Holding

The Supreme Court held that the land‑allocation policy and the Government Orders classifying MPs, MLAs, AIS officers, judges and journalists for concessional land allotment are arbitrary, lack a rational nexus and violate Article 14, and therefore are quashed.

Summary

The case concerned several Government Orders (GoMs) issued by the Andhra Pradesh (now Telangana) government that allotted public land at basic rates to a select class of persons – MPs, MLAs, All India Services officers, judges of the Supreme Court and High Courts, and journalists – through cooperative societies. The petitioners challenged the constitutional validity of these GoMs, arguing that the classification was arbitrary, capricious and violated Article 14’s guarantee of equality. The Supreme Court examined whether the State could exercise absolute discretion in policy making and land allocation, and applied the reasonable classification test and the doctrine of substantive equality. It also considered the applicability of res judicata and constructive res judicata, holding that the earlier judgments did not decide the constitutional validity of the challenged GoMs and therefore the principle did not bar the present challenge. The Court found that the classification lacked an intelligible differentia and rational nexus with the policy’s objective, amounted to manifest arbitrariness and violated substantive equality. Consequently, the Court quashed GoMs 243, 244 (2005) to the extent they created a separate class, and declared GoMs 419‑425 (2008) and 551 (2008) void as violative of Article 14, and ordered restitution to the cooperative societies.

Issues considered

Whether the State has absolute discretion to frame policy, allocate public land and enter contracts without judicial review
Whether the classification of MPs, MLAs, AIS officers, judges and journalists for concessional land allotment violates Article 14
Whether the principles of res judicata and constructive res judicata bar the present challenge to the GoMs
Whether the land‑allocation policy satisfies the two‑pronged test of reasonable classification and the doctrine of substantive equality
Whether the policy constitutes arbitrary and capricious exercise of state power

Legislation cited

Headnote

Issue for Consideration Issue arose that whether the Government, like any private individual, have the absolute discretion to frame policy, distribute resources and enter into a contract with whomsoever it pleases, on any terms and conditions it – Land allocation policy – Distribution of State largesse – State distributing public land in the State of Telangana – Allotment of land parcels, vide several State Government Memoranda within the Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation limits through Cooperative Societies

Subjects

Absolute discretion to frame policyDistribution of resourcesState largesseState distributing public land in the State of TelanganaAllotment of land parcelsGreater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation limitsGoM Nos. 243 and 244 dated 28.02.2005GoM Nos. 420, 422 to 425 dated 25.03.2008GoM No. 551 dated 27.03.2008MPs, MLAs, AIS/State Government officers, Judges of the Constitutional Courts, and journalists classified as separate class for allotment of land at basic rateAllocation of land at basic rates to select privileged groupsCapricious and irrational approachDoctrine of manifest arbitrarinessGovernment servants, elected legislators, Judges in the Supreme Court and High Court, and prominent journalists do not belong to the “weaker” or per se deserving sections of the societyPreferential treatmentEroding trust in democratic institutionsSocietal hierarchiesFinancial ramificationsPublic exchequerAccredited journalistsFour pillars of democracyPolicy of the State GovernmentMalaise of unreasonableness and arbitrarinessColourable exercise of powerIllegal distribution of State resourcesTwo-pronged classification test coupled with arbitrarinessSubstantive equalityLand, finite and highly valuable resourceDensely populated urban areasAccess to land for housing and economic activitiesSystem of inequalityPublic trustPublic revenueJournalists as a separate classGovernment discretionEquality before lawReasonable classificationSubstantive equality testRestitution

Judgment

[2024] 11 S.C.R. 1366 : 2024 INSC 894

State of Andhra Pradesh and Others
v.
Dr. Rao, V.B.J. Chelikani and Others
(Civil Appeal No(s). 3791-3793 of 2011)
25 November 2024
[Sanjiv Khanna,* CJI and Dipankar Datta, JJ.]

Issue for Consideration
Issue arose that whether the Government, like any private
individual, have the absolute discretion to frame policy, distribute
resources and enter into a contract with whomsoever it pleases,
on any terms and conditions it so desires.

Headnotes†

Government policy – Land allocation policy – Distribution
of State largesse – State distributing public land in the
State of Telangana – Allotment of land parcels, vide several
State Government Memoranda within the Greater Hyderabad
Municipal Corporation limits through Cooperative Societies –
GoM Nos. 243 and 244 dated 28.02.2005; GoM Nos. 420, 422
to 425 dated 25.03.2008 and GoM No. 551 dated 27.03.2008
whereby MPs, MLAs, officers of the AIS/State Government,
Judges of the Constitutional Courts, and journalists classified
as a separate class for allotment of land at the basic rate –
Constitutional validity:
Held: GoM Nos. 243 and 244 dated 28.02.2005 quashed to
the extent they classify MPs, MLAs, officers of the AIS/State
Government, Judges of the Constitutional Courts, and journalists
as a separate class for allotment of land at the basic rate – GoM
Nos. 419, 420, 422 to 425 dated 25.03.2008, and GoM No. 551
dated 27.03.2008, declared bad in law, being violative of Art.14 –
Allocation of land at basic rates to select privileged groups reflects
a “capricious”, “irrational” and arbitrary approach – This policy of the
State Government, is an abuse of power meant to cater exclusively
to the affluent sections of the society, disapproving and rejecting
the equal right to allotment of the common citizen and the socio-
economically disadvantaged – Doctrine of manifest arbitrariness is

*Author
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 1367

State of Andhra Pradesh and Others v.
Dr. Rao, V.B.J. Chelikani and Others

applicable – Government servants, elected legislators, Judges in the
Supreme Court and High Court, and prominent journalists do not
belong to the “weaker” or per se deserving sections of the society,
warranting special State reservations/preferential treatment to land
allotment – When the government allocates land at discounted rates
to the privileged few, it engenders a system of inequality, conferring
upon them a material advantage that remains inaccessible to the
common citizen – This preferential treatment conveys practices
foster resentment and disillusionment among ordinary citizens, who
perceive these actions as corrupt or unjust, thereby eroding trust
in democratic institutions – This policy undermines solidarity and
fraternity, reinforcing societal hierarchies rather than actively working
to dismantle them – When land is offered at a discounted rate, it
distorts the natural market forces that govern the value of land –
This has severe financial ramifications for the public exchequer –
Furthermore, the accredited journalists cannot be treated as a
separate class for such preferential treatment – Core framework
of these policies suffers from the malaise of unreasonableness
and arbitrariness – It reeks of colourable exercise of power
whereby the policymakers are bestowing valuable resources to
their peers and ilk, triggering a cycle of illegal distribution of State
resources – Allotment policy fails to satisfy the requirements of the
two-pronged classification test coupled with arbitrariness – To test
the facts against the standards of substantive equality, the Judges
of the Supreme Court and the High Court, MPs, MLAs, officers of
the AIS, journalists etc. cannot be treated as a separate category
for allotment of land at a discounted basic value in preference to
others – Order of restitution passed and Cooperative Societies and
their members, entitled to refund of the entire amount deposited
by them, including stamp duty and registration fee, development
charges/expenses paid by them, along with interest – Constitution
of India – Art.14. [Paras 76, 77, 79, 80-83, 85-92, 94]

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – s.11 – Res Judicata and
constructive Res Judicata – Applicability – Plea of the
Cooperative Societies and its members that the principle of
res judicata and constructive res judicata would apply to the
instant case:
Held: Res judicata will not apply, as the previous judgment did
not examine the constitutional validity of GoM Nos. 243 and 244 –
1368 [2024] 11 S.C.R.

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GoM Nos. 420, 422 to 425 dated 25.03.2008 had not been issued
at the time the said judgment was pronounced and hence, could
never have been challenged – Plea of the Cooperative Societies
that the principle of constructive res judicata should apply to the
examination of the challenge to GOM Nos. 243 and 244, cannot be
accepted – Principles of constructive res judicata should not have
been applied, given the significant public interest at stake – Once
the allotments were cancelled and the writ petition was allowed,
the State had the opportunity to re-evaluate the entire issue in
light of the findings recorded – Members of the public cannot be
restrained in filing writ petition challenging GoM Nos. 243 and 244 –
Constructive res judicata applies only when the cause of action is
identical – Causes of action in the two litigation proceedings should
not be considered identical, as the first litigation focused on the
allotment and its terms and conditions – GoM Nos. 243 and 244
are separate and distinct from the allotment itself, and challenging
these notifications constitutes a separate and independent cause
of action. [Paras 35, 38, 39]

Constitution of India – Art.14 – Equality before law – Test of
reasonable classification – Concept of substantive equality –
Substantive equality test – Explained. [Paras 48, 52, 56, 59,
67, 68, 73, 74]

Case Law Cited
Forward Construction Company and Others v. Municipal Corporation
of Greater Bombay [1985] Supp. 3 SCR 766 : (1986) 1 SCC
100; State of Karnataka and Another v. All India Manufacturers
Organisation and Others [2006] Supp. 1 SCR 86 : (2006) 4 SCC
683; V. Purushotham Rao v. Union of India and Others [2001]
Supp. 4 SCR 411 : (2001) 10 SCC 305; National Confederation
of Officers Association of Central Public Sector Enterprises and
Others v. Union of India and Others [2021] 10 SCR 954 : (2022)
4 SCC 764; Rural Litigation and Entitlement Kendra v. State of
U.P. [1990] 3 SCR 72 : 1989 Supp (1) 504; Erusian Equipment
and Chemicals Ltd. v. State of West Bengal [1975] 2 SCR 674 :
(1975) 1 SCC 70; Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International
Airport Authority of India [1979] 3 SCR 1014 : (1979) 3 SCC 489;
Common Cause, A Registered Society v. Union of India [1996]
Supp. 9 SCR 296 : (1996) 6 SCC 530; Shrilekha Vidyarthi v. State
of Uttar Pradesh [1990] Supp. 1 SCR 625 : (1991) 1 SCC 212;
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 1369

State of Andhra Pradesh and Others v.
Dr. Rao, V.B.J. Chelikani and Others

Subramanian Swamy v. Director, Central Bureau of Investigation
[2014] 9 SCR 283 : (2014) 8 SCC 682; Ram Krishna Dalmia v.
Justice S.R. Tendolkar [1959] 1 SCR 279 : AIR 1958 SC 538;
Nagpur Improvement Trust v. Vithal Rao and Others [1973] 3 SCR
39 : (1973) 1 SCC 500; In Re: The Special Courts Bill, 1978 [1979]
2 SCR 476 : (1979) 1 SCC 380; State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali
Sarkar [1952] 1 SCR 284 : (1952) 1 SCC 1; Kathi Raning Rawat
v. State of Saurashtra [1952] 1 SCR 435 : (1952) 1 SCC 215;
State of Jammu and Kashmir v. Triloki Nath Khosa [1974] 1 SCR
771 : (1974) 1 SCC 19; Hiral P. Harsora and Others v. Kusum
Narottamdas Harsora and Others [2016] 9 SCR 515 : (2016) 10
SCC 165; Union of India v. N.S. Rathnam & Sons [2015] 8 SCR
751 : (2015) 10 SCC 681; LIC v. Consumer Education Centre
[1995] Supp. 1 SCR 349 : (1995) 5 SCC 482; Indian Council
for Legal Aid and Advice v. Bar Council of India [1995] 1 SCR
304 : (1995) 1 SCC 732; Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi
[1981] 2 SCR 79 : (1981) 1 SCC 722; A.L. Kalra v. Project and
Equipment Corporation of India Ltd [1984] 3 SCR 646 : (1984) 3
SCC 316, 328; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India [1978] 2 SCR
621 : (1978) 1 SCC 248; Shayara Bano v. Union of India [2017]
9 SCR 797 : (2017) 9 SCC 1; National Legal Services Authority
v. Union of India and Others [2014] 5 SCR 119 : (2014) 5 SCC
438; Navtej Johar v. Union of India [2018] 7 SCR 379 : (2018)
10 SCC 1; Lt. Col. Nitisha v. Union of India [2021] 4 SCR 633
: (2021) 15 SCC 125; Chiranjit Lal Chowdhuri v. Union of India
[1950] 1 SCR 869 : AIR 1951 SC 41; Anuj Garg and Others v.
Hotel Association of India and Others [2007] 12 SCR 991 : (2008)
3 SCC 1; E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu [1974] 2 SCR
348 : (1974) 4 SCC 3; Joseph Shine v. Union of India [2018]
11 SCR 765 : (2019) 3 SCC 39; Ram & Shyam Co. v. State of
Haryana [1985] Supp. 1 SCR 541 : (1985) 3 SCC 267; NOIDA
Entrepreneurs Association v. NOIDA and Others [2011] 8 SCR
25 : (2011) 6 SCC 508 – referred to.
Greenhalgh v. Mallard (1947) 2 All England Reporter 255 (CA);
Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia [1989] 1 SCR 143;
Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) [1999]
1 SCR 497; R. v. Kapp [2008] 2 SCR 483; Withler v. Canada
(Attorney General) [2011] 1 SCR 396; Quebec (Attorney General)
v. A [2012] 1 SCR 61; Fraser v. Canada (Attorney General) [2020]
3 SCR 113; Lawrence v. Texas, 539 US 558 – referred to.
1370 [2024] 11 S.C.R.

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Books and Periodicals Cited
Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Alienation of State Lands & Land
Revenue Rules, 1975; Sandra Fredman, “Substantive Equality
Revisited”, I.CON (2016), Vol. 14 No. 3, 712-738 – referred to.

List of Acts
Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Alienation of State Lands &
Land Revenue Rules, 1975; Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; Andhra
Pradesh (Telangana Area) Land Revenue Act, 1317F; Stamp Act,
1899; Assignment of House Sites in Villages & Towns in Telangana
Area Rules, 1975.

List of Keywords
Absolute discretion to frame policy; Distribution of resources; State
largesse; State distributing public land in the State of Telangana;
Allotment of land parcels; Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation
limits; GoM Nos. 243 and 244 dated 28.02.2005; GoM Nos. 420,
422 to 425 dated 25.03.2008; GoM No. 551 dated 27.03.2008; MPs,
MLAs, AIS/State Government officers, Judges of the Constitutional
Courts, and journalists classified as separate class for allotment
of land at basic rate; Allocation of land at basic rates to select
privileged groups; Capricious and irrational approach; Executive
action; Arbitrariness; Policy of the State Government; Abuse
of power; Affluent sections of the society; Right to allotment of
common citizen and socio-economically disadvantaged; Doctrine
of manifest arbitrariness; Arbitrariness inherent in land allocation
policy; State reservations to land allotment; Land, finite and highly
valuable resource; Densely populated urban areas; Access to
land for housing and economic activities; System of inequality;
Preferential treatment; Eroding trust in democratic institutions;
Societal hierarchies; Diminishes public revenue; Financial
ramifications; Public exchequer; Accredited journalists; Preferential
treatment; Higher echelons of three wings of the government,
legislators, bureaucrats; Judges of Supreme Court and High Courts;
Journalists; Fourth pillar of democracy; Distribution of extraordinary
State benefits; Healthy checks and balances within the democratic
system; Malaise of unreasonableness and arbitrariness; Colourable
exercise of power; Policymakers; Illegal distribution of State
resources; De facto trustees and agents/repositories; Allotment
policy; Two-pronged classification test coupled with arbitrariness;
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 1371

State of Andhra Pradesh and Others v.
Dr. Rao, V.B.J. Chelikani and Others

Standards of substantive equality; Allotment of land; Object of
policy perpetuates inequality; Promotes social-economic exclusion;
Small and privileged section/group; Equality and fairness standards;
Policy or law allotting land to public servants; Classification;
Substantive equality; Order of restitution; Cooperative Societies;
Refund of entire amount deposited; Stamp duty; Registration
fee; Development charges/expenses; Interest; Lease deeds; Res
Judicata; Constructive Res Judicata; Principles of constructive res
judicata; Public interest; Causes of action; Equality before law;
Test of reasonable classification; Concept of substantive equality;
Substantive equality test.

Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No(s). 3791-3793
of 2011
From the Judgment and Order dated 05.01.2010 of the High Court
of A.P. at Hyderabad in WP Nos. 7956, 7997 and 23682 of 2008
With
Civil Appeal Nos. 3794-3796, 3797-3799, 3800-3802, 3803, 3804-
3806, 3807-3809 and 3810 of 2011, Civil Appeal No. 13060 of 2024
and Contempt Petition (Civil) Nos. 1122-1124 of 2023 In Civil Appeal
Nos. 3797-3799 of 2011

Appearances for Parties
R. Venkataramani, AG, Tushar Mehta, SG, Tapesh Kumar Singh,
Sr. Adv./A.A.G., Dr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi, Raghenth Basant,
S.S. Prasad, Dr. Menaka Guruswamy, Rajshekhar Rao, Ms. Vibha
Dutta Makhija, Rajiv Dutta, Tapesh Kumar Singh, K. Ramakantha
Reddy, Sr. Advs., Ms. Devina Sehgal, Amit Bhandari, Ms. Somaya
Gupta, Praveen Kumar Singh, Ms. Priyansha Sharma, R.V.
Yogesh Venkata, Ms. Kaushitaki Sharma, Ms. Prerna Acharya,
Ms. Twinkle Rathi, M/s. Mclm & Co., Prashant Bhushan, Anurag
Tiwary, R. Nedumaran, Ms. C.K. Sucharita, Vinod Kumar Gupta,
Lavkesh Bhambhani, Utkarsh Pratap, Harshwardhan Thakur,
Chandan Kumar, Manoj C. Mishra, Pawan Sharma, Anuj Shah,
Ms. B. Vijayalakshmi Menon, M/s. Venkat Palwai Law Associates,
Ashutosh Srivastava, Ms. Abhipsa Mohanty, Rajeev Singh, Guntur
Prabhakar, Ranjan Mukherjee, Amit Pawan, K.V. Vijayakumar, S.
Thananjayan, Ms. K. Enatoli Sema, Ms. Limayinla Jamir, Amit
1372 [2024] 11 S.C.R.

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Kumar Singh, Ms. Chubalemla Chang, Prang Newmai, Kumar
Dushyant Singh, Siddharth Dutta, Ms. Subasri Jaganathan, Ms.
G. Indira, Abinash Kumar Mishra, T.V. Ratnam, S. Udaya Kumar
Sagar, Bijoy Kumar Jain, Ms. Promila, C.K. Sasi, Ms. Meena K
Poulose, B. Krishna Prasad, Raghvendra Kumar, Gopal Singh,
Amrish Kumar, Mrs. Swati Ghildiyal, Navanjay Mahapatra, Mrs.
Sonali Jain, Raman Yadav, Chitvan Singhal, Kartikay Aggarwal,
Abhishek Kumar Pandey, Sateesh Galla, C. Raghavendren, Ch.
Leela Sarveswar, Saurabh Gupta, N. Rajaraman, Ms. Lihzu Shiney
Konyak, Ms. Astha Sharma, Narendra Kumar, Shuvodeep Roy,
Kabir Shankar Bose, Saurabh Tripathi, Devashish Bharuka, Ms.
Komal Agarwal, Ms. Kavya Vijay, Ms. Ashtha Chaudhary, Umesh
Chandra Srivastava, Ms. Praseena Elizabeth Joseph, Ms. Tulika
Mukherjee, Beenu Sharma, Venkat Narayan, Rushab Aggarwal,
Pashupathi Nath Razdan, Astik Gupta, Ms. Riddhima J Aggarwal,
Japnish Singh Bhatia, D. Abhinav Rao, Mahfooz Ahsan Nazki,
Polanki Gowtham, K.V. Girish Chowdary, T. Vijaya Bhaskar Reddy,
Ms. Rajeswari Mukherjee, Meeran Maqbool, Ms. Archita Nigam, R.
Ravi, Manish Dua, Somanatha Padhan, G. Sheshagiri Rao, Ms.
Anu Gupta, Azmat H. Amanullah, Tirupati Gaurav Shahi, Avijit Mani
Tripathi, T.K. Nayak, Advs. for the appearing parties.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

Sanjiv Khanna, CJI
Leave granted in Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 19838 of 2010.
2. This common judgment decides the cross appeals which impugn
the judgment dated 05.01.2010, of the Division Bench of the High
Court of Andhra Pradesh in Writ Petition Nos. 7956, 7997, and
23682 of 2008. These Writ Petitions challenged the allotment of
land parcels, vide several State Government Memoranda,1 within
the Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation limits. The land was
allocated to Cooperative Societies composed of members of various
groups, including Members of Parliament,2 Members of both houses

1 For short, “GoM”.
2 For short, “MP”.
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 1373

State of Andhra Pradesh and Others v.
Dr. Rao, V.B.J. Chelikani and Others

of the State Legislature,3 officers of All India Services,4 Judges of
the Supreme Court and High Court,5 State Government employees,
defence personnel, journalists and individuals from weaker sections
of society.
3. The High Court, in the impugned judgment, has partly allowed the
Writ Petitions, quashing the GoMs that laid down the allotment
policy and facilitate the allotments to the Cooperative Societies. It
held that the parcels of land allotted to the respondents were to be
restored to the Government, and that fresh allotments can only be
made following the issuance of appropriate GoMs consistent with the
judgment. The High Court further directed that before such GoMs
are issued, the State shall call for details of members who meet the
eligibility criteria; ensure they sign affidavits declaring their eligibility;
and publish this information on its website for public access. Any
false declaration will result in cancellation of the allotment, and
initiation of civil and criminal proceedings.
4. While the Cooperative Societies, their members, and the State of
Telangana6 have preferred appeals contesting these directions, Mr.
Keshav Rao Jadhav, the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 23682/2008,
has filed a cross-appeal. Mr. Keshav Rao Jadhav prays that
preferential allotment of land – particularly at basic rates – to MLAs,
MPs, journalists, officers of the AIS and Judges, is illegal, arbitrary
and unconstitutional, as it violates the right to equality guaranteed
under Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

Facts of the Case
5. On 28.02.2005, the Government of Andhra Pradesh issued three
GoMs – Nos. 242, 243 and 244. GoM No. 242 established a
comprehensive policy for managing land resources and housing in
urban and semi-urban areas. GoM No. 243 outlined categories of
individuals eligible for land allotment, while GoM No. 244 provided
guidelines for this process.

3 For short, “MLA”.
4 For short, “AIS”.
5 We note that while the Judges of the Supreme Court and High Court have withdrawn their claims and
are not seeking allotment, we have addressed their category for the purpose of tackling the legal issue
arising out of allotment made under GoM No. 243.
6 Refer to the order dated 30.03.2016 passed by this Court, giving directions for amendment in the Cause
Title.
1374 [2024] 11 S.C.R.

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6. GoM No. 242 emphasized the urgent need for prudent management
of land resources in urban and semi-urban areas due to rising
urbanization and increasing demand for housing. Due to growing
urbanisation, demand for land for housing purposes has surged.
It highlighted the challenges faced by the working middle class,
as private developers often artificially inflate land prices, making it
difficult for them to secure plots. Recognizing that providing shelter is
a top priority for the State, the Government had previously formulated
a housing scheme for the poor. However, there was no fixed policy
catering to “other deserving sections” of the society. Consequently,
the Government decided that a comprehensive policy was necessary,
leading to the issuance of GoM No. 242. Key stipulations of the
GoM include:
• Creation of a land bank, source-pooled for allotment to various
housing Cooperative Societies and other target groups.
• The source of the land bank would consist of land located in
and around 120 municipalities with clear titles.
• The land would be within a radius of 25 kilometres for Category
“A” municipalities, 15 kilometres for Category “B” municipalities
and 10 kilometres for Category “C” municipalities.
• Government land available with various departments which was
not being used for specified categories such as Horticulture,
Agriculture, Roads and Buildings amongst other categories,
was also to be subsumed and put in the land bank.
• Surplus ceiling land, endowment lands and private lands that
had been acquired were to also form a part of the land pool.
• Revenue department was responsible for collecting details
of large chunks of available land which would fall in the said
categories.
• The Collector and District Magistrate was nominated as the
Competent Authority for transfer of the government land to
the land bank in consultation with concerned government
departments.
• The Collector and District Magistrate would also be competent
to acquire private land for public purposes, after examining
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 1375

State of Andhra Pradesh and Others v.
Dr. Rao, V.B.J. Chelikani and Others

the demand and after consulting the agencies in-charge of
the land bank.
• Each category of land was to be treated as a distinct entity till
the same was alienated to the applicant. The objective was to
plough back the cost of land acquisition.
• The Empowered Committee chaired by the Chief Commissioner
of Land Administration and comprising five members was vested
with the power to decide allotment of the land, its apportionment
and its use, based upon the hierarchy of needs, and submit
proposals to the Government.
• The designated officers who would be the members of the
Empowered Committee, while recommending allotment of land
in favour of the Cooperative Societies, would also recommend
the price to be fixed for the land proposed for allotment.
• The recommended price was to be fixed after taking into account
the acquisition cost of land, activity of the beneficiary institution
and demand for the land.
• Separate orders were to be issued on the methodology to be
adopted for selecting the housing society/institution for allotment
of land from the land bank; deciding conditions of allotment;
and ownership rights.
7. On 28.02.2005, GoM No. 243 was also issued. It stated that land
from the land bank could be allotted for housing and institutional
purposes. For housing, the Government encouraged allocation of
land for independent housing sites in areas where such housing
schemes were prevalent, and for the construction of flats in regions
where flats were established. The key stipulations of the GoM are
outlined below:
• The Government might alienate lands, preferably for construction
of flats in view of land scarcity, in the Municipal Corporation
of Hyderabad, Warangal, Vijayawada, Guntur, Rajahmundry,
Visakhapatnam, Kurnool and Nellore.
• Land was not to be allotted to individual beneficiaries, but to
groups or Cooperative Societies of which the beneficiaries
would be members.
1376 [2024] 11 S.C.R.

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• A Cooperative Society or group was to have a minimum of 12
eligible members.
• The applications for allotment of flat/housing site were to be
made to the Collector and District Magistrate, who in turn
had to obtain necessary approval for land allotment from the
Empowered Committee and the Government.
• The Collector was to be nominated as the Nodal Authority and
was tasked with the duty to make the Scheme operational.
• For allotment of the land to institutions, the Collector was to
submit the proposal to the Empowered Committee.
• The allotment for the Cooperative Societies comprising Judges,
MPs, MLAs, officers of the AIS, officers of the Andhra Pradesh
cadre, officers of other State cadres who were natives of
Andhra Pradesh and who had worked on deputation with the
Andhra Pradesh Government, officers of the Government of
Andhra Pradesh, and journalists, would be in satellite towns
of Hyderabad and Ranga Reddy districts.
• The lands located in prime locations would only be allotted to
government organisations for public purposes or for institutional
use.
• Government lands located in the proposed Outer Ring Road
would not be allotted for housing sites for group of individuals
or Cooperative Housing Societies.
• The Cooperative Society or group concerned which would be
allotted land by the Government, shall further allot individual
housing sites/flats to its individual members.
• Land would be allotted without any development, which had to
be undertaken by the Cooperative Society or group.
• Time limit fixed for the completion of development of land and
infrastructure facilities (road, water supply, electricity etc.) was
one year from the date of alienation of land, failing which the
land would be repossessed by the government.
• Cost and categorisation of sections of the society was prescribed
in the following manner:
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 1377

State of Andhra Pradesh and Others v.
Dr. Rao, V.B.J. Chelikani and Others

“CATEGORISATION FOR PRICING:
i) MLAs, MPs, Judges of Supreme Court and High
Court, All India Services Officers.
ii) Accredited Journalists from recognized and
registered newspapers.
iii) State Government Employees and Panchayat
Raj Teachers working in the State of Andhra
Pradesh.
iv) Recognised National and International Sports
persons and eminent persons in the field of
Culture and Arts.
v) Defence Employees, Central Government
employees and employees of PSUs.
vi) Widows of Kargil and other war heroes and
extremist violence who are hailing from Andhra
Pradesh.
vii) Weaker Sections.
viii) Institutions - Educational/Charitable/Religious
etc.,
The land shall be allotted to the categories figuring
at Sl. No. i to iv at the basic value of the land; for
category v and viii at prevailing market value; for
category vi on free of cost and for category vii as per
the policy of the Government in vogue. The acquired
land shall be alienated on cost basis, which means
that the actual cost paid to the landowners shall be
fixed as cost of land.”
• The following conditions of allotment were laid down:
o The Cooperative Society/group would ensure that its
members were seeking allotment of land for the first time.
o All the members were to file an affidavit stating that they
had not received benefit of concessional allotment from
the government earlier, nor were they a member of any
Cooperative Society/group to which concessional allotment
had been made earlier.
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o The members would also give an undertaking that they
would not avail of such facility in the future.
o Allotment process had to be completed within six months
from the date of alienation of land.
o The allottee/beneficiary would have to complete the
development within a period of two years from the date
of allotment by the Cooperative Society/group.
o The beneficiary/allottee would not have any right to sell
the property allotted for a period of 15 years.
o The Cooperative Societies/groups were restricted from
allotting open spaces in the layout or making changes in
the layout without approval of the Competent Authority.
o In satellite townships being developed by the urban
development agencies in Hyderabad and Ranga Reddy
districts, certain categories of persons, such as Class IV
Employees, NGOs etc., who may not be in a position make
an investment for buying a plot, would be considered for
allotment of housing sites at an appropriate rate.
o However, the conditions for allotment in respect of
government employees would be issued separately.
• The Supreme Court and High Court Judges, MLAs, MPs, and
officers of AIS would be allotted plots of 500 square yards.
• Government employees would be allotted plots of 100-400
square yards.
• Journalists would be allotted plots of 300 square yards.
• The Cooperative Society/group would decide whether they
would like to build the houses themselves or would like to avail
assistance of Andhra Pradesh Housing Board.
8. On 28.02.2005, GoM No. 244 was also issued, whose key stipulations
read:
• The Collector would be the Nodal Authority to make the scheme
operational and would be competent to allot the land to the
Cooperative Society or the group.
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 1379

State of Andhra Pradesh and Others v.
Dr. Rao, V.B.J. Chelikani and Others

• The Collector would monitor implementation of the scheme very
closely and send a monthly progress report to the Government.
• The Government would alienate land to the Cooperative Society
or the group, which would in turn convey the title of the plot/flat
to the members through a registered sale deed.
• Following conditions of allotment were laid down:
o The employee must be a member of the Cooperative
Society or the group.
o To facilitate the Cooperative Society to arrive at an
estimation of the land required, they were advised to
complete the admission of its members before making an
application to the authorities.
o Where some employees did not form part of an existing
society, they could form a separate Cooperative Society/
group and make a request for allotment.
o The Cooperative Societies/groups would not allot housing
sites/flats to any other member whose name did not figure
in the application submitted to the Competent Authority.
o The employee would have to be an approved probationer
in service of the Government or local body, who has
completed a minimum of five years in service.
o Only one housing site/flat would be allotted to a particular
government servant.
o If both the husband and wife were in government service,
they would be eligible for allotment of only one housing
site/flat.
o The allotment of the housing site/flat was to be completed
within six months from the date of alienation of the land.
o The allotment of house site/flat would be done by draw
of lots.
o The Cooperative Societies/group would complete
construction on the allotted land within two years from
the date of allotment.
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o Construction would be done directly or through the Housing
Board or through any other agency as mutually agreed
upon by the members.
o The employee who was once allotted a housing site/flat
would not be permitted to sell the same for a period of
15 years.
o The society would not allot open spaces indicated in the
layout or change the layout without the approval of the
Competent Authority.
o The allotment of housing site/flat would be recorded in the
service book of the employee.
o The employee would be entitled for concessional allotment
of land only once during the period of service.
o Members of the Cooperative Society would have to file an
affidavit stating that they had not received the benefit of
concessional allotment earlier, nor were they a member
of a society to which concessional allotment of land had
been made earlier.
o All members would have to furnish an undertaking stating
that they would not avail of such facilities in the future.
o Indian Administrative Service,7 Indian Police Service,8
and Indian Foreign Service9 officers belonging to Andhra
Pradesh cadre would be entitled to a plot size of 500
square yards.
o Non-cadre Head of Departments, Fourth Level Gazetted
Officers and above were entitled to a plot size of 400
square yards.
o Second and Third Level Gazetted Officers were entitled
to a plot size of 300 square yards.
o First Level Gazetted Officers were entitled to a plot size
of 250 square yards.

7 For short, “IAS”.
8 For short, “IPS”.
9 For short, “IFS”.
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 1381

State of Andhra Pradesh and Others v.
Dr. Rao, V.B.J. Chelikani and Others

o Superintendents, Assistant Section Officers, Senior
Assistants, Telephone Operators, LD Stenos, TCAs, Junior
Assistants, etc. and persons holding equivalent posts were
entitled to a plot size of 175 square yards.
o Attenders, Record Assistants, drivers, etc., and persons
holding equivalent posts were entitled to plot size of 100
square yards.
o In case sufficient land was not available, Category 1
officers, namely, those belonging to IAS, IPS and IFS were
to retain the mentioned plot size of 500 square yards, but
there would be a reduction of plot size in terms of ratio of
4 : 3 : 2.5 : 1.75 : 1 for Categories 2 to 5.
9. Thereafter, on 04.05.2006, the Government of Andhra Pradesh issued
GoM No. 522. The GoM stated that based upon representations
from various individuals or groups i.e., Judges of the High Court,
MLAs, MPs, officers of the AIS, people of eminence and journalists,
the Collector of Ranga Reddy District had proposed allotment of
government land for housing purpose on payment of basic value
through the Chief Commissioner of Land Administration, Hyderabad.
The Government, after careful examination of the proposal, had
directed allotment of government land to the extent of 245 acres
in villages of Ranga Reddy District in favour of Judges of the
High Court, MLAs, MPs, serving left over officers of pre-1989 AIS
batches, AIS officers serving since 1989, serving AIS officers of
other cadre with Andhra Pradesh nativity, people of eminence and
working journalists, as a one-time benefit as per their eligibility.
The allotment was made in relaxation of the order issued in GoM
No. 243 dated 28.02.2005, subject to the guidelines and filing of
affidavit proforma 1 and 2 appended to the order. The stipulations
of the GoM were:-
• 72 acres of land was to be allotted in Survey No. 276 of
Puppalaguda Village, Rajendranagar Mandal to the MLAs and
MPs.
• 38 acres of land was to be allotted in Survey No. 149 of
Nanakramguda Village, Rajendranagar Mandal in favour of
Judges, people of eminence, and serving left over officers of
pre-1989 AIS batches.
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• 32 acres of land was to be allotted in Survey No. 454/1 of
Puppalaguda Village, Rajendranagar Mandal in favour of serving
post-1989 AIS officers and serving AIS officers of other cadre
with Andhra Pradesh nativity who are working or had worked
on deputation in Andhra Pradesh.
• 33 acres of land was to be allotted in Survey No. 132 of
Vattinagulapalli Village to AIS officers serving post 1989, in the
order of seniority.
• 32 acres of land was to be allotted in Survey No. 332 of Nizampet
Village and 38 acres of land was to be allotted in Survey No.
35/2 of Pet Basheerabad Village to media persons.
• Judges of the High Court, MPs, MLAs, serving AIS officers and
persons of eminence were to be allotted plots of 500 square
yards.
• Former members of the Legislative Assembly, their widows and
working journalists were to be allotted plots of 300 square yards.
• The land was to be allotted to Hyderabad Urban Development
Authority,10 which in turn would develop layouts in the five
blocks at the respective locations for allotment of housing sites
to individuals.
• Advance possession of the land would be given to HUDA.
• HUDA will commence work from its own reserves. Each allottee
would reimburse the said amount to HUDA as per the time
schedule fixed.
• Format of the townships was to be based on the gated community
concept.
• Appendix to the GoM stated that the allotment to the members
of Legislature, Judiciary, Executive and the press was a one-time
beneficial measure, irrespective of any other private ownership
of land, to ensure equity and to avoid discrimination.
• The appendix laid down the details including approximate
number of housing sites etc. with stipulation regarding the size
of the plots which would be allotted.

10 For short, “HUDA”.
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 1383

State of Andhra Pradesh and Others v.
Dr. Rao, V.B.J. Chelikani and Others

• The general conditions of eligibility read:
o Members of the categories listed at serial no. 3 to 6 under
item 1, i.e. Judges of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh,
AIS officers, persons of eminence and journalists, should
not have availed any benefit of allotment of land in the
cities of Hyderabad, Secunderabad, and Ranga Reddy
district or any other district.
o All the sitting MLAs and MPs were to be given a plot,
provided they did not have a house or housing site in
Hyderabad or Secunderabad.
o All eligible persons who were being allotted the land
would have to file an affidavit agreeing to the conditions
and stipulations.
o No person who was allotted a plot shall alienate or transfer
it using the instrument of General Power of Attorney11 within
a period of 10 years from the date of allotment.
• Committees and sub-committees were formed to process
allotment applications.
• Government would allot land to HUDA at the basic rate, and
as already noted above, HUDA would develop layouts in the
five blocks at the respective locations.
• The allottees were to pay the actual cost of the plot, i.e., the
basic value plus cost of development, as worked out by HUDA,
in three equal instalments, within six months from the date of
allotment.
• The plot will not be handed over and registered till full payment
is made by the allottee to HUDA.
• In case of default, the Screening Committee could recommend
the Government to delete such names from the list.
• Construction of houses was to commence within a period of two
years from the date of handing over the plot to the individual
allottee.

11 For short, “GPA”.
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10. GoM No. 522 dated 04.05.2006, was challenged by Mr. V.S. Bose,
Dr. Rao V.B.J. Chelikani and Mr. O.M. Debara in the High Court in
Writ Petition No. 13730 of 2006. It was submitted that:
• Land worth Rs. 700 crores was sought to be allotted to the
specified categories at a throw-away price compared to the
market value.
• The government, as a trustee of the public land, cannot dispose
of land except by way of a policy which was consistent with
Articles 14, 38 and 39(d) of the Constitution of India.
• Majority of the beneficiaries were affluent persons with good
social standing.
• Land prices have escalated substantially and hence, land
allotment at basic value without auction was detrimental to
public interest.
• There was no rational basis or object which was sought to be
achieved through such a land allotment policy.
• Lastly, there was no justification for allotting the land to preferred
individuals at a fraction of the market value.
• GoM No. 243 had completely prohibited allotment of land to
individuals who had already received benefit of concessional
allotment from the Government. This requirement was deleted/
removed through GoM No. 522. The policy also permitted
allotment of land to those who own or possess land in their own
name or in the name of their spouse or children. Reference
was made to the amendment made vide GoM No. 1424 dated
28.09.2006.
11. The Writ Petition was allowed by judgment dated 08.10.2007. At
the outset, we must notice that the judgment of the Division Bench
specifically recorded that the petitioners therein had not questioned
the vires of GoM Nos. 242, 243 and 244, which established the
policy, categories, and guidelines for land allocation. Therefore, the
validity of these GoMs was not examined. The focus of the Writ
Petition concerning GoM No. 522 was the relaxation of conditions
which had been prescribed in the earlier GoMs.
12. The High Court referred to Rules 3 and 10 of the Andhra Pradesh
(Telangana Area) Alienation of State Lands & Land Revenue
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 1385

State of Andhra Pradesh and Others v.
Dr. Rao, V.B.J. Chelikani and Others

Rules, 1975, 12 which pertain to the alienation of land to local
authorities. The Court recorded that according to the 1975 Rules,
land acquired by the State could be alienated to a local body/
authority for unremunerative public purposes without charging a
price. However, when the land was to be allocated for remunerative
public purposes or to private entities, it could only be done at
market value. Rule 10 allows the Government to deviate from the
established procedures. However, any such deviation must follow
a reasonable process for land alienation, including auction, where
such alienation/sale is deemed necessary.
13. The Court noted that a reading of GoM No. 522 made it clear that it
relaxed the conditions of GoM No. 243, with the intent of providing
undue benefits to individuals who would not otherwise qualify for
land allotment under GoM No. 243. The relaxation was made in
favour of (i) Sitting and former MLAs, including widows of deceased
MLAs; (ii) Sitting MPs from Andhra Pradesh in Lok Sabha and Rajya
Sabha; (iii) Judges of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh; (iv) AIS
officers; (v) Persons of eminence and (vi) Journalists. There was
no justification for allotting land to these categories of persons by
relaxing conditions, to make them eligible for allotment of land even
if they had a house in their name, or in the name of their spouse or
children, or had earlier been allotted a plot of land at a concessional
rate, provided they did not have any house in the cities of Hyderabad
or Secunderabad. The Appendix to GoM No. 522, which lists the
categories of beneficiaries entitled to the relaxation, only states that
the allotment to such categories was done irrespective of their private
possessions, in order to “ensure equity and avoid discrimination”. The
Court found no plausible reason for relaxing the restrictions outlined
in GoM No. 243, stating that the revised policy under GoM No. 522
was contrary to public interest and it favoured certain individuals at
the cost of the public exchequer. The State was unjustifiably giving
the benefit of concessional land allotment to some affluent persons,
who had no pressing need for housing sites, while depriving the
persons who were genuinely in need of a housing plot. Further, the
State was also losing out on a substantial amount of revenue that
it could have generated by duly auctioning the Government land
instead of allotting it at such low rates.

12 For short, “1975 Rules”.
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14. The Court held that the principle of equality had been undermined by
the policy. GoM No. 1424, dated 28.09.2006, was deemed consistent
with GoM No. 243, with the stipulation that the restrictions outlined in
GoM No. 243 would apply to land allotted by the Cooperative Society
to its members. The High Court held that the Government would
be well advised to impose additional restrictions against allotments
to individuals who owned a house in their name or that of their
spouse or children, and this recommendation should apply to the
allotments made to Respondent No. 4 therein. The directive of the
High Court did not preclude the Government from making allotments
in accordance with the policy under GoM No. 243. It was also open
for the identified category of individuals to form a new society and
submit the necessary registration applications.
15. Following this judgment, the State of Andhra Pradesh issued six
GoMs (Nos. 419 to 425), all dated 25.03.2008, although GoM
No. 421 was later rescinded. GoM No. 419 states that, based on
representations from the four wings—Legislature, Judiciary, Executive,
and Media—land allotments for housing sites had been made under
GoM No. 522, albeit the same was subsequently struck down by the
High Court on 08.10.2007. The Court had directed the Government
that it would be well advised to incorporate additional restrictions
for those who owned a house or housing site in their name or that
of their spouse or children.
16. In issuing GoM No. 1424, which allocated land for Respondent No.
4 therein, the Government confirmed that all restrictions in GoM
No. 243 would apply to those allotments. The Government decided
to accept and implement the order of the High Court and to allot
housing sites to members and societies according to GoM Nos.
242, 243, and 244. Consequently, 3.25 acres of government land in
Puppalaguda Village, Rajendranagar Mandal, Ranga Reddy District,
was earmarked for allotment to Uday Civil Services Cooperative
Mutually Aided House Building Society, specifically for AIS officers
with Andhra Pradesh nativity and those who had worked or were
working in the State for at least three years.
17. The allotment was to be done at the basic value of land per acre as
on 04.05.2006, for housing purposes. Conditions specified in GoM
No. 419 included adherence to the policies outlined in GoM Nos.
242, 243, and 244. Members who had received any prior allotment
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 1387

State of Andhra Pradesh and Others v.
Dr. Rao, V.B.J. Chelikani and Others

at a concessional rate, either directly or through a society, would
not be eligible. Members in service as on 29.04.2006, would qualify,
and in cases where both spouses were employed, only one would
be eligible. Development of the land would be carried out by the
Cooperative Society or a designated agency, adhering to applicable
zoning regulations. Each member was eligible for a plot of 500 square
yards, and no allottee could transfer or dispose of the land via GPA
for a period of ten years from the date of allotment. Allotments were
to be made within six months of the alienation date. A member who
was allotted a housing site was to complete the construction of the
house within a period of two years. Affidavit would be furnished by
every allottee on a non-judicial stamp paper in accordance with the
prescribed format.
18. On similar terms and conditions, vide GoM No. 420, an allotment
of 72 acres of land in Puppalaguda Village, Rajendranagar Mandal,
Ranga Reddy district, was made to Indira Legislators Mutually Aided
Cooperative Housing Society Limited on the basic value of land. It
was further stipulated that MLAs and MPs who have previously been
allotted a housing site on a concessional rate, either directly or as
party of any society, would not be eligible for allotment.
19. GoM No. 422 provided for allotment of 48.15 acres of land in
Puppalaguda Village, Rajendranagar Mandal, Ranga Reddy District to
Adarshnagar Mutually Aided Cooperative Housing Society on payment
of the basic value of land per acre as on 04.05.2006 on the same
terms and conditions. Allotment of 16 acres of land at Nanakramguda
Village, Serilingapalli Mandal, Ranga Reddy District, was made in
favour of Koh-Ei-Noor Civil Services MACHSL, Hyderabad Officers
of AIS pre-1989 service, vide GoM No. 423 on payment of the basic
value of land per acre on 04.05.2006 on similar terms. GoM No. 424
was for allotment of 32 acres in village Nizampet and 38 acres in Pet
Basheerabad village in Qutubullapur Mandal, Ranga Reddy District
in favour of Jawaharlal Nehru Journalists Mutually Aided Cooperative
Housing Society Limited on payment of the basic value of land per
acre as existing on 04.05.2006. However, in this case, each member
was eligible for 300 square yards of land. Other terms and conditions
were the same. GoM No. 425 refers to three letters – two letters
written by the Collector, Ranga Reddy District and one by the Chief
Commissioner of Land Administration, Hyderabad, furnishing the
Collector’s proposal, which reported the requisition made by the Indian
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Revenue Service Officers Housing Society for allotment of 50 acres
of Government land for housing purposes in Puppalaguda Village,
Rajendranagar Mandal. The Government had carefully considered
the proposal and had agreed to allot 30 acres of land in Gopannapalli
Village, Serilingampally Mandal, Ranga Reddy District in favour of
Indian Revenue Service13 Officers (Income Tax) Housing Society on
payment of the basic value. The conditions relating to the basic value
on allotment within Outer Ring Road project prescribed in GoM No.
243 were relaxed in favour of the Cooperative Society. The terms and
conditions fixed as per the annexure stipulate that the IRS officers
should be natives of Andhra Pradesh, working in Andhra Pradesh or
any other part of the country. In case of non-Andhra IRS Officers, one
should have worked a minimum of 5 years in Andhra Pradesh and
should be serving in Andhra Pradesh as on 01.01.2008. If not a native
of Andhra Pradesh, one should have declared any place in Andhra
Pradesh as his hometown/place of settlement after retirement, through
a formal declaration to Income Tax Department. Each eligible member
was to be allotted 500 square yards. A member already allotted land
by any other government was not eligible. An allottee was not entitled
to alienate/transfer/dispose of the land using the instrument of GPA
for a period of 10 years from the date of allotment. Through GoM No.
451 dated 27.03.2008, land was allotted to A.P. S.P. MACHS Ltd. to
the extent of 21 acres, on somewhat identical terms.
20. After the said notification was issued, the three Writ Petitions
mentioned in paragraph 1 above were filed. The lead Writ Petition
No. 7956/2008 was filed by Dr. Rao V.B.J. Chelikani who was also
a co-petitioner in the first Writ Petition No. 13730/2006. In addition,
M/s Campaign for Housing and Tenural Rights (CHATRI) filed Writ
Petition No. 7997/2008 and Mr. Keshav Rao Jadhav filed Writ Petition
No. 23682/2008. It may be relevant to reproduce the prayers made
in the Writ Petitions, which read:
“Petition Under Article 226 of the Constitution of India
praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit
filed herein the High Court will be pleased to issue a writ,
order or direction more particularly one in the nature of
writ of Mandamus declaring G.O.Ms. No.419 to 425 &

13 For short, “IRS”.
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 1389

State of Andhra Pradesh and Others v.
Dr. Rao, V.B.J. Chelikani and Others

551 Revenue (ASN.V) Department dated 25.3.2008 &
dated 27.3.2008 respectively issued by 1st respondent
as illegal, arbitrary, unconstitutional, without jurisdiction,
void ab initio and violative of petitioners fundamental
rights guaranteed under article 14 orders dated 8.10.2007
in W.P.No.13730 passed by the Hon’ble High Court and
consequently to set-aside the same and to pass such
other order or orders.

xx xx xx
Petition Under Article 226 of the Constitution of India
praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit
filed herein the High Court will be pleased to issue a writ,
order or, direction more particularly one in the nature of
writ of Mandamus declaring the
i) G.O.Ms. No.243, 28.2.2005 issued by the 1st
respondent providing for the allotment of land to
persons categorized in Sl. Nos. i to V & Vii detailed
therein.
ii) G.O.Ms. No.244 dated 28.2.2005 issued laying
guidelines for allotment of land to Govt. of Employees
and the methodology ·therefor including the entitlement
to varying extents of land and
iii) The consequential allotment. of lands to the respondents
4 to 11 vide the impugned to G.O.Ms. No.419 to 425
dt.25.3.2008 and G.O.Ms. No.551 dt.27.3.2008 as
arbitrary unreasonable opposed to public interest
of violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India
being contrary to the Judgment of this Hon’ble Court
in W.P.No.13730 of 2006 dt.8.10.2007 and also Rule
10(a) of the A.P. Telangana Area Revenue Rules
and to set aside same and consequently direct
the respondents to forthwith forbear from acting in
pursuance of the impugned policy and pass such
other order or orders as are deemed fit and proper
in the facts and circumstances of the case.

xx xx xx
1390 [2024] 11 S.C.R.

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Petition Under Article 226 of the Constitution of India
praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit
filed herein the High Court will be pleased to issue
a writ, order or direction more particularly one in the
nature of writ of Mandamus declaring the
iv) G.O.Ms. No.243, 28.2.2005 issued by the 181
respondent providing for the allotment of land to
persons categorized in Sl.Nos. i to V & Vii detailed
therein.
v) G.O.Ms. No.244 dated 28.2.2005 issued laying
guidelines for allotment of land to Govt. of Employees
and the methodology therefor including the entitlement
to varying extents of land and,
vi) The consequential allotment of lands to the
respondents 4 to 11 vide the impugned to G.O. Ms.
No.419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425 dt.27th March,
2008 and all the consequential actions including the
execution the execution of the sale deeds. as arbitrary,
unreasonable, opposed to public interest, violative of
Article 14 of the Constitution of India, being contrary to
the Judgment of this Hon’ble Court in W.P. No.13730
of 2006 dt.8.10.2007 and the provisions of the A.P.
Telangana Area Land Revenue Act, 1317 Fasli and
the Rules made thereunder and set aside same and
consequently direct the respondents to forthwith
forbear from acting in pursuance of the impugned
policy and pass such other or orders.”
21. The housing Cooperative Societies were also made parties to the
said Writ Petitions. In Writ Petition No. 7956/2008, the petitioner
prayed for striking down GoM Nos. 419 to 425 dated 25.03.2008
and GoM No. 551 dated 27.03.2008, as being illegal, arbitrary,
unconstitutional, without jurisdiction, void ab initio and being in
violation of the fundamental rights and the judgment of the High
Court dated 08.10.2007 in Writ Petition No. 13730 of 2006. However,
in the Writ Petition filed by M/s Campaign for Housing and Tenural
Rights (CHATRI) and Keshav Rao Jadhav, the petitioners prayed
for setting aside the categorisation and guidelines of the policy
itself, as envisaged under GoM No. 243 and GoM No. 244 dated
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 1391

State of Andhra Pradesh and Others v.
Dr. Rao, V.B.J. Chelikani and Others

28.02.2005, along with striking down the consequential allotment
of lands to Respondent Nos. 4 to 11 vide GoM Nos. 419 to 425
dated 25.03.2008 and GoM No. 551 dated 27.03.2008. All the
above GoMs were challenged as being arbitrary and opposed to
public interest, as well as violative of Article 14 of the Constitution
of India and being contrary to the judgment dated 08.10.2007, in
Writ Petition 13730/2006. Reference was also made to Rule 10 (a)
of the 1975 Rules.

Impugned Judgment
22. The High Court rejected the preliminary submission made by the
Respondents on the principle of res judicata in the second round
of litigation. However, the Court held that principles of constructive
res judicata would apply, emphasizing that the petitioners in Writ
Petition No. 13730/2006 should also have challenged GoM Nos.
243 and 244. Reference was made to the judgments of this Court
in Forward Construction Company and Others v. Municipal
Corporation of Greater Bombay,14 and State of Karnataka and
Another v. All India Manufacturers Organisation and Others,15
stating that in public interest litigations, when Writ Petitions are filed
on identical grounds, the principles of res judicata and constructive
res judicata are applicable.
23. The question of locus standi was decided in favour of the petitioners,
who were recognized as public-spirited individuals espousing a public
cause. The High Court held that the petitioners could legitimately
claim that the measures for land allotment concern not only them
but also the public at large. The plea of laches was dismissed, as
the fresh allotment made after the judgment dated 08.10.2007, in
Writ Petition 13730/2006, constituted a fresh cause of action. The
Court further stated that the Writ Petitions acted as a class action.
24. Regarding the validity of GoM Nos. 419, 420, and 422 to 425, the
High Court noted that the earlier decision dated 08.10.2007, in Writ
Petition 13730/2006, had outlined restrictions on land allotment for
individuals who had already received similar government concessions,
either directly or through Cooperative Societies. Contrary to the

14 [1985] Supp. 3 SCR 766 : (1986) 1 SCC 100
15 [2006] Supp. (1) SCR 86 : (2006) 4 SCC 683
1392 [2024] 11 S.C.R.

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Respondents’ claims, the Division Bench did not leave the final
decision solely to the Government. It observed that the new GoM
Nos. 419 to 425 failed to bar allotment to individuals who already
owned land in their own name or that of their spouse or children.
The earlier decision was unequivocal in stating that the principle of
equality had been violated, as it did not restrict allotment of land to
those who had already been allotted land at concessional rates or
who privately owned a house or housing site.
25. The High Court further noted that while the earlier Division Bench
could have quashed GoM No. 522, it chose to give the government
an opportunity to comply with its directions. It went on to observe that
the government improperly issued the new GoMs, rendering them
invalid. It held that the allotment of land to those who already owned
land in their own name or in the name of their spouse or children,
cannot be sustained. As a result, the Division Bench quashed all the
GoMs in its judgment dated 05.01.2010, and directed that the various
parcels of land be restored to the Government. Fresh allotments
could be made only after issuing new GoMs in accordance with the
High Court’s directions.
Contentions and Arguments Raised by the Parties
26. To avoid prolixity and repetition, we will not separately refer to the
arguments raised by the counsels for Cooperative Societies and
their members as well as State of Telangana on one side, and the
counsel for the Writ Petitioners, who, as noted above, have also
challenged the impugned judgment.
27. The contentions and pleas raised by the counsel for the Cooperative
Societies, its members, and State of Telangana, can be crystallised as:
(i) Successive governments have allotted lands in Hyderabad at
concessional rates till 1989.
(ii) The GoM Nos. 419 to 425 were issued after almost 18 years
for allotment of housing sites as a one-time benefit.
(iii) Allotment to members of AIS, government service, etc. on
preferential basis does not violate Article 14 of the Constitution of
India, as these officers constitute a separate class. Government
servants play a vital role in governance and contribute to the
society through their toil and sacrifice. They have an unwavering
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 1393

State of Andhra Pradesh and Others v.
Dr. Rao, V.B.J. Chelikani and Others

commitment towards societal welfare and public services.
However, at the same time, their salary and pay structures never
match those of their counterparts in the private sector. Their
carry home pay is much less than the persons with similar level
of education and experience in the private sector. There is much
less scope for wealth accumulation. Post-retirement benefits
are also limited. They suffer on account of opportunity cost.
Due to the transferable nature of their jobs, they do not have
a permanent residence and, therefore, the scheme envisages
allotment of housing sites to enable them to have a semblance
of residential security.
(iv) The allotment of housing sites, in view of the aforesaid
differentiation and classification, has a rational nexus and
objective. The policy provides stability to the lives of these officers
and reduces dependence on government accommodation. It
is a symbolic gesture of the government’s commitment to the
welfare of the officers given the importance of their role and
the challenges they face. No government largesse is given to
the government employees.
(v) The Cooperative Societies to whom land has been allotted
have made substantial payments towards the price of the plots
as also towards stamp duty.16 In many cases, the employees
have retired and in some cases they have even died without
getting benefit of the plots though they had made payments.
Some of the societies have also undertaken development work
at their own expense.
(vi) Since journalists constitute a separate class, several Governments
have allotted housing sites to them at concessional rates.

16 The details of the payments made by some of the Cooperative Societies towards the land cost and
infrastructure development and conversion charges is as under:
• Respondent No. 4 – M/s Indira Legislators Mutually Aided Cooperative Housing Society has spent
more than Rs. 20 crores.
• Respondent No. 6 – Adarshnagar Mutually Aided Cooperative Housing Society has spent more
than Rs. 10 crores.
• Respondent No. 7 – Koh-Ei-Noor Mutually Aided Cooperative Housing Society Ltd. has spent
around Rs. 9.75 crores.
• Respondent No. 8 – Jawaharlal Nehru Journalists Mutually Aided Cooperative Housing Society
has spent around Rs. 13.8 crores.
• Respondent No. 9 – M/s Indian Revenue Services Officers’ (Income-Tax) Housing Society has
spent around Rs. 3.9 crores.
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(vii) Allotment of plots at the basic rate, is legal and valid. Price
determination falls within the exclusive domain of the Executive.
Procedure under the law has been duly followed. Reliance is
placed upon Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Land Revenue
Act, 1317F17 and the alienation rules framed thereunder which
we shall refer to subsequently.
(viii) Basic market value is determined by the Collector as per the
Telangana Revision of Market Value Guideline Rules, 1998
which have been made in exercise of the power under Section
47A of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899. Sale value cannot be less
than the basic value. Since market value is highly volatile,
there cannot be any uniform system of determining the market
value. It cannot be argued, therefore, that the land has been
granted at a concessional rate as it has been sold at basic
market value.
(ix) There are enough safeguards in the impugned GoMs which
ensure that the allotments made are not maliciously converted
into a profiteering exercise. One such safeguard is that allotment
is not made directly to individuals, but through a society. Further,
an employee is entitled to such allotment only once during her/
his service. A cut-off date is also prescribed. If both spouses
are in government service, only one of them is eligible for land
allotment. The allotment is not alienable or transferable by any
instrument, including GPA, for a period of ten years from the
date of allotment.
(x) Allotments to specified categories also includes family members
of AIS officers who died in harness prior to their retirement,
including those killed by Naxalites while on duty, and had not
availed facilities of allotment of housing sites at concessional
rates.
28. On behalf of the Writ Petitioners, it is submitted that:
(i) A policy or an executive decision should be backed by a
social and welfare purpose. It should not be for the profit
or benefit of private individuals or a particular class. Public
interest should be the paramount consideration. Departure

17 Year 1906 according to the Gregorian Calendar.
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 1395

State of Andhra Pradesh and Others v.
Dr. Rao, V.B.J. Chelikani and Others

from these principles should be for compelling reasons that
must be rational and not suggestive of discrimination, bias,
jobbery or nepotism.
(ii) Land is a natural resource and being so it should be expended
to best subserve the common good. It should not be dissipated
at a consideration lower than the actual worth. One set of
citizens, without good reason and justification, cannot prosper
at the cost of the other set of citizens.
(iii) Valuable government property of around Rs. 10,000 crores
belonging to the people of the State, which is held in trust by the
State Government, is sought to be transferred in favour of the
privileged section or class of persons without an overwhelming
or legitimate public purpose. The eight categories of persons
include MLAs, MPs, officers of the AIS, journalists, Judges
of the Supreme Court and High Court, State Government
employees, etc.
(iv) The size of plots which are being sold at the basic price clearly
shows arbitrariness and discrimination as Judges of the Supreme
Court and High Court, MPs, MLAs, and officers of the AIS are
being allotted plots of 500 square yards, whereas others have
been allotted smaller plots.
(v) Almost all MPs, MLAs, Judges of the Supreme Court and High
Court, officers of the AIS and even journalists, already own a
plot or a house within the State. Therefore, they should not be
shown any indulgence in distribution of the State’s largesse
which would allow them to profiteer at the cost of the State
and the common man.
(vi) The State Government had acquired 5,000 (five thousand)
acres of land in various villages in Ranga Reddy District for
Information Technology projects, Biotech Park, Apparel Park,
Discovery City and Hardware Park etc. The landowners were
poor agriculturists who were paid meagre amounts when their
lands were acquired. The land is now being transferred to the
privileged section of the society without a public auction, on
payment of an amount which is much less than the market value.
While the allottees will become rich overnight, the villagers and
the agriculturists who were the erstwhile owners of the land,
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along with the general public and the society, will be denied
the benefits of the surged land prices.
(vii) Past allotments, if any, made contrary to law, would not justify
allotments in the present date, if the same were in violation
of the rule of law and Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
While the State is entitled to frame and take policy decisions,
such decisions cannot be arbitrary and violate the principles
of equity and fairness. The Constitution of India does not vest
absolute discretion with the Executive. Public interest is the
paramount consideration. Land, including property, should be
sold and disposed of by public auction or by inviting tender. It
is the duty of the court, as a policy, to set the wrong right, and
not allow perpetuation of the wrongdoing.
(viii) Land in the concerned area is scarce, as is accepted by the
Cooperative Societies, its members and others. This cannot be
a reason to make preferential allotment to a select few who are
the privileged or better off members of our society. Allotment of
government land to such members is contrary to public interest,
when a considerable portion of the population of the State lives
below the poverty line, struggling for basic amenities, and is
without shelter. The impugned land allotment policy is a cloaked
attempt of the Executive at the aggrandisement of certain
privileged groups such as bureaucrats, Judges, journalists etc.
(ix) Allotment of individual housing plots to persons belonging
to weaker sections of the society in Hyderabad and Ranga
Reddy district was prohibited by the Government Memo dated
17.11.2004 on the ground that there is paucity and dearth of
government land in those areas. Construction of only G+3
multi-storeyed flats was allowed. However, in case of the
respondents, except for Respondent No. 1 – M/S Campaign for
Housing and Tenural Rights (CHATRI) in C.A. No. 3792/2011,
all Cooperative Societies have been allowed to make allotment
of plots to its members. No principle has been followed and
there is no justification for taking the said decision, which is
without any rhyme or reason.
(x) Reliance placed upon the 1975 Rules is misplaced as they do
not have any application. Allotment of housing sites is governed
by Assignment of House Sites in Villages & Towns in Telangana
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 1397

State of Andhra Pradesh and Others v.
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Area Rules, 1975. This aspect, as mentioned above, will be
referred to subsequently.
Analysis – Res Judicata and Constructive Res Judicata
29. The issue with regard to res judicata and constructive res judicata has
been raised before us and was also argued before and considered
by the High Court in the impugned judgment. The plea of res judicata
was rejected by the High Court, but it upheld the plea of constructive
res judicata raised by the Cooperative Societies, their members and
the State Government.
30. In Forward Construction Company (supra), this Court, relying
upon Explanation (IV)18 to Section 11 of the Code of the Civil
Procedure, 1908,19 observed that any matter that might or ought to
have been made a ground of attack in a former suit is deemed to
have been made a matter directly or substantially an issue in the
said suit. Therefore, res judicata impacts not only the actual matter
determined, but every other matter which the parties might or ought
to have litigated and have decided as incidental to, or essentially
connected with the subject matter of the litigation. It includes every
matter coming into the legitimate purview of the original action,
both in respect of the matters of claim and defence. The judgment
explains that the underlying principle in Explanation (IV) is that where
the parties have had an opportunity of controverting a matter, that
should have been taken to be the same thing as if the matter had
been actually controverted and decided.
31. However, in the said case the contention relying upon Explanation (IV)
was rejected observing that when a matter has been constructively
in issue, it cannot be said to have been actually heard and decided.
Reference was also made to Explanation (VI) to Section 11.20 It is
observed that the said explanation will apply when the conditions
mentioned in that explanation are satisfied. This means that the
Court should be satisfied that the decision in the litigation shall bind

18 Explanation IV.—Any matter which might and ought to have been made ground of defence or attack in
such former suit shall be deemed to have been a matter directly and substantially in issue in such suit.
19 For short, “CPC”.
20 Explanation VI.—Where persons litigate bona fide in respect of a public right or of a private right claimed
in common for themselves and others, all persons interested in such right shall, for the purposes of this
section, be deemed to claim under the persons so litigating.
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all persons interested in the right litigated. Onus of proving want
of bona fides in respect of the previous litigation is on the parties
seeking to avoid the said decision. Referring to the Explanation, it is
said that Section 11 applies to public interest litigation as well. Such
litigation has to be a bona fide litigation in respect of a right which
is common and agitated in common with others. In the said case,
this Court approved the decision of the High Court that Section 11
will not be applicable in view of the finding recorded by the High
Court, observing that the first Writ Petition was not a bona fide one.
32. In All India Manufacturers Organisation and Others (supra),
this Court examined the question of res judicata observing that it is
based upon larger public interest, being founded on two grounds:
firstly, no one should be vexed twice for one and the same cause;
and secondly, there should be an end to the same litigation. This
Court further observed that Section 11 is a statutory recognition of
the principle of res judicata and, therefore, not a complete code,
or exhaustive of the general law and principle of res judicata. This
Court thereafter observed, that a judgment in public interest litigation,
when the litigation is bona fide, operates in rem. It binds the public
at large. Thereafter, it examined Explanations (III) and (IV) to Section
11. Specific reference is made to the judgment in Greenhalgh v.
Mallard,21 which observes that it would be an abuse of the process
of the court to allow a new proceeding to be started in respect of
the same issue which has already been decided. This principle
will equally apply to every other matter where the parties might or
ought to have litigated. The principle applies when issues have been
decided incidentally or essentially connected with the subject matter
of litigation so as to come within the purview of the original action
both in respect of the matter of claim and defence.
33. In V. Purushotham Rao v. Union of India and Others,22 a question
that arose before this Court was whether the principle of constructive
res judicata should be applied as there was an earlier judgment.
The contention was rejected as being devoid of any substance, by
observing that the earlier Writ Petition under Article 32 was regarding
cancellation of 15 allotments of petroleum and gas dealerships and

21 (1947) 2 All England Reporter 255 (CA).
22 [2001] Supp. 4 SCR 411 : (2001) 10 SCC 305
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 1399

State of Andhra Pradesh and Others v.
Dr. Rao, V.B.J. Chelikani and Others

final directions given to the High Court to dispose of the pending
Writ Petition after examining the individual cases. Clearly, in the
present matter also, in the first litigation and decision which has
been quoted above, allotments made were quashed and therefore,
the effect thereof was that none of the Cooperative Societies or its
members would have been entitled to any benefit.
34. A more authoritative pronouncement on the said subject is to be
found in a recent decision of this Court in National Confederation
of Officers Association of Central Public Sector Enterprises and
Others v. Union of India and Others,23 wherein it takes notice of
the argument relating to applicability of res judicata and constructive
res judicata to PILs. This judgment not only examines the provisions
of Section 11 of the CPC but the judgment of this Court in Rural
Litigation and Entitlement Kendra v. State of U.P.,24 wherein it
is observed that in PILs, every technicality in procedural law is not
available in defence. Therefore, it would be wrong to dismiss a matter
involving grave public importance, to entertain the plea of res judicata.
Reference was also made to All India Manufacturers Organisation
and Others (supra) which also elucidates the question of bona
fides. It is observed that the petitioner therein who had filed the first
litigation had special technical expertise on the matter to impute the
project on the ground that he did. Further, the first judgment had
references to the issue of plan, types of plan required, etc. Lastly,
the claims and the arguments raised in the second petition were
largely and substantially same in the first petition. After referring to
the first judgment, it is observed:
“35. As a matter of fact, in a public interest litigation, the
petitioner is not agitating his individual rights but represents
the public at large. As long as the litigation is bona fide, a
judgment in a previous public interest litigation would be
a judgment in rem. It binds the public at large and bars
any member of the public from coming forward before
the court and raising any connected issue or an issue,
which had been raised should have been raised on an
earlier occasion by way of a public interest litigation. It

23 [2021] 10 SCR 954 : (2022) 4 SCC 764
24 [1990] 3 SCR 72 : 1989 Supp (1) 504
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cannot be doubted that the petitioner in Somashekar
Reddy was acting bona fide. Further, we may note that,
as a retired Chief Engineer, Somashekar Reddy had
the special technical expertise to impugn the Project on
the grounds that he did and so, he cannot be dismissed
as a busybody. Thus, we are satisfied in principle that
Somashekar Reddy, as a public interest litigation, could
bar the present litigation.”
35. The main argument raised on behalf of the Cooperative Societies
and its members is that the principle of res judicata and constructive
res judicata would apply in the present case. We are of the opinion
that the question of res judicata will certainly not apply, as the
previous judgment did not, as accepted by everyone, examine the
constitutional validity of GoM Nos. 243 and 244. GoM Nos. 420,
422 to 425 dated 25.03.2008 had not been issued at the time the
said judgment was pronounced and hence, could never have been
challenged. On the question of constructive res judicata, we must
accept that the same will have limited application to public interest
litigation.
36. The contention is that Writ Petition No. 13730 of 2006 was filed in
public interest by Mr. V.S. Bose, Dr. Rao V.B.J. Chelikani and Mr.
O.M. Debara, which petition was disposed of vide judgment dated
08.10.2007. The judgment, as noticed above, specifically records that
the petitioners therein had not challenged GoM Nos. 243 and 244
dated 28.02.2005. However, this judgment had in fact quashed the
allotment made in terms of GoM No. 522 dated 04.05.2006, insofar
as the GoM had permitted allotment of land to individuals, who are
not members of Cooperative Societies and groups, or who may
have received benefit of concessional allotment, either in individual
capacity or as a member of a Cooperative Society or group to which
preferential allotment had been made. The said judgment directed
that the Government should identify the category of persons who
may form a new Cooperative Society, get the same registered and
make an application as a group for the purpose of allotment of land
in terms of the policy contained in GoM Nos. 242 and 243 dated
28.02.2005. It further ruled that all allotments must be in accordance
with the stipulations in GoM Nos. 242, 243 and 244. Further, the Court
observed that the Government would be well advised to incorporate
a condition of inapplicability of the policy to those who own a house
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 1401

State of Andhra Pradesh and Others v.
Dr. Rao, V.B.J. Chelikani and Others

or housing site in their own name, or in the name of their spouse
or children, so as to make it applicable to all future allotments. We
would like to quote the relevant paragraphs from the judgment:
“In the result, the writ petition is allowed and G.O.Ms.
No.522, dated 04.5.2006 is quashed insofar as it provides
for allotment of land to individuals, who are not members
of the societies/groups and who may have received the
benefit of concessional allotment from the government
earlier or as member of any society or group to which
concessional allotment was made. G.O.Ms.No.1424,
dated 28.9.2006 whereby the land has been earmarked
for respondent No.4 is declared to be in consonance with
the policy contained in G.O.Ms.No.243, dated 28.2.2005
subject to the rider that all the restrictions contained in
that G.O. will apply to the allotment of land by respondent
No.4 to its members. The government will also do well to
incorporate an additional restriction against the allotment
of land to those who own house or house-site in their own
name or in the name of their spouse or children and make
the same applicable to the allotment made to respondent
No.4 and all future allotments, which may be made in
accordance with the policy enshrined in G.0.Ms.Nos.242
and 243 dated 28.2.2005.
However, it is made clear that this order of ours will not
preclude the government from making allotment to societies
or groups of the identified categories in accordance with
the policy contained in G.O.Ms.No.243, dated 28.2.2005
and it will be open to the identified categories of persons
to form new society and get the same registered or make
applications as groups for the purpose of allotment of
land in terms of the policy contained in G.O.Ms.No.243,
dated 28.2.2005.
Before parting with the case, we consider it necessary
to mention that the provision contained in the impugned
G.O. for processing of the applications of the individual
High Court Judges by the sub-committee comprising
Advocate General, Secretary, Legal Affairs and Registrar
General, A.P. High Court, with senior-most among them
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being its Chairman had the pernicious effect of demeaning
the status of the members of the superior judiciary and
seriously eroding the confidence of the common man
in the system of administration of justice because, then
the individual Judges would have been required to make
applications for allotment of land to the government
and their applications would have been processed by a
committee comprising two officers who are constitutionally
subordinate to the High Court. It is a matter of satisfaction
that the government has taken corrective measure,
removed the offending clause and earmarked the land
for respondent No.4, which is bound to be allotted to the
members of the said respondent, who do not suffer from
any disability incorporated in G.O.Ms.No.243 and the
restriction, which may be imposed by the government in
terms of the observations made in this order.”
37. In view of the legal position, we reject the contention of the Cooperative
Societies etc. that the principle of constructive res judicata should
apply to our examination of the challenge to GOM Nos. 243 and
244. We, therefore, set aside the reasoning of the High Court to
this extent.
38. We believe that the principles of constructive res judicata should not
have been applied, given the significant public interest at stake in
this public interest litigation. It is clear that GoM Nos. 243 and 244
were not part of the challenge in the first litigation, as the petitioners
then believed that simply quashing the allotments would suffice. Once
the allotments were cancelled and the Writ Petition was allowed,
the State of Telangana had the opportunity to re-evaluate the entire
issue in light of the findings recorded.
39. It will not be correct to put fetters on the members of the public
in filing a Writ Petition challenging GoM Nos. 243 and 244 in this
factual background. Constructive res judicata applies only when the
cause of action is identical. In our view, the causes of action in the
two litigation proceedings should not be considered identical, as the
first litigation focused on the allotment and its terms and conditions.
GoM Nos. 243 and 244 are separate and distinct from the allotment
itself, and challenging these notifications constitutes a separate and
independent cause of action.
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 1403

State of Andhra Pradesh and Others v.
Dr. Rao, V.B.J. Chelikani and Others

Constitutional Validity of Impugned Government Memoranda
40. To assess the constitutional validity of GoM Nos. 243 and 244
dated 28.02.2005; GoM Nos. 420, 422 to 425 dated 25.03.2008 and
GoM No. 551 dated 27.03.2008; it is crucial to consider the factual
context of their stipulations.25 The core issue at hand pertains to
the distribution of State largesse—the generosity exercised by the
State in distributing public resources—in this instance, public land
in the State of Telangana. The term “State largesse” often implies
a level of discretion in how these resources are allocated and can
be seen as a reflection of a government’s priorities or policies.
Consequently, the exercise of such “generosity” or “discretion”
has significant implications for the citizenry, their rights, and the
functioning of democracy.
41. The question that arises is – Can the Government, like any private
individual, have the absolute discretion to frame policy, distribute
resources and enter into a contract with whomsoever it pleases, on
any terms and conditions it so desires?
42. In Erusian Equipment and Chemicals Ltd. v. State of West
Bengal,26 this question was posed to this Court. The then Chief
Justice,27 on behalf of the Bench, responded that the Government
is not like a private individual who can pick and choose the person
with whom it will deal. When the Government is trading with the
public, the democratic nature of Government demands equality
coupled with an absence of arbitrariness and discrimination in
such transactions. The activities of the Government have a public
element and, therefore, they should be conducted with fairness and
equality. The State need not enter into any contract with anyone, but
if it does so, it must do so fairly, without discrimination and without
adopting an unfair procedure.
43. In Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of
India,28 relying upon the principle established by Erusian Equipment
(supra), this Court, observed:

25 See paragraphs 7 and 8 of this judgment for specifics of GoM Nos. 243 and 244.
26 [1975] 2 SCR 674 : (1975) 1 SCC 70
27 A.N. Ray, CJI.
28 [1979] 3 SCR 1014 : (1979) 3 SCC 489
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“…This proposition would hold good in all cases of dealing
by the Government with the public, where the interest
sought to be protected is a privilege. It must, therefore, be
taken to be the law that where the Government is dealing
with the public, whether by way of giving jobs or entering
into contracts or issuing quotas or licences or granting other
forms of largesse, the Government cannot act arbitrarily
at its sweet will and, like a private individual, deal with
any person it pleases, but its action must be in conformity
with standard or norms which is not arbitrary, irrational or
irrelevant. The power or discretion of the Government in
the matter of grant of largesse including award of jobs,
contracts, quotas, licences, etc. must be confined and
structured by rational, relevant and non-discriminatory
standard or norm and if the Government departs from
such standard or norm in any particular case or cases,
the action of the Government would be liable to be struck
down, unless it can be shown by the Government that the
departure was not arbitrary, but was based on some valid
principle which in itself was not irrational, unreasonable
or discriminatory.”
44. These principles were reiterated in Common Cause, A Registered
Society v. Union of India,29 where this Court quashed certain
petroleum pump allotments made by the Minister in exercise of his
discretionary power. This Court observed:
“22. The Government today — in a welfare State — provides
large number of benefits to the citizens. It distributes wealth
in the form of allotment of plots, houses, petrol pumps, gas
agencies, mineral leases, contracts, quotas and licences
etc. Government distributes largesses in various forms.
A Minister who is the executive head of the department
concerned distributes these benefits and largesses. He is
elected by the people and is elevated to a position where
he holds a trust on behalf of the people. He has to deal with
the people’s property in a fair and just manner. He cannot
commit breach of the trust reposed in him by the people.”

29 [1996] Supp. 9 SCR 296 : (1996) 6 SCC 530
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 1405

State of Andhra Pradesh and Others v.
Dr. Rao, V.B.J. Chelikani and Others

45. In Shrilekha Vidyarthi v. State of Uttar Pradesh,30 this Court
unequivocally rejected the argument of absolute discretion of the
administrative authorities and immunity of their action from judicial
review. The Court observed:
“21. … In our opinion, it would be alien to the constitutional
scheme to accept the argument of exclusion of Article 14
in contractual matters. The scope and permissible grounds
of judicial review in such matters and the relief which may
be available are different matters but that does not justify
the view of its total exclusion. This is more so when the
modern trend is also to examine the unreasonableness
of a term in such contracts where the bargaining power
is unequal so that these are not negotiated contracts but
standard form contracts between unequals.
xx xx xx
29. It can no longer be doubted at this point of time
that Article 14 of the Constitution of India applies also
to matters of governmental policy and if the policy
or any action of the Government, even in contractual
matters, fails to satisfy the test of reasonableness, it
would be unconstitutional.”
(emphasis supplied)
46. Thus, time and again, this Court has held that while the power to
distribute and redistribute public assets and resources lie within the
State’s discretion, such discretion is not absolute. Article 14 and the
logic of equality impose fetters on the exercise of this discretionary
power. Therefore, it cannot be questioned or contested that state
policy and executive action must satisfy the rigours of Article 14.
47. This leads us to the subsequent inquiry – how do we ascertain
whether a State policy or executive action has violated the fetters
imposed by Article 14? In other words, what are the tests applicable
to evaluate the legality of State conduct in terms of Article 14? Do
GoM Nos. 243 and 244 dated 28.02.2005; GoM Nos. 420, 422-425
dated 25.03.2008 and GoM No. 551 dated 27.03.2008 pass the
constitutional muster?

30 [1990] Supp. 1 SCR 625 : (1991) 1 SCC 212
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48. The test of reasonable classification, developed several decades
ago, continues to be a dominant test permeating our constitutional
discourse. It consists of two prongs:
(i) the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia
which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together
from others that are left out of the group; and
(ii) the differentia must have a rational relation with the object
sought to be achieved by the statute/policy in question.
49. Referring to the two-fold classification test, a Constitution Bench of
this Court in Subramanian Swamy v. Director, Central Bureau of
Investigation,31 emphasised that there must be a nexus between
the basis of the classification and the object of the legislation/
policy under consideration. The Court also referred to its earlier
Constitution Bench decision in Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Justice
S.R. Tendolkar,32 which observes that the legislature is free to
recognise varying degrees of harm and may confine its restrictions
on classification to those cases where the need is most evident.
However, the courts can interfere when there is nothing on the face
of law or the surrounding circumstances which reasonably support
the classification. In such cases, the presumption of constitutionality
does not extend to suggesting that there are always undisclosed
reasons for subjecting certain individuals or entities to discriminatory
legislation. The rationale for classification may be specified in the
statute, policy etc., or inferred from the surrounding circumstances
known or brought to the notice of the court.
50. In Nagpur Improvement Trust v. Vithal Rao and Others,33 a
Constitution Bench of this Court emphasised that the object itself
should be lawful and cannot be discriminatory. If the object is to
discriminate against a section of the minority, such discrimination
cannot be justified on the grounds of reasonable classification, even
if it has a rational connection to the intended objective.
51. In a reference made to this Court under Article 143(1) of the
Constitution of India regarding the constitutional validity of the

31 [2014] 9 SCR 283 : (2014) 8 SCC 682
32 [1959] 1 SCR 279 : AIR 1958 SC 538
33 [1973] 3 SCR 39 : (1973) 1 SCC 500
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Special Courts Bill, 1978, a seven-Judge bench of this Court in
In Re: The Special Courts Bill, 1978,34 concluded that the State
possesses the authority to enact laws that operate differently on
various groups or classes of individuals to achieve specific ends.
Constitutional command to the State to afford equal protection of
laws sets a goal that cannot be achieved through rigid formulae.
Therefore, courts should not demand delusive exactness or apply
doctrinaire tests. Classification is justified as long as it is not palpably
arbitrary. Laws must be applied equally to all individuals placed in
similar situations, and reasonable classification involves segregating
groups based on shared properties and characteristics. This power
of classification enables the State to recognise and deal with the
needs and exigencies of the society as suggested by experience,
which includes recognition of given degree of evil. What is necessary
is that there should be a nexus between them.
52. The basis of classification, and object of the legislation are distinct
things. Article 14 postulates the need for a rational nexus. Therefore,
mere designation of a classification based on an identified objective
does not lead to an automatic satisfaction of Article 14. Such an
approach can devolve into legal formalism, which risks disregarding
the substantive implications of the constitutional guarantee of
equality. This Court, to avoid such formalism, has transitioned from
an exclusive reliance on the test of classification to a concurrent
application of the doctrine of arbitrariness when actions are not
grounded in valid reasons. Article 14 of the Constitution prohibits
class discrimination by conferring privileges or imposing liabilities
on individuals arbitrarily selected from a larger group in similar
circumstances concerning the privileges sought or the liabilities
imposed. The classification must never be arbitrary, artificial or
evasive.
53. The foundations of arbitrariness in the context of the classification
test were laid by Bose J. in State of West Bengal v. Anwar
Ali Sarkar35 and subsequently in Kathi Raning Rawat v. State
of Saurashtra. 36 Bose J. has questioned the propriety of the

34 [1979] 2 SCR 476 : (1979) 1 SCC 380
35 [1952] 1 SCR 284 : (1952) 1 SCC 1
36 [1952] 1 SCR 435 : (1952) 1 SCC 215
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classification test by propounding that mere classification by itself
is not enough, for the simple reason that anything can be classified
and every discriminatory action must of necessity fall in some
category of classification. Classification is nothing more than dividing
of one group of things from another, and unless some difference
or distinction is made in a given case, no question under Article
14 can arise. Mere classification is only a means of attaining the
desired result. Therefore, the ends cannot be entirely ignored and
consequently, the Court in a limited way is not precluded from
examining the legitimacy of the legislative object.
54. In a number of decisions of this Court, a similar approach has been
taken. In State of Jammu and Kashmir v. Triloki Nath Khosa,37
this Court cautioned that classification can pose a danger of creating
artificial inequalities and thus to overdo classification is to undo
equality. Therefore, classification has to be demonstrably based
upon substantive differences and should promote relevant goals
that have constitutional validity.38 The legitimacy of the object, in a
limited way, is a necessary element to be considered for assessing
validity of any classification. The classification must be just and fair,
which necessitates that the court scrutinizes the underlying purpose
of the law. Many a case will ex-facie or demonstrably meet the equity
compliance, some will be declared constitutional after in-depth judicial
examination. This Court in LIC v. Consumer Education Centre,39
had accordingly struck down an insurance policy which was limited
to employees of the Government or reputed commercial firms, as
violating Article 14 on the ground that it did not meet the test of
equality, fairness and justice. Significantly, the Court had observed
that the doctrine of classification is simply a subsidiary rule that
the judiciary has evolved to give practical content to the doctrine
of equality. In Indian Council for Legal Aid and Advice v. Bar
Council of India,40 the stipulation that advocates must be under
the age of 45 for enrolment was invalidated as being discriminatory,
despite its intention to address specific demographics. The criterion

37 [1974] 1 SCR 771 : (1974) 1 SCC 19
38 Also see Hiral P. Harsora and Others v. Kusum Narottamdas Harsora and Others (2016) 10 SCC
165, and Union of India v. N.S. Rathnam & Sons (2015) 10 SCC 681, where similar views have been
expressed.
39 [1995] Supp. 1 SCR 349 : (1995) 5 SCC 482
40 [1995] 1 SCR 304 : (1995) 1 SCC 732
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was found to be unreasonable and consequently, impinging upon
the principle of equality.
55. Thus, it is crucial to recognise that the unreasonableness of a
law, policy or state action can be both relative and absolute. First,
unreasonableness can be comparative, meaning it is assessed
in relation to something else. In Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib
Sehravardi,41 this Court stipulated that a policy in question must
satisfy two requirements under the reasonable classification test –
(a) the classification must be reasonable; and (b) it must fulfil the
twin conditions of intelligible differentia and rational nexus. Second,
a policy may perpetrate discrimination inherently, instead of inter
se discrimination vis-à-vis others. In A.L. Kalra v. Project and
Equipment Corporation of India Ltd.,42 this Court held that one need
not confine the denial of equality to a comparative evaluation between
two persons to arrive at a conclusion of discriminatory treatment. An
action/policy can per se be arbitrary, and such arbitrariness in itself
constitutes a violation of the equal of protection under law.
56. It follows that the rigours of Article 14 cannot be interpreted in a narrow,
pedantic or lexicographical manner.43 The doctrine of classification
is neither a mere restatement of Article 14 nor is it the objective
and end of that Article.44 In a catena of judgments, this Court has
held that the reasonable classification doctrine is a judicial formula
to assess whether legislative or executive actions are arbitrary,
thus amounting to a denial of equality.45 It is arbitrariness that lies
at the heart of the reasonable classification test. The principle of
reasonableness – both legally and philosophically – is an essential
element of equality or non-arbitrariness, pervading Article 14 like a
“brooding omnipresence”.46
57. In recent pronouncements, this Court has clearly expounded India’s
equality jurisprudence – from a reliance on the test of classification
and arbitrariness to a more substantive interpretation of equality.

41 [1981] 2 SCR 79 : (1981) 1 SCC 722
42 [1984] 3 SCR 646 : (1984) 3 SCC 316, 328
43 Ibid.
44 Natural Resources Allocation, In re, Special Reference No. 1 of 2012 (2012) 10 SCC 1
45 Ajay Hasia (supra); Shrilekha Vidyarthi (supra).
46 Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978) 1 SCC 248. Also see Shayara Bano v. Union of India (2017) 9
SCC 1
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For instance, A.K. Sikri J., in National Legal Services Authority
v. Union of India and Others,47 had referred to the relationship
between equality and dignity. In Navtej Johar v. Union of India,48
D.Y. Chandrachud, J. (as his Lordship then was) explicitly articulated
the principle of substantive equality and remarked:
“Equating the content of equality with the reasonableness of
a classification on which a law is based advances the cause
of legal formalism. The problem with the classification test is
that what constitutes a reasonable classification is reduced
to a mere formula: the quest for an intelligible differentia
and the rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved.
In doing so, the test of classification risks elevating form
over substance. The danger inherent in legal formalism lies
in its inability to lay threadbare the values which guide the
process of judging constitutional rights. Legal formalism
buries the life-giving forces of the Constitution under a mere
mantra. What it ignores is that Article 14 contains a powerful
statement of values – of the substance of equality before
the law and the equal protection of laws. To reduce it to a
formal exercise of classification may miss the true value of
equality as a safeguard against arbitrariness in state action.
As our constitutional jurisprudence has evolved towards
recognizing the substantive content of liberty and equality,
the core of Article 14 has emerged out of the shadows of
classification. Article 14 has a substantive content on which,
together with liberty and dignity, the edifice of the Constitution
is built. Simply put, in that avatar, it reflects the quest for
ensuring fair treatment of the individual in every aspect of
human endeavor and in every facet of human existence.”
58. Similarly, in Lt. Col. Nitisha v. Union of India,49 the Court referred
to jurisprudence relating to indirect discrimination which may also be
a valid reason to strike down a legislation. This decision refers to the
principle of substantive equality and that the right of equality should
not be seen through a narrow lens. The court should examine the

47 [2014] 5 SCR 119 : (2014) 5 SCC 438
48 (2018) 10 SCC 1
49 [2021] 4 SCR 633 : (2021) 15 SCC 125
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impact of the law, and whether the law or a policy adversely affects
members of a particular disadvantaged group disproportionately. In
other words, when the courts examine the question of rationality
of a classification, they in a way also examine non-classificatory
arbitrariness. No doubt, in doing so, the court does show a degree
of deference. There are decisions of this Court which hold that
under- inclusiveness will not result in invalidity of a statute, and
that the State is not obligated to extend a policy to all such cases
to which it would otherwise apply.50 These decisions are based on
the premise that a legislation is permitted to recognise degrees of
harm and may confine its restrictions or benefits to those cases
where the need is the clearest. Legislative or executive action does
not deal with absolutes.
59. Thus, over the years, there is a discernible and marked shift from
mere formal equality to the broader concept of substantive equality,
which encompasses various dimensions of the principle of equality.51
On one hand, substantive equality focuses on correction of historical
wrongs, checking stereotypes, stigma, prejudice etc.,52 while on the
other, it also scrutinizes if a law or policy is inherently discriminatory.
The latter principle applies when the legitimacy of the objective is
flawed and manifests arbitrariness. We shall subsequently elaborate
on the legal meaning of substantive equality.
60. This evolution of the law under Article 14 aligns with judicial decisions
in the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, and South Africa. For
our purposes, we will refer to some decisions of the Supreme Court
of Canada that exemplify the development of Canada’s approach
to equality as articulated in Section 15 of the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms, 1982.53
61. Section 15 of the Canadian Charter54 aims to provide substantive

50 See Ram Krishna Dalmia (supra) and Chiranjit Lal Chowdhuri v. Union of India, AIR 1951 SC 41
51 Jahnavi Sindhu and Vikram Aditya Narayan, “Equality under the Indian Constitution: Moving away from
Reasonable Classification” (November 29, 2022).
52 Sandra Fredman, “Substantive Equality Revisited”, I.CON (2016), Vol. 14 No. 3, 712-738.
53 For short, “Canadian Charter”.
54 Section 15 – (1) Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal
protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination
based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.
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equality.55 To begin, in 1989, the Supreme Court of Canada, in
Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia, 56 interpreted
Section 15(1) of the Canadian Charter to include both direct and
indirect discrimination. Subsequently, in Law v. Canada (Minister of
Employment and Immigration),57 a three-fold test was laid down.58
This included identifying a comparator group of individuals in similar
circumstances and determining whether the law’s disadvantage
constituted an impairment of human dignity. The Supreme Court of
Canada later modified the test in R. v. Kapp,59 reframing the doctrine
of substantive equality and held that it should prevail over formal
equality. The court noted that the human dignity aspect, included in
the third part of the Law v. Canada (supra) test, had not achieved
the intended philosophical enhancement. However, human dignity
remains a fundamental value underlying the principle of equality.
62. In the context of Section 15, which is divided into subsections
(1) and (2)—the latter addressing reverse discrimination and
ameliorative measures—the inquiry for classification under Kapp
(supra) requires the government to demonstrate that a program
has an ameliorative and remedial purpose and specifically targets
a disadvantaged group identified by enumerated or analogous
grounds. The test was further refined in Withler v. Canada (Attorney

(2) Subsection (1) does not preclude any law, program or activity that has as its object the amelioration
of conditions of disadvantaged individuals or groups including those that are disadvantaged because of
race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex or mental or physical disability.
55 A literal reading of the Constitution of India shows that our founders envisaged a progressive and
substantive framework of equal protection of laws. See Article 14, read with Articles 15, 16, 17, and 18
of the Constitution of India.
56 [1989] 1 SCR 143
57 [1999] 1 SCR 497
58 The three-part test is as follows:
A court that is called upon to determine a discrimination claim under s. 15(1) should make the following
three broad inquiries:
A. Does the impugned law (a) draw a formal distinction between the claimant and others on the
basis of one or more personal characteristics, or (b) fail to take into account the claimant’s already
disadvantaged position within Canadian society resulting in substantively differential treatment
between the claimant and others on the basis of one or more personal characteristics?
B. Is the claimant subject to differential treatment based on one or more enumerated and analogous
grounds?
and
C. Does the differential treatment discriminate, by imposing a burden upon or withholding a benefit
from the claimant in a manner which reflects the stereotypical application of presumed group or
personal characteristics, or which otherwise has the effect of perpetuating or promoting the view
that the individual is less capable or worthy of recognition or value as a human being or as a
member of Canadian society, equally deserving of concern, respect, and consideration?
59 [2008] 2 SCR 483
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General),60 wherein the Supreme Court of Canada explicitly rejected
the notion that formal equality alone is adequate, emphasizing the
necessity of substantive equality, stating:
“Substantive equality, unlike formal equality, rejects the
mere presence or absence of difference as an answer
to differential treatment. It insists on going behind the
facade of similarities and differences. It asks not only
what characteristics the different treatment is predicated
upon, but also whether those characteristics are relevant
considerations under the circumstances. The focus of
the inquiry is on the actual impact of the impugned law,
taking full account of social, political, economic and
historical factors concerning the group. The result may be
to reveal differential treatment as discriminatory because
of prejudicial impact or negative stereotyping. Or it may
reveal that differential treatment is required in order to
ameliorate the actual situation of the claimant group.”
63. Thus, the Supreme Court of Canada has significantly reshaped
the comparator group requirement, providing a broader and wider
meaning to equality claims. The test poses two questions – (1) Does
the law create a distinction based on an enumerated or analogous
ground? and (2) Does the distinction create a disadvantage by
perpetuating prejudice or stereotypes? The purpose of the distinction
component is to demonstrate that the claimant has been treated
differently from others—specifically, that they have been denied a
benefit available to others or are burdened in a way that others are
not, due to personal characteristics that qualify as enumerated or
analogous grounds.
64. In Quebec (Attorney General) v. A,61 the court observed that
substantive equality is not compromised merely because a
disadvantage is imposed; rather, it is denied when that disadvantage is
unfair or objectionable. This is often the case when the disadvantage
perpetuates prejudice or stereotypes. Such discrimination can
overlook significant harms, including marginalization, oppression,
and the deprivation of essential benefits. The focus should be on

60 [2011] 1 SCR 396
61 [2012] 1 SCR 61
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the execution and impact of the law, rather than the government’s
intent, when applying this test.
65. Section 15 is violated when distinctions lead to the perpetuation of
arbitrary disadvantages based on an individual’s membership in an
enumerated or analogous group. Importantly, the test requires a
flexible and contextual inquiry. Lastly, we will refer to the decision of
Fraser v. Canada (Attorney General),62 where the court summarized
the law on the adverse effects of discrimination, noting that this occurs
when a seemingly neutral law disproportionately impacts members of
groups protected on the basis of enumerated or analogous grounds.
66. In this manner, the development of equality jurisprudence in
Canada bears resemblances with the progressive development of
constitutional jurisprudence in India. In the Indian context, the mere
fact that a policy caters to a distinct, intelligible class, does not
automatically imply that the rigours of Article 14 are satisfied. The
second prong of the reasonable classification test mandates that
the distinction created by the policy between the two classes must
have a rational nexus with the object that policy seeks to achieve.
Furthermore, the objective of the classification should not itself be
illogical, unfair and unjust.
67. The substantive equality test, as enunciated in our recent
pronouncements, is broader and is not confined to a single principle.
No doubt, it accommodates the legislature and the executive’s right
to achieve structural change, but this right should be exercised to
benefit those who are disadvantaged, marginalized, or those in need
or grouped, while excluding others from the benefit or for imposition of
the burden or obligation. It is crucial for the Court to consider both the
intent behind legislation or policy and its practical impact, especially
when it reflects discrimination based on proscribed grounds.63
68. Substantive equality is satisfied when the law or policy genuinely
intends to and provides, an equal chance of satisfying the criteria for
access to a particular social or economic good. It respects individual
dignity, which encompasses three characteristics: (i) a sense of
self-worth, (ii) protection of basic choices an individual makes, and

62 [2020] 3 SCR 113
63 The expression “proscribed grounds” has reference to Articles 15 to 18 of the Constitution of India. These
Articles and their impact on Article 14, have been examined later.
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(iii) protection of individuals against harmful stereotypes. Lastly,
substantive equality is achieved when legislation or policies enhance
participation and representation, countering both political and socio-
economic exclusion. The last aspect permits anti-subordination,
as it focuses on the group which has suffered the disadvantage
and examines whether the legislation or policy aims at neutrality
or incorporates affirmative action to rectify the disadvantage or
discrimination. Anti-subordination promotes structural change and
aims to rectify disadvantages. In this sense, substantive equality
factors in multiple aspects of inequality offering a multidimensional
approach that allows the Court to address the interplay of various
aspects of equality, and equally accommodate differences instead
of masking them with formal equality.64
69. A literal reading of the Constitution’s equality provisions – Articles 14,
15, 16, and 17 which collectively form the core of equality – supports
an interpretation of substantive equality. While these Articles are
broadly interconnected, they also confer independent rights. Article
18, which prohibits the granting of titles to Indian citizens, aligns
with this objective, serving as a response to the colonial practice of
elevating certain Indians over others.
70. Article 15(1) explicitly bars discrimination on the grounds of race,
religion, caste, sex, and place of birth. These can be loosely called
proscribed grounds for classification.65 Classifications based on
these criteria will be unconstitutional, unless permitted by clauses
(3), (4), (5), and (6) of Article 15 of the Constitution of India, when
they are justified on the ground of anti-subordination. Latter clauses
specifically permit the State to create special provisions for women
and children, and for the advancement of socially and educationally
backward classes, including Scheduled Castes and Scheduled
Tribes. These are anti-subordination grounds.66 The clauses permit

64 Supra note 50.
65 However, as held, classification on the basis of proscribed grounds is not forbidden vide Article 14, albeit
it should satisfy principles of anti-subordination and non-arbitrariness. Classification based on proscribed
grounds must at the same time, to be valid, independently meet the mandate of Articles 15 to 18 of the
Constitution. Articles 15 to 18 confer independent rights to equality, which are not diluted or foregone
in compliance to Article 14. However, it would be rare that such a situation would arise, once the test of
substantive equality is satisfied.
66 Anti-subordination grounds refer to the objectives of the legislation. They are not classifications. As in
case of proscribed grounds for classification, in case of anti-subordination grounds, the court’s scrutiny
is not totally prohibited, albeit substantive equality test will be satisfied when anti-subordination principle
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provisions for their admission to educational institutions, whether aided
or unaided by the State, with the exception of minority educational
institutions. Under Article 15(6), the State is authorized to enact laws
for the economically weaker sections, allowing for up to ten percent
reservation in employment. Article 16, which deals with equality of
opportunity in matters of public employment, prohibits discrimination
of any citizen on the ground or religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth
or residence. However, it permits the State to make provisions for
reserving appointments for backward classes that are inadequately
represented, as well as for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes
in State services.
71. Article 14, which provides for equality before the law, and mandates
that the State shall not deny to any person equality before the law
or equal protection of laws, does not specifically refer to a particular
classification unlike Articles 15 and 16 of the Constitution, allowing
greater legislative flexibility. This design is intentional; the framers
understood that rigid classifications could hinder the legislature’s
ability to address emerging societal issues and adapt to the evolving
needs of future generations. By avoiding specificity, the Constitution
enables lawmakers to make laws on futuristic grounds which may
arise with the struggles and challenges faced by the new generation.67
72. Therefore, this Court has taken the view that Article 14 allows for
reasonable and fair classification but prohibits class legislation.
Classifications based on the categories outlined in Articles 15 and
16 are acceptable as long as they have a rational connection to their
intended objectives. These classifications—such as those pertaining
to other backward classes, scheduled castes and tribes, and women
and children—aim to fulfil the principle of equal ends. This approach
accepts and accommodates the said difference. They adopt an anti-
subordination approach, treating these groups differently to promote
greater equality. In this manner, Articles 15 and 16 of the Constitution
of India explicitly recognize the necessity for legislative measures
aimed at uplifting certain disadvantaged sections to achieve equality.

is not violated, and the classification does not result in indirect discrimination.
67 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 US 558, which dealt with the 14th amendment to the United States
Constitution, observes that the framers knew that times could blind them to certain truths and later
generations could see the laws once thought necessary and proper, in fact, serve only the oppressed.
The Constitution endures, a person of every generation can invoke its principles in search for greater
freedom.
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73. The substantive equality test will also fail in case the legislation or
the policy, in its operation, results in indirect discrimination.68 The
principle of indirect discrimination comes into play when legislation
or policy applies equally to all but disproportionately disadvantages
individuals or groups based on protected characteristics, which
cannot be justified. It refers to inequality of results and outcomes.
Substantive equality also encompasses equality of opportunity,
addressing institutional discrimination and rejecting policies that
promote imbalances rather than equalize starting points. Policies
should not impose additional obstacles for those requiring protection,
or who have faced historical discrimination or do so in the present.
74. Therefore, unless a law meets these criteria of substantive equality,
it would violate Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
75. At this juncture, we will apply the law to the facts of the case. To
quote from the GoM No. 242, the land allotment policy seeks to
serve the following objective:
“Providing shelter is amongst the top priorities of the
Government. There are well defined schemes for providing
housing for the poor. In so far as meeting the requirement
of the other deserving sections of the society, there is no
fixed policy and mechanism for alienation of land to such
sections and Allotment was done case by case, for the land
identified. Therefore, Government have decided to have
a comprehensive policy of meeting housing requirement
of targeted sections of society by creation of land bank
and· accordingly order the following...”
We would like to emphasise that the policy, while not targeted
towards the poor, is also aimed towards “other deserving sections
of the society”, to meet their “housing requirement”.
76. The category of people who have been identified as beneficiaries
of this State largesse as “other deserving sections of the society”
are: Judges of the Supreme Court and High Court, MPs, MLAs,
journalists, State and Central Government employees. It would be
apt to note that, not only are these classes of people being allotted

68 See Lt. Col. Nitisha (supra). Also see Anuj Garg and Others v. Hotel Association of India and Others
(2008) 3 SCC 1
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land preferentially, the price of such land is also discounted to the
basic rate, instead of the prevalent market rate.
77. The State of Telangana, in its defence, has contended that the
abovementioned category of people forms a distinct class. However,
we have already enunciated above that, not only must a distinct
classification exist but such classification should not be arbitrary,
artificial or artful, and should be rationally tailored to serve the
objective.
78. In the present case, the principle of arbitrariness, as expounded
in E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu in its puritan form, is
applicable.69 The classification giving State largesse to Judges of
Constitutional Courts, MPs, MLAs, officers of the AIS, journalists, etc.
favours a privileged segment of society, which is already better off
compared to the vast majority of marginalized and socio-economically
disadvantaged individuals. The benefits granted to these privileged
and well-off classes come at a cost, as they effectively deprive and
deny the essentials to the marginalized and socially vulnerable
populations.
79. The allocation of land at basic rates to select privileged groups reflects
a “capricious” and “irrational” approach. This is a classic case of
executive action steeped in arbitrariness, but clothed in the guise of
legitimacy, by stating that the ostensible purpose of the policy was
to allot land to “deserving sections of society”. Shorn of pretence,
this policy of the State Government, is an abuse of power meant to
cater exclusively to the affluent sections of the society, disapproving
and rejecting the equal right to allotment of the common citizen and
the socio-economically disadvantaged. It would not be wrong to say
that the doctrine of manifest arbitrariness, as expounded in Shayara
Bano v. Union of India is applicable.70
80. The arbitrariness inherent in the land allocation policy is further
reflected in GoM No. 244. This order stipulates that if the available
land is insufficient to meet the prescribed allocations for AIS officers,
the size of the plots may be reduced according to a specified ratio.
However, an exception is carved out for Category 1 beneficiaries,

69 (1974) 4 SCC 3
70 [2017] 9 SCR 797 : (2017) 9 SCC 1; also see Navtej Johar (supra) and Joseph Shine v. Union of India
(2019) 3 SCC 39
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which includes IAS, IPS, and IFS officers. This category is afforded
preferential treatment without any justification for such a distinction,
highlighting an undue bias in favour of the most privileged subset
within an already irrational classification.
81. In this regard, members of the AIS have asserted that they are
“underprivileged”, or have made “sacrifices”, which entitles them
to the privilege of preferential land allotment at a discounted rate.
We reject this argument as fallacious and untenable. Government
servants, elected legislators, Judges in the Supreme Court and High
Court, and prominent journalists do not belong to the “weaker” or
per se deserving sections of our society, warranting special State
reservations to land allotment.
82. Land is a finite and highly valuable resource, particularly in densely
populated urban areas, where access to land for housing and
economic activities is increasingly scarce. When the government
allocates land at discounted rates to the privileged few, it engenders
a system of inequality, conferring upon them a material advantage
that remains inaccessible to the common citizen. This preferential
treatment conveys the message that certain individuals are entitled
to more, not due to the necessities of their public office or the
public good, but simply because of their status. Such practices
foster resentment and disillusionment among ordinary citizens,
who perceive these actions as corrupt or unjust, thereby eroding
trust in democratic institutions. This policy undermines solidarity
and fraternity, reinforcing societal hierarchies rather than actively
working to dismantle them.
83. The policy has wider economic ramifications as well. When land is
offered at a discounted rate, it distorts the natural market forces that
govern the value of land. The true market price of land reflects its
demand and utility, but when individuals receive land at a discount,
it artificially devalues the property and consequently diminishes
public revenue. This has severe financial ramifications for the public
exchequer.
84. In Ram & Shyam Co. v. State of Haryana,71 this Court observed
that, typically, the State is under an obligation to sell public property

71 [1985] Supp. (1) SCR 541 : (1985) 3 SCC 267
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only at the market price, with the sole exception of achieving a
constitutionally recognised public purpose:
“…Disposal of public property partakes the character
of a trust in that in its disposal there should be nothing
hanky panky and that it must be done at the best price
so that larger revenue coming into the coffers of the State
administration would serve public purpose viz. the welfare
State may be able to expand its beneficient activities
by the availability of larger funds. This is subject to one
important limitation that socialist property may be disposed
at a price lower than the market price or even for a token
price to achieve some defined constitutionally recognised
public purpose, one such being to achieve the goals set
out in Part IV of the Constitution. But where disposal is
for augmentation of revenue and nothing else, the State
is under an obligation to secure the best market price
available in a market economy…A welfare State exists for
the largest good of the largest number more so when it
proclaims to be a socialist State dedicated to eradication of
poverty. All its attempt must be to obtain the best available
price while disposing of its property because the greater
the revenue, the welfare activities will get a fillip and shot
in the arm…”
85. We are also of the opinion that, accredited journalists cannot be
treated as a separate class for such preferential treatment. In fact,
a careful study of the policy indicates that higher echelons of all the
three wings of the government, —legislators, bureaucrats, and Judges
of the Supreme Court and High Courts—have been afforded such
preferential treatment. Journalists, who are considered the fourth
pillar of democracy, have also been included. These four pillars
of democracy are expected to act as checks and balances on the
arbitrary exercise of the State’s power. However, the distribution of
such extraordinary State benefits renders nugatory the very optics
of healthy checks and balances within our democratic system.
86. Thus, the core framework of these policies suffers from the malaise
of unreasonableness and arbitrariness. It reeks of colourable exercise
of power whereby the policymakers are bestowing valuable resources
to their peers and ilk, triggering a cycle of illegal distribution of State
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 1421

State of Andhra Pradesh and Others v.
Dr. Rao, V.B.J. Chelikani and Others

resources. The State holds all its resources in trust for its citizens,
to be utilised in larger public and social interest. The State, including
the three organs – Legislature, Executive and the Judiciary, are de
facto trustees and agents/repositories which function and govern for
the benefit of the citizens who are the beneficiaries.72
87. Thus, the allotment policy fails to satisfy the requirements of the
two-pronged classification test coupled with arbitrariness. As noted
earlier, the jurisprudence surrounding equality law has evolved beyond
a purely technical analysis, embracing an approach that considers
not only the intent behind legislation or policy but also its real-world
impact. We are of the opinion that the policies in question are a
relevant example to show that merely likes being treated alike can
lead to injustice. The pursuit of consistency through classification,
while appealing in theory, does not ensure that the classification is
either appropriate or equitable in practice. The substantive equality in
contemporary equality jurisprudence calls not for a conceptually tidy
“test”, but a multi-pronged approach to equality, which acknowledges
the diverse ways in which inequality and discrimination may be
perpetuated.73 To test the facts against the standards of substantive
equality, we are of the opinion that Judges of the Supreme Court
and the High Court, MPs, MLAs, officers of the AIS, journalists
etc. cannot be treated as a separate category for allotment of land
at a discounted basic value in preference to others. The object
of the policy perpetuates inequality. The policy differentiates and
bestows largesse to an advantwaged section/group by resorting
to discrimination and denial. It bars the more deserving, as well as
those similarly situated, from access to the land at the same price. It
promotes social-economic exclusion, to favour a small and privileged
section/group. The policy does not meet the equality and fairness
standards prescribed by the Constitution.
88. Of course, the State has the discretion and duty under the Constitution,
to distribute its resources to marginalised sections of society, or
other imminent and deserving personalities, to the extent necessary
to discharge their public functions. Personalities who contribute to

72 NOIDA Entrepreneurs Association v. NOIDA and Others (2011) 6 SCC 508
73 The impugned policies are not in furtherance of anti-subordination principle, and they do not raise a
presumption of constitutionality.
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the nation’s progress through excellence in sports or other public
activities may also be compensated through reasonable and non-
arbitrary distribution of State largesse. We would also like to clarify
that a policy or law allotting land to public servants may be justifiable
provided such allotment is within the confines of Article 14. Unless the
classification satisfies the twin prong test and the substantive equality
benchmark, the mandate of Article 14 is not met. The State cannot
exercise discretion to benefit a select few elites disproportionately,
especially ones who are already enjoying pre-existing benefits and
advantages.
89. Reliance placed by some of the Cooperative Societies and members
on the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Land Revenue Act, 1317F,
and the 1975 Rules, including Section 25,74 is misconceived. Section
25 states that the land can be assigned for special purposes and
such assignment shall be lawful. However, it does not mean that
the land can be allotted in violation of principle of equality enshrined
under Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
90. Further, Rule 2(b) of the 1975 Rules states that alienation of land
means placing land at the disposal of a third person for a public
purpose or a specified cause. Alienation of land revenue, as defined
in Section 2(c), means the grant of exemption from payment. Section
2(i) defines market value to mean value of the land that would fetch
in the open market if sold, subject to appropriate charge for land
revenue. Rule 10, which is relied upon by the Cooperative Societies
and its members, states that notwithstanding anything contained
in the rules, the Government, if it so desires, can sell or otherwise
alienate the land or other property in Telangana area by following
reasonable procedure, including public auction where alienation
is deemed necessary. This rule does not support or assist the
Cooperative Societies and their members in their argument.
91. At this juncture, it is worth noting that during the pendency of the Writ
Petition before the High Court, several members of the Judiciary, to

74 25. Assigning of land for special purpose to be lawful – When a village is under settlement, the
Commissioner of Survey Settlement or the Commissioner of Land Records in that Village and in
other cases with the sanction of the Board of Revenue, the Collector may, subject to the orders of the
Government, set apart any Khalsa land not in the lawful occupation of any person or class for pasturage
of cattle or for grass reserves or for other Government purposes or for the purposes of public benefit;
provided that it does not interfere with any right of any person or class. The land so set apart shall not be
otherwise appropriated without the order of the Board of Revenue.
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 1423

State of Andhra Pradesh and Others v.
Dr. Rao, V.B.J. Chelikani and Others

their credit, decided to withdraw their applications for allotment of
land. Recognizing the constitutional limitations and acknowledging that
such allotment would violate Article 14, they made this decision upon
thoughtful consideration. However, many others continued to defend
the allotment, vigorously presenting arguments that they constituted a
separate class with a rational nexus to the policy. These arguments,
however, are devoid of merit and must be unequivocally rejected.
Conclusion and Directions
92. In view of the aforesaid findings and discussion, we dismiss the
appeals preferred by the State of Telangana, the Cooperative
Societies and their members, and we allow the appeal preferred by
Mr. Keshav Rao Jadhav challenging the judgment dated 05.01.2010
passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh
in Writ Petition Nos. 7956, 7997 and 23862 of 2008. The said
Writ Petitions are allowed, thereby issuing a Writ of certiorari and
quashing GoM Nos. 243 and 244 dated 28.02.2005 to the extent
they classify MPs, MLAs, officers of the AIS/State Government,
Judges of the Constitutional Courts, and journalists as a separate
class for allotment of land at the basic rate. As a sequitur, GoM
Nos. 419, 420, 422 to 425 dated 25.03.2008, and GoM No. 551
dated 27.03.2008, are declared to be bad in law, being violative of
Article 14 of the Constitution of India, and are quashed by issuing
a Writ of certiorari.
93. The interim directions passed by this Court in some of these cases will
now stand merged with the final direction. Parties will be accordingly
bound by the same.
94. We also deem it appropriate to pass an order of restitution and
direct that the Cooperative Societies and their members, as the case
may be, will be entitled to a refund of the entire amount deposited
by them, including the stamp duty and the registration fee paid by
them, along with the interest which may be quantified by the State
of Telangana. The rate of interest will not exceed the Reserve Bank
of India’s rate of interest applicable from time to time, as may be
deemed fit by the State of Telangana. The lease deeds executed
by the State of Telangana in favour of the societies/members will be
treated as cancelled. Similarly, development charges/expenses paid
by the Cooperative Societies/members, as reflected in the books of
accounts of the Cooperative Societies /members, duly certified by
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the income-tax returns, will be refunded to them along with interest
at the rates specified.
95. It will be open to the State of Telangana to deal with the land in the
manner it deems fit and proper and as per law, keeping in mind the
observations and findings recorded in this judgment.
96. The appeals and the contempt petitions are accordingly disposed
of. All pending applications also stand disposed of.

Result of the case: Appeals and contempt petitions disposed of.

†
Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain