definition, all those whom he desires
to proceed against and omit those he does not want to subject to prosecution.
This, it was said, was arbitrary. The prejadice that may be caused to a person
sought to be roped in under Section 68 of FERA was highlighted. It was
submitted that the proviso to sub-section (I) would not be a mitigating factor
in view of the serious damage done to the reputation of the person alleged E
to be an offender under FERA. It was contended that the section also offended
Article 14 of the Constitution as it permitted a whole class of persons to be
·prosecuted irrespective of their culpability. Vast and arbitrary powers were
conferred on the department to prosecute the same person, a director of the
company either under sub section (I) where inevitably the accused carried p
the burden to prove his absence of knowledge or under sub-section (2) where
the prosecution takes on itself the burden of proving the wrong doing, with
a potential to pick and choose between sub-section (I) and sub-section (2).
This also violated Article 21 of the Constitution. The fiction involved in
Section 68(1) would equally violate Article 21 where the presumption of
knowledge attaches to the officers of the company against whom no wrong G
doing whatsoever is alleged except by indicating his status in the company.
Learned Additional Solicitor General met these contentions by pointing out
that in view of the inclusion of the Act in the Ninth Schedule to the
Constitution, these arguments even if found tenable, cannot carry the appellants
far. He also submitted that Section 68(1) was consistent with similar provi5ions H
726 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2006] 2 S.C.R.

A under other laws and it applied only to a person who was in charge of and
who was responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the
company as well as the company at the relevant time. This was a clear
identification of the person who was to be roped in, in terms of Section 68(1)
of FERA, and there was nothing arbitrary, unclear or unreasonable in the
B provision. He also pointed that under Section 68( l) what was needed to be
proved was an offence against the company and when that was done, the
person in charge of the affairs of the company at the relevant time, still had
an opportunity to prove that the alleged contravention took place without his
knowledge or that he exercised all due diligence to prevent such a "'~
contravention and that this availability of opportunity, adequately safeguarded
C the rights of any person who was sought to be roped in under Section 68( I)
of the FERA. Counsel also pointed out that under Section 68(2), if any other
officer of the company had to be roped in, the burden was on the prosecution
and this clearly showed that there was nothing arbitrary in Section 68(2) of
the Act or on. the placing of the burden of proof differently under the two
sub-sections. In answer, learned counsel for the appellant further submitted
D that the reversal of burden of proof under Section 68 of FERA was violative
of Article 14 of the Constitution of India and relied on Cv/lectur v[Customs
v. Nathella Sampathu Chetty, [1962] 3 SCR 786 in support. f

15. As we have indicated earlier, in view of the fact that the FERA has
E been included in the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution, the challenge based
on Articles 14 and 21 cannot prevail even assuming that the arguments have
any substance. But on the scheme of the Act, with particular regard to Sections
56, 59, 61 and 68 of FERA, we find that the provisions cannot be successfully
challenged as either being arbitrary or discriminatory. All that Section 68(1)
says is that if the commission of an offence by the company is proved, the
F person who was in charge and was n:sponsible to the company for the conduct
of the business of the company at the time the contravention was committed,
was to be deemed to be guilty of the contravention and was liable to be
proceeded against and punished. He is being punished in view of his status
in the company and because it is proved that the company is guilty of
G contravention of any of the provisions of FERA. There is nothing unreasonable
in this, since a company normally acts through a person who is in charge of
its affairs and even in that case, the person in charge and responsible to the
company for the conduct of its business, is given an opportunity to show that
the alleged contravention by the company took place without his knowledge
or in spite of the exercise of all due diligence by him to prevent such
H contravention. Section 68(2) is attracted in a case where a company has
STANDARD CHARTERED BANK v. DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT [BALASUBRAMANY AN, J] 727
contravened the provisions of the Act or any rule, direction or order made A
thereunder and that particular contravention is proved to have taken place
with the consent or connivance or is attributable to any neglect on the part
of any Director, Manager, Secretary or other officer of the company. In other
words, the prosecution, in addition to prosecuting the company, can also
prosecute any particular officer whose action or inaction or negligence resulted B
in the commission of the particular offence by the company. This only means
that a person who is instrumental in the commission of an act by the company
that is in contravention of FER{\ or the rules or directions issued thereunder,
also lays himself open to prosecution. Having done something or omitted to
do something leading to the company contravening the provisions of the Act,
the officer concerned cannot say that it is unreasonable to prosecute him also, C
along with the company and the person in charge of and responsible to the
/ company for the conduct of its business.

16. The argument that the section violates Article 14 of the Constitution
cannot thus be accepted. The same is the position regarding the argument
based on Article 21 of the Constitution. The object of the Act is clearly to D '
protect the economic interests of the country and to deal with any violation
that causes economic loss to the country. In the context of that object, any
contravention of the provisions of the Act have to be viewed seriously and
any one directly responsible or conniving at the offence is liable to be punished.
This appears to be the legislative intent in enacting FERA 1973 replacing the E
Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947 and also including it in the Ninth
Schedule to the Constitution.

17. Considera~le amount of argument was raised as to who is the
person who is liable to be prosecuted under Section 68(1) as in charge of or
responsible for the affairs of the company. The question whether a particular F
person who is sought to be prosecuted under Section 68(1) of the Act, is the
person who is liable to be prosecuted under Section 68(1 ), is a question that
has to be raised at the trial. We have already noticed the scope of the writ
petitions giving rise to these appeals. The question sought to be raised on this
aspect based on the various decisions of the English Courts and the decision
of this Court in Va/liappa Textiles Ltd and Anr (supra) depends upon the G
facts of the case proved before the Court dealing with the prosecution and it
is not necessary for us to pronounce on those aspects in these appeals. Suffice
it to say, that the arguments on this score are of no avail while considering
the constitutional challenge to Section 68 of the Act as being violative of
Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution. We reject the contention, leaving it H
728 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2006) 2 S.C.R.

A to the concerned appellant to raise that plea before the appropriate forum
regarding his culpability under Se1;tion 68( I) of FERA.

18. Learned senior counsel for the appellants in Civil Appeal No.1750
of 1999, in addition to adopting the arguments of learned senior counsel
already adverted to, also contende:d that on the scheme of the Act, it was
B incumbent on the Directorate of Enforcement to first adjudicate in terms of
Section 51 of FERA and only if satisfied, proceed with the prosecution under
Section 56 of the Act. According to counsel, under the scheme of FERA, the
adjudication proceedings must first be commenced and only after they are
completed, the directorate of enforcement ran, in the light of the findings in
C the adjudication for penalty, decide to initiate a prosecution and seek to
impose or not to impose a further punishment under Section 56 of the Act.
It is submitted that the adjudication proceedings would give an idea to the .
authorities under the Act as to the gravity of the violation and the opportunity ·
to decide whether the contravention deserved also a punishment by way of
prosecution. They would decide whether the penalty imposed under Section
D 50 of the Act is adequate or not. If in the adjudication proceedings it is found
that the alleged offender has not infringed any of the provisions of the Act,
there will be no occasion for the Directorate of Enforcement to prosecute the
I
concerned person. It would then be incongruous and unreasonable for the
Directorate of Enforcement to prosecute a person for violating FERA, when
E in the adjudication proceedings against him, it had been found that the person
had not violated any of the provisions of FERA. It was in this context that
the scheme of the FERA should be understood as indicating that there should
first be an adjudication and thereafter, if the Directorate of Enforcement feels
that the penalty is inadequate, to consider the launching of a prosecution.

p 19. Learned Additional Solicitor General contended that under FERA,
adjudication and prosecution are two separate and distinct procedures with
distinct purposes. There was no bar either in FERA or in any other law, to
an adjudication and prosecution being launched in respect of an alleged
contravention of FERA. Counsel submitted that the law has permitted it by
providing two separate modes for dealing with the person who contravenes
G the law in relation to foreign exchange. While the primary purpose of imposing
of the penalty is the interests of revenue and the preservation of foreign
exchange, the primary purpose of prosecution is to serve as a strong deterrent
to persons or companies contravening the provisions of the Act and to send
a message to the society at large. Counsel pointed out that Section 56 of
H FERA which deals with offences and prosecutions, commences with the words
STANDARD CHARTERED BANK v. DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT [BALASUBRAMANYAN. J.] 729
"without prejudice to any award of penalty by the adjudicating officer under A
J this Act". A person contravening any of the provisions shall upon conviction
by a court will be punished, even if a penalty has been imposed on him.
There was no warrant for reading the words "without prejudice to" as
restricting the right of the authorities under the Act to proceed with the
adjudication first and to commence the prosecution only at its conclusion.
Counsel also emphasized that the two proceedings are independently dealt. B
with. Counsel pointed out that even in respect of the FERA Act of 1947, in
Shanti Prasad Jain v. Director of Enforcement, [1963] 2 SCR 297, this Court
~ .'I had upheld a special procedure under the statute holding that it was not
__.,.
violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. It is submitted that the purpose of
the Act is to bring the accused to book, more so in case of a serious offence c
and it could not have been the intention of the legislature to await a long time
for an adjudication to be completed by way of an appeal and a second appeal
and then only to commence the prosecution.

20. The Act was enacted, as indicated by its preamble, for the
conservation of foreign exchange resources of the country and the proper D
utilization thereof in the economic development of the country. When
) interpreting such a law, in the absence of any provision in that regard in the
'1 Act itself, we see no reason to restrict the scope of any of the provisions of
the Act, especially in the context of the presence of the "without prejudice"
clause in Section 56 of the Act dealing with offences and prosecutions. We
find substance in the contention of the learned Additional Solicitor General
E
that the Act subserves a twin purpose. One, to ensure that no economic loss
is caused by the alleged contravention by the imposition of an appropriate
penalty after an adjudication under Section 51 of the Act and two, to ensure
that the tendency to violate is curbed by imposing an appropriate punishment
after a due prosecution in terms of Section 56 of the Act. The contention that F
as a matter of construction - since the provisions could not be attacked as
~·
violative of the rights under Part Ill of the Constitution - - we .should
interpret the provisions of the Act and hold that an adjudication has to precede
a prosecution cannot be accepted as we see nothing in the provisions of the
Act justifying such a cons•ruction. On the scheme of the Act, the two
proceedings are seen to be independent and the launching of the one or the
G

- ~-~,
other or both is seen to be controlled by the respective provisions themselves.
In the context of the inclusion of this Act in the Ninth Schedule, the reliance
placed on the decision in Raya/a Corporation (P) Ltd & Ors. v. Director of
Enforcement, New Delhi, [1969] 2 SCC 412 cannot enable this Court to deem
the provisions as arbitrary and to read them down or understood them in the H
730 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2006] 2 S.C.R.

A manner suggested by the learned senior counsel. The very purpose of the Act
and the very object of inclusion of the Act in the Ninth Schedule justifies an
interpretation of the provisions as they stand on the basis that there is nothing
arbitrary or unreasonable in the provisions and in the scheme as enacted. We
may also notice that Section 230 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act,
1947, which was considered in Raya/a Corporation (P) Ltd & Ors., had a
B proviso, which indicated that the adjudication for the imposition of penalty
should precede the making of a complaint in writing to the concerned court
for prosecuting the offender. The absence of a similar proviso to Section 56
or to Section 51 of the present Act, is also a clear indication that the legislature
T 1
intended to treat the two proc'!edings as independent of each other. Obviously,
C the legislature must be taken to have been conscious of the interpretation
placed on the corresponding provisions by this Court in the decisions above
referred to when the 1973 Act was enacted and it was also included in the
Ninth Schedule to ward off any challenge on the ground that it would be
violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, unless understood or read in a
particular fashion.
D
21. Learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant in criminal appeal
arising out of SLP(Crl) No.5892 of 2004 in which the Full Bench decision
of the Calcutta High Court is challenged, supported the arguments raised by
learned senior counsel in Civil Appeal No.1750 of 1999. The Full Bench of
E the Calcutta High Court in the judgment under appeal has, on a consideration
of the relevant aspects, answered the reference made to it by holding that a '
complaint under Section 56 of FERA can never be said to be premature if it
is instituted before the awarding of penalty under Section 50 of the Act and
such criminal proceeding being an independent proceeding, can be initiated
during the pendency of an adjudication proceeding under Section 51 of FERA,
F 1973. Therein, the Full Bench has referred to the decision of the Madras
High Court in A.S.G. Jothimani Nodar v. The Deputy Director, Enforcement
Directorate (I 984) Excise and Customs Cases 319 and that of the Andhra
Pradesh High Court in Anil Kumar Aganval v. K.C. Basu (2003) Criminal
Law Journal 2197 which also take the same view as the one taken by the Full
Bench in the judgment under challenge. The court has also derived support
G for its view from the decisions of this Court in Assistant Collector ofCustoms,
Bombay v. L.R. Melwani and Anr., AIR (1970) SC 962 and in P. Jayappan
v. S.K. Perumal, AIR (1984) SC 1693 = [ 1984] Suppl. SCC 437. We see no
reason not to approve the answer given by the Full Bench to the question
referred to it for decision. On the whole, we are satisfied that there is no .
H justification in accepting the argument that unless an adjudication proceeding
STANDARD CHARTERED BANK'· DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT [BALASUBRAMANYAN, J.] 731
under Section 51 of the Act is completed, a prosecution under Section 56 of A
FERA cannot be initiated. Both proceedings can simultaneously be launched
and can simultaneously be pursued.

22. Counsel submitted that the devising of a special machinery for
adjudication, the limiting of the "without prejudice" clause in Section 56 to
any award of penalty and not the initiation of proceedings under Section 51 B
of the Act, the making of a contravention of any of the provisions of this Act
as the key to both proceedings, would all indicate that an adjudication should
)/
precede a prosecution under Section 56 of the Act. There is nothing in the
~
Act to indicate that a finding in an adjudication, is binding on the court in
a prosecution under Section 56 of the Act. There is no indication that the c
prosecution depends upon the result of the adjudication. We have already
held that on the scheme of the Act, the two proceedings are independent. The
finding in one is not conclusive in the other. In the context of the objects
sought to be achieved by the Act, the elements relied on by the learned senior
counsel, would not justify a finding that a prosecution can be launched only
after the completion of an adjudication under Section 51 of the Act. The D
decision in K.C. Builders and Anr. v. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax,
[2004] 2 SCC 731 is clearly distinguishable. The Court proceeded as if under
°'1 the Income Tax Act, the prosecution is dependent on the imposition of penalty.
That was a case where the prosecution was based on a finding of concealment
of income and the imposition of penalty. When the Tribunal held that there E
was no concealment, and the order levying penalty was cancelled, according
to this Court, the very foundation for the prosecution itself disappeared. This
Court held that it was settled law that levy of penalties and prosecution under
Section 276-C of the Income Tax Act are simultaneous and hence, once the
penalties are cancelled on the ground that there was concealment, the quashing
of the prosecution under Section 276-C of the Income Tax Act was automatic. F
~•r
We have held already that on the scheme of FERA, the adjudication and the
prosecution are distinct and separate. Hence, the ratio of the above decision
is not applicable. That apart, there is merit in the submission of the learned
Additional Solicitor General that the correctness of the view taken in K. C.
Builders (supra) may require reconsideration as the reasoning appears to run
G
counter to the one adopted by the Constitution Bench in Assistant Collector
of Customs, Bombay v. L.R. Melwani and Anr (supra) and in other decisions
~-~ not referred to therein. For the purpose of these cases, we do not think it
necessary to pursue this aspect further. Suffice it to say, that the ratio of that
decision has no application here.
~ H
732 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] 2 S.C.R.

.· A 23. The prayer for the issue of a writ of prohibition restraining the
authorities under the Act from proc,eeding with the adjudication and the
prosecution is essentially based on the constitutional challenge to the relevant
provisions of the Act on the ground that th<:y violate Articles 14 and 21 of
the Constitution of India. Once we have held, as the High Court did, that the
B provisions are constitutional, the basis on which the writ of prohibition is
sought for by the appellants disappears. It i!. settled by the decisions of this
Court that a writ of prohibition will issue to prevent a Tribunal or Authority
from proceeding further when the Authority proceeds to act without or in
excess of jurisdiction; proceeds to act in ~ iolation of the rules of natural >< ,
justice; or proceeds to act under .a law which is itself ultra vires or
C unconstitutional. Since the basis of the claim for the relief is found not to
exist, the High Court rightly refused the prayer for the issue of a writ of
prohibition restraining the Authorities from continuing the proceedings
, pursuant to the notices issued. As indicated by this Court in State of Uttar
Pradesh v. Brahm Datt Sharma. [1987] 2 SCC 179 when a show cause notice
D is issued under statutory provision calling upon the person concerned to show
cause, ordinarily that person must place his case before the Authority concerned
by showing cause and the courts should b1~ reluctant to interfere with the
notice at that stage unless the notice is shown to have been issued palpably
without any authority of law. On the facts of this case, it cannot be said that
these notices are palpably without authority of law. In that situation, the
E appellants cannot successfully challenge the refusal by the High Court of the
writs of prohibition prayed for by them.

24. Thus, on the whole, in the cont1!xt of the answer given by the
Constitution Bench on one of the important aspects raised in these cases and
in the light of the prayers made in the writ petitions giving rise to these
F appeals, we see no reason at the instance of the appellants in these four
appeals either to interfere with the decisions of the High Court of Bombay •·
or with the answer given by the Full Bench of the High Court of Calcutta to
the first question referred to it for decision. ln that view, all these appeals are
liable to be dismissed.
G
CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 1751 and 1944 OF 1999

25. These appeals are by the Union of India and the Authorities under
the FERA challenging the decision of the High Court of Bombay to the
extent that court held that Section 68 of the Act is inapplicable to proceedings
H for adjudication under Section 51 of the Act and its operation is confined
STANDARD CHARTERED BANK"· DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT [BALASUBRAMANYAN, !.] 733
only to prosecutions under the Act. The High Court reasoned that the argument A
that having regard to the placement of Section 68 under the Legislative
Scheme of FERA, the same is equally applicable to penalty, could not be
accepted since the very caption of Section 68 indicates that it deals with
offences by a company and as such Section 68 cannot be invoked for the levy
of penalty on the persons indicated therein. According to the High Court, B
apart from the caption, sub-Sections (I) and (2) of Section 68 speak of the
officers referred to therein being liable to be proceeded against and punished
and this indicates that it is intended to apply only in respect of prosecutions
against a company and only in such a prosecution for an offence by the
company, the persons indicated therein are liable to be proceeded against and
punished. The Section does not indicate that it could be extended to penalty. C
Since the penalty could be imposed on a company, as distinct from the
punishment of imprisonment, if the company contravenes any of the provisions
of the Act, it would be proper to understand Section 68 as being confined
only to criminal prosecutions. The High Court stated that Section 50 of the
Act dealing with liability for penalty, does not refer to the persons referred D
to by Section 68 of the Act. As such, Section 68 of the Act could not be
availed of to impose a penalty on the officials of the company in terms of
Sections 50 and 51 of the Act simultaneously with the company, which is the
person guilty of contravention. In view cif the fact that Section 50 also
prescribes an outer limit for the penalty to be imposed and the said penalty
can be imposed on the company itself, it would be incongruous to hold that E
the same quantum of penalty could be recovered from the officials of the
company all over again. That would lead to an anomalous position of the
penalty exceeding the outer limit prescribed in Section 50 in respect of a
particular offence committed by the company. The High Court gave liberty
to the Writ Petitioners to raise this aspect before the Adjudicating Authority
based on its finding. F
''i 26. The learned Additional Solicitor General in support of the appeals
by the Union of India, urged that the expression 'offence' used in Section 68
is all comprehensive and would include every contravention in respect of
which an adjudication under Section 50 of the Act can also be made against G
a company and the object of the Act being to prevent the evasion of the law
relating to foreign exchange, the expression 'offence' need not be confined
to a criminal offence and Section 68 should be understood as being applicable
even in respect of adjudications of penalty under Sections 50 and 51, of the
Act. Learned counsel submitted that the legislation being in the interests of
society, it must be construed in that context. Learned counsel also referred to H
734 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] 2 S.C.R.

A Section 64 of the Act and pointed out that whereas sub-Section (I) specifies
Section 56, sub-section (2) ropes in a proceeding for adjudication of penalty
as well and in Section 68 of the Act there was no such specification as found
in Section 64 (I) of the Act and that was a pointer to understand Section 68
as being applicable to an adjudication of penalty as well, especially in the
B context of Section 64(2). It is submitt1~d on behalf of the respondents in these
appeals that a reference to Section 56 of the Act shows that it deals with
offences and prosecutions. In the absence of a definition in the Act, the term
'offence' should be understood in the context of Section 40 of the Indian
Penal Code as an act that is criminally punishable and Section 3(38) of the
General Clauses Act as an act made punishable by any law and the essential
C ingredient is that it should be a criminal act as understood. Whereas under
Section 50 of FERA, in the matter of adjudication of penalty there was an
outer limit of five times of the amount or value involved in any contravention,
under Section 56 of the Act, as regards the tine to be imposed, there was no
limit. It was submitted that in the case of contravention by a company, the
D adjudication is against the company and the penalty is imposable on the
company itself within the iimits prescribed by Section 50 of the Act, and in
the light of this position, the High Court was justified in holding that Section
68 could not be applied in the matter of adjudication of penalty and the
imposition of penalty can only be on the company when the company is the
person who contravenes any of the provisions of the Act coming within
E Section 50 of the Act.

27. Both, Section 50 providing for imposition of penalty and Section
56 providing for prosecution, speak of contravention of the provisions of the
Act. Contravention is the basic element. The contravention makes a person
liable both for penalty and for prosecution. Even though the heading to
F Section 56 refers to offences and prosecutions, what is made punishable by
the Section is the contravention of the provisions of the Act and the prosecution
is without prejudice to any award of penalty. The award of penalty is also
based on the same contravention. Section 63 is the power of confiscation of
currency, security or any other moiney or property in respect of which a
G contravention of the provisions of the Act has taken place conferred equally
on the Adjudicating Authority and the Court, whether it be during an
adjudication of the penalty or during a prosecution. Whereas Section 64 (I)
relating to preparation or attempt at contravention is confined to Section 56,
the provision for prosecution, sub-Section (2) of Section 64 makes the attempt
to contravene or abetment of contravention, itself a contravention, for the
H purposes of the Act including an adjudication of penalty under the Act.
STANDARD CHARTE~D BANK"· DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT [BALASUBRAMANYAN. J.] 73 S

Section 68 relating to offences by companies, by sub-Section (I) introduces A
a deeming provision that the person who was in charge of and was responsible
to the company for the conduct of the business of the company, shall also be
deemed to be guilty along with the company of the contravention of the
provisions of the Act and liable to be proceeded against and punished
accordingly. The proviso, no doubt, indicates that a person liable to punishment
could prove that the contravention took place without his knowledge or that B
he exercised all due diligence to prevent such contravention. Sub-Section (2)
again speaks only of a contravention of the provisions of the Act and the
• y
persons referred to in that sub-section are alse to be deemed to be guilty of
the contravention liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly.
The word 'offence' is not defined in the Act. According to Concise Oxford C
English Dictionary, it means, 'an act or instance of offending'. Offend means,
'commit an illegal act' and illegal means, 'contrary to or forbidden by law'.
According to New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, an offence is "a breach
of law, rules, duty, propriety, etiquette, an illegal act, a transgression, sin,
wrong, misdemeanour, misdeed, fault." Thus, an offence only means the
commission of an act contrary to or forbidden by law. It is not confined to D
the commission of a crime alone. It is an act committed against law or
omitted where the law requires it and punishable by it. In its legal signification,
an offence is the transgression of a law; a breach of the laws established for
the protection of the public as distinguished from an infringement of mere
private rights; a punishable violation of law, a crime, the doing that which a E
penal law forbids to be done or omitting to do what it commands (see P.
Ramanatha Aiyar's Advanced Law Lexicon, 3rd Edn, 2005 page 3302). This
Court in Depot Manager, Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation
v. Mohd. Yousuf Miya, [1997] 2 SCC 699 stated that the word 'offence'
generally implies infringement of a public duty, as distinguished from mere
private rights punishable under criminal law. In Brown v. Al/weather
F1
Mechanical co. (1954) 2 QB 443], it was described as "a failure to do
something prescribed by a statute may be described as an offence, though no
criminal sanction is imposed but merely a pecuniary sanction recoverable as
a civil debt." The expression 'offence' as defined in Section 3(38) of the
General Clauses Act means an act or omission made punishable by any law G
for the time being in force. 'Punishable' as noticed by this Court in Sube
Singh & Ors. v. State of Haryarza & Ors., [1989] I SCC 235 is ordinarily
defined as deserving of, or capable or liable to punishment. According to
Concise Oxford English Dictionary, 'punish' means, 'inflict a penalty on as
retribution for an offence, inflict a penalty on someone for (an offence)'. In
H
736 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2006 J 2 S.C.R.

A the New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (Vol. 2, 3rd ed., reprint 1993),
the meaning of punishment is given as, "infliction of a penalty in retribution
for an offence; penalty imposed to ensure application and enforcement of a
law." Going by Black's Law Dictionary (8th ed.) it is, "a sanction-such as a
fine, penalty, confinement, or loss of property, right or privilege-assessed
against a person who has violated the law." According to Jowitts Dictionary
B of English Law Vol. 2 (2nd ed. By John Burke), punishment is the penalty
for transgressing the law. It is significant to notice that Section 68, both in
sub-Section (I) and in sub-Section (2) uses the expression, shall be liable to
be proceeded against and punished accordingly. There does not appear to be
any reason to confine the operation of Section 68 only to a prosecution and
C to exclude its operation from a penalty proceeding under Section 50 of the
Act, since the essential ingredient of both is the contravention of the provisions
of the Act. A company is liable to be proceeded against under both the
provisions. Section 68 is only a provision indicating who all in addition can
be proceeded against when the contravention is by a company or who all
should or can be roped in, in a contravention by a company. Section 68 only
D clarifies the nature and mode of proceeding when the contravention of any
of the provisions of the Act is by a company. whether it be by way of
adjudication to impose a penalty or by way of prosecution leading to
imprisonment and a fine.

E 28. The High Court rested its decision mainly on the use of the expression
in sub-Sections (I) and (2) of Section 68 that the officer or officers concerned
shall be 'liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly'. According
to the High Court, the use of the expression "punished" makes it apparent
that Section 68 can be availed of only when there is a criminal prosecution
for an offence by a company, where the person or persons indicted are liable
F to be punished. Hence, its application cannot be extended to penalty
proceedings. The other reason mentioned by the High Court is that the
provision under Section 68 had a special task and it dealt with offences and
prosecutions against any person which includes a company and on conviction
such a person is liable to be imprisoned and company being a juristic person,
G it cannot suffer imprisonment. Then, section 68 springs into the operation to
identify every person who is liable to be punished with imprisonment for the
contraver.tion by the company. However, penalty can be saddled on the
company if it has contravened any of the provisions of the Act. Section 50
does not refer to every person as envisaged by Section 68. As such, Section
68 cannot be availed ofto indict the officials of the company for the purposes
H of penalty. Section 50 also lays down an outer limit of penalty. Since the
STANDARD CHARTERED BANK v. DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT [BALASUBRAMANYAN, !.] 73 7

.~ penalty can be imposed on the company itself as a person contravening the A
provisions of the Act, if the operation of Section 68 is extended to penalty
proceedings also, the penalty would become leviable against each person
who comes within the purview of Section 68 of the Act and that will create
a serious anomaly.

29. There does not appear to be any reason to confine the operation of B
Section 68 of the Act as was done by the High Court. Merely because the
expression 'punished' is used, it does not mean that it is confined to a
• prosecution under Section 56 of the Act, since the element that attracts the
" imposition of penalty and the prosecution is the same, namely, the
contravention of any of the provisions of the Act. Moreover, there is nothing
in the Act which confines the expression 'punished' only to a punishment for
c
a criminal prosecution. An imposition of a penalty can also be a punishment.
'-~~
The second part of the reasoning appears to be self-contradictory. If a person
includes a company, there is no reason to confine Section 68 to a prosecution
only, because the company as a person is liable to be proceeded against
under Section 50 and Section 56 of the Act, though in a criminal prosecution D
the punishment by way of imprisonment can be imposed only on the officer
)
'i or officers of the company referred to in Section 68 of the Act. Section 68
only indicates the manner in which a contravention by a company can be
dealt with and it does not show that it is confined in its operation only to
prosecutions against a company. It is a general provision relating to a
contravening company, which is to be proceeded against whether it be under
E
Section 50 or under Section 56 of the Act. The fact that a fine alone can be
imposed on a company in a prosecution under Section 56 of the Act, cannot
enable us to confine the operation of Section 68 to criminal prosecutions
alone under the Act. We see no reason to whittle down the scope of Section
68 of the Act. F
---1
30. It is true that the entire penalty that may be imposed on adjudication,
is capable of being recovered from the company itself. But that does not
mean that it cannot be recovered from the officer incharge of the company
or those who connived at or were instrumental in the contravention of the
:1 provisions of the Act by the company. Once the ingredient of the offence is G
contravention of the provisions of the Act and the consequences flowing
~~. from the contravention is to make that person including a company liable for
penalty as well as for prosecution, there does not appear to be any justification
in confining the scope of the Section 68 only to prosecutions under Section
56 of the Act. We have earlier indicated that use of the expression 'offence'
H
738 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] 2 S.C.R.

A in the marginal heading of Section 68 is not indicative of the expression
'being confined to a criminal offence alone' because an offence in the context
of the Act is really a contravention of any of the provisions of the Act
referred to in Section 50 and in Section 56 of the Act.

31. Hence, the decision of the High Court calls for modification as
B regards the scope and applicability of Section 68 of the Act. The appeals
filed by the Union of India are liable to be allowed to that extent.

WRIT PETITION NO. 165 OF 2004 -. '
32. The challenge in this Writ Petition to the prosecution launched
c against the Writ Petitioner is on the same basis as the one contained in the
Writ Petitions giving rise to the Civil Appeal Nos. 1748, 1749 and 1750 of
1999. For the reasons set out by us in the earlier paragraphs, this Writ Petition
has only to be dismissed. Obviously, it would be open to the Writ Petitioner
to raise all available defences before the concerned Criminal Court.
D
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 684 OF 2005

33. This appeal challenges the decision of the High Court of Andhra ~

Pradesh refusing to interfere with an order of the Special Judge of Economic
Offences at Hyderabad refusing to discharge the appellant. The argument
E before the High Court was that the prosecution contemplated by Section 56
of the Act could take place only if an adverse finding is recorded by the
Adjudicating Officer in the proceedings under Section 51 of the Act and that
no crime or offence can be said to have been committed by the appellant
unless the proceedings under Section 51 of the Act culminates in a finding
adverse to him. The High Court reje:cted this contention. In view of our
F conclusions recorded earlier, the said argument which is reiterated before us
in support of this appeal, has only to be rejected. The order of the High Court r
does not call for interference and this appeal deserves to be dismissed.

CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS. 847 AND 848 OF 2004
G 34. The accused has filed these appeals challenging the orders of the
High Court of Delhi. Criminal Appeal No. 847 of2004 is filed by the accused
challenging the decision dismissing an application filed by the appellant under
.
Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, by following the decision of
this Court in Santram Paper Mills v. Collector of Central Excise, Ahmedabad,
H [1998) 8 sec 335 and taking the view that an adjudication proceeding is

.,
STANDARD CHARTERED BANK v. DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT [BALASUBRAMANYAN. I.] 739
independent of the criminal liability under the Act.· irhe contention of the A
appellant was that since in the adjudication proceedings no penalty was
imposed and there was no finding of personal involvement of the appellant,
the prosecution had also to be quashed. We have held that the two proceedings
are independent of each other and the finding on the adjudication is not
conclusive on a prosecution under the Act. Hence, the High Court was fully
justified in refusing to quash the proceedings on the ground put forward by B
the appellant. There is no merit in Criminal Appeal No. 847 of 2004.

35. The appellant, after the petition under Section 482 of the Code of
•· ¥
Criminal Procedure was dismissed, purported to file another Writ Petition
challenging the vires of Section 140 (I) of the Customs Act. He also sought
a stay of further proceedings before the Additional Chief Metropolitan
c
Magistrate, New Delhi based on the complaint filed by the Enforcement
Officer. The Division Bench after taking note of the earlier proceedings
declined to stay. the· proceedings. That order is challenged in this appeal.

36. We see no reason to interfere with the interim order passed by the D
High Court in view of our conclusions as above. Even otherwise, the High
} Court has exercised its discretion properly in refusing to grant a stay of
'( further proceedings and there is no reason to interfere with that order. Criminal
proceedings of this nature cannot be allowed to be delayed unduly. This
appeal also is liable to be dismissed.
E
37. In the result, W.P.(Crl.) 165 of 2004 and all appeals other than
Civil Appeal Nos. 1751and1944 of 1999 are dismissed. Civil Appeal Nos.
17 51 and 1944 of 1999 are allowed by vacating the finding of the High Court
of Bombay that Section 68 of FERA is confined in its operation only to
prosecutions under Section 56 of the Act. The parties are directed to suffer
their costs in all the appeals.
F
--~
v.s. Appeal dismissed.