STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH & ANR.versusBALAJANGAM SUBBARAJAMMA
- Citation
- 1988 INSC 330
- Decided
- 27 October 1988
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Bench
- G L OZA
Holding
The detainee, though barred from legal representation, must be allowed assistance of a friend; denial of such assistance violates procedural fairness and the detention order was rightfully quashed.
Summary
The respondent was detained under the Prevention of Black Marketing and Maintenance of Supplies of Essential Commodities Act, 1980 and the matter was referred to an Advisory Board. The Board heard senior police officials representing the State but denied the detainee any assistance of a lawyer or a ‘friend’, despite the detainee’s request. The High Court quashed the detention order on the ground of unequal representation, holding that the Board’s procedure violated Article 22(5) and the principle of equality. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed that while Section 11(4) of the Act bars legal practitioners, the detainee must be permitted assistance of a friend; denial of such assistance amounted to procedural unfairness. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the High Court’s order quashing the detention.
Issues considered
- Whether Section 11(4) of the Prevention of Black Marketing Act bars a detainee from being represented by a legal practitioner before the Advisory Board.
- Whether denial of assistance of a friend to the detainee violates Article 22(5) of the Constitution and the equality clause of Article 14.
- Whether the procedure adopted by the Advisory Board satisfied the requirement of procedural fairness under Article 21.
- Whether the High Court was justified in quashing the detention order on the basis of unequal representation.
Legislation cited
- Constitution of Indias. Article 136, s. Article 14, s. Article 21, s. Article 22(1), s. Article 22(3)(b), s. Article 22(4), s. Article 22(5), s. Article 226
- Prevention of Black‑marketing and Maintenance of Supplies of Essential Commodities Act, 1980s. 10, s. 11(1), s. 11(2), s. 11(3), s. 11(4), s. 12
Subjects
Judgment
A STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH & ANR.
v.
BALAJANGAM SUBBARAJAMMA
OCTOBER 27, 1988
B [G.L. OZA AND K. JAGANNATHA SHETIY, JJ.]
Constitution of India, 1950: Articles 22, 226, 136 and Schedule
VII Entry 9 of List I, Entry 3 of List Ill-Preventive detention-Power
of legislation-Safeguards provided in ·the Constitution-Advisory
Board-Right to representation by legal practitioner-Whether per-
missible.
c
Prevention of Blackmarketing and Maintenance of Supplies of
Essential Commodities Act, 1980: Section 11-Advisory Board-Right
to representation by a lawyer at proceedings-Whether permissible--
High ranking police officers appearing on behalf of Government and
D detaining authority before Advisory Board-Detenu not permitted to
have representation through a legal practitioner-Quashing of the
detention order by the High Court-Justified:
An order was passed by the District Magistrate, Nellore, directing
the detention of the respondent under the Prevention of Black Market-
E ing and Maintenance of Supplies of Essential Commodities Act, 1980.
The State Government approved the detention and referred the matter
to t.he Advisory Board under section IO of the Act. The detenu's rep-
resentation was also forwarded by the Government to the Advisory
Board. The Advisory Board heard the detenu and the top ranking
. police officers, who represented the State, and expressed the opinion
F that there was sufficient cause for the detention of the respondent. The
Government agreed with the opinion and confirmed the respondent's
detention for a period of six months.
I
The detenu challenged the validity of the order of detention. The
High Court allowed the writ petition. The High Court found that there
G was unequal treatment by the. Advisory Board in considering the rep-
resentation of the detenu.
Dismissing the appeal, it was,
HELD: (1) The Act by s. 11(4) expressly denies representation
H through a legal practitioner. The Board may hear any person if neces-
620
STATE OF A.P. v. BALAJANGAM 621
sary. If the detenu desires to be heard, the Board may hear him also. A
But no person has a right to be represented by a lawyer, much less the
detenu. This provision is in conformity with Art. 22(3)(b) of the
Constitution. [626B-C)
(2) The power to detain a person without trial is a serious in-
road Into the liberty of individuals. It is a drastic power capable B
of being misused or arbitrarily exercised. The framers of our Con-
stitution were not unaware of it, They had, therefore, specially
incorporated in the Constitution enough safeguards against the abuse
of such power. f630G-H)
(3) The Advisory Board is a constitutional imperative. It has an
important function to perform. There is no particular procedure pre- C
scribed for the Advisory Board since there is no lis to be adjudicated.
Section 11 of the Act provides only the broad guidelines for observance.
The Advisory Board, howeve~, may adopt any procedure depending
upon varying circumstances. But any procedure that it adopts most
satisfy the procedural fairness. [631F-G) D
(4) It is important for laws and authorities not only to be just but
also appear to be just. Therefore, the action that gives the appearance
of unequal treatment or unreasonableness-whether or not any sub-
stance In it-should be avoided by the Advisory Board. It is the duty of
the Advisory Board to see that the case of detenu is not adversely E
affected by the procedure it adopts. It must be ensured that the detenu
is not handicapped by the unequal representation or refusal of access to
a friend to represent his case .. [632B-C)
(5) In the Instant case, since the Advisory Board has heard
the high ranking officers of the Police Department and others on F
behalf of the Government and detaining authority, it ought to have
permitted the detenu to have the assi.stance of a friend who could have
made an equally effective representation on his behalf. Since that has
been denied to the detenu, the High Court was justified in quashing
J the detention order. [632D-E)
G
A.K. Roy v. Union of India, [1982) 2 SCR 272; Kavita w/o
Sunder Shankardas Devidasani etc. v. State of Maharashtra, [1982) I
SCR 138; Nand Lat v. State of Punjab, [1982] l SCR 718; Johney
DaCouto v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1988.SC 109, referred to.
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Petition for H
Special Leave to Appeal (Crl) No. 1783/1988.
622 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988] Supp. 3 S.C.R.
A From the Judgment and Order dated 14.4.1988 of the Andhra
Pradesh in W.P. No. 4454 of 1988.
G. Ramaswamy, Additional Solicitor General and T.V.S.N.
Chari for the Petitioners.
B A. Subba Rao for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
K. JAGANNATHA SHETTY, J. This appeal by special leave is
directed against the judgment dated April 14, 1988 of the High Court
C of Andhra Pradesh in writ petition No. 4454 of 1988 whereby the order
of detention passed against the resyondent under the Prevention of
Black Marketing and Maintenance of Supplies of Essential Commodi-
ties Act, 1980 ("The Act") was quashed.
Briefly stated the facts are these: The respondent was said to
Q have smuggled paddy from Andhra Pradesh to Tamil Nadu; During
the watch kept by the Inspector, Vigilance Cell, Civil SuiJplies
Department, Nellore on the night of November 4, 1987 a lorry bearing
No. MDN-8505 carrying 125 bags of iJaddy was spotted when it was
trying to go to Tamil Nadu avoidinz checkpost. The lorry was chased
by \he Inspector of Police and his staff. The driver suddenly stopped the
E lorry, but the persons in the vehicle took the heals jumping out there-
from and disappeared in the bushes. The respondent was identified by
the Inspector of Police and his staff in the head lights of the jeep in
which they were chasing. The driver of the vehicle was apprehended
after a hot chase, but not the respondent. From the interrogation of
the driver, it was established that on November 4, 1987, the respon-
f dent along with two others were in the cabin of the lorry and they were
responsible for transporting paddy to Tamil Nadu. The paddy and the
lorry were seized by the Inspector. A criminal case was registered
against the driver under the Essential Commodities Act and the
Andhra Pradesh Rice Procurement (Levy) Order, 1984. When the
investigation of that case was proceeding, Additional Superintendent
o of Police, Nellore sent proposals to the District Magistrate for detain-
ing the respondent under the Act. The District Magistrate passed an
order dated December 24, 1987 directing the detention of the respon-
dent. On January 4, 1988, the State Government approved the deten-
tion. On January 11, 1988 the State Government acting under sec. 10
of the Act refered the matter to the Advisory Board.
H
STA'.fE OF A.P. v. BALAJANGAM [SHETTY, J.] 623
l
On January 27, 1988, the detenu submitted a representation A
through the Superintendent, Central Prison where he was detained to
the Chairman of the Advisory Board and to the Chief Secretary,
Government of Andhra Pradesh and also to the detaining authority.
The Government forwarded the representation to the Advisory
Board. On January 29, 1988, the Advisory Board met and heard the
B
detenu and the officers on behalf of the Government. There were high
ranking police officials representing the Government. The Advisory
Board after hearing those officers and the detenu made an order:
"We have heard the detenu, who has been produced
before us and considered his written representat4on. We
have also heard Sri V. Appa Rao, l.G.P. (Sp!), Vigilance, c
Sri C.R. Naidu, Addi. S.P. (Vigilance), Hyderabad, Sri
N. Chandramouli, D.S.P. (Vigilance), _Nellore and Sri
Nageswara Rao, Incharge Joint Collector, Nellore District.
We have perused the grounds of detention and other con-
nected papers.
D
OPINION
We are of the opinion that there is sufficient cause for
the detention of Balajangam Subbaramaiah@ Bommu Sub-
baramaiah @ Subbarami Reddy S/0 Changaiah.
E
Chairman
Member
Member"
The Government agreed with the opinion and confirmed the detention F
for a period of six months. The detenu challenged the validity of the
order of detention before the High Court. The High Court allowed the
writ petition and quashed the order of detention. The High Court
found that there was unequal treatment by the Advisory Board in
considering the representation of the detenu. The Advisory Board
having decided to hear the top ranking police officers like the Inspector G
General of Police, Vigilance, Additional Superintendent of Police,
Vigilance, Deputy Superintendent of Police, Vigilance and Joint Col-
lector of Nellore District ought to have given an equal chance of rep-
resentation to the detenu by permitting him to be represented by a
lawyer or at least by an official (friend) of an equal rank.-The High
Court tersely observed: 1-1
624 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988] Supp. 3 S.C.R.
"In such circumstances, the Advisory Board ought to
A have provided the prisoner an opportunity for representa-
tion though not by a lawyer at least by some one equally
competent like those who appeared for the State. The
Government cannot deny the fact that the might of the
official representation before the Advisory Board out-
weighed by several times the value of the detenu's
representation."
The High Court also found that the detenu did write to the Govern-
ment on January 27, 1988 asking for representation by a lawyer and
that request ought to have been acceded to by the Advisory Board
when +.he matter came up before it. The High Court then said:
c
"We are of the opinion that the dormant right of the
detenu for equal representation had become active upon
the mode of conducting the proceedings by the Advisory
Board. The prisoner in this case could not have envisaged
D that the High State officials would appear against his case
and for the detaining authority. For these reasons, we can-
not agree with the contention that the prisoner himself was
to blame for ·not asking the Advisory Board for a lawyer's
representation or for equal level of representation before
the Advisory Board. As we are of the opinion that Article
22(5) requires the Advisory Board to afford the prisoner an
equal opportunity for representing his case compared with
the quality and quantity of official representation allowed
for the detaining authority and as we are also of the opinion
that the official representation in this case far outweighed
in importance the detenu's representation we hold that
Art. 22(5) is violated in this case."
These are the findings of the High Court. The question is
whether the view taken by the High Court in the premises is justified.
In .view of the fact that top ranking officials representing the Govern-
ment were personally heard by the Advisory Board whether the
G detenu was prejudiced? Whether there was any breach of equality in
denying him representation by a lawyer or friend?
The Act by sec. 10 provides for constitution of an Advisory [
Board. Sub-sec. 2 thereof provides that every such Board shall consist
of three persons who are, or. have been, or are qualified to be
H. appointed as, Judges of a High Court, and such persons shall be
'
I
I
STATE OF A.P. v. BALAJANGAM (SHETIY, J.] 625
appointed by the appropriate Government. Sub-sec. 3 provides that
the Government shall appoint one of the members of the Advisory A
Board who is, or has been, a Judge of a High Court to be its Chairman,
etc. Section 10 f\rovides for reference to Advisory Board. In every case
where a detention order has been made under the Act, the Govern-
ment shall, within three weeks from the date of detention of a person,
place before the. Advisory Board constituted by it, the grounds on B
which the order has been made the representation, if any, made by the
person affected by the order. Section 11 provides procedure to be
followed by Advisory Board. It reads:
"( l) The Advisory Board shall, after considering the
materials placed before it and, after calling for such further
information as it may deem necessary from the appropriate c
Government or from any person called for the purpose
through the appropriate Government or from the person
concerned, and if, in any particular case, it considers it
ess.ential so to do or if the person concerned desires to be
heard, after hearing him in person, submit its report to the D
appropriate Government within seven weeks from the date
of de_tention of the person concerned.
(2) The report of the Advisory Board shall specify in
a separate thereof the opinion of the Advisory Board as to
whether or not there is sufficient cause-for the detention of E
the person concerned.
· (3) When there is a difference of opinion among the
members forming the Advisory Board, the opinion of the
majority of such members shall be deemed to be the
opinion of the Board. F
(4) Nothing in this section shall entitle any person
against whom a detention order has been made to appear
by any legal practitioner in any matter connected with the
reference to the Advisory Board, and the proceedings of
the Advisory Board, and its report, excepting that part of G
the report in which the opinion of the Advisory Board is
specified, shall be confidential."
Section 12 provides that where the Advisory Board has reported that
there is in its opinion sufficient cause for the detention of a person, the
Government may confirm the detention order and continue the deten- H
-
I
626 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1988] Supp. 3 S.C.R.
A tion of the person concerned for such period as it thinks fit. But in case
where the Advisory Board has reported that there is in its opinion no
sufficient cause for the detention of the person concerned, the
Government shall revoke the detention order and cause the person to
bereleased forthwith.
B
The Act thus by sec. 11{ 4) expressly denies representation
through a legal practitione{, The Board may hear any person if neces-
sary. If the detenu desires to be heard, the Board may hear him also.
But no person has a right to be represented by a lawyer much less the
detenu. This provision is in conformity with Art. 22(3)(b) of the Con-
stitution, the scope of which has been explained by a Constitution
c Bench of this Court. In A.K. Roy v. Union of India, (1982] 2 SCR 272,
this Court speaking through Chandrachud, CJ., had this to say (at
339): .
"On a combined reading of clauses ( 1) and (3){b) of
Article 22, it is clear that the right to consult and to be
D
defended by a legal practitioner of one's choice, which is
conferred by clause ( 1), is denied by clause 3(b) to a person
who is detained under any law providing for preventive
detention. Thus, according to the express intendment of
the Constitution itself, no person who is detained under
any law, which provides for preventive detention, can
E
claim the right to consult a legal practitioner of his choice
or to be defended by him. In view of this, it seems to us
difficult to hold, by the application of abstract, general
principle or on a priori considerations that the detenu. has
the right of being represented by a legal practitioner in the
proceedings before the Advisory Board. Since the Con-
F
stitution, as originally enacted, itself contemplates that
such a .right should not be made available to a detenu, it
cannot be said that the denial of the said right is unfair,
unjust or unreasonable. It is indeed true to say, after the
decision in the Bank Nationalisation case, that though the
subject of preventive detention is specifically dealt with in
G
Article 22, the requirements of Article 21 have neverthe-
less to be satisfied. It is therefore, necessary thatthe proce-
dure prescribed by law for the proceedings before the
Advisory Boards must be fair, just and reasonable."
H Learned Chief Justice continued:
STATE OF A.P. v. BALAJANGAM {SHEITY, J.] 627
"But then, the Constitution itself has provided a yardstick A
for the application of that standard, through the medium of
the provisions contained in Article 22(3)(b). However,
much we would have liked to hold otherwise, we ex-
perience serious difficulty in taking the view that the proce-
dure of the Advisory Boards in which the detenu is denied
the right of legal representation is unfair, unjust and B
unreasonable. If Article 22 were silent on the question of
the right of legal representation, it would have been possi-
ble, indeed right and proper, to hold that the detenu can-
not be denied the right of legal representation in the pro-
ceedings before the Advisory Boards. It is unfortunate that
courts have been deprived of that choice by the express C
language of Article 22(3)(b) read with Article 22(1)."
And also said:
"We must, therefore, hold, regretfully though, that
the detenu has no right to appear through a legal practi- D
tioner in the proceedings before the Advisory Board. It is,
however, necessary to add an important caveat. The reason
behind the provisions contained in Article 22(4)(b) of the
Constitution clearly is that a legal practitioner should not
be permitted to appear before the Advisory Board for any
party. The Constitution does not contemplate that the E
detaining authority or the Government should have the
facility of appearing before the Advisory Board with the
aid of a legal practitioner but that the said facility should be
denied to the detenu. In any case, that is not what the
Constitution says and it would be wholly inappropriate to
read any such meaning into the provisions of Article 22. F
Permitting the detaining authority or the Government to
appear before the Advisory Board with the aid of a legal
practitioner or a legal adviser would be a breach of Article
14, if a similar facility is denied to the detenu. We must,
therefore, make it clear that if the detaining authority or
the Government takes the aid of a legal practitioner or a G
legal adviser before the Advisory Board, the detenu must
be allowed the facility of appearing before the Board
through a legal practitioner. We are informed that officers
of the Government in the concerned departments often
appear before the Board and assist it with a view of justify-
ing the detention orders. If that be so, we must clarify that H
628 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988] Supp. 3 S.C.R.
the Boards should not permit the authotities to do indi-
A rectly what they cannot do directly; and no one should be
enabled to take shelter behind the excuse that such officers
are not "legal practitioners" or legal advisers. Regard must
be had to the substance and not the form since, especially,
in matters like the proceedings of Advisory Boards,
B whosoever assist or advises on facts or law must be deemed
to be in the position of a legal adviser. We do hope that
Advisory Boards will take care to ensure that the provi-
sions of Article 14 are not violated in any manner in the
proceedings before them."
Learned Chief Justice also examined the right of a detenu to be rep·
c resented by a friend if not by a lawyer and in that context observed:
"Another aspect of 'this matter which needs to be
mentioned is that the embargo on the appearance of legal
practitioners should not be extended so as to prevent the .•
D detenu from being aided or assisted by a friend who, in
truth and substance, is not a legal practitioner. Every
person whose interests are adversely affected as a result of
the proceedings which have a serious import, is entitled to
be heard in those proceedings and be assisted by a friend.
A detenu, taken straight from his cell to the Board's room,
E may lack the ease and composure to present his point of
view. He may be "tongue-tied, nervous, confused or want-
ing in intelligence", and if justice to be done, he must at
least have the help of a friend who can assist him to give
coherence to his stray and wandering ideas. Incarceration
makes a man and his thoughts disnevelled. Just as a person
F who is dumb is entitled, as he must,. to be represented by a
person who has speech, even so, a person who finds himself
unable to present his own case is entitled to take the aid
and advice of a person who is better situated to appreciate
the facts of the case and the language of the law. It may be
that denial of legal representation is not denial of natural
G justice per se, and therefore, if a statute excludes that faci-
lity expressly, it would not be open to the tribunal to allow
it. Fairness, as said by Lord Denning M.R., in Maynard v.
Osmond, [1977] 1 Q.B. 240, 253 can be obtained without
legal representation. But, it is not fair, and the statute does
not exclude that right, that the detenu should not even be
H allowed to take the aid of a friend. Whenever demanded,
'
STATE OF A.P. v. BALAJANGAM [SHETTY, J.] 629
the Advisory Boards must grant that facility."
A
There are two decisions of this Court earlier to A. K. Roy,
(supra). In Kavita w/o Sunder Shankardas Devidasani etc. v. State of
Maharashtra, [ 1982] 1 SCR 138, Chinnappa Reddy, J. speaking for a
three Judge Bench, observed (at 147):
B
"Where a detenu makes a request for legal assis-
tance, his request would have to be considered on its own
merit in each individual case. In the present case, the
Government merely informed the detenu that he had no
statutory right to be represented by a lawyer before the
Advisory Board. Since it was for the Advisory Board and C
not for the Government to afford legal assistance to the
detenu the latter, when he was produced before the Ad-
visory Board, could have; if he was so minded, made a
request to the Advisory Board for permission to be rep-
resented by a lawyer. He preferred not to do so. In the
special circumstances of the present case, we are not pre- D
pared to hold that the detenu was wrongfully denied the
assistance of counsel so as to lead to the conclusion that
procedural fairness, a part of the Fundamental Right
guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution was denied to
him."
E
In that case, this Court found that there was no denial of procedural
fairness which is a part of the Fundamental Rights guaranteed under
Article 21 of the Constitution. It was also found that the detenu made
no request for representation by a legal practitioner before the Advi-
sory Board.
F
In Nand Lal v. State of Punjab, [·1982] 1 SCR 718, A.P. Sen, J.
said (at 723):
"It is the arbitrariness of the procedure adopted by
the Advisory Board that vitiates the impugned order of
detention. There is no denying the fact that while the G
Advisory Board disallowed the detenu's request for legal
assistance, it allowed the detaining authority to be
represented by counsel. It appears that the Advisory Board
blindly applied the provisions of sub-s. (4) .of s. 11 of the
Act to the case of the detenu failing to appreciate that it
could not allow legal assistance to the detaining authority H
630 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988) Supp. 3 S.C.R.
and deny the same to the detenu. The Advisory Board is
A
expected to act in a manner which is just and fair to both
the parties."
More recently in Johney D'Couto v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR
1988 SC 109, Ranganath Misra, J. speaking for a Bench of this Court,
B said (at 112): -
"The rule in A. K Roy's case (supra) made it clear
that the detenu was entitled to the assistance of a 'friend'.
The word 'friend' used there was obviously not intended to
carry the meaning of the term in common parlance. One of
the meanings of the word 'friend', according to the Collins
c English Dictionary is "an ally in a fight or cause; suppor·
ter". The term 'friend' used in the judgments of this Court
was more in this sense than meaning 'a person known well
to another and regarded with liking, affection and loyality'.
A person not being a friend in the normal sense could be
D picked up for rendering assistance within.the frame of the
law as settled by this Court. The Advisory Board has, of
course, to be careful in permitting assistance of a friend in
order to ensure due observance of the policy of law that a
detenu is not entitled to representation through a lawyer.
As has been indicated by this Court, what cannot be
E permitted directly should not be allowed to be done in an
indirect way. Sundararajan, in this view of the matter, was
perhaps a ·friend prepared to assistthe detenu before the
Advisory Board and the refusal of such assistance to the
appellant was not justified."
F The history of civilised man is the history of incessant conflict
between liberty and authority. The concentration of power in one
hand and liberty in the other cannot go side by side. Temptation to use
the power to curtail or destroy the liberty will be always there. It is
found in the history of every country. The power to detain a person
without trial is a serious inroad into the liberty of individuals. It is a
G drastic power capable of being misused or arbitrarily exercised. The
Framers of our Constitution were not unaware of it. Some of them
perhaps were the worst sufferers being the victims in the exercise of
that arbitrary power. They had, therefore, specifically incorporated in
the Constitution enough safeguards against the abuse of such power.
The power to legislate in regard to preventive detention is located in
H Entry 9 of List I as well as in Entry 3 of List III in the VII Schedule of
STATE OF A.P. v. BALAJANGAM [SHETTY, J [ 631
the Constitution. The safeguards in regard to preventive detention are
incoporated under Article 22 of the Constitution. Article 22( 4) A
provides:
"No law providing for preventive detention shall
authorise the detention of a person for a longer period than
three months unless- B
(a) an Advisory Board consisting of persons who are,
or have been, or are qualified to be appointe.d as, Judges of
a High Court has reported before the expiration of the said
period of three months that there is in its opinion sufficient
cause for such detention:
c
Provided that nothing in this sub-clause shall
authorise the detention of any person beyond the
maximum period prescribed by any Jaw made by Parlia-
ment under sub-clause (b) of clause (7): or
D
xxx . xxx xxx xx xx xx xx xx xx
Article 22(5) provides:
"When any person is detained in pursuance of an order
made under any law providin& for preventive detention, E
the authority making the order shall, as soon as may be,
communicate to such person the grounds on which the
order has been made and shall afford him the earliest
opportunity of making a representation against the order."
These are the two important constitutional safeguards. The F
• Advisory Board is a constitutional imperative. It has an important
function to perform. It has to form an opinion whether there is suffi-
cient cause for the detention of the person concerned. There is np
particular procedure prescribed for the Advisory Board since there is
no !is to be adjudicated. Section 11 of the Act provides only the broad
guidelines for observance. Tue Advisory Board however, may adopt G
any procedure depending upon varying circumstances. But any proce-
dure that it adapts must satisfy the procedural fairness. We need not
deal with this aspect in detail since the Advisory Board consists of
person who are, or have been or are qualified to be appointed as
Judges of a High Court. They are men of wisdom and learning. Their
report as envisaged under sec. 11(2) of the Act should provide specifi- H
632 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988) Supp. 3 s,c.R.
A cally in a separate part whereof as to "whether or not there is sufficient
cause for the detention of the person concerned." That opinion as to
sufficient cause is required to be reached with equal opportunity to the
State as well as the person concerned, no matter what the procedure.
It is important for laws and authorities not only to be just but also
appear to be just. Therefore, the action that gives the appearance of
B unequal treatment or unreasonableness-whether or not any subs-
tance in it-should be avoided by the Advisory Board. We consider
that. it must be stated and stated clearly and unequivocally that it is the
duty of the Advisory Board to see that the case of detenu is not
adversely affected by the procedure it adopts. It must be ensured that
the detenu is not handicapped by the unequal represe.ntation or refusal
c of access to a friend to represent his case.
. In the instant case, since the Advisory Board has heard the high
ranking officers of the Police Department and others on behalf of the
Government and detaining authority, it ought to have permitted the
D
detenu to have 'the assistance of a friend who could have made an
equally effective representation on his behalf. Since that has been
denied to the detenu, the High Court, in our opinion, was justified in
quashing the detention order·,
, It was,, however, sought to be made out for the State that the
police officers were present before the Board only to produce the
E record and they did not do anything further. But the record show~
otherwise. The officers were not there only to produce the records.
They were Tu fact heard by the Advisory Board obviously, on the merits
of the matter aild that makes all the difference in the instant case.
In the reS\llt, we agree with the conclusioil of the High Court and
F dismiss this appeal.
Appeal dismissed.
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